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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the content of eighteenth-century American and British
portraits within the ideologically-expanding context of eighteenth-century British
identity. It explores the ways in which Britons and Americans negotiated who they
were and, consequently, their claims on society, in the era preceding and including
the American Revolution. It does so for three reasons: to advance a more
interdisciplinary approach to the study of American portraiture; to motivate further
dialogue on the relationship between American and British portraits; and to invoke
the potential for American portraits as documentary evidence of social history.
Through historical examination of philosophical influences informing the
development of British narratives, Part One considers the contexts within which
portraits were produced and the implications of those contexts for the interpretation
and presentation of identity. Against this ideological backdrop, Part Two
deconstructs the content of selected portraits by John Singleton Copley, Charles
Willson Peale, Ralph Earl, William Hogarth, Allan Ramsay, Sir Joshua Reynolds and
others in order to come to terms with contemporary perceptions of reality and identity
vis-a-vis the dominant narrative.
Broadly speaking, American Revolutionary portraits suggest a standard for
identity based on principles drawn from conflicting narratives. This standard
intimates an effort to conflate the principal ideals of a dominant neo-Country
narrative—those of natural progress, potentiality and virtue, for example—with
Liberal and Reformed notions of autonomy, self-determination and industry that
denied the doctrines of hierarchy, fixity and birth upon which the traditional ideals
were said to depend. The results signaled a gap between British ideology and
colonial experience visually manifest as conflicting perceptions of reality. Implicated
in these conflicting perceptions was an alternative meaning of life whose suppression
may have led, ultimately, to revolution.

xii
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2

INTRODUCTION
IMAG[IN]ING IDENTITY: SELF AS SUBJECT

And is not the fairest sight of all... for him who has eyes to see it, the
combination in the same bodily form of beauty of character and looks to
match and harmonize with it?
- Plato, ca. 375 BC1
Mirror, mirror, On the wall, Who is the fairest One of all?
- Jakob and Wilhelm Grimm, 18122
it is impossible... to prevent the Sale of Portraits and Looking Glasses.
- John Oakley, 17613

When the Wicked Queen sat down before her dressing mirror in the Brothers
Grimm tale, Snow White, she instigated the negotiation of her own identity through
engagement with two interested parties: the maker (the mirror); and the spectator (the
voice behind the mirror). The subject beautified herself, the maker captured and
framed her image, and the spectator proclaimed her the fairest—or not—of them all.
Each participant was necessarily ‘interested’ in the outcome, for in the Wicked
Queen’s identity resided their own relative one; her claim to “fairest of all” denied

1 See Plato, The Republic, trans. and intro. Desmond Lee (London: Penguin Books, (1955) rev. 1974),
p. 105.
2 The Brothers Grimm, “Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs” (1812), in Fairy Tales from the Brothers
Grimm, rev. Nicola Baxter (New York: Smithmark, 1997).
3 St. James’s Chronicle, April 25,1761, p. 3, quoted in David H. Solkin, Paintingfo r Money: The
Visual Arts and the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century England (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1992), p. 180.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

their title to it, as well as any accompanying privileges. Herein resides the power of
identity—and its threat to social order.
John Oakley’s allusion to an underlying link between mirrored and painted
images suggests the possibilities attendant the imag[in]ing of identity in eighteenthcentury Britain.4 For example, the classical narrative of Aristotle and Plato
understood the internal and external selves to be complementary facets of a single
whole, their common purpose the individual’s advancement towards a predetermined
unity—the virtuous ideal. In this analysis, the internal self was understood as the
essential self—one’s thoughts, feelings, and beliefs—, the external self the material
form on “which these mental states bear.”5 The matter of the external self was thus
understood to be a natural extension of the essence of the internal self and, so, a
natural signifier of one’s virtues vis-a-vis the universal ideal.
By the late Middle Ages, manuals were being produced to instruct princes in
the appropriate presentation of their persons at court. Prompted by an evolving selfconsciousness, these manuals—aptly termed “mirrors”—reflected a need for guidance

4 Indeed, the medieval thinker, John o f Salisbury (1115/20-1180), understood “imagines” to be
likenesses of “the forms o f material things.” (Copleston, II, p. 172) John Canfield suggests that the
mirrored image were intended to represent a unified objectification o f the immaterial and material self.
Hence, identity, as “likeness,” was challenged to summarize a singular self. Nonetheless, as Claire
Pajaczkowska reminds us, the challenges “likeness” posed undermined the certainty o f a unified self, a
circumstance which may have urged more concentrated efforts manifest, in part, in the development of
portraiture. “Lacan’s concept o f the mirror phase... offers the insight that the structure o f the [visual]
image is inherently connected to the subject’s desperate quest for imaginary unity...” (Pajaczkowska,
pp. 103-108) See Frederick Copleston, A History o f Philosophy, 6 vols, II (New York: Doubleday,
1993), p. 172; John V. Canfield, The Looking-Glass Self: An Examination o f S elf Awareness (New
York: Praeger, 1990), pp. 174-175; Claire Pajaczkowska, “The ecstatic solace o f culture: self, not-self
and other; a psychoanalytic view,” in Juliet Steyn, ed., Other than identity: the subject, politics and art
(New York: Manchester University Press, 1997), pp. 103-108.
5 Charles Taylor, Sources o f the Self: The Making o f the Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1989), p. 111.
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4

in the construction of public personae.6 As Stephen Jaeger describes it, “Words,
gestures, intonation, and facial expression all bear meaning, express policy—no act or
gesture is random.... Conduct becomes so highly structured that life approaches art:
the courtier is himself a work of art, his appearance a portrait, his experience a
narrative.”7 This suggested that one’s external persona was no longer the implicit
expression of one’s internal self.

o

The intervening development of the mediaeval ‘mirror’, and the like evidence
of self-fracturing resonant in Snow White, implied not only a mediaeval split in the
relationship between the internal, private, essential self and its external, public, and
material representation, but an evolving tension between them.9 As Taylor observes,
6 T. A. Sinclair writes: “For centuries monarchical rule o f one kind or another had occupied the central
position in political thought; .. .and above all how to build up what they called a ‘Mirror o f Princes’ for
the monarch to copy.” (Sinclair, in Aristotle, The Politics, pp. 16-17) Machiavelli, for one, urged
“princes [to] .. .discover how to behave ...[by] glanc[ing] at the looking-glass in which the lives of
good men are reflected....” (Machiavelli, The Discourses, p. 396) See T. A. Sinclair, in Aristotle, The
Politics, trans. T. A. Sinclair, rev. Trevor J. Saunders (London: Penguin Books (1962), 1981), pp. 1617; Niccolo Machiavelli, The Discourses, ed. and intro. Bernard Crick, trans. Leslie J. Walker, S.J.,
rev. Brian Richardson (London and New York: Penguin Books (1970), 1998), p. 396.
7 C. Stephen Jaeger, The Origins o f Courtliness: Civilizing Trends and the Formation o f Courtly
Ideals, 939-1210 (Philadelphia, 1985), p. 258, quoted in Bushman, p. 35
8 Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary (1786) defined “mirror” as both “A looking-glass; anything which
exhibits representations of objects by reflection,” and a “pattern...; an exemplar; an archetype,” the
latter of which draws on this medieval usage. See Samuel Johnson A Dictionary o f the English
Language (London: Harrison & Co., 1786); Richard Bushman, The Refinement o f America (New York:
Knopf, 1992), p. 33.
9 As Claire Pajaczkowska argues, “The satisfaction felt by achieving imaginary unity through the
construction o f a merged ego and ego-ideal in visual representation is at the cost o f the structured
alienation o f the self into divided identities o f observer and observed....” This, she continues, offers a
valuable insight into the origins o f the philosophical need for a ‘unitary’ subject and why, within the
humanities, it has recently become possible and necessary to think of a ‘divided’ subject.”
(Pajaczkowska, pp. 103-108) She goes on: “The metaphor o f an ‘inner’ world has been suggested as a
description [for the process o f internalization that connotes] psychic reality... which has the advantage
o f implying a clear opposition between the supposedly physical, material nature o f external reality and
whatever is conceived as ‘mental’, psychological, emotional. Unfortunately, this convenient opposition
is... distorting....” (Pajaczkowska, p. 103) As Baumeister explains it, sociological identities are
“interpersonal” or “public” in being dependent upon “the roles o f the person in relation to society at
large and to other particular persons.” Such identities aimed to impress “in the minds o f others” one’s
“particular traits or qualities.” (Baumeister, p. 153) By contrast, psychological identities depend on
“the structure o f values and priorities” evolving “out o f the inner, or hidden, self.” (Baumeister, p. 171)
By emphasizing the internal, private self, the psychological model privileged the individual; by
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the growing influence of the psychological (individual) self came at the expense of
social standards and authority.10 With the advent of the divided self, the classical
premise of a natural identity, bom of the complementary relationship between the
internal and external self, was undermined. Identity became a means of reconciling
the self with a narrative of coexisting others.11 Indeed, Snow White and the mediaeval
Mirror suggest that, by the late Middle Ages, identity was no longer simply received
by the individual from society, but might rather be posited by the individual for
*

•

society’s rejection or approval—it might be negotiated.

12

These developments implied a degree of individual autonomy and selfdetermination not found in ancient classicism. They also signaled the prospect of
social fluidity and competition, pitting one person’s claims against another’s desires
in a society where resources were shared and finite. This nurtured the development of
individual self-fashioning that, in turn, expanded the demand for prescriptive
literature. Like the mediaeval ‘mirror’, Baldassare Castiglione’s The Book o f the
Courtier outlined the standards of courtly appearance and behavior for a Renaissance
audience of upper-class persons.13 By the eighteenth century, the audience had

presenting the subject’s more public self, the sociological model privileged society. See Pajaczkowska,
pp. 103-108; Canfield, pp. 173,205; Roy F. Baumeister, Identity: cultural change and the struggle for
self{New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 153,170-171,246.
10 Taylor, pp. 163, 188,510.
11 Baumeister writes: “Identities exist only in societies, which define and organize them. Thus, the
search for identity includes the question o f what is the proper relationship o f the individual to society as
a whole....” See Baumeister, p. 7.
12 As Baumeister writes, “the search for identity includes the question of what is the proper relationship
of the individual to society as a whole.” See Baumeister, p. 7.
13 Written between 1508 and 1516, The Book o f the Courtier was first published in Venice in 1528.
The first English edition was printed in London by Thomas Hoby in 1561. Providing an informal
account of Italian courtiers engaged in after-dinner entertainment, it became a model—a Mirror—for
the ideal courtier. See Count Baldesar Castiglione, The Book o f the Courtier, trans. Leonard Eckstein
Qpdycke (New York: H. Liveright, 1929).
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stretched to a British ‘middling’ sort.14
Over time, the balance-of-influence between the internal and external self
shifted. If initially the historical shift from a unified to a divided self was marked by a
sociological emphasis, in which identity was prescribed by the Public on the basis of
external social factors, by the eighteenth century, it increasingly assumed a
psychological one. Ultimately, the shift from a sociological to psychological identity
signaled a changing relationship between the individual and society.15
This paper examines identity in eighteenth-century portraits within the context
of these ideologically-expanding opportunities. That these opportunities were
matched by a burgeoning demand for visual self-imagery suggests: first, that the
physicality and legibility of painted images provided a recognized means by which
individuals could claim and assert their identity;16 and, second, that this may have

14 With regard to the notion of a “middling” sort, the use o f this term helps to distinguish between an
expanding group o f individuals whose improved economic circumstances separated them from the
lower classes without defining them as a political group— i.e. a bourgeoisie. In speaking o f her
neighborhood, Samuel Richardson’s Pamela notes that “All the rest were but middling people, and
traders, at best.” (Richardson, p. 166) These were distinct, too, from those “fine folks, who live upon
their means.” (Richardson, p. 85) See Samuel Richardson, Pamela; or, Virtue Rewarded (1740), ed.
Peter Sabor, intro. Margaret A. Doody (New York: Penguin Books, 1980), pp. 85, 166.
13 According to Taylor, the drift away from a sociological towards a more psychological identity was
the consequence of an “historical evolution” effected by a shift in the balance-of-influence between the
individual and customary authority. The resulting “new subjectivism,” as Taylor describes it, bore
significant implications for identity. Once the formal self came to be understood as a by-product o f the
process o f disengagement, objectification and rationalization—what Taylor terms “radical
reflexivity”—, identity became a matter of rationalizing the external world in a manner beneficial to
one’s attributes— in other words, o f imposing one’s own standards o f interpretation. This “new
subjectivism,” Taylor writes, removed the mask o f objectivity supporting classical standards of
comparison, giving “rise to the notion o f a subject in its modem sense... whereby we place ‘within’ the
subject... an order which is inseparably indexed to a personal vision....” See Taylor, pp. 163, 188,
510.
16 As Jonathan Richardson argued, painting is a useful “means whereby we convey our Ideas to each
other.... And thus it must be...accordingly esteem’d not only as an Enjoyment, but as another
Language, which completes the whole Art of communicating our Thoughts....” (Richardson, p. 5)
Hence, he adds: “Upon the sight o f a Portrait,” he wrote, “the Character... o f the Person it represents
[is]... apt to... be the Subject o f Conversation.” (Richardson, p. 16) See Jonathan Richardson, An
Essay on the Theory o f Painting (London: printed by W. Bowyer, 1715), pp. 5-6, 16.
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been a factor in the expanding market for portraits.17 This premise turns on the
assumption that paintings are social and linguistic constructions inscribed by a
narrative that functions to locate the individual within a visually-articulated social
context.18 On the one hand, then, coming to terms with a portrait’s content permits a
glimpse at the ideological context informing its making. On the other hand, coming
to terms with the ideological context of a portrait permits a glimpse at the social
implications attendant the resulting identity. As Locke aptly noted, “One who holds a
belief is ... engaged with, or operates from within, a specific social s y s t e m . h e n c e ,
“to comprehend a given ‘belief means to understand the system within which the
belief is... accepted.”19 Hence, as Edgar Wind has observed:
Portraiture shows this give and take... especially clearly. Attached to the
painting of a portrait is a social situation, in which the artist has to come to
terms with an attitude, that of his sitter, .. .that will often be supported by
philosophical views.... Then there is the correspondence between the
objectives of the painter and of the philosopher, the one aiming at the
representation of individual man, the other enquiring into the nature of man,
and both working in an intellectual climate which fostered speculation on the
aesthetic and moral qualities of ‘the perfect man’. As a result, the historian is
able to use the works of art of the period to illustrate the controversy about the
17 According to Ellen Miles, “About four times as many portraits were painted in the colonies between
1750 and 1776 than in the first fifty years o f the century.” (Miles, p. 10) As Gibson-Wood notes: “The
economic historian Peter Earle has analyzed how the London middle class spent the wealth they were
accumulating in the period 1660-1730, and notes that, along with increased expenditure on fashionable
clothes and comfortable furnishings, ‘another feature o f middling homes was the huge increase in
pictures, ornaments, and bits and pieces as the period goes on’. We know this largely through the
detailed inventories o f household goods that were routinely made on the death of London citizens....”
Spawned by a growing popularity and audience for connoisseurship, the evidence o f inventories
suggests that “by the time Richardson was writing pictures were a common feature in the homes of
tradesmen and craftsmen, in both London and the provinces, and that a dramatic rise in the frequency
of ownership had occurred between 1695 and 1715.” (Gibson-Wood, pp. 14-17, 200) For a discussion
o f this development, see Ellen G. Miles, “Introduction,” in The Portrait in Eighteenth-Century America
(Newark, DE: University o f Delaware Press, 1993), p. 10; Carol Gibson-Wood, Jonathan Richardson:
Art Theorist o f the English Enlightenment (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 14-17,200.
18 As Brilliant describes it: “.. .the artistic definition of identity would seem to be the focus o f that
visual processing of information needed to bring together the various ingredients that constitute the
basis of identification.” See Richard Brilliant, Portraiture (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1991), p. 14.
19 Canfield, p. 132.
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idea of Man and to find the conflict of views concerning human nature
20
reflected in the pictorial representations of particular human beings.

This paper considers the ways in which Britons and Americans negotiated
who they were—and, consequently, their claims on society—by examining the ways
in which their portraits supported, challenged, or manipulated the dominant narrative
through the use—and misuse—of inherited visual languages. Putting aside more
conventional interpretations of portraiture—as souvenirs of family and friends,
displays of economic condition, and evidence of ancestral lineage—, it aims to
recover the language and context of eighteenth-century image-making as a means of
coming to terms with the intent of Americans and Britons as they conceptualized and
negotiated their identities. 21
To this end, the paper has been divided into two parts. Part One explores the
narrative contexts within which portraits were produced and the implications of these
narratives for the interpretation and presentation of identity. Chapter I considers
“narrative” as a structure for ‘meaning-making’, the foundations of classical
narratives, differences between theoretical and empirical narratives, and their
significance for the evaluation of identity. Chapter II sketches the body of
philosophical ideas informing the narratives of the pre-modem period, from
20 Edgar Wind, Hume and the Heroic Portrait: Studies in Eighteenth Century Imagery, ed. Jaynie
Anderson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 3-4.
21 This paper relies heavily on the excellent work o f others in researching and identifying such criteria
as maker, date, materials, condition, and biographical information. Its highly interdisciplinary
approach is a natural outgrowth o f current trends in British art history applied, less characteristically, to
American art. As Ellen Miles aptly notes, the portrait genre has excited less attention among American
scholars than the single image and the monograph, noteworthy exceptions being the work o f Richard
Brilliant and Joanna Woodall. See Ellen G. Miles, “Introduction,” in Painting and Portrait Making in
the American Northeast, ed. Peter Benes, vol. 19 (Boston: Boston University and The Dublin Seminar
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Augustine to Machiavelli. Chapter III addresses the ideological polarities plaguing
seventeenth-century Britain—arising, for example, from the economic and political
pressures accompanying commercial expansion and the collapse of monarchy—and
the struggle to squeeze them into a civic humanist paradigm. Finally, Chapter IV
examines the implications of these developments for eighteenth-century British
narratives and identities.
Part Two focuses on a few of the most illuminating portraits produced in the
eighteenth century. It begins by outlining the influence of British ideology on the
interpretation of art, technique, and the stature of portraiture and portrait-painters.
Chapter VI continues with a narrative deconstruction of John Singleton Copley’s
Major Hugh Montgomerie. Finally, borrowing on an observation of Aristotle—that
how something is said bears direct relation to what is being said—, Chapter VII
examines American Revolutionary portraits within the context of British ideological
and aesthetic conventions.22 For all its obvious challenges, the goal of this study is
three-fold: to advance a more interdisciplinary approach to the study of American
portraiture; to motivate further dialogue on the relationship between American and
British portraits; and to invoke the potential of American portraits as documentary
evidence of social history. To this end, a concluding chapter considers the
implications of eighteenth-century American portraits for our understanding of the
American Revolution.
for New England Folklife Annual Proceedings, 1994) For examples of this approach in British art
scholarship, see Marcia Pointon, David Solkin and John Barrell.
22 As Aristotle aptly noted, “it is not enough to know what we ought to say; we must say it as we
ought.” See Aristotle, The Rhetoric, in The Rhetoric and the Poetics of Aristotle, trans. W. Rhys
Roberts, intro. Edward P. J. Corbett (New York: Random House, Inc. (1954), 1984), p. 164; George
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Campbell, Philosophy o f Rhetoric, in The Scottish Enlightenment: An Anthology, ed. Alexander
Broadie (Edinburgh: Canongate Classics, 1997), pp. 685-694.
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PART ONE
CONSTRUCTING IDENTITY: THE CONTEXT
CHAPTER I
THE NARRATIVE OF IDENTITY

Modem scholars have convincingly argued that identity is a social
construction; through language, society provides the narrative parameters within
which—or against which—identities are assumed and negotiated.1 However, as
“perception”—how one understands “reality” and one’s place within it—, is prone to
relativism, so conflicting perceptions risk narrative crisis.2 The result is identity
crisis—what Taylor describes as “an acute form of disorientation, which people often

1 See Roy Baumeister, Identity: cultural change and the struggle for self (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1986), p. 15; John V. Canfield, The Looking-Glass Self: An Examination o f SelfAwareness (New York: Praeger, 1990) p. 135; Charles Taylor, Sources o f the Self: The Making o f the
Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 28, 35,40, 47-49, 286-289.
2 See Thomas Aquinas, The Summa o f Theology, I-I, Qu. 75, 5, in St. Thomas Aquinas on Politics and
Ethics, trans. and ed. Paul E. Sigmund (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1988), p. 34;
Greg Dening, “Texts o f Self,” in Through a Glass Darkly: Reflections on Personal Identity in Early
America, Ronald Hoffman, Mechal Sobel, and Fredrika J. Teute, eds. (Chapel Hill, NC: University of
North Carolina Press for the Omohundro Institute o f Early American History and Culture, 1997), p.
159; Trevor Saunders, introduction to Plato, The Laws, trans. and intro. Trevor J. Saunders (New York:
Penguin Putnam, Ltd., (1970) 1975), p. 25; Roland Barthes, Empire o f Signs, trans. Richard Howard
(New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), p. 6; quoted in Gange, “Beyond Identity? The beyond in Beyond
Japan,” in Other Than Identity: the subject, politics, and art, Juliet Steyn, ed (New York: Manchester
University Press, 1997) p. 205; John Gange, “Beyond Identity? The beyond in Beyond Japan,” in
Other Than Identity: the subject, politics, and art, Juliet Steyn, ed (New York: Manchester University
Press, 1997), pp. 204-205; Canfield, The Looking-Glass Self, p. 135; David Hume, Treatise o f Human
Nature (1739) (Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 1992), p. 108; John Locke, An Essay
Concerning Human Understanding (1690), ed. Roger Woolhouse (New York: Penguin Putnam, Inc.,
1997), pp. 155, 363-371,437-453; Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651), ed. C. B. MacPherson (New
York: Penguin Books, 1968), pp. 105, 112; Frederick A. Copleston, A History o f Philosophy (New
York: Doubleday, 1993), V, pp. 101-107.
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express in terms of not knowing who they are, but which can also be seen as a radical
uncertainty of where they stand.”
Broadly speaking, ancient classicism embraced two forms of reality, each
conditioned upon a different kind of knowledge and each conducing to a specific kind
of narrative.4 Where reality implied a metaphysical realm of eternal existence
informed by universal truths, and the meaning of life was understood to derive from a
theoretical comprehension of nature’s ‘first principles’, the resulting narrative was
theoretical—classical theoretike—, employing intellectual contemplation to arrive at
the fixed standards of natural law and civic life.5 By contrast, where reality implied a
physical realm of temporal history informed by sensory knowledge, and the meaning
of life was confined to a cumulative understanding of one’s particular experience, the
resulting narrative was practical—classical praktike—-, employing observation to
arrive at the fluid standards of human convention.6

J Taylor, p. 27.
4 Aristotle described three kinds o f knowledge: theoretical knowledge, equated with philosophy and
wisdom, “in which knowledge as such is the end in view”; empirical knowledge (practical); and a
middle kind o f “poetical knowledge” or art, which “has to do with production and not with action as
such....” (Copleston, I, p. 277) As Saunders suggests, Aristotle’s endorsement o f philosophical
knowledge presupposed not only that pure truth or wisdom existed, but that it was intelligible. Socrates
and Plato had shared this belief. Moreover, all three had used this principle to distinguish theoretical
and prescriptive narratives from empirical and “descriptive” ones. See Saunders, introduction to
Aristotle, Politics, T. A. Sinclair, trans., Trevor J. Saunders rev. (London: Penguin Books (1962),
1981), pp. 19, 37; Desmond Lee, introduction to Plato, Republic, Desmond Lee, trans. and intro.
(London: Penguin Books, (1955) rev. 1974) p. xxxiii; Copleston, I, pp. 143, 149,277.
5 According to Aristotle, the highest form o f knowledge “deals with the first principles and causes of
things, and so is universal knowledge in the highest degree.... [This] is the science which is furthest
removed from the senses, the most abstract science.” (Copleston, I, p. 288) The primary methodology
of theoretike was contemplation, though Aristotle conceded the need for observation. As Sinclair
observes, theoretical narratives were “regarded as truly philosophical and truly scientific... [for being]
based on theoria, observation plus contemplation.” (Sinclair, in Aristotle, The Politics, pp. 14-15) See
Copleston, I, pp. 205-206, 288; Sinclair, in Aristotle, The Politics, pp. 14-15.
6 According to T. A. Sinclair, “the distinction between theoretike and praktike was not at all the same
as between theory and practice. They were two separate branches of knowledge, not two different ways
of dealing with knowledge.” See Sinclair, in Aristotle, The Politics, pp. 14-15.
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In fact, theoretical narratives recognized both forms of reality, but ranked the
metaphysical and eternal above the physical and temporal according to the hierarchy
of knowledge; as that which attained universal truth was necessarily superior to that
which arrived at particular ones, so a reality and identity premised on metaphysical
knowledge was necessarily higher than a reality and identity premised on physical
data.7 Extrasensory reality thus came to be associated with truth and “Being,” the
“final cause” or end—presumed “Good”—towards which man naturally progressed.

O

By the same token, sensory reality became affiliated with ignorance and “Becoming,”
the imperfect activity of temporal life.9

7 Both Plato and Aristotle recognized two realms o f existence: “the realm o f change and appearance,
the everyday, physical world in which we live; and the realm o f the forms, a realm of eternals and
absolutes.” (Lee, introduction, Republic, p. xxxix, and Copleston, I, p. 327) As Lee describes it, the
realm o f “unchanging forms, which are the objects o f the philosopher’s knowledge, are what is
ultimately real. The world perceived by the sense, the world o f change, though not unreal, has a lower
status ontologically than the realm o f forms....” (Lee, p. 205) Though Aristotle’s interpretation of the
two realms differed from Plato’s— for example, he opposed Plato’s location o f the soul in the external
realm o f the intelligences on grounds that it precluded the achievement of self-actualization, which
required that the body be united with the soul so that it participated in the Universal Mind o f truth—he
did not deny the two realms o f existence or their separate modes o f intelligence; as Copleston writes:
“Reason is the highest faculty o f man, and theoretical contemplation is the highest activity o f reason.”
(Copleston, I, pp. 348-349). See Lee, introduction to Plato, Republic, p. xxxix; Plato, Republic, pp.
149-164,205, 260; Copleston, I, pp. 112, 151-155, 163-206,327-329, 348-349; Plato, Laws, pp. 434,
519; Plato, Republic, pp. xxxix, 149-164,205, 260; Sir David Ross, Aristotle, John L. Ackrill, intro.
(Routledge: London and New York, (1923) 1996), p. 77.
8 For Aristotle, the end for man was the fulfillment of potentiality, a self-actualization that Plato
described, similarly, as a “unity with oneself’ arising from one’s comprehension o f the Ideas and one’s
place within them. Moreover, the state was the proper venue for this progress; as Aristotle described it,
“while the state came about as a means o f securing life itself, it continues in being to secure the good
life.” (Aristotle, Politics, p. 59) As a consequence o f this, Sinclair notes, “Aristotle was saddled with
...th e notion that whatever is good is according to nature” and, inversely, that whatever is natural is
necessarily good. (Sinclair, in Aristotle, The Politics, p. 21) See Aristotle, The Politics, translated by
T. A. Sinclair, revised and re-presented by Trevor J. Saunders (New York and London: Penguin Books
(1962,1981), 1992), p. 21; Aristotle, Politics, pp. 21, 56-59, 187, 439; Aristotle, The Rhetoric, in The
Rhetoric and the Poetics o f Aristotle, W. Rhys Roberts, trans,, Edward P. J. Corbett intro. (New York;
Random House, Inc. (1954), 1984), pp. 37-38; Plato Republic, pp. 58-65, 138-139, 142-147, 161;
Plato, Laws, p. 121, 124-126; Taylor, pp. 115-116, 121; Ross, p. 76; Copleston, I, pp. 216, 160-162,
260-261.
9 Copleston writes: “Socrates tries to show that the objects o f perception are, as Heraclitus taught,
always in a state o f flux: they never are, they are always becoming.’' (I, p. 144) This supported the
Aristotelian premise that “nature makes nothing without some end in view, nothing to no purpose”—
i.e. “Becoming” was necessarily a stage in the process towards “Being.” (Aristotle, Politics, p. 79) In
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Ultimately, the theoretical narrative was teleological and evolutionary; man, it
suggested, began in a state of nature and, through the virtuous improvement attendant
intellectual enlightenment, was naturally advanced from a mechanical to a
philosophical condition, from a savage to a civic and, ultimately, to an ideal state of
“happiness” and “independence.”10 In this analysis, the gap between one’s
‘potentiality’ and ‘actuality’ was gradually reduced by an innate motivation towards
“self-realisation” that occurred as part of man’s natural social development. In other
words, as the relationship between society—the state or polls—and the individual was
deemed complementary to nature, so society was deemed the natural venue for “selfactualization.”11 Moreover, as society was deemed the natural venue of the

general, godliness was the height o f a descending scale o f lesser virtue; as Plato described it, “God ...
is pre-eminently the ‘measure o f all things.” Hence, those who inspired good in others assumed the
heroic stature o f Great Men (Guardians) responsible for guiding society. (Plato, Laws, pp. 175-176,
195-196; Plato Republic, pp. 14, 77-78) However, Aristotle and Plato entertained slightly different
interpretations o f the relationship between Being and Becoming; whereas Plato interpreted the
realization of potentiality as a “unity with oneself’ arising from the recovery o f divine Ideas, and
perceived this as occurring within the spiritual realm, this separation between the spiritual and material
realms presented difficulties for Aristotle: how did one reunite with an inaccessible soul? He thus
relocated the universal element o f man— his soul or ‘active intellect’—within his temporal matter—his
body. This required a rethinking o f the relationship between Being—divine— and Becoming—
temporal. Ultimately, Aristotle recast Being as natural rather than divine; each living thing has “an
innate and natural tendency towards its own full evolution.” (Copleston, I, p. 313) By this means, “the
development from a state o f potentiality to one o f actuality” precluded the need for metaphysical
revelations. (Copleston, I, p. 325) This difference between the two theorists informed variations in
mediaeval scholarship. See Plato, Laws, pp. 175-176, 195-196; Plato, Republic, pp. 14, 77-78;
Aristotle, Politics, p. 79; Taylor, pp. 115-116, 121; Baumeister, pp. 248,251; Copleston, 1, pp. 144,
209,313,325.
10 As Aristotle described it: “Generally, of course, it is the good, and not simply the traditional, that is
aimed at....” (Aristotle, Politics, p. 138) “This end,” he later wrote, “is happiness and its
constituents”— i.e. “prosperity combined with virtue; or... independence o f life....” (Aristotle, The
Rhetoric, pp. 37-38) See Plato, Republic, pp. 56,58-59, 63-69,71-78; Plato, Laws, p. 162; Aristotle,
The Politics, pp. 138, 187; Aristotle, Rhetoric, pp. 37-38; Copleston I, pp. 335, 338-339, 343; Taylor,
pp. 278-279.
n According to Aristotle “the state... exists by nature.” (Aristotle, Politics, p. 55) Plato concurred; as
Lee writes, “society, with its regulations, is a ‘natural’ growth....” (Plato, Republic, p. 56) Indeed,
Copleston adds, “human life is not lived out... apart from Society and the State, nor is man a being
entirely apart from nature....” (Copleston, I, p. 199) Hence, Saunders notes, “‘Nature’ seems to carry
strong social and political imperatives.” (Saunders, in Aristotle, Politics, p. 186) See Aristotle,
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individual, so that which advanced the ‘good’ of society was presumed to advance the
‘good’ of the individual—hence the origins of “common good.”

12

In theory, then, advocates of theoretical, classical narratives endorsed fixed
moral codes that rationalized and ordered society according to a prescribed set of
values and beliefs that deemed the ‘common good’ natural, attainable, and ideal. 13
•

•

Within this context, one’s identity became the measure of one’s virtue—one’s
capacity and inclination to advance the common good prescribed by the fixed moral
principles of eternal law intelligible through contemplation. Because this capacity
and inclination were affiliated with disinterested independence—with leisured selfsufficiency—those whose circumstances permitted of virtue—i.e. those not dependent
on commercial or domestic activities for material sustenance—assumed the highest
identities.14
Politics, pp. 39, 55; Plato, Republic, p. 56; Copleston, I, pp. 199, 320, 351; Saunders, in Aristotle,
Politics, p. 186.
12 Both Plato and Aristotle interpreted the good to mean the simultaneous advancement o f the
individual and the state. Copleston writes: “in [Aristotle’s] eyes the end of the State and the end o f the
individual coincide, not in the sense that the individual should be entirely absorbed in the state but in
the sense that the State will prosper when the individual citizens are good, when they attain their own
proper end.” (Copleston, I, p. 357) Consequently, as Plato wrote: “The object o f our legislation ...is
not the special welfare o f any particular class in our society, but o f the society as a whole; ... its
purpose ... is not to leave everyone to please himself, but to make each man a link in the unity o f the
whole.” (Republic, p. 263) Thus Sinclair observes, “the subject o f political philosophy, or politike,
embraced the whole o f human behaviour.... It was the aim o f political philosophy to establish
standards o f social behavior.” (Saunders, in Aristotle, The Politics, pp. 26-27) See Plato, Republic, p.
263; Sinclair, in Aristotle, Politics, pp. 26-27; Copleston, I, p. 357. For Aristotle’s discussion o f the
best states, see Politics, pp. 379-393,401-426,439-444.
13 According to Trevor Saunders, the “guiding principles” o f this approach were as follows: “(a) That
certain absolute moral standards exist, (b) That such standards can be, however imperfectly, embodied
in a code o f law. (c) That most o f the inhabitants o f the state, being innocent o f philosophy, must never
presume to act on their own initiative in modifying either their moral ideal or the code o f laws which
express it; they must live in total and unconditional obedience to the unchanging rules and regulations
laid down for them by the legislator.” See Saunders, introduction to Plato, Laws, pp. 28-29.
14 Plato described three kinds o f men: Guardian-Rulers, a citizen class characterized by “a
philosophical disposition and a love o f learning” (Plato, Republic, p. 69); Auxiliaries, a citizen-military
whose “function is ‘to assist the Rulers in the execution o f their decisions’” (Lee, in Plato, Republic, p.
121); and a ‘Third Class ’ o f non-citizens whose function “is to provide for the material and economic
needs of the community”—i.e. Lee writes, “Their virtue is obedience....” (Lee, in Plato, Republic, p.
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The symbiotic relationship between the individual and society ensured that
“citizenship” assumed a central role in the classical evaluation of identity; classical
citizenship distinguished the independent, wise, and virtuous from the dependent,
ignorant and self-interested.15 However, precisely because citizenship meant political
action on behalf of the public good, because this good was deemed intelligible only to
those with a knowledge of ‘first principles’, and because this knowledge was deemed
accessible only to those whose virtue made them capable of disinterested reason,
citizenship was confined to leisured—and, so, educated—men.16 By this means—i.e.
1) the subordination of the individual to the state; 2) the privileged position of the
state in the attainment of actuality; 3) the correlation between actuality and reason; 4)

xli) Though potentially wealthy, the Third Class suffered from its affiliation with money; according to
Aristotle, there were three ways o f accumulating property, one natural (farming), one neutral
(bartering), one unnatural (profit-making). This last was equated with “illiberal” leanings “unfit for the
free man.” (Copleston, I, p. 335) They were thus excluded from classical citizenship. As Aristotle
wrote, “citizens are a particular class o f men, to which no one who is constantly engaged in commercial
or manual labour can belong, at any rate in the ‘best’ state. Such people simply do not have the time
and opportunity to fulfil the essential function o f a citizen, to rule (while holding office) and to be ruled
by turn....” (Aristotle, Politics, p. 183) Plato concurred. See Plato, Laws, pp. 23-24, 137, 349; Plato,
Republic, pp. xli, 56,69,121, 139, 207,228, 239,243, 247-248,260-283; Aristotle, Politics, p. 183;
Copleston, I, pp. 108, 335.
15 The classical standard o f identity was deeply entangled with the definition of citizenship. See
Copleston, I, p. 108.
16 The function of politics was to translate the fixed moral order into a fixed code of laws, a task suited
only to those o f the greatest wisdom and virtue. As Saunders notes, anything less than this risked
“moral relativism and the abandonment o f the absolute standards to which Socrates’ questioning had,
for Plato [and Aristotle], pointed the way.” (Saunders, introduction to Plato, Laws p. 27) Sinclair adds:
“Alongside the strong ethical bias in political philosophy went a sense of the need for fixing standards.
An ethical code had to be embodied in a code o f law, and this code o f law in turn described the whole
framework o f the social and political system and the moral standards under which the citizens were to
live, and for which the Greek word was politeia, usually translated by Constitution.” (Sinclair, in
Aristotle, The Politics, p. 26) Consequently, Plato concluded, “no citizens who suffer from... ignorance
should be entrusted with a degree o f power,” (Plato, Laws, p. 137) for “there are some who are
naturally fitted for philosophy and political leadership, while the rest should follow their lead ....”
(Plato, Republic, p. 207) See Saunders, in Plato, Laws, pp. 27-29; Plato, Laws, pp. 137, 526, 528;
Plato, Republic, p. 207; Sinclair, in Aristotle, Politics, p. 26.
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and the resulting emphasis on reason as the medium of virtue and, therefore, the
•

highest standard of citizenship—, reason became the pivot on which identity turned.

IT

Significantly, the classical term for the wise and virtuous man was ‘aristocrat’;
as ‘aristocracy’ was esteemed the best form of political constitution—the best means
♦ * 18
of ordering society—, so the aristocrat was esteemed the best kind of citizen. Those
constitutions which embraced lower standards of citizenship were thus interpreted as
something less than ‘best’; the risk of democracy, for example, which granted
citizenship to non-‘aristocrats’, was that it permitted men without wisdom to hold
public office, thereby sacrificing statesmanship (the just rule of citizen-equals) for
mastership (power in the pursuit of self-interest) to the detriment of good.19 On this

17 Plato and Aristotle argued that true knowledge was absolute and unchanging. It was, therefore, an
appropriate and fixed measure o f human value. Thus, the capacity for theoretical wisdom became a
measure o f one’s capacity for universal virtue and the attainment o f wisdom became a reflection of
one’s progress towards the ideal. But Aristotle also believed—as did Socrates before him—that
individuals were complementary in this regard and, hence, that there was a necessary and harmonious
inequality o f virtue among members o f a state. It was this which lent credence to the principle o f social
hierarchy. See Aristotle, Politics, pp. 93,95; Copleston, I, pp. 216,218.
18 According to Aristotle, the name “aristocracy... is justly given only to that constitution which is
composed of those who are ... best in virtue.... For only [in this] ... type of aristocracy are good man
and good citizen one and the same....” See Aristotle, Politics, p. 257.
19 As Aristotle described it, statesmen rule “men who are free, and similar in birth,” (Politics, p. 182)
whereas the “rule of master over slave is exercised primarily for the benefit of the master and only
incidentally for the benefit o f the slave....” (Aristotle, Politics, p. 188) In general, Aristotle defined
three ‘good’ and three ‘bad’ constitutions according to “three grounds for claiming equality
[citizenship] in a constitution”: “freedom, wealth and virtue (a fourth claim, called ‘good birth’, arises
out o f the two last o f these three, for good birth is wealth plus virtue going back to one’s forebears).”
(Aristotle, Politics, p. 160) Good constitutions were those which sought the common good and
included monarchy (which granted citizenship and, so, sovereignty to a virtuous one, though it could
vary in type), aristocracy (which granted citizenship and sovereignty to a virtuous few), and polity,
which granted citizenship and sovereignty to a middling group whose combined attributes
approximated the virtuous mean. In the absence o f virtuous men, Aristotle supported polity as the most
conducive to the ideal because it located a moderate amount o f wealth in the hands o f a large number of
persons, thereby combining elements o f oligarchy and democracy (wealth and numbers) while
defending against the tyrannical tendencies o f each. Bad constitutions were similarly structured, but
were motivated by interest rather than good; tyranny promoted the interests o f one man, oligarchy of
wealthy men, and democracy o f unpropertied men. As Aristotle wrote, “only with the arrival o f
extreme democracies have workmen attained to participation in office.” (Aristotle, Politics, p. 181)
Like Aristotle, Plato endorsed monarchy or aristocracy as most conducive to the ideal state, rejecting
“timarchy,” oligarchy, democracy and tyranny as destructive factions that undermined social stability.
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premise, the classical social hierarchy descended from the philosopher-prince to the
manual laborer.
Theoretical narratives thus suggested that empirical knowledge of sensory
experience was valuable only insofar as it nurtured the human behavior prescribed by
theoretical ideals. Politics, for example, a science derived from the evidence of
human experience, was ‘good’ only insofar as it served the ideals of a metaphysical
reality; it was not in itself meaningful—i.e. the proper foundation for a narrative
‘meaning of life’—but rather an instrument for procuring a meaningful life. Of
course, all facets of life were necessarily implicated in this doctrine; identity, for
example, became a theoretical prescription, rationalized and articulated by a ‘natural’
elite for receipt by the individual.

'j j

Perhaps for this reason, alternatives emerged to

For further discussion, see in particular Aristotle’s Politics, pp. 80-89,119, 125-129,150, 153-154,
157-158, 177, 181-182, 188, 190-206, 210, 216-232, 235, 237, 239,245,251, 259-260, 274-275, 295356, 367-385, 391-401,426-439; Aristotle, Rhetoric, pp. 8, 50; Plato, Republic, pp. xvi, 202-203,216,
228,235, 262, 293; Plato, Laws, pp. 55, 82, 142-144, 147, 149,157,212-214, 229-230, 327, 349, 449452,457-459. For a discussion o f statesmanship, see in particular Aristotle’s Politics, pp. 395-6, 399401; Aristotle, Rhetoric, pp. 8, 50; Plato, Laws, p. 82.
20 Hence, Copleston writes, although Aristotle began his Metaphysics with the claim that ‘“All men by
nature desire to know’...,” he continued by recognizing “different degrees o f knowledge,” ranking “the
man who seeks knowledge for its own sake above him who seeks for knowledge o f some particular
kind with a view to ... some practical effect.” (Copleston, I, p. 287) As Aristotle wrote, “no two o f us
are bom exactly alike. We have different natural aptitudes, which fit us for different jobs.” (Aristotle,
Politics, p. 59) Plato concurred: “the man naturally fitted to be a shoemaker, or carpenter, or anything
else, should stick to his own trade....” (Plato, Republic, p. 161) Hence the premise o f social order; as
“men differ in intellectual and physical capacities and are thereby fitted for different positions in
society,” so they will enjoy varying levels o f virtue and independence. (Copleston, I, p. 352) As a rale,
Plato explained, “only a small part o f mankind—a few highly-educated men o f rare natural talent—is
able to steel itself to moderation when assailed by various needs and desires....” (Plato, Laws, p. 457)
Hence, as a tradesman should never participate in politics, so “a gentleman must never participate in
trade....” (Plato, Laws, p. 459) On these grounds, Plato sought to make land inalienable. (Plato, Laws,
pp. 449-452) While both Plato and Aristotle emphasized reason as the highest standard o f identity,
Aristotle was wary o f accepting Plato’s emphasis on birth, fearing it granted too much power to
unproven men. (Aristotle, Politics, p. 153) Ultimately, however, the relationship between birth, wealth,
and reason confined classical citizenship to the landed classes. See Aristotle, Politics, pp. 58-59, 153,
169; Plato, The Republic, pp. 161, 261-262; Plato, Laws, pp. 449-452, 457-459; Copleston, I, pp. 287,
352.
21 Theoretical narratives were concerned with the individual only insofar as the individual participates
in the universal human ideal. As a result, “the most exact description of each individual will be a
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challenge the intelligibility and credibility of universal truths and fixed standards,
undermining the influence of theoretical narratives. 22
«

•

Historians have persuasively argued that the dominant narrative of eighteenthcentury Britain derived from a classical concern to render human existence intelligible
and meaningful in universal and fixed terms.23 Ultimately, however, British
neoclassicism represented the selective quilting of Aristotelian and Platonic ideas
with those of Christianity and science. This blending resulted in ambiguities and
inconsistencies that subjected the dominant narrative to manipulation, criticism and
rejection. The greatest risk came from empirical and ‘convention’ narratives—those
which denied the intelligibility of metaphysical reality and premised knowledge on
sensory experience, challenging the credibility of social prescription.24 Locke, for

special description ofhis virtue.” (Aristotle, Politics, p. 179; Copleston, I, p. 292) Identity was thus
assigned according to different “grades of being” deduced from the relationship between “potentiality
and actuality.” (Ross, Aristotle, pp. 77, 129,246) Moreover, any “interference” or “interchange” in
this structure was deemed “the worst o f evils.” (Plato, Republic, p. 146) See Aristotle, Politics, p. 179;
Plato Republic, pp. 146-147; Ross, pp. 77,129, 246; Copleston, I, pp. 308-309.
22 Significantly, these narratives borrowed, in part, from Aristotle; as Copleston remarks, “it is arguable
that Aristotle’s ‘empiricism’ was one o f the influences which gave rise in the fourteenth century to lines
o f criticism which tended to undermine the metaphysical systems which had themselves been built on
Aristotle’s ideas.” (See Copleston, III, p. 417) See Copleston, I, pp. 261,266-267,281, and III, p. 417.
23 As Copleston observes, “After its first beginnings in Asia Minor, Greek philosophy pursued its
course of development until it flowered in the two great philosophies o f Plato and Aristotle, and later,
through Neo-Platonism, exercised a great influence on the formation o f Christian thought.” (Copleston,
I, p. 10) J. G. A. Pocock has traced this influence from Machiavelli to James Harrington in The
Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), Politics, Language and Time: Essays on Political
Thought and History (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, (1971) 1989) and Virtue, Commerce, and
History: Essays on Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, (1985) 1995). For a discussion o f the development of Greek and Roman
thought, see Copleston, A History o f Philosophy. Volume I: Greece and Rome—From the PreSocratics to Plotinus (New York: Doubleday, (1962) 1993).
24 See Hobbes, Leviathan (1651) and Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690). In
very different ways, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke each challenged the credibility of the neo
classical narrative. For example, while Hobbes denied the natural origins o f society and presented it,
instead, as the product o f interest, Locke, while holding fast to the principle o f natural law, denied the
intelligibility o f universal truths in the absence o f revelation (though he did allow for the notion o f
mathematical certainty) and, consequently, denied the existence o f fixed universal standards. By
making knowledge the by-product o f sense-experience and, hence, the meaning o f life a self
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example, condemned theoretical narratives and customary authority as instruments of
power politics. As he described it,
it was of no small advantage to those who affected to be masters and teachers,
to make this the principle ofprinciples, that principles must not be questioned:
for having once established this tenet, that there are innate principles, it put
their followers upon a necessity of receiving some doctrines as such; which
was to take them off from the use of their own reason and judgement, and put
them upon believing and taking them upon trust... in which posture of blind
credulity, they might be more easily governed by, and made useful to some
sort of men, who had the skill and office to principle and guide them....
Whereas had they examined the ways, whereby men came to the knowledge of
many universal truths, they would have found them to result in the minds of
men, from the being of things themselves.... 25
•

Alternative narratives were not new to the modem period; indeed, Socrates,
Plato and Aristotle had condemned the moral relativism of the Sophist tradition as the
ignorant by-product of inferior minds and methodologies.26 However, as theoretical

determined capacity o f all men, Locke leveled the intellectual playing field, making moral virtue—the
proper pursuit o f all men—a universal privilege. See Woolhouse, introduction to Locke, An Essay
Concerning Human Understanding, pp. xi-xii.
25 See Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, in Woolhouse, p. 106. Locke was highly
critical o f the Scholastics and, in particular, the Aristotelian theory o f ‘first principles’ or “maxims”
from which certain truth might be deduced. According to Copleston, this affected Locke’s notion of
general and particular ideas; “since universality and generality are not attributes o f things, which are all
individual or particular, but o f ideas and words... it is the mind which observes... likenesses among
particular things and uses them as the occasion to form general ideas.” (Copleston, V, p. 105) This
distinguished Lockean general ideas from those o f Aristotelian “abstraction,” which recognized general
essences in particular things and, so, granted a concrete source for universal ideas. See Locke, An
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, pp. 59, 564, 576-577; Woolhouse, introduction to Locke,
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, p. xv; Copleston, V, pp. 73-78, 101-107.
26 For practical purposes, the Sophists—including Protagoras, Prodicus, Hippias, and Gorgias—
employed an empirical, inductive method to explain human behavior—i.e. for “the art and control of
life.” (Copleston, I, pp. 82-83) Consequently, Copleston notes, “ Socrates considered ... the Sophists
... superficial thinkers who merely adopted and reflected the prejudices of society at large....”
(Copleston, I, p. 20) Moreover, Saunders writes, Aristotle’s “repeated emphasis ... on the state’s being
‘natural’ suggests ... the polemical purpose o f refuting those who believed that the state was an
‘artificial’ or a ‘conventional’ creation.” (Saunders, in Aristotle, Politics, p. 56) Significantly,
empirical narratives challenged the classical distinction between liberal and illiberal men; whereas
Aristotle distinguished between liberal (theoretical) and illiberal (practical) thinkers, Locke conflated
the two forms o f knowledge into one. (Aristotle, Rhetoric, pp. 139-140) See Saunders, introduction to
Aristotle, Politics, pp. 26, 56; Aristotle, The Rhetoric, pp. 139-140; Copleston, I, pp. 20, 82-83,219;
Saunders, introduction to Plato, Laws, pp. 20-24. For a further discussion o f the Sophists, and their
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narratives came under pressure to reconcile gaps between theory and practice, the
opportunity for alternatives increased. For example, if in theory the capacity for
public office turned on a capacity for civic virtue (as measured by disinterested
reason), in practice it turned on a capacity for leisure. In the absence of state
subsidies, virtue became conflated with a leisured independence conditioned upon
birth and wealth.27 As a result, the relationship between virtue and independence was
inverted; whereas in theory one’s independence was a measure of one’s virtue, in
practice one’s virtue was a measure of one’s independence. In the end, men of birth
and wealth were presumed more virtuous—more “aristocratic”—than those of modest
birth and property. Ultimately, it was this conflation between virtue and leisure which
made the classical standard for identity so complementary to the objectives of a later
generation of British elites: the model classical citizen was the well-to-do
gentleman.28
Significantly, empiricism’s denial of intelligible fixed truths implied a like
denial of absolute standards. This suggested not only that identity was artificial, fluid,

condemnation by Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, see Copleston, I, pp. 20, 82-95, 98,104-105,243, 111112, 342,351-352,357.
27 Aristotle did not ignore the relationship between birth, wealth, and reason, for, as he wrote, the
“upper groups will always be superior in education and ability....” (Aristotle, Politics, p. 194) Rather,
he insisted that “something more is needed besides: I mean justice, and the virtue that is proper to
citizens.” (Aristotle, Politics, p. 208) This required a particular kind of leisure; unlike “play,” which
“belong[ed] rather to the sphere of work,” leisure was an “elevated” intellectual activity “worthy of
free men.. .’’(Aristotle, Politics, pp. 456-457) As Plato similarly described it, leisure was “a life devoted
to the cultivation o f every physical perfection and every moral virtue....” (Plato, Laws, p. 297) Hence,
Aristotle concluded, “the virtue of a citizen cannot be ascribed to everyone, nor yet to free men alone,
but simply to those who are relieved o f necessary tasks.” (Aristotle, Politics, p. 184) See Aristotle,
Politics, pp. 194, 208,454-476; Aristotle, The Rhetoric, p. 48; Plato, Laws, pp. 297, 327; Niccolo
Machiavelli, The Discourses, ed. and intro. Bernard Crick, trans. Leslie J. Walker, rev. Brian
Richardson (New York: Penguin Books (1970), 1998), p. 451.
28 Indeed, Saunders suggests, “gentleman” and “citizen” were interchangeable; “The chief aim of a
gentleman’s, that is, a citizen’s education is to enable him to enjoy his intellectual and artistic faculties
to the full, to live a life o f ‘virtue’ and o f ‘leisure’....” See Aristotle, Politics, p. 455.
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and distinct from an ‘authentic’ singular self—a circumstance which conduced to the
mediaeval split between the internal and external self—but, more radical still, that it
was bom of—and conditioned upon—relative social interests. 29 Such a suggestion
•

•

*

was not without risks. Indeed, William Hogarth’s The Painter and his Pug (Fig. 1-1;
1745; oil on canvas, 35-7/16 x 27-1/2 inches; Tate Britain) hints at the implications
attendant social relativism. His portrait-within-a-portrait format uses spatial
juxtapositions—that between the ‘fictional’ portrait and the ‘real’ Pug, for example—
to highlight the specious nature of imag[in]ed realities and identities. One has only to
compare the viewer’s space with Trump’s to know that the pug’s space, too, is ‘false’
and our own position uncertain.

29 See Andrew Benjamin, “Figuring self-identity: Blanchot’s Bataille,” in Other than identity: the
subject, politics and art, ed. Juliet Steyn (New York: Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 9.
30 Plato described this as being “deceived in one’s own mind about realities,” a condition attendant
convention narratives, which made men “the victim o f falsehood and ignorance.” (Plato, Republic, p.
79) As David Bindman notes, Hogarth’s portrait-within-a-portrait “conceit points wittily to the paradox
inherent in the painting o f reality.” (Bindman, Hogarth, p. 151) As Bindman likewise adds: “The threat
o f a Scottish invasion in 1745 also encouraged defiant displays o f patriotism, and it is surely significant
that the great self-portrait painting, The Painter and his Pug (Tate Gallery), should be dated to the
same year. Hogarth rests his Active portrait on volumes by great English authors, Shakespeare, Milton
and Swift, though he omitted these names in the engraving (no. 23). In fact, only the last could be
considered a major influence on his work to date, so his claim to an exclusively English literary
ancestry should be treated as little more than patriotic rhetoric.” (Bindman, Hogarth and his Times, pp.
47-48) See Bindman, Hogarth (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 151; Bindman, Hogarth
and his Times (London: British Museum Press, 1997), pp. 47-48; Plato, Republic, pp. 79-80, 85-86.
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Fig. 1-1

Hogarth’s image is useful for two reasons. On the one hand, it reminds us that
the implications of social relativism dogged civic humanism well into the modem
period; as Baumeister notes, “rejection of the legitimacy of the traditional, stable
political and social order led to a troubled recognition of the pervasive conflict
between the individual and society.”

1 1

On the other hand, however, it suggests an

awareness of the problems attendant these narrative inconsistencies. It was this
awareness that invited the development of alternative narratives. But it was also this

31 Baumeister, p, 59. For Plato, any “division o f purpose” caused people to “wrong each other” and to
erode the justice upon which a harmonious and stable society depended. Hence, once empirical
narratives permitted the individual to define his own purpose, conflict was inevitable. See Plato, The
Republic, p. 38.
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awareness that nurtured the development of alternative narratives supportive o f more
desirable identities,3Z The result was instability; as identities were most stable when
the relationship between ideology and experience was deemed natural and ‘fixed’, so
they lost that stability when the standards of reality became mutable and uncertain.
As

H orn m i

K. Babba suggests, imperial powers were particularly vulnerable;

governed by narratives supportive of inequality, they struggled to defend their
narrative legitimacy in the face of opposing pressure. 33
Perceptions of the origin, purpose, and end of society thus affected the
interpretation of identity. Once gaps emerged between perception and prescription,
once language was used to ‘name’ and, so, ‘define’ an alternative reality, there arose
new opportunities for describing the self.34 All of this bore relevance for portraiture;
as Richard Brilliant aptly notes: “Conflicting views on the nature of personal identity
have confounded the very concept of the portrait as a significant genre of
representation because they affect the answer to a basic question presented by art
works of this kind: ‘Who is the who that is being represented?”’35

32 This occurred, Baumeister argues, because people “began to be chronically dissatisfied with the
identities society had given them.” See Baumeister, p. 170.
Inequality was characteristic of imperialism, which was fueled by the demand for property and, as
Rousseau observed, “nascent inequality” is one o f “the main effects o f property.” (Rousseau, A
Discourse on Inequality, p. 119) According to Homi K. Bhabha, in colonial identity-making, ‘fixity’
functions to order individuals according to their ‘differences’. This has the advantage o f subverting
differences to the interests of the colonizer. See Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin and Foundations
o f Inequality among Men (1755) (New York: Penguin Putnam Inc., 1984), p. 119; Homi K. Bhabha,
“The other question,” Screen, 24 (6), Nov.-Dee. 1983, p. 23, quoted in Gange, “Beyond Identity? The
Beyond in Beyond Japan,” p. 209; Taylor, p. 20.
34 Once experience no longer corresponds with received ideas, or received ideas no longer complement
practice, practices or ideas are modified. As Benjamin notes, this “necessitated... another thinking of
identity....” (Benjamin, “Figuring self-identity,” pp. 28-29) See Benjamin, “Figuring self-identity,” pp.
9-10, 16, 28-29; Canfield, p. 1-10, 32; Taylor, pp. 204-205.
35 See Brilliant, Portraiture, pp. 13-15. Whereas Aristotle described “Character” as the moral matter of
the individual—as that which “makes us ascribe certain moral qualities to the agents”—and, hence, as
the signifier o f moral quality, Baumeister highlights contemporary ambiguities: “The differing usages
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For Plato and Aristotle—who deemed society the natural venue of selfactualization, who considered identity a singular representation of the individual’s
virtue vis-a-vis the final, universal ideal and, so, as a measure of one’s location on the
road to perfect virtue, who held virtue and vice as properly represented by modes of
painting as by modes of government, and, hence, for whom each type of government
necessarily endorsed accompanying aesthetic standards—, the ‘best’ portrait was the
aesthetic complement to the aristocratic ideal; lesser minds, with their more limited
understanding of reality, necessarily embraced inferior forms of government and
inferior aesthetic standards.
Ultimately, then, classicism endorsed parallel social and stylistic hierarchies:
as society descended from the virtuous and intellectual aristocrat to the interested and
ignorant laborer, so portraiture descended from the philosophical to the mechanical,
from the general to the particular, from the beautiful to the ugly—from the heroic to
the graceful to the conversational to the comic.

■ 27

In the end, a portrait’s success

o f the term ‘identity’ by social scientists reflect an imprecise understanding o f identity even among
researchers.” (Baumeister, Identity: Cultural Change and the Struggle for Self, p. 3; Aristotle, The
Poetics, in Corbett, p. 231) See Aristotle, The Poetics, in The Rhetoric and the Poetics o f Aristotle, ed.
W. Rhys Roberts, intro. Edward P. J. Corbett (New York: Random House, Inc. (1954), 1984), pp. 231,
242; Baumeister, p. 3.
35 Thus, Saunders writes, “‘correct’ artistic standards” demanded that “art should portray ‘good’ men
attractively and ‘bad’ men unattractively.” (Saunders, in Plato, Laws, p. 83) As Plato described it (and
Reynolds later observed), those styles based on ornament and variety were symptomatic o f ignorance.
(Plato, Laws, p. 109) A true knowledge o f art thus required an education in Taste— in the virtuous
standards o f truth. In the end, it was assumed, only the aristocrat might judge. For a further discussion,
see Aristotle, The Poetics, pp. 224-225; Aristotle, Politics, p. 224; Plato, Laws, p. 83, 154; Copleston,
I, pp. 200, 259-260.
37 The hierarchy o f styles was informed by the need to fix the standards of virtue and vice through
visual standards o f beauty. “That Plato regarded beauty as objectively real, is beyond all question... [;]
all beautiful things are beautiful in virtue o f their participation in the universal Beauty.... The obvious
consequence o f such a doctrine is that there are degrees o f beauty... [;] beautiful things will
approximate more or less to this objective norm.” (Copleston, I, p. 254) Although Aristotle says that
the beautiful is not the same as the good, it is clear that both derive from a rational love o f truth—from
“order and symmetry and definiteness.” (Copleston, I, p. 359) The result was a classical standard o f
ideal beauty complementary with the standards o f reason and virtue. This was likewise supported by
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turned on its proper rendering of ‘correct’ narrative principles.38 Hence the origins of
the “grand-style” portrait as the visual metaphor of the neoclassical identity.
However, by the eighteenth century, the content and context of portrait images was
being informed by a rich legacy of philosophical opinions.39 The next three chapters
will examine their influence on developing British narratives.

Augustine. (Copleston, I, p. 360) See Copleston, I, pp. 254,359-360; Augustine, The Nature o f the
Good, 3, and The True Religion, 30.55-56, in The Essential Augustine, ed. Vemon J. Bourke
(Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 1964-1974), pp. 49, 134.
jS On this premise there emerged a hierarchy o f styles descending from the heroic to the indecent. For
Plato, the hierarchy ran from the “pyrrhic” style, divided into the “heroic” and the “graceful”— a style
taken up in the eighteenth century by Richardson, who called it “greatness” and “grace”—to the comic,
what Aristotle described as the lower “iambic” style o f “life” and “conversation.” (Plato, Laws, p. 307;
Aristotle, Poetics, pp. 227-228,258) Significantly, however, Plato and Aristotle understood different
interpretations of imitation: for Plato it was mimetic and, therefore, mechanical; for Aristotle, it was an
abstraction and, therefore, philosophical. Hence a portrait likeness might represent either the universal
or the particular and, thereby, reflect a higher or lower ideological standard. (Copleston, vol. I, pp.
360-362) See Plato, Laws, pp. 83-84, 108, 307-308; Aristotle, The Poetics, pp. 227-228,258,260;
Copleston, I, pp. 360-368; Jonathan Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting (London, 1715),
pp. 161-163, 175, 177; Carol Gibson-Wood, Jonathan Richardson: Art Theorist o f the English
Enlightenment (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 163, 169-171.
39 The eighteenth-century artist-theorist Jonathan Richardson, for example, although he did not assume
a high level o f art knowledge among his readers, did intend his work for “a literate public that was
abreast of current British philosophical and theological” writings, “particularly the writings o f John
Locke and his followers.” (Gibson-Wood, p. 181) Indeed, Gibson-Wood argues, Richardson’s writings
suggest not only his own “familiarity with the fundamentals o f Lockean philosophy, which had by 1715
been popularized by writers like Addison,” but “his expectation that his readers were likewise
informed.” (Gibson-Wood, p. 147) See Gibson-Wood, Jonathan Richardson, pp. 147, 181.
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CHAPTER II
NARRATIVE CONFLICTS

Eighteenth-centuxy British narratives included a selective blending of ancient,
mediaeval, Renaissance and early modem theories. The purpose of the next three
chapters is to indicate the scope of narrative possibilities which arose from this
blending and their relevance for the imag[in]ing of identity in eighteenth-century
Britain and America. In order to provide for a richer deconstruction of eighteenthcentury portraits in Part n, these chapters give particular attention to those ideas
thought to have dominated the period.
According to Frederic Copleston,1the post-ancient period was marked by a
classical revival that is best understood in two parts: a pre-Aristotelian phase, based
primarily on the neo-Platonism of Roman Patriarchs like St. Augustine;2 and an
Aristotelian phase, in which the writings of Aristotle were assimilated into Christian
thought in tandem with ideas from Islamic and Jewish thinkers.3 Although

1 These chapters draw heavily on the writings o f Frederick Copleston, whose nine-volume history of
philosophy provides an excellent foundation for interpreting the primary documents o f various periods.
The first six volumes have been used in this paper. See Copleston, A History o f Philosophy, volumes IVI (New York: Doubleday, 1993)
2 Baumeister writes, “Political historians generally agree that medieval social theory was wholly
dominated by Augustine’s views.” (Baumeister, p. 52) See Baumeister, p. 52; Copleston, II, pp. 9-10;
and The Essential Augustine, ed. Vernon J. Bourke (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 19641974).
3 The introduction of Aristotle’s work marked the beginning of the second phase o f mediaeval
philosophy, which witnessed a shift in the balance-of-influence between theology and philosophy, to
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Augustinian neo-Platonism continued to provide the foundation for mediaeval
philosophy, the introduction of Aristotle’s writings complicated its legacy. In the end,
classicism continued to provide a structure and language for the organization and
articulation of Christian thought, but the influence of its content varied considerably,
often to contrary ends.
In general, medieval thought was based on a selective interpretation of neoPlatonism, which provided an effective conduit for advancing Christian beliefs.4 For
example, both Plato and Augustine regarded soul and body as distinct and separate
elements, the rational, immortal, and spiritual soul guiding the sensitive, mortal, and
material body during historical, temporal life.5 In addition, however, by bending and
extending the parameters of neo-Platonism, Plato’s perfect, impersonal Good became
the point-of-departure for explaining Augustine’s perfect and personal God; on
grounds of Plato’s necessary perfection, manifest in his exemplary Form of the
Good—that from which the essence of goodness found in lesser forms necessarily
emanated—, Augustine could defend the notion of a necessarily perfect Being—that
by whom all lesser beings are lovingly created and on whom those beings necessarily
depended.6 This served as the foundation for Augustine’s Holy Trinity, a single God

the latter’s advantage. In general, Aristotle’s writings were integrated into the university system by the
mid-thirteenth century. Copleston refers to this period as one of “constructive synthesis.” (Copleston,
II, p. 9) See Copleston, II, pp. 9-10,208,211, and III, pp. I, 414.
4 Copleston, II, pp. 1, 5-6, and ID, p. 7.
5 Lee concludes, it is “the general philosophical and religious conviction o f the Republic that the
temporal is only the shadow of the eternal, and that the human soul is responsible not simple to itself
but to God.” See Lee, in Plato, Republic, p. xl.
6 As Augustine writes, “The highest good... is God.... All other good things are only from Him....”
(Augustin, The Nature o f the Good, I, in Bourke, p. 48) Indeed, Lee notes, “The vision o f the form of
the good is not entirely dissimilar to what others have called the vision of God.” (Lee, introduction to
Plato, Republic, pp. xxxix-xl) In keeping with Plato, Augustine understood God/ goodness to have
created society by way o f rationes seminales, original “seeds” or ideas. {Literal Commentary on
Genesis, IX, 17.31, and IV, 3.7, in Bourke, pp. 103-105) As Bourke describes it, these seeds were
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composed of three persons: the Godhead or Father, source of the Divine Ideas or
Essences—the rationes seminales of universal truth;7 Christ (the neo-Platonic Nous)
or The Word (Logos), by which the divine ideas were impressed on the human soul;
and the Holy Spirit or Grace, the medium of final cause—that eternal happiness/
goodness (as opposed to temporal classical virtue) manifest in reunion with God.9
The Augustinian narrative thus blended the philosophy of Platonism with the
theology of Christianity, subordinating the reason of the former to the revelation of
the latter in a manner conducive to lower (temporal and active) and higher (eternal
and contemplative) realities.10 Significantly, however, this dual reality—one natural,

informed by three principles which guided the “development and movement of living things”: measure,
affiliated with mind and being; number, “a sort o f metaphysical determinant”; and weight, that which
propels natures towards their “appointed ends.” (Bourke, p. 99) For further discussion on the
relationship between God and the Good, see Augustine, The Nature o f the Good, 1-25, in Bourke, pp.
48-57; Copleston, I, pp. 190-193, 350.
' Augustine refers to Plato’s Ideas as the “primary forms” or “immutable reasons o f real things...
contained in the divine intelligence.” He adds: “these primary reasons... are true because they are
eternal...; and it is by participation in these that whatever exists is produced, however its way of
existing may be.” (Augustine, Eighty-three Different Questions, 46.2, in Bourke, pp. 62-63) These are
comparable to Augustine’s rationes seminales— what Copleston calls “germs of things or invisible
powers or potentialities, created by God in the beginning... and developing into the objects o f various
species by their temporal unfolding....” (Copleston, II, p. 76) These “essences or rationes o f things are
present in the divine mind from all eternity as the divine ideas... [;] in the De Ideis he explains that the
divine ideas are ‘certain archetypal forms or stable and unchangeable reasons o f things, which were not
themselves formed by are contained in the divine mind eternally and are always the same... ’
(Copleston, II, p. 73) See Copleston, II, pp. 73, 76, and III, pp. 49-50; Augustine, On the Trinity, III,
8.13, and Eighty-three Different Questions, 46.2, in Bourke, pp. 62-63, 102-103.
8 Augustine, On Psalm 32, Serm. 3, 16, in Bourke, p. 152. According to Copleston, “This exemplarist
doctrine was, o f course, influenced by neo-Platonic theory, according to which the Platonic exemplary
ideas are contained in Nous, though for Augustine the ideas are contained in the Word, who is not a
subordinate hypostasis, like the neo-Platonic Nous, but the second Person o f the Blessed Trinity,
consubstantial with the Father. From Augustine the doctrine o f exemplarism passed to the Middle
Ages....” See Copleston, II, p. 73.
9 Augustine, On Admonition and Grace, 2.3, in Bourke, p. 176. For Augustine, grace was the agent by
which free will was transformed into pure liberty, the commitment to goodness without evil that arose
from a love of God. This required faith. Thomas Aquinas shared Augustine’s interpretation o f perfect
happiness and freedom as arising from a knowledge and union with God. See Augustine, Retractions,
I, 9.2-4, On the Grace o f Christ, 26.27, City o f God, XXI, 15-16, Enchiridion, 30-32, in Bourke, pp.
175-183; Aquinas, The Summa o f Theology, I-II, Qu. 3,8, in Sigmund, p. 42; Copleston, II, pp. 31-39,
42-43.
10 Augustine wrote: “the study o f wisdom consists in action and contemplation, so that one part of it
may be called active, and the other contemplative—the active part having reference to the conduct of
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material and temporal, the other supernatural, spiritual and eternal—was joined with a
Christian narrative of Fall and Redemption that nurtured the specter of moral duality:
a post-Fall ethic based on the imperfection of civil society; and a post-Redemption
ethic based on the goodness of eternal life. Christianity thus complicated the balanceof-influence between the individual and society. As the relationship between
individual and State was subverted to the relationship between individual and God, so
the classical emphasis on public virtue in the civic sphere was properly
subordinated-—at least in theory—to the Christian emphasis on private goodness in
the realm of salvation.11
This shift in the balance-of-influence between the individual and society
implied a like shift in the proper context for identity. As the individual was made

life, that is, to the regulation o f morals, and the contemplative part to the investigation into the causes
of nature and into pure truth....” (City o f God, VIII, 4; in Bourke, p. 136.) On Plato’s example,
Augustine defined three kinds o f philosophy: moral philosophy, “chiefly occupied with action”; natural
philosophy, “of which the object is contemplation”; and rational philosophy, “which discriminates
between the true and false.” (Augustine, City o f God, VIII, 4, in Bourke, p. 136) He did not
acknowledge a metaphysical realm in the Aristotelian sense o f an extra-physical reality, but he did
define three realms o f existence— divine, psychic and corporeal. Man occupied the middle realm,
between the realm o f eternal truth and goodness and temporal ignorance and privation. It was up to
each man to choose his direction—to look upward towards the divine or downward towards
corporeal— sinful—life. Thomas Aquinas made a similar observation. See Augustine, Questions for
Simplicianus, I, 2.18, Letter 18, to Coelestinus, City o f God, VIII, 4-6, in Bourke, pp. 43-45, 58-60,
136; Aquinas, The Summa Against the Gentiles, Book III, Chapters 3 ,25,27, 32, 37, 48, in Sigmund,
pp. 6-8; Copleston, II, pp. 428-429.
11 Augustine’s emphasis on sin as the background of human society after the Fall led him to cast
temporal life in negative terms, its only goodness arising from Christ’s sacrifice for man’s salvation.
For Augustine, the purpose o f civil society was to protect the individual from the sins o f others until
salvation was attained. This caused him to make a more marked distinction between the secular and
sacred spheres than had the ancients. Plato and Aristotle looked upon temporal society as an integral
part of man’s advancement towards eternal goodness and potentiality and, therefore, as in itself ‘good’.
It also permitted certain inconsistencies in his thought to stand as dualities rather than conflicts. For
example, Augustine accepted that a hierarchical order was necessary in the secular realm in order to
maintain peace and stability, but he did not consider such distinctions divine in origin. While Plato had
recognized that temporal society fell short o f the ideal, even though the laws o f the ideal necessarily
informed temporal life, Augustine believed that divine laws—and, so, the ideal—were suited to man
only after salvation. As a result, the principles informing the ideal were not necessarily applicable to
man’s temporal state. Nonetheless, Augustine’s position on natural equality provided important
material for later Reformed Christians. See Taylor, pp. 47-49; Plato, Republic, p. 188.
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responsible for his own self-realization, so he became the agent of his own goodness.
Hence the Christian emphasis on ‘will’ as the highest faculty of the human soul.12
As Augustine explained it, though the will was naturally directed towards the good, it
required the voluntary action of the individual to nurture its progress, an action
compatible with the higher ideals of reason impressed upon man by God.13 This
made the individual an agent in his own identity.
In practice, however, the potential for individual self-determination was
tempered by the implications attendant the Fall and the need for a well-governed
State.14 For Augustine, if the totality of individuals in the State governed themselves
according to those temporal virtues conducive to eternal good, society would attain
happiness, but if the people succumbed to worldly desires, society would suffer from
privation and evil. Hence, the Christian State was rightfully ordered—and its people
aptly judged—according to intelligible eternal standards informing man’s final,
supernatural end.15 Indeed, Augustine’s belief in harmonious order, coupled with his

12 According to Augustine, our progress towards perfection comes from God’s gift o f free will received
at the time o f Creation. Although all men are naturally inclined towards the good—the final cause
towards which they are divinely directed—, the determination to act on one’s reason, and thereby
advance that inclination, was a matter o f will. Combined with faith—itself motivated by will—, will
paves our progress “from the temporal to the eternal.” (Augustine, The True Religion, 24.42, in
Bourke, p. 32) See Augustine, On the Spirit and the Letter, 34.60, City o f God, V, 9, XII, 6, and XIV,
6-7, The True Religion, 24.42,29.52-53, in Bourke, pp. 22,32, 60-62, 132-133, 158-160; Copleston,
II, pp. 85-86,285, 288-291.
13 Sin is likewise voluntary. As Copleston explains, man must choose to follow the way o f God or,
alternatively, choose not to; “The will is free to turn away from the immutable Good and to attach itself
to mutable goods....” (Copleston, II, p. 82) See Aquinas, The Summa o f Theology, II-U, Qu. 64,8, in
Sigmund, p. 81; Copleston, II, p. 82.
14 As the proper end o f human life is eternal salvation, so the proper end o f temporal society is the City
o f God. In both cases, the pursuit o f happiness is the pursuit o f goodness—the pursuit o f God. See
Augustine, Confessions, 20.29, The True Religion, 7.13, and City o f God, XIX, 23-24, in Bourke, pp.
209-211; Copleston, II, 87-90.
15 According to Augustine, God is the highest standard by which all else is judged; He is “the highest
good.” See Augustine, The Nature o f the Good, 22, in Bourke, p. 55.
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fear of social instability, resulted in his support for fixed social ranks.16 The
implications of self-determination nonetheless remained (however dormant).
Although Augustine restricted self-determination to the eternal sphere, thereby
lim itin g

its implications for civic identities, he planted the seed for a later generation

of Reformed thinkers.17
The duality of Augustine’s narrative—its notion of separate higher and lower
realms—continued to characterize the philosophy of his followers.18 And although it
did not, of necessity, point to moral duality, the credibility of a single, fixed moral
standard depended on certain assumptions. Augustine assumed that, by virtue of the
rationes seminales impressed on the human soul during Creation, the eternal
standards governing perfect goodness were temporally intelligible through internal
contemplation and, therefore, that man might reason the fixed standards of
harmonious order informing society and, by extension, the standards of human virtue
and identity. In fact, the intelligibility of eternal laws informing final cause was
essential to Augustine’s theory insofar as it was through divine illumination of this

16 Baumeister writes: “The medieval Christian believed the social hierarchy to be fixed and legitimate.
St. Augustine had written that God assigned to each person a definite place in the community.”
(Baumeister, p. 52.) This supported the notion o f harmonious order; according to Augustine, proper
ranks “tend in the divine providence to that end which is embraced in the general scheme o f the
government o f the universe... producing that which was designed to be their result.. . (Augustine, City
o f God, XII, 4, in Bourke, p. 101) See Augustine, City o f God, XII, 4 and XIX, 13, in Bourke, pp. 101,
216-218.
17 In theory, Augustine opened the way for a self-determined identity; that the capacity for truth was
equal among men, that grace was the true mark o f privilege: both opened the way for the lowest bom to
assume the highest ranks o f identity. In practice, however, “the earlier medieval concept o f virtue
[which] included fulfilling the tasks and duties o f one’s station in society... [meant] the person was
equated with the social roles...[and, therefore,] in order to fulfill one’s potential, one had to do the
tasks assigned by society to him or her.” See Baumeister, p. 56.
18 Roger Bacon, for example, distinguished two kinds o f moral philosophy, one governing the actions
o f men in relationship with other men, and one governing the actions o f men in their relationship with
God. See Copleston, II, p. 447.
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intelligence that man came to know the existence of God.19 On these grounds, a
singular perfect goodness linking temporal with eternal became the necessary
corollary of a singular perfect reason linking man with God. By the same token, that
which was less than good reflected the absence of reason—the sensory instincts
belonging to a lower realm of existence.20 In the end, Augustine crafted a hierarchy
of morality and intelligence in which identity was necessarily implicated: as morality
ascended from interest to virtue, as knowledge ascended from the particularities of
sensory experience, to the speculations of reason (scientia), to the authority of
‘wisdom’, so too did the individual ascend from ignorance and vice to wisdom and
virtue.21
Ultimately, then, the standards shaping identity and social order turned on the
relationship between knowledge and virtue. As long as knowledge—the by-product
of contemplation and divine illumination—and virtue—the by-product of divine
goodness—were deemed perfect corollaries, knowledge was the necessary standard of
19 Augustine, On Free Choice, II, 39-41, Confessions, VII, 10.16-11.17, in Bourke, pp. 124-128. One
had to be “illuminated” by the divine light in order to see the truth impressed on the human soul during
Creation. In the process, one came to know the existence o f God. Later Christian thinkers responded
differently to Augustine’s doctrine of illumination. See Copleston, II, pp. 63-65, 68.
20 Copleston, II, pp. 381, 398-402,405,407-411, and III, pp. 104-106.
zl As Copleston remarks, “There is one true ‘philosophy’ or wisdom, which is attained adequately only
through Christian revelation, though Greek philosophers divined something o f the truth.” (Copleston,
II, p. 19) On this premise, Augustine conceived of an a priori access to virtue in the form of
illumination, “that natural light by which [the mind] can recognise truth and rectitude;” illumination is
the means by which the soul “apprehend[s] ...the rationes aeternae [which] are ... in fact identical with
the Word o f God.” (Copleston, II, p. 288-289) This is the higher reason o f sapientia derived from faithbased illumination. As Augustine described it, one has to think in order to believe, but one also has to
believe in order know God. Ultimately, Augustine described three levels o f understanding in terms of
an ascending order of vision: the sensory (sight); the spiritual (image); and the intellectual
(understanding). Aquinas likewise distinguished between speculative and practical reason, the former
conducing to the understanding o f first principles, the latter to good judgments. Aquinas also spoke of
light, but he confined its purpose to the vision o f God. See Augustine, On the Trinity, XV, 12.21,
Predestination o f the Saints, 5, On Free Choice, II, 6, The True Religion, 3.3, Literal Commentary on
Genesis, XII, 6.15, 31.59, in Bourke, pp. 19, 22-23,25, 34,47-48, 53, 93-94, 97; Aquinas, Summa
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identity—of virtue.22 By the twelfth century, however, a growing uncertainty about
the nature and lim itatio n s of human knowledge was undermining this standard. This
surfaced as a debate over particular and universal ideas: how is the knowledge of
particulars (which exist outside the mind as material things) translated into a
knowledge of general principles (which exist inside the mind as universal concepts)
and, indeed, can universal concepts be said to exist if they have no objective existence
in reality?23 This raised doubts about the nature and extent of human knowledge: was
certain truth, in fact, intelligible by any means other than revelation? And, if not, if
internal contemplation could not yield even a handful of certain truths, on what
grounds could one claim the perfect link between knowledge and virtue? Such
questions threatened the standards of identity and social order. 24 For example, was
there a difference between civic virtue—the public attribute of the temporal sphere—
and goodness—the private attribute of the eternal sphere? Could the public virtues of
the civic man be said to reflect the personal virtues of the good Christian?25 And, if

Against the Gentiles, II, 53, The Summa o f Theology, I-I, Qu. 79,12, and I-II, Qu. 62, 3, in Sigmund,
pp. 9, 35-36; Copleston, II, pp. 19,48-51, 225,288-289, III, pp. 5-7.
22 According to Copleston, the ascending stages o f the soul, from the vegetative to the sensitive to the
intellectual state— the latter being composed o f a lower, sensory aspect and a higher, intelligible
aspect—and ultimately to the will, represented “different potentialities’ in the progress from nature to
grace. According to Lee, the elision between knowledge and virtue had roots in the Greek definition of
‘wisdom’, which “had a strong ethical meaning.” (Lee, introduction to Plato, Republic, p. xv) See
Copleston, II, p. 427; Lee, in Plato, Republic, p. xv; Ross, Aristotle, p. 76.
23 “In other words,” Copleston continues, “objects outside the mind are individual, whereas concepts
are general, universal in character, in the sense that they apply indifferently to a multitude of
individuals. But, if extramental objects are particular and human concepts universal, it is clearly of
importance to discover the relation holding between them... [;] if these terms have no foundation in
extramental reality,... science is an arbitrary construction, which has no relation to reality.”
(Copleston, II, p. 139) See Copleston, II, pp. 139, 150-151, 153, 389.
24 As God creates man according to His universal idea o f man, so likeness becomes the expression of
this idea. For example, Copleston writes, “The likeness of humanity is abstracted from individual men,
and this likeness, considered by the mind, is the idea o f the species....” (Copleston, II, p. 138)
25 According to Aquinas, “every human act that is good or bad is meritorious or lacking in merit in
relation to God by virtue o f the act itself,” not “in relation to the political community.” (Aquinas,
Summa o f Theology, I-II, Qu. 21,4, in Sigmund, p. 43) Machiavelli’s Prince and Discourses, on the
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not, was the personal worth of the good Christian made manifest in the character of
the civic man and, if so, how?
If the first phase of mediaeval thought envisioned a universal reality made
fully intelligible by divine Grace and partially intelligible by philosophical
contemplation, the second phase witnessed a more neo-Aristotelian interpretation of
revelation and reason.26 Whereas Augustine had argued that certain truth was
possible only by a divine illumination of the rationes seminales—the seeds of reason
implanted in man for his contemplation during his progress towards perfect
goodness—, and, hence, insofar as God was the only source of “illumination,” His
was the only active intellect, Aquinas, accepting the Aristotelian interpretation of the
human intellect, granted man both active and passive intellectual capacities.27 On the

other hand, wholly dispensed with Christian virtue as unsuited to the political sphere. As Pocock
described it, “There is one theological problem here, and one philosophical. Does the republic
substitute itself for Christ’s kingdom, thus subverting the existence o f any church distinct from political
society? Both Hobbes and Harrington seem to have looked on Christ as returning to restore the
theocracy God had exercised in Israel.... For Hobbes the political form o f this theocracy had been
monarchy, but for Harrington it had been a republic....” (Pocock, introduction to Harrington, The
Commonwealth o f Oceana, p. xxii) See Aquinas, Summa o f Theology, I-1I, Qu. 21,4, in Sigmund, p.
43; Pocock, introduction to James Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana, in The Commonwealth
o f Oceana and a System o f Politics (1656), ed. J. G. A. Pocock (New York: Cambridge University
Press (1992), 1999), p. xxii; Grafton, introduction to Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, intro. Anthony
Grafton, rev. George Bull (London and New York: Penguin Books, (1961) 1999), p. xxi; Crick,
introduction to Machiavelli, The Discourses, p. 63; Machiavelli, The Discourses, Disc. 111.28, in Crick,
p. 482.
26 According to Copleston, the influence o f Augustinian neo-Platonism was extended into the Middle
Ages by thinkers like Boethius, whose De Consolatione Philosophiae distinguished between the
dogmatic theology o f neo-Platonic revelation and the natural theology o f Aristotelian philosophy. By
the ninth century, Charlemagne was encouraging the establishment o f monastic schools structured
around Aristotle’s seven liberal arts. According to Copleston, John Scotus produced “the first great
system o f the Middle Ages” based on a reconciliation o f “the categories and modes o f thought and
ideas which former writers had bequeathed to him...[J moulding them into a system.” (Copleston, II, p.
112) See Copleston, II, pp. 101-133.
2' Unlike Plato, who located the soul in the realm o f the intelligences external to the body, Aristotle
located the soul in man and made the “active intellect” the source of human progress. (Copleston, I, p.
331) Drawing, in part, on Plato, Augustine argued that “the soul is illumined, in order that it may see
and truly understand everything, either in itself or in the light. For the light is God himself, whereas the
soul is a creature; Yet, since it is rational and intellectual, it is made in His image.” (Augustine, Literal
Commentary on Genesis, XII, 31.59, in Bourke, p. 97) Aquinas also spoke o f light, but he confined its
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one hand, the “passive” intellect received the particularities of a material object as a
sensory experience and, transmitting that reception to the mind, created a visual
image or “likeness.” On the other hand, this likeness might be received by the
“active” intellect, which translated the image into a universal idea from which axioms
might ultimately be deduced—axioms which, when combined, fostered our
knowledge of universal reality and efficient cause. By this means, Aquinas
transformed universal ideas into the potential by-product of the active intellect’s
abstraction of c o m m on essences in particular things.28 On the one hand, this served
to relocate the soul in the body—a circumstance indicative of the philosophical shiftin-influence from Plato to Aristotle—and, thereby, to make man a ‘whole’ and
autonomous—if imperfect—being. On the other hand, by shifting the emphasis from
contemplation and illumination to observation and contemplation, it served to restore
the link between knowledge and virtue: the closer the individual approached to
perfect knowledge the closer he approached to perfect goodness.

7Q

purpose to the vision o f God. (Aquinas, Summa Against the Gentiles, II, 53, in Sigmund, p. 9) Thomas
Aquinas located the source o f divine light directly in the intellect and, thereby, deemed the theory of
illumination redundant; according to Aquinas, who adopted an a posteriori method o f reasoning, the
existence o f God might be proved in five ways: by “the argument o f motion,” which Aristotle employed
in the form o f Unmoved Mover, “from the nature of an efficient cause,” which derived from Aristotle’s
Metaphysics, V, 2; on the basis o f “possibility” and “necessity”; on the principle o f gradation—there
being a lower, there must be a highest; and on the evidence o f “order... in the universe.” (Aquinas, The
Summa o f Theology, I-I, Qu. 2,3, in Sigmund, pp. 30-32) See Copleston, I, p. 331, and II, p. 225;
Augustine, Literal Commentary on Genesis, XII, 31.59, in Bourke, p. 97; Aquinas, Summa Against the
Gentiles, II, 53, The Summa o f Theology, I-I, Qu. 2,3, in Sigmund, pp. 9. 30-32.
28 According to Aquinas, “The human intellect... is able to know the form that exists individually in
corporeal matter... by abstracting the form from individual matter as it is represented by sensory
images.” (Aquinas, The Summa o f Theology, I-I, Qu. 85,1, in Sigmund, p. 36) Hence, he continues, “to
understand humanity apart from individual conditions, that is, .. .to universalize it, humanity must be
perceived by the intellect as the likeness o f the typical nature, not o f the individual men.” (Aquinas,
The Summa o f Theology, I-I, Qu. 85,2, in Sigmund, pp. 36-37) See Aquinas, The Summa o f Theology,
I-I, Qu. 85,1-2, in Sigmund, pp. 36-37; Copleston, II, pp. 189-190, 197-199, 201-204, 389-390.
29 As Aquinas wrote, “since all knowledge that a person has about a thing is based on his understanding
o f its substance (according to the Philosopher [Aristotle]...), in this life all knowledge that is in our
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As a result of Aristotle’s influence, St. Albert the Great (1206-1280) and,
more notably, St. Thomas Aquinas broke from Augustine, emphasizing empirical
observation as a necessary component of reason.30 While Aquinas, too, believed that
morality and reason were informed by eternal law, he added the intermediary context
of natural law, discernible to man through his participation in, and observation of, the
external world.31 This was to relocate the source of “realism.” Whereas Augustine’s
neo-Platonist realism cautioned against the subjective, fluid and, ultimately, imperfect
knowledge bom of sensory experience,32 and endorsed internal contemplation as the
proper method for attaining wisdom,33 Aquinas’s neo-Aristotelian realism, while
continuing to privilege philosophical contemplation as the medium of higher reason,
grounded knowledge in sense-perception.34
In general, then, a more external and secular approach to the understanding of

intellects originates in the senses.” See Aquinas, The Summa Against the Gentiles, I, 3, in Sigmund, p.
3.
30 Copleston, n, pp. 293-300, 303-306, 310-311.
35 Aquinas, The Summa o f Theology, 1-13, Qu. 100, 1, in Sigmund, p. 58. According to Aquinas,
“Rational creatures... participate in eternal reason in that they have a natural inclination to their proper
actions and ends. Such participation in the eternal law by rational creatures is called the natural law.”
(Aquinas, The Summa o f Theology, I-I I, Qu. 91, 2, in Sigmund, p. 46) For a further discussion on
eternal, natural, human and divine laws, see Aquinas, Summa o f Theology, l-II, Qu. 91-109, in
Sigmund, pp. 46-60.
Augustine calls this process o f internal gazing as seeing “the truth within your own heart.”
(Augustine, On Free Choice, II, 4; in Bourke, p. 23) As Copleston writes, “Augustine assumed, with
Plato, that the objects of true knowledge are unchanging, from which it necessarily follows that
knowledge o f changing objects is not true knowledge.” (Copleston, II, pp. 56-57) Sensory knowledge
was less useful for contemplation because more likely to deceive. See Augustine, On Free Choice, II,
4, On the Trinity, XII, 14.22-15.25 and XV, 12.2, City o f God, VIII, 6, Confessions, 17.23, in Bourke,
pp. 23, 36-37, 59, 130-131; Copleston, II, pp. 55-61.
33 While holding that the end o f temporal life was eternal life, and that the moral codes of society were
necessarily prescribed by the eternal laws o f God, Augustine did not ground these beliefs in evidence
drawn from nature. And it was not that God impressed the soul with the standards o f truth themselves
(the ideogenetic viewpoint), or even with a vision of God from which such standards might be deduced
(the ontological viewpoint), but simply with the necessity o f their existence. See Copleston, II, pp. 64,
71, 139-142, 392, and III, p. 50.
34 Copleston, II, pp. 55-56.
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reality went hand-in-hand with the growing influence of Aristotle and his alternative
theory of human intellect. Combined, the effect was to generate an alternative
interpretation of classicism. In general, although all continued to advance those
fundamental positions consistent with Augustine, Plato and Aristotle—the
intelligibility of reality, for example, and the notion of a necessary state of perfection
towards which man progressed and in conformity with which he was necessarily
designed—, they differed where their mentors likewise differed—as in the
relationship between body and soul, existence and essence, matter and form, faith and
reason, contemplation and observation, nature and God.

O f

These differences were reflected in the various schools of thought that
emerged in the thirteenth century.36 For example, whereas the more neo-Platonic
Augustinians of the Franciscan school continued to locate knowledge in the
contemplation and illumination of rationes seminales impressed on the human soul
during Creation, the more neo-Aristotelian Augustinians of the Dominican school
located knowledge in the observation and contemplation of the external evidence of
the natural world.37 Similarly, whereas Augustine and the Franciscans adopted a neoPlatonic position, holding body/ matter/ existence and soul/ form/ essence to be

35 Copleston, II, p. 424.
36 Initially, Copleston writes, “the prevailing philosophy... was derived from Platonism... and... the
Platonic tradition continued for long to dominate Christian thought from the philosophic viewpoint.”
(Copleston, II, p. 14) By the thirteenth-century, however, Augustinianism could be divided into two
major schools whose differences were informed by a more Platonic or Aristotelian bias. Essentially,
Franciscans like St. Bonaventure stressed a neo-Platonic tradition whereas Dominicans like St. Albert
the Great and St. Thomas Aquinas emphasized an Aristotelian view o f knowledge. This gap was
narrowed at the end o f the thirteenth century when John Duns Scotus established a neo-Franciscan
tradition more complementary with Aristotelianism. In general, then, although other schools of thought
continued to exist, thirteenth-century Scholasticism was dominated by a neo-Aristotelian reconciliation
o f Augustinian and classical influences. See Copleston, II, pp. 14, 213-217,242-243, 245-246,460475.
37 Copleston, III, pp. 416, 418.
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separate entities, the soul or “form” being “pure potentiality” in containing the
essence of human perfection, the Dominicans sided with Aristotle who, supporting
the unity of body and soul, concluded that matter, as the medium of change and
motion, was the primary instrument of self-realization/8 Finally, against Augustine,
who deemed human society a negative consequence of the Fall, neo-Aristotelian
Thomists emphasized the positive role of society in the attainment of good, making
*

*

the narrative of Christianity more complementary with classicism.

39

Thus, by the thirteenth century, a more critical and empirical approach was
shaping the analysis of knowledge and reality.40 This effected a slightly different
interpretation of identity: whereas the neo-Platonism of Augustine and the
Franciscans suggested soul/ form/ essence to be the proper context of being and, so,
made virtue the by-product of internal contemplation—insofar as the spiritual realm
of the intelligences was the proper context for understanding the eternal relationship
between man and God41—, the Dominicans inquired after body/ matter/ existence as

38 Hence Aristotle’s definition of the Unmoved Mover. As Aquinas likewise described it, “the human
soul needs bodily organs to derive its knowledge from bodily things.” (Aquinas, Summa Against the
Gentiles, III, 81, in Sigmund, p. 10) By contrast, Augustine held the external soul to move the body
towards knowledge. (Augustine, Literal Commentary on Genesis, VIII, 20.39, in Bourke, pp. 63-64)
See Aquinas, Summa Against the Gentiles, III, 81, in Sigmund, p. 10; Augustine, Literal Commentary
on Genesis, VIII, 20.39, in Bourke, pp. 63-64; Copleston, III, p. 29; Bourke, pp. 67-68.
39 Like Aristotle, Aquinas believed that “man is by nature a political and social animal.” (Aquinas, On
Kingship, Ch. 1, in Sigmund, p. 14) Society was thus the context for good. But he added to this
classical vision a Christian emphasis on eternal life: “Now, because the man who lives the life o f virtue
is destined for a higher end which is, as we have said, the enjoyment o f the divine, this must also be the
final end o f human society. The final end o f organized society then is not [merely] to live the life o f
virtue but through a life o f virtue to attain the enjoyment of God.” (Aquinas, On Kingship, Ch. 14, in
Sigmund, p. 27) See Aquinas, On Kingship, Ch. 1, 14, in Sigmund, pp. 14,27.
40 Like Aristotle before them, the thirteenth-centmy philosophers were more moderate ‘realists’ than
Augustine had been, basing knowledge o f reality on contemplation bom o f sense-experience. This
helped distinguish philosophy from theology. See Copleston, III, pp. 2-3.
41 On the one hand, Franciscans like St. Bonaventure envisioned a unified and harmonious reality
hierarchically ordered according to the relationship between God and His created beings. Although
each being was considered equal in essence— its divine origin— , it was necessarily ‘higher’ or ‘lower’
by virtue o f its capacity for intellectual and moral truth—i.e. its temporal capacity for contemplation
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the proper context for being, making virtue, at least in part, a by-product of action
insofar as nature was the proper context for understanding the relationship between
man and God.42 This advanced the role of empirical science as a point-of-departure
for theological, philosophical and, ultimately, scientific inquiry.43
According to Paul Sigmund, St. Thomas Aquinas was the most influential
philosopher of the mediaeval period.44 He brilliantly blended Aristotelian and
Christian doctrines into a credible synthesis that made classicism and Christianity
compatible,45 reconciling their different visions of society, their different emphases on
reason and faith, and their different perceptions of the relationship between man and
God.46 The results were a more moderate realism based on natural law and the

and illumination. (Copleston, II, pp. 271-272,291) This capacity informed the difference between man
and animals, for example, but it also informed distinctions among men: the more the individual turned
inward and employed his will to seek out and ascend the scale of goodness towards which his soul was
naturally directed, the closer he ranked to God and the higher he ascended in the hierarchy o f beings.
(Copleston, II, pp. 266-270, 273, 279) Aquinas shared this vision o f universal order based on
intelligence. (Aquinas, Summa Against the Gentiles, II, 81, in Sigmund, p. 11) A similar idea is found
in St. Paul’s letter to the Corinthians. ( I Corinthians 12:4-13) See Copleston, II, pp. 266-273,279,
291; Aquinas, Summa Against the Gentiles, n, 81, in Sigmund, p. 11; I Corinthians 12:4-13.
42 Sigmund writes: “Aristotle described a world in which matter and motion were eternally derived by
inflexible necessity from the potentiality o f ‘prime matter’ by a ‘First mover’ whose essential
characteristic is the uncaused activity o f reason (pure act). Man was described by Aristotle as a
composite o f bodily matter and a rational soul that was its form.” (Sigmund, introduction to Aquinas, p.
xviii) As Aristotle deemed the First Mover “pure act,” so the active life— what Augustine described as
the “regulation o f morals” as opposed to “the contemplative part” concerned with “the investigation
into the causes o f nature and into pure truth....”—became an essential component o f Aristotelian
virtue. (Augustine, City o f God, VIII, in Bourke, p. 136) See Sigmund, introduction to Aquinas, p.
xviii; Augustine, City o f God, VIII, in Bourke, p. 136; Copleston, II, pp. 308-309.
43 As Aquinas wrote, “Our natural knowledge begins from the senses. Therefore our natural knowledge
can only extend as far as it can be led by the objects o f the senses.” (Aquinas, Summa o f Theology, I-I,
Qu. 12, 12; in Sigmund, p. 32) It is for this reason that a knowledge o f God is not possible without
divine intervention. St. Thomas “recognized the rights and position of philosophy as a rational study
distinct from theology.” (Copleston, III, p. 415) See Copleston, II, pp. 6-7, 83, and III, p. 415;
Aquinas, Summa o f Theology, I-I, Qu. 12,12, and I-II, Qu. 62, 3, in Sigmund, pp. 32 and 43.
44 Sigmund, introduction, St. Thomas Aquinas on Politics and Ethics (New York: W. W. Norton and
Company, Inc., 1988), p. xiii.
45 Sigmund, introduction, pp. xviv-xix.
46 See Aquinas, The Summa Against the Gentiles, I, 7; in Sigmund, p. 4. See also Sigmund,
introduction, p. xix.
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elevation of philosophy into a distinct discipline.47 Indeed, by grounding social
relationships in natural laws made newly accessible by observation, Thomism allowed
for the examination and resolution of social issues without theological intervention.

48

This paved the way for an autonomous, secular State.49
In the end, then, Augustine’s legacy became linked with conflicting
interpretations of knowledge and virtue and their varying methodologies: while
Augustine and the Franciscans deemed knowledge to move from efficient to final
cause—our knowledge of God thus being the point-of-departure for our knowledge of
the world50— and, therefore, endorsed an a priori method based on internal
contemplation, St. Thomas and the Dominicans, while admitting man’s implicit
knowledge of God, located the source of that knowledge in internal contemplation of

47 Both Aristotle and Aquinas argued “for an order and purpose in nature and man that can be
determined by the study of their structure and development.. . Moreover, whereas the Platonists
“argued for the real existence o f universal Ideas or Forms, apart from individual things,” Aristotle and
Aquinas argued only for the existence o f individual things, from the essence o f which universal ideas
might be abstracted. See Sigmund, introduction, pp. xix-xx.
48 As Sigmund writes, Aquinas crafted “a vision o f an objective and purposive order o f justice in the
universe in which reasons and purposes can be found for what we observe in the external world, in
society, and in man.” (Sigmund, introduction, p. xxvi) Sigmund adds: “Aquinas shares with his mentor,
Aristotle, a belief in the human capacity to identify goals, values, and purposes (‘teleology’) in the
structure and functioning of the human person that can provide the basis o f a theory of ethics.... His
Christian belief in the providence o f God and his Aristotelian doctrine o f teleology combine to
convince him that life has meaning, and that that meaning is, at least in part, available to human
reason.” (Sigmund, introduction, pp. xxvi-xxvii.) See Sigmund, introduction, St. Thomas Aquinas on
Politics and Ethics, pp. xxvi-xxvii; Aquinas, Summa Against the Gentiles, II, 2-3, 25, in Sigmund, pp.
6-7.
49 Sigmund, introduction, p. xxi. Whereas Augustine was skeptical of man’s will and capacity to
pursue virtue in the social sphere—Augustine interpreted temporal history as a battle between the will
o f the Church (goodness) and the will of the State (interest)— , Aquinas adopted the Aristotelian vision
o f progress as the natural course o f society.” (Sigmund, introduction, pp. xiii-xiv.) He explains: “The
teleological outlook o f Aristotle is used to fashion a rational philosophical basis for the Christian belief
in a purposive and loving Creator. Their combination leads Aquinas to look for an order and harmony
in human society, politics, and ethics that is free o f contradiction, although not o f tension....”
(Sigmund, introduction, p. xxvi) See Augustine, City o f God, XIX, 17, and On Psalm 64, 2, in Bourke,
pp. 203-205; Copleston, II, pp. 289-291; Aquinas, The Summa o f Theology, I-II, Qu. 92,1, in Sigmund,
p. 47; Sigmund, introduction, St. Thomas Aquinas on Politics and Ethics, pp. xiii-xiv, xxii, xxvi.
50 Copleston, II, p. 253.
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the external world, thereby endorsing an a posteriori method that moved from the
evidence of final effect back to efficient cause—from Nature to God.51 This required
that some element of God—the perfect universal—exist in the material world for
mental detection. Hence the Thomist emphasis on the real existence of common
essences in particular things. 52
*

This difference bears relevance for the study of portraiture. In the study of
portraits, the issue of knowledge is reflected in the issue of “likeness.” Among
Thomists, “likeness” was understood to be an expression of the universal idea
contained in the common essences found in particular things. Franciscans, on the
other hand, while not denying that “likeness” might capture similarities among things,
rejected any necessary correlation between these similarities and universal ideas, since
all sensory knowledge is necessarily singular and, so, particular.53 The importance of
this difference rests in its intellectual implications for the meaning and value of
likeness. Among those who subscribed to the Thomist view, a “likeness” might be
said to advance human knowledge and, so, goodness, by providing an audience with
universal truths about reality. Among Franciscans, on the other hand, a “likeness”
might provide little more than the subjective rendering of a particular experience.54 In

51 Aquinas distingui shed this form o f knowledge from the perfect truth of revelation acquired upon
knowledge o f God. But man is given “a certain foretaste” o f such knowledge by the first principles of
nature—those which his natural reason recognizes as self-evident and those deduced from self-evident
principles. See Aquinas, Summa Against the Gentiles, I, 3 and 8, IV, 54, in Sigmund, pp. 3, 5, 12.
52 Copleston, II, pp. 253,258-260, 309-310, 325, 336-346. Augustine and the Franciscans argued that
universal ideas have only a conceptual existence, without foundation in reality. St. Bonaventure, for
example, though he differed from Augustine in admitting sensory objects as a source o f passive
sensation, defended the interior source o f eternal truth. See Copleston, II, pp. 250-258, 283-284.
53 As Copleston writes, “One can speak o f abstracting something ‘common’ from things, if one means
that one can consider things according to their likeness to one another. But the universality o f the
concept... is superimposed by the mind....” See Copleston, III, pp. 39-40.
54 According to Augustine, likenesses are but images o f memories based on experience—real or
imagined. See Augustine, Confessions, X, 8.14, in Bourke, p. 79; Copleston, III, pp. 29-33.
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theory, then, whereas a “general” likeness could be interpreted as more valuable than
a “particular” likeness, insofar as the general expression of a subject might be said to
equate with a general knowledge of its species and, so, with a knowledge of its
potentiality and final cause, such an argument would bear relevance only among those
who subscribed to the intelligibility of reality and located the source of that
intelligibility in the reasoned contemplation of sense-experience.55
Significantly, this appears to have been the case in Britain.56 Even the
Franciscan Roger Bacon (d. circa 1292) emphasized the importance of sensory
observation.57 Indeed, the writings of Roger Bacon mark a stage in the development
of neo-Franciscan thought that culminated in the consensus of John Duns Scotus (c.
1265/6 - 1308). Endorsing an Aristotelian view of knowledge, Scotus defended
scientific demonstration based on observation and experiment as the only method for
proving God’s existence in the absence of revelation, thereby advocating the a
posteriori approach endorsed by Thomism in matters of philosophical inquiry.58 At
the same time, however, while rejecting the Augustinian doctrines of rationes
seminales and divine illumination, Scotus denied any extramental foundation for
universal concepts, thereby undermining the value of likeness.59

55 According to Copleston, for example, Francis Suarez endorsed the Thomist theory o f abstracted
likeness, but whereas neo-Aristotelians understood individuality to derive from distinctions of matter
(body), Suarez perceived them to derive from differences o f form (soul). See Copleston, III, pp. 360361,366-367. For further comparison between Suarez and Thomas, see Copleston, III, pp. 376-378.
56 According to Copleston, the Oxford University curriculum represented “a characteristic mingling of
the Augustinian tradition with ‘empiricism’....” See Copleston, II, p. 212.
57 Copleston, n, pp. 228-231, 236-238, 442-448, and III, pp. 182-196.
58 Copleston, II, pp. 454, 519-523.
59 Copleston, II, pp. 475, 483, 488, 491, 497, 499, 510-512, 517. For more information about John
Duns Scotus, see Copleston, II, pp. 476-551.
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In the end, although the debate between the Franciscans and Dominicans60
was largely theoretical—insofar as the disciplinary distinctions between theology and
philosophy engendered in the work of Dominicans like Aquinas in no way denied the
supremacy of revealed truth or fundamental tenets like the intelligibility of reality, the
necessary relationship between eternal and moral laws, and the necessary perfection
of the eternal end for which man was divinely intended—, their differences forged a
gap between philosophy and theology that affected the perception of human intellect
and identity. Over time, a more critical understanding of the relationship between
truth—the by-product of wisdom—and reason—the medium of knowledge—
undermined the credibility of an intelligible supernatural reality; whereas strict
Franciscans continued to perceive knowledge as deriving from an internal
contemplation and illumination of the rationes seminales impressed on the human
soul during Creation, and neo-Aristotelian Dominicans and neo-Franciscan Scotists
continued to hold that a limited knowledge of reality might derive from a reasoned
understanding of the external world—neither group denying the primacy of
contemplation or revelation—, the way was opened for more radical interpretations.61
Indeed, the neo-Aristotelian emphasis on sensory experience invited a critique of

60 Not all Dominicans were Thomists; some, for example, like James o f Metz, held form—rather than
matter—to be the “principle of individuation,” thereby aligning with the Franciscans. See Copleston,
III, p. 24.
Dl The Dominican hierarchy o f knowledge informed the thought o f later philosophers. Machiavelli, for
example, wrote: “There are three kinds o f intelligence: one kind understands things for itself
[knowledge], the second appreciates what others can understand [customary authority], the third
understands neither for itself nor through others [ignorance].” (Machiavelli, The Prince, p. 75) See
Machiavelli, The Prince, p. 75; Copleston, II, pp. 545-546, 548-550.
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realism that inverted the relationship between contemplation and observation, with
important implications for identity.

62

As the interpretation of reality came increasingly to turn on a question of
knowledge, the Scholastic consensus of the late thirteenth century was weakened. In
general, Scholastics continued to recognize a realist hierarchy of knowledge
descending from theology (wisdom based on revealed truths), to philosophy
(knowledge based on reasoned observation and deduction), to physical science
•

•

■

(knowledge based on demonstration—hypothesis and experiment—and induction).

63

And this continued to guide their realist interpretation of virtue and identity. Since
knowledge was the medium of goodness—the final state of eternal happiness and
perfection (beatitude)—, and the value of the individual turned on his contribution to
the good life, a contribution dependent upon knowledge, those with claims to a higher
knowledge of reality were necessarily more virtuous—and, therefore, superior—to
those without such claims.64 But by the fourteenth century, a nominalist movement
led by the Franciscan, William of Ockham, was challenging the credibility of
62 For a discussion o f this difference, and its influence on St. Thomas Aquinas, see Copleston, II, pp.
328-334, 375-376, 385-386. The heightened emphasis on empirical studies can be attributed, in part,
to the evolution of science and mathematics with which William of Ockham and the nominalist
movement was affiliated. According to Copleston, “Already in the thirteenth century... we can see the
beginning of a scientific investigation o f Nature.” (Copleston, III, p. 422) See Copleston, III, pp. 15-16,
420-422.
63 Copleston, II, p. 325, and III, p. 419.
64 Aquinas described three levels o f happiness and goodness: pleasure, affiliated with corporeal desire
and ignorance; virtue, affiliated with civic goodness and reason; and truth, affiliated with divine
wisdom and pure happiness. One’s identity thus turned on one’s will and capacity to attain ever-higher
levels. (Aquinas, Summa Against the Gentiles, II, 63, in Sigmund, pp. 9-10) As inequality was an
effect o f will, so society fell into a natural order “based on different duties and functions” in which
superior persons ruled inferior ones. (Aquinas, Summa o f Theology, I-I, Qu. 96, 3-4, in Sigmund, p.
38-39) However, because Aquinas conditioned a “good life” on two things—“to act in accordance
with virtue” and “a sufficiency o f the material goods that are necessary for virtuous action”— will
became a complement to landed leisure. (Aquinas, On Kingship, 15, in Sigmund, p. 29) The end result
was three social classes: nobility, gentry and commons. (Aquinas, Summa o f Theology, I-I, Qu. 108,2,
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Scholastic realism.65 Ockham’s insistence on the liberty of the divine will, which
implied the possibility of arbitrary laws and standards, and his rejection of the
necessary relationship between eternal and natural laws, advocated only two types of
knowledge: revealed truth and demonstrated fact.66 On the one hand, this was to
complicate—if not deny—the necessary link between knowledge and virtue; if
metaphysical knowledge were a matter of divine will, and virtue a matter of human
will, upon what might virtue be based and by what standards measured?

67

On the

other hand, by subverting the authority of philosophy to the interests of science and,
by extension, the place of the philosopher to the place of the scientist, the conditions
upon which one might acquire knowledge and, so, ascend the scale of human value,
were made more inclusive.
In denying the relevance of philosophy to knowledge, in confining knowledge
to revealed truth and demonstrated fact, nominalism upset the balance-of-influence
between theoretike—the realm of philosophy—and practike—the realm of science—
in Sigmund, p. 41) See Aquinas, Summa Against the Gentiles, II, 63, Summa o f Theology, I-I, Qu. 96,
3-4, and 108,2, On Kingship, 15, in Sigmund, pp. 9-10,29,38-39,41.
65 According to Copleston, nominalism twisted Aristotelianism: “questions which were formerly treated
as metaphysical questions are treated primarily as logical questions.” (Copleston, III, p. 12) Petrus
Aureoli, who rejection the material foundations o f universal ideas, marked a stage in the development
o f nominalism. (Copleston, III, pp. 41-42) See Copleston, III, pp. 12,41-42.
66 According to Copleston, William o f Ockham recognized two kinds of science: physical science,
which deals with real things and effects ‘first terms’; and rational science or logic, which deals with
terms and concepts. Since only real, material things exist—as Aristotle and the Thomists likewise
believed—physical science must serve as the rightful foundation for logical science. Hence,
observation and demonstration must properly precede metaphysical contemplation or rationalization.
Physical science thus became affiliated with two forms of knowledge: certain truths based on analytical
propositions— i.e. self-evident principles that cannot be contradicted— ; and uncertain facts, based on
repetitive cause and effect. This was to deny the a priori approach o f traditional Franciscan thought.
See Copleston, II, p. 323, and III, pp. 11-14,41-42, 59-60,69, 91-92, 101, 125-126, 151-157, 166-167.
67 Aristotle and Plato understood the meaning o f life to be the attainment of good and identity to be the
measure o f one’s contribution to this end—one’s virtue. In general, Augustine also understood the end
of human life to be the achievement o f Good and the standard o f individual worth to be virtue, but he
took the classical position one step further by making this virtue a matter o f ‘will’; by virtue o f our will,
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and the balance-of-authority between the ‘higher’ standards of theoretike—those
based on eternal, natural laws—and the ‘lower’ standards ofpractike—those based on
convention and experience.68 Fundamental tenets were affected, including the
necessary relationship between divine and human intellect (the latter an imperfect
image of the former), the necessary relationship between divine and human will (the
latter an imperfect complement to the former), and the principle of perfection as
necessarily informing the foundations of law and virtue, the intelligibility of reality,
the theory of potentiality and, by extension, the standards of social order and
individual identity.69
Indeed, having located the standards of human life in the evidence of
particular experience, nominalism upset the traditional social order.

Whereas St.

Thomas had deemed the common man too preoccupied with labor to indulge in the
contemplation essential to truth and, consequently, made the common man dependent
on a leisured—disinterested and self-sufficient—elite, nominalism suggested that the
leisured intellectual was no better a source of truth than the common observer.71 At
the same time, its denial of theoretical truth invited the common man to narrate a
reality and identity suited to his particular experience, regardless of customary

in tandem with Grace, we have the capacity to progress from ignorance “to true self-knowledge.”
(Taylor, pp. 135-139) See Taylor, pp. 116, 135-139.
68 Copleston, III, pp. 21-22. As Copleston notes, the result was a new emphasis on empiricism and the
reality o f everyday life; although “Renaissance scientists ... [were] interested primarily in knowledge
for its own sake... [,] new scientific discoveries and the opening up o f the new world naturally
suggested a contrast between a knowledge o f nature... for man’s benefit, and the older abstract
discipline which seemed devoid o f practical utility.” See Copleston, III, p. 21.
69 Copleston, II, pp. 398-400,407-411, and III, pp. 48-49,421.
70 Copleston, III, pp. 420-422, 425.
71 As Copleston writes: “By making the moral law dependent on the free divine choice [Ockham]
implied... that without revelation man can have no certain knowledge even o f the present moral order
established by God.” See Copleston, III, pp. 14 -15; quoted from p. 14.
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authority.72 This was not without risk. Once individuals became persuaded they
could shape narratives and identities beyond the parameters of a socially-defined
subjecthood, the social order became subject to ‘false’ standards at the risk of
instability.73 In the end, those who held eternal laws to be unintelligible severed the
link between eternal standards and temporal life, opening the way for moral fluidity
and a more subjective interpretation of identity.74 As Frederic Copleston writes, “a
new age for man was beginning.... And [it]... favoured the growth of
individualism.”75
The second phase of mediaeval thought was thus characterized by a move
from consensus to criticism. By the fourteenth century, the realist consensus of the
“old” schools—those which retained the legacies of St. Thomas (The Thomists or
Dominicans), Duns Scotus (The Scotists or, more loosely, the Franciscans), Giles of
Rome (the Hermits of St. Augustine) and Henry of Ghent—was being challenged by
those who denied the intelligibility of universal truths in the absence of revelation.76
In denying the credibility of realism, nominalism weakened the customary
foundations for evaluating identity: whereas most mediaeval thinkers had come to

72 Benjamin, “Figuring self-identity,” in Steyn, pp. 16-17. As Benjamin describes it, once the
“questioning” began, it invited “the abeyance o f conventional and therefore traditional forms o f identity
thinking,” undermining “the traditional linkage [between]... self and identity.” See Benjamin,
“Figuring self-identity, in Steyn, p. 16.
73 John Canfield describes ‘false’ identities as mere summations o f “what the self-image images,”
effected by a ‘false’ consciousness. (Canfield, p. 134) Among theorists as dissimilar as Locke,
Shaftesbury, and Rousseau, a society composed o f false identities was considered to be dangerous, for
false identities signaled false realities, the foundation o f instability and corruption. See Canfield, p.
134; Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, III, p. 193; Taylor, pp. 21, 159-161; Pocock, The Machiavellian
Moment, pp. 464-6, 495-6, 538.
74 For Augustine and his followers, moral laws were fixed, based on the intelligible standard of
goodness. This was not necessarily the case in the modem period. See Augustine, Moral Behavior of
the Catholic Church, 5-8, in Bourke, pp. 155-158.
'5 Copleston, III, pp. 18-20; quoted from p. 19.
76 Copleston, II, pp. 9-11, 435-440.
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endorse the Aristotelian description of man as a social animal and society as the
natural inclination of human potentiality, nominalism rejected such claims on grounds
of divine liberty, which entitled God to any agenda, however inconsistent with the
demands of human reason; whereas most mediaeval thinkers had come to perceive the
rise of civil society as occurring, first, for purposes of mutual preservation and,
ultimately, for purposes of higher good, nominalism reclaimed the Augustinian tenor
of self-interested preservation; whereas most mediaeval thinkers had come to believe
that political authority was properly vested in the people and the purpose of
“compact” was to effect a natural and harmonious balance between government and
governed, the “natural rights” retained by the individual being justly balanced by the
necessary powers of a sovereign authority, nominalism opened the way for a more
arbitrary understanding of compact—i.e. for individual rights and sovereign authority
to become “social conventions” without foundation in natural law.77
Indeed, nominalism changed the relationship between nature, man, society,
and God, recasting the State in Augustinian terms, conducive to more radical
convention narratives—those based not on a natural proclivity towards the good, but
on a need to protect against evil.78 At the same time, it elevated the role of empirical
observation at the expense of contemplation. In the end, two competing narratives
emerged, each endorsing different combinations of classical and Christian doctrine:

77 Copleston, III, pp. 312-315. Joannes Althusius provided perhaps the first “clear statement o f the
contract theory” in which “a contract lies at the basis of every association or community o f men.”
(Copleston, III, p. 327) However, unlike Jean Bodin, Althusius argued that individuals necessarily
retained their natural authority in the act o f compact, a point which linked him to Locke rather than
Hobbes. As Copleston explains it, because contract is sanctified by its roots in natural law, according
to divine authority, “sovereignty rests always, necessarily and inalienably with the people.” See
Copleston, III, p. 327.
78 Copleston, III, pp. 111-113, 116-118, 173, 179-180.
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on the one hand, a moderate realist narrative supported a neo-Aristotelian correlation
between knowledge and virtue characterized by a traditional Christian ethic and an
interest in empirical observation as the point-of-departure for higher reason; on the
other hand, a nominalist narrative subverted the neo-Aristotelian correlation between
knowledge and virtue to an Augustinian pessimism and a secondary interest in
scientific methodology.
In part, these developments reflected the growing influence of science on
society and narrative. The emerging perception of nature as whole in and of itself
and, so, as intellectually accessible in the absence of revelation inclined attention
away from the eternal realm of theological contemplation towards the temporal realm
of scientific observation.79 As nature became the complement to science—their
relationship reflected in the popularity of mathematics—, traditional religion lost
ground to deism and contemplation lost ground to observation.80 At the same time, as
knowledge became more inclusive, the opportunities for individual agency in
narrative and identity increased. This influence persisted during the early modem
period: as observation and induction informed modem British empiricism, so
mathematical deduction shaped Continental rationalism.81

79 Copleston, III, pp. 248-250. For an overview o f the arguments engaged in this development, see
Copleston, III, pp. 250-289.
80 Copleston, III, pp. 289-291. As Copleston describes it, deism “brings in God simply as an
explanation o f the origin o f the mechanical system.” (Copleston, III, p. 289) See Copleston, III, pp.
275-276,289.
81 Science informed the development o f two strains o f thought: continental rationalism, led by Rene
Descartes (1596-1650) in France; and British empiricism, led by Francis Bacon (1561-1626) in
England. For a discussion o f these developments, see Copleston, III, pp. 290, 300, IV, pp. 1, 13-33, 3738, 55-62, 396-403,427-433, and vol. VI, pp. 405-415.
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In part, too, the criticism motivating the nominalist movement was bom of the
tensions between Church and State.82 Similar conditions affected the Renaissance
period. Machiavelli’s Prince, for example, defended absolute monarchy and secular
interests in the interest of political stability.83 Indeed, faced with Florentine political
turmoil from 1494 to 1530, Machiavelli crafted a political discourse that undermined
the authority of traditional realist narratives. Not only did it counsel princes to
privilege power above virtue,84 it dismissed with the principle of moral continuity,
forgin g

a separate ethic for political society than that ascribed to eternal life—one

based on civic virtue (per human reason) the other based on moral goodness (per
divine wisdom).85 As Bernard Crick writes, “Here we are, for the first time, on the
edge of the relativity of morals; and there is a case... for seeing Machiavelli rather
q

than Montesquieu as the first master of political sociology.”

/:

The influence of Machiavelli’s Prince is resonant in Hobbes’s Leviathan,
which was likewise motivated by contemporary political tensions and the demands of
a commercial experience.87 Indeed, the political absolutism of Machiavelli’s

82 Machiavelli wrote in The Discourses: “It is the Church that has kept, and keeps, Italy divided.”
(Machiavelli, Discourse 1.12, in Crick, p. 145.) For a full discussion of Machiavelli’s concerns, see
Discourse 1.12, in Crick, pp. 142-146; Copleston, III, pp. 346-347.
83 Anthony Grafton, introduction, in Macchiavelli, The Prince, pp. xiii-xxviii. See also Copleston, III,
pp. 21-23, 111, 117-118, 173.
84 Machiavelli wrote: “a man who wants to act virtuously in every way necessarily comes to grief
among so many who are not virtuous. Therefore if a prince wants to maintain his rule he must be
prepared not to be virtuous....” (Machiavelli, The Prince, pp. 49-50) See Machiavelli, The Prince, pp.
19, 30-50, 56-58; Machiavelli, The Discourses, Discourse 1.32, in Crick, p. 188.
85 As Crick describes it, Machiavelli recognized two moralities, “the morality o f the soul and the
morality o f the city,” which coexisted in tension. (Crick, introduction, p. 65) This observation
undermined the classical theory o f virtue, which presumed a single moral standard operating towards
potentiality. See Crick, introduction to Machiavelli, The Discourses, pp. 28, 33-34, 63, 65-67.
86 Crick, introduction to Machiavelli, The Discourses, p. 28.
87 Indeed, what is significant about Machiavelli’s perspective is that his notion o f gentlemen is not
based on landed birth and leisure but on positive productivity. Venetian “gentlemen,” he wrote, were
gentlemen in name only, “for they do not derive any considerable income from estates: their great
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Prince—and the self-preserving negativism of Augustinian nominalism

helped

make credible both the practical absolutism of Hobbes’s Leviathan and the theoretical
absolutism informing the ‘divine right of kings’.88 Yet political absolutism was, in
general, short-lived. Over time, the principle of individual rights—of the people’s
natural authority and the sovereign’s natural duty—, and the neo-classical perception
of society—as the by-product of a divine and natural inclination among men to
compact, first, among themselves and, second, between themselves and a legislator—,
were reasserted with greater force.89 In the end, the influence of Machiavelli’s Prince
was exceeded by his Discourses, whose practical republic appeared a modem update
on neo-Aristotelian realism.90
In fact, Machiavelli’s republic represented an unusual blending of theoretical
principles and practical expediency.91 As Crick observes, the conditions it invoked
reflected an urban bias not found in traditional Aristotelian narratives. Indeed, a

wealth is based on merchandise and movable goods.” (Machiavelli, Discourse 1.55, in Crick, p. 247)
As Crick observes: “Here is a bourgeois assumption, indeed ...[;] property... has a dynamic of its own:
it is the duty o f men - just as John Locke was to argue - to use and improve it.” (Crick, introduction to
Machiavelli, The Discourses, p. 39) But Machiavelli was not consistent on this point, for he also
advocated poverty as a means o f de-emphasizing the connection between property and virtue.
(Machiavelli, The Discourses, Discourse 111.25, in Crick, p. 475) See Crick, introduction to
Machiavelli, The Discourses, pp. 39; Machiavelli, Discourse 1.55 and 111.24, in Crick, pp. 245-247,
475; Grafton, introduction to Machiavelli, The Prince, p. xxiv.
88 Copleston, HI, pp. 311-312.
89 Copleston, III, pp. 347-348.
90 Machiavelli’s Discourses were probably begun, at least in thought, by 1513, when he wrote the
Prince. The two works appear as bookend manuals for alternative political conditions. Yet, even when
he was writing the Prince, he was casting himself in the guise o f humanist; a letter to Vettori records:
“When evening comes, I return to my home, and I go into my study; and on the threshold, I take off my
everyday clothes, which are covered with mud and mire, and I put on regal and curial robes; and
dressed in a more appropriate manner I enter into the ancient courts of ancient men...; and there I am
not ashamed to speak to them, to ask them the reasons for their actions; and they, in their humanity,
answer m e...: I become completely part of them.” See Machiavelli, Letter to Vettori, quoted in
Grafton, introduction to Machiavelli, The Prince, p. xix.
91 Machiavelli’s methodology is a posteriori, based on practical experience as well as theoretical ideals.
See Crick, introduction to Machiavelli, The Discourses, pp. 48-49.
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traditional emphasis on custom and civic virtue was joined with the authority of town
over country, “a large middle class,” and the institutional participation of commoners
in politics.92 Coupled with his concession to “flexibility,” Machiavelli’s narrative
*

•

anticipates the commercial humanism of eighteenth-century Britain.

93

Moreover,

while endorsing common good as the end of society, Machiavelli makes the means by
which it is attained less fixed than traditional neo-Aristotelian narratives. Indeed, in
the interest of social stability, not only does he make the three “powers” or estates of
Aristotelian theory more fluid in both character and authority, he advocates a
controlled tension between nobility and common as essential to the security of
liberty.94 The sum effect was to alter the nature of republican identity. While
continuing to highlight the heroic virtue attendant active civic life, Machiavelli
emphasized the singular talents of distinguished elites—“Great Men” or “Catos”—as
opposed to a body of citizen-equals.95

92 Crick, introduction to Machiavelli, The Discourses, p. 41. Machiavelli’s emphasis on a large middle
class, like Aristotle’s endorsement of polity, was intended as alternative to democracy or oligarchy.
See Crick, introduction to Machiavelli, The Discourses, p. 43.
93 As Crick writes, Machiavelli’s republic suggested “that civilization itself—morality, civic spirit,
learning, art, science and commerce - was a product o f city life...”— not country life. See Crick,
introduction to Machiavelli, The Discourses, pp. 43, 536 (Note 34).
94 For example, circumstances that require absolute rule may call on the estate o f kingship. See Crick,
in Machiavelli, The Discourses, pp. 30, 34, 534 (Note 27); Machiavelli, The Discourses, Discourse 1.4,
1.9,1.17, in Crick, pp. 113, 132, 159.
95 Machiavelli, The Discourses, Discourse III. 1, in Crick, p. 386-389. The ideal legislator was
celebrated in the person of Cincinnatus, a virtuous Roman citizen called on to serve as a military
dictator in order to save Rome from defeat. Having completed his public task, Cincinnatus returned to
his farm and resumed his place as a private citizen—a prime example of the “ruled and be ruled” ethic
extolled by Aristotle. Still, Machiavelli’s legislators are “great men”—as opposed to citizen-equals.
They “rise above the rank and file” to govern the natural tensions between the upper and lower classes.
A similar position was held by Polybius and Aquinas. As Thomas Aquinas described it: “the best
constitution for a city or kingdom is one in which one person rules in accordance with virtue, and under
him there are others who govern in accordance with virtue.... This was... the government established
by divine law.” (Aquinas, Summa o f Theology, I-II, Qu. 105, 1, in Sigmund, p. 59) See Machiavelli,
The Discourses, Discourse 1.2, III. 1,111.25,111.34, and Crick, introduction and Notes 2, 8, 14, in Crick,
pp. 24-25, 27-28, 110, 386-390, 475-476, 497, 529-531; Aquinas, Summa o f Theology, I-II, Qu. 90,3
and 91, 1-4, Summa Against the Gentiles, IV, 76, On Kingship, 1-15, in Sigmund, pp. 13-29, 45-47.
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Although the endorsement of republican ideals—however much modified-—
implied a rejection of convention theories and a general belief in natural law as the
proper basis for society—for interpreting sovereign authority and individual rights, for
example—, alternative narratives continued to coexist, often to conflicting ends.96
Machiavelli’s version of the classical republic, for example, subverted the private and
domestic to the public and civic, Christian goodness to pagan virtue. By contrast,
Northern Renaissance narratives tended to subvert public to private, heroic virtue to
Christian goodness. Indeed, while both sides acknowledged the necessary role of
sense-perception in the development of knowledge—even self-knowledge—, and
both accepted the principle of perfection as the final cause and necessary standard of
human life—each an indication of Aristotle’s expanding influence—, the Northern
Renaissance placed greater emphasis on the internal individual, thereby effecting a
•

different relationship between the individual and society.

07

Beginning around 1536, when John Calvin argued that an individual’s worth
was a measure of his Christian goodness in the temporal realm, the Protestant
Reformation initiated an ‘ethic of ordinary life’ that, in complement with the
expanding marketplace, turned attention towards the private man in the social
sphere.

no

This conflicted with traditional distinctions between public and private

men—the former an essential feature of the virtuous republic, the latter a metaphor
96 Copleston, III, pp. 207-220, 227-228,273-274,348-349.
9' In general, the Italian Renaissance was characterized by a renewed interest in classical literature for
purposes of improving man and society. In Northern Europe, this interest was wed with demands for
moral and social reform. See Copleston, III, pp. 223,225,228, 322-324, 329-332, 335-344.
98 The “key point,” Taylor writes, “is that the higher is to be found not outside o f but as a manner of
living ordinary life,” and this ethic, he adds, fostered “anti-elite” sentiments, a key influence in the
development of a “bourgeois” ideology. See Taylor, pp. 13-14,23, 211; John Calvin, Institutes o f the
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for patronage and corruption—, recasting the private man in Christian terms.

99

In

fact, however, the emerging influence of ‘ordinary life’ was indicative of a changing
social and political environment caused, at least in part, by three interlocking trends: a
growing uncertainty about customary authority and the possibility of intelligible truth;
a corresponding uncertainty about the credibility of social prescriptions; and a
consequent emphasis on the secular realm as the only ‘knowable’ sphere of human
existence.100
The possibility that truth was unintelligible prior to revelation freed Reformed
Christians from the natural and fixed standards to which more orthodox Christians
were subject. As Baumeister suggests, people became conscious of their two selves,
one public and external, the other private and internal.101 As a result, he writes, they
“gradually ceased to equate the individual with the individual’s [birth-Jplace in
society, and they ceased to feel that the person was morally obligated to fulfill the role

Christian Religion (1536), trans. Henry Beveridge (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm B. Eerdmans Publishing
Co., (1989) 2001).
99 As Machiavelli described it, only public citizens benefited society. However, Baumeister notes,
“dramatic social changes at the end o f the Middle Ages” witnessed “the spread o f religious dissent and
a great increase in social mobility ....” By the sixteenth century, he goes on, there was an awareness of
a “self not directly visible in social actions and roles.” (Baumeister, pp. 30-45) See Baumeister, pp. 3045; Machiavelli, The Discourses, Discourse III. 28, in Crick, p. 482.
100 According to Roy Baumeister, the “transition from the medieval to the early modem period included
two developments important for identity. First, the Protestant Reformation divided the educated classes
over the correct interpretation o f Christian truth. As a result, instead of being a firm basis for identity,
Christian belief became itself somewhat problematic.... Second, social mobility made it quite possible
to change one’s rank in society, at least to some extent. Thus, one major component of identity (social
rank) came to depend on individual achievement rather than on passive assignment.” See Baumeister,
p. 57; Plato, Laws, pp. 277-278, 284-289.
101 As Baumeister observes, “The ‘inner self does not really exist. It is a useful concept for describing
important parts o f human experience and behavior.... [However, as] the contents o f the inner self are
essentially contents o f meaning," in the absence o f a universally-convincing narrative, the context of
meaning was lost. (Baumeister, p. 164) Hence, the Reformed Christian turned inward to discover his
own “purpose and meaning” for life. (Baumeister, p. 171) See Baumeister, pp. 56-57, 164, 171.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

56

assigned by society.”102 The effects were resonant in the accompanying shift from
sociological to psychological identities. As the individual was made responsible for
his own salvation and was thus charged with determining his own ‘meaning of life’, a
wedge was forged between the individual and the community manifest in a
philosophical isolation between man and his world.103 Over time, morality and
identity assumed a new fluidity as a secular Christian ethic emerged disengaged from
the civic ideals of neo-Aristotelian politics and the universal authority of Augustinian
realism.104 The result was a division between the public/ external and private/
internal self resonant, for example, in the spatial segregations of Renaissance
portraiture.

ins

All this rested uneasily with classicism.106 Although classical principles
continued to inform the dominant ideology, the ‘internal self nurtured by the

102 On the one hand, Baumeister writes, “the decline of Christian moral and political views erased the
requirement that the individual be content with his lot in society....” (Baumeister, p. 56) On the other
hand, the absence o f fixed standards made it essential that “each identity ... contain an inner structure
o f values and priorities” to guide its subject. (Baumeister, p. 164) As a result, “the concept of person
was separated from the concept o f his or her place in the social structure.” (Baumeister, p. 57) This
conduced to the Puritan vision o f two selves—one private and internal, one public and external.
Indeed, Baumeister notes, “It is likely that the two developments were related.” (Baumeister, p. 171)
See Baumeister, pp. 15, 30-45, 53, 56-57, 164, 171, 246.
103 As Baumeister writes, “Medieval attitudes lacked... emphasis on individuality.... A main reason for
the relative indifference to individuality was the firm medieval faith in Christianity.... Salvation ...
was collective.... In the twelfth century, however, this seems to have changed.... The later medievals
expected the archangel to evaluate your soul based on what you did during your life.... This shift...
put the all-important issue o f salvation in individualistic terms.” See Baumeister, pp. 30-45.
104 Against traditional Christian and classical narratives, the Reformed ethic o f ‘ordinary life’ privileged
the private individual in the secular world. As Baumeister observes, “Morality survived as a set o f rules
about right and wrong, but morality was no longer the means used for fulfilling one’s potentiality.” See
Baumeister, pp. 56-57.
105 By the Renaissance, a growing awareness o f individual autonomy was made manifest in portraiture
through the compositional, linguistic, and psychological devices o f space, gesture, brushstroke, and
color. “This freeing of nature from the iconographic tradition,” Taylor writes, “also carries
consequences for the place of the subject.... There is a new distance between subject and object, and
they are clearly situated relative to each other....[—space] ‘at one and the same time objectifies the
object and personalizes the subject’.” See Taylor, pp. 200-202
106 Plato’s insistence on the divine and fixed nature o f morality was a conscious refutation of the moralrelativism of convention theories. See Plato, Laws, pp. 408-409, 416-424, 516.
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Reformation urged an individual autonomy and self-determination that undermined
*

•

the ‘fixed’ social and political structure advanced by neo-Aristotelian realism.

107

The

result was a paradoxical blending of individualism and neo-Aristotelian realism in
which the principle of individual agency coexisted with the principle of universal
perfection.108 On the one hand, men were taught that the evaluation of civic virtue
and social identity was informed by fixed, natural standards of goodness grounded in
eternal laws. On the other hand, they were increasingly encouraged, within this
context, to advance and improve themselves according to their independent
evaluation of those standards. The result was a constant renegotiation of one’s
identity and social place.

| r iQ

In the end, the Reformation’s dissent from customary

authority permitted the autonomous and self-determining individual to surface as the
agent of his own identity.110 As Baumeister explains it, the gain in individual agency
that resulted from the Reformation’s dissent from orthodox standards granted the
individual “more latitude for defining himself’ according to his own “sense of
personal potential.”111

107 Baumeister concludes: “By the eighteenth century, “persons could be permitted to choose their own
forms of potential to try to fulfill.... A person’s potentiality thus became an unknown instead of a fixed
and known quantity.” See Baumeister, pp. 56-57.
108 Copleston, III, pp. 242-243.
109 As Crick notes, “What is decisive to Machiavelli, as to Shakespeare, is the interplay between the
two presumed forces of character and circumstance, not the fixity of either. If he had meant to say that
human nature is everywhere the same, in a strong rather than a weak sense, then he would, presumably
have laid out schematically what types o f human nature there are, or what basic humours. Plato had
done so, and the Mediaeval allegorists.” See Crick, in Machiavelli, The Discourses, Note 72, p. 544.
110 Taylor, p. 21; Baumeister, pp. 168,252.
111 Baumeister, p. 171.
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CHAPTER III
THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD

Persona in latine signifies the disguise, or outward appearance of a man,
counterfeited on the Stage; and sometimes more particularly that part of it,
which disguiseth the face, as a Mask or Visard.... So that a Person, is the
same that an Actor is, both on the Stage and in common Conversation; and to
Personate, is to Act, or Represent himselfe, or an other; and he that acteth
another, is said to beare his Person, or act in his name....
- Thomas Hobbes, 16511

Empirical science, practical politics and Reformed Christianity continued to
influence the development of British neo-classicism well into the early modem
period.2 In the seventeenth-century, a growing emphasis on politics and the proper
distribution of political authority brought the relationship between the individual and
society to the fore. On the one hand, in a nod to Machiavelli, Royalists like Lord
Halifax urged the authority of a single sovereign on grounds that commoners lacked
the capacity for disinterested virtue essential to social stability and public good; the
King (supported by the House of Lords) was thus the best means of protecting society
from the dangers attendant human power relations.3 On the other hand,

1 “A PERSON,” he goes on, “is he [to whom]... words or actions are ...attributed, whether Truly or by
Fiction.” See Hobbes, Leviathan, or the Matter, Form and Power o f a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical
and Civil (London, 1651), p. 217. Hobbes’s philosophy was outlined in three works: De Cive (Paris,
1642), De Corpore (1655) and De homine (1658.) See Copleston, V, p. 2.
2 Copleston, IV, pp. 4-10.
3 According to an anonymous essay, “Observations Upon a late LIBEL, called A Letter from a Person
o f Quality to his Friend, Concerning the King’s Declaration, &c.,” attributed to George Savile, 1st
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Parliamentarians like the first earl of Shaftesbury advanced the House of Commons as
the best means of preserving the natural rights of the individual in the interest of
public good.4
In 1642, Charles I responded to Parliamentarian demands for a more
‘balanced’ government with his Answer to the Nineteen Propositions o f Both Houses
o f Parliament. This document stands as testimony to the influence of republican
principles on British politics, but it also serves as a reminder of the various forms a
republic might take; it described a ‘mixed monarchy’ that wed the principles of
‘hierarchy’ and ‘republic’ into a Polybian-Machiavellian variation on Aristotle’s
‘mixed’ government, transforming the Aristotelian distinction between one
Marquis of Halifax, the claims o f the Country nobles were exaggerated. In defense o f the Court, the
author notes the “Excesses o f the Commons,” which had resulted in hostility between the two Houses
o f Parliament. But he also highlights the self-interested motivations o f the Letter writer: they “would
be glad, instead o f being a little men as their Neighbors, to gain that superiority which Nature denied
them.” (“Observations,” p. 2) In this, “the Misleaders” went on, they recall the Long Parliament of the
Commonwealth period, insofar as “they would have... a House o f Commons that may do what they
will, and as long as thy will, that is for ever,” without the consent o f Lords and King. (“Observation,”
pp. 2, 5, 8) This exceeds even the hopes o f “our Modem Plato”— i.e. the first Earl of Shaftesbury. See
Anonymous, “Observations Upon a late LIBEL, called A Letter from a Person o f Quality to his Friend,
concerning the K ing’s Declaration, &c.,” (1675) (London: printed for C. Mason, 1681), pp. 2, 5, 8.
4 In A Letter from a Person o f Quality, To His Friend in the Country, attributed to the first Earl of
Shaftesbury, the writer outlines contemporary concerns raised by the recent sitting of the House of
Lords: the effort to solidify a “Cavalier Party” in disregard of the “Country Lords;” the effort to solidify
unalterably the government o f the Church, “and so Tacitely owned to be o f Divine Right;” and the
declaration o f a “government absolute and Arbitrary,” in which Parliament is reduced to a fund-raising
and administrative arm o f the legislature—“to pass such laws, as the Court and Church shall have a
mind to....” (Anon., Letter from a Person o f Quality, pp. 1,2, 6) Hence, he argues, he “Cavalier
Party” proposes a “divine Institution.... Nay what is worse, they have truckt away the Rights and
Liberties o f the people in this,... that they might be owned by the Prince to be Jure Divino, and
maintained in that Pretention by that absolute power and force....” (Anon, Letter from a Person o f
Quality, p. 34) Against this platform, the “Old English Lords” support “Magna Charta” as the premise
o f English liberties and “humane Laws:” it “says, Our Kings may not take our Fields, our Vineyards,
our Com, and our Sheep ” (Anon., A Letter from a Person o f Quality, p. 34) As likewise
communicated in A Letter from a Friend, to a Person o f Quality: In Answer to A Letter from a Person
o f Quality to his Friend; about Abhorers and Addressers, attributed to John Locke, the position o f the
‘Country Lords’ was heralded as a defense o f the people’s rights and liberties and the “Protestant
Religion,” in which light, the Church o f England was held to be “the best Reformed Church.” (Anon, A
Letter from a Friend, to a Person o f Quality, p. 1). See A Letter from a Person o f Quality, To His
Friend in the Country (London: printed in 1675), pp. 1, 2, 6, 33-34; A Letter from a Friend, to a
Person o f Quality (London: printed for T. Davies, 1682), p. 1.
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(monarchy), few (aristocracy) and many (polity) into a ‘balanced’ authority
combining three estates—king, nobility, and people—, each bearing its own form of
virtue—security, wisdom, and liberty—and, consequently, each bearing a legitimate
claim to political authority.5 Indeed, the ready manipulation of classical principles
permitted their assimilation into all kinds of agendas. As Machiavelli suggested, a
republic might conduce to hereditary hierarchy or social equality, to a philosopherprince or a republican citizen.5 Similarly, it might exclude the commercial classes
from political authority or defend their claim to virtue, might make them gentlemen of
‘title’ or deny such title on grounds of birth—thereby setting or bending the standards
of Public identity.

*7

5 According to Pocock, His Majesty's Answer to the Nineteen Propositions o f Both Houses of
Parliament, written in August 1642 by advisors to the Charles I, was a key document in the
development o f republicanism. It described an English parliamentary monarchy that was ‘republican’,
Pocock argues, “in the sense that it was Polybian, ... a mixed government in which monarchy,
aristocracy and democracy combined to balance one another... [and] check the degenerative tendency
o f each.” (Pocock, introduction to Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana and A System o f Politics,
pp. xiii-xiv) Borrowing on the writings o f Machiavelli, as Harrington explained it: “the senate
proposing, the people resolving, and the magistracy executing, whereby partaking o f the aristocracy as
in the senate, o f the democracy as in the people, and o f monarchy as in the magistracy, it is complete.”
(Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana, p. 25) See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 355358, 377, 421; Taylor, p. 195; Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana, pp. 23-24, 38, 65-66, 234,
237; Harrington, A System o f Politics, pp. 280-281; Pocock, introduction to Harrington, The
Commonwealth o f Oceana and A System o f Politics, pp. xiii-xiv.
6 As Aristotle and Harrington described it, a “citizen”—as opposed to a “servant”— was a “freeman,”
one “that can live upon his own” and, hence, claim title to independence. (Harrington, A System o f
Politics, p. 269) Likewise, a nation of independent men was a nation of citizens whose “government
may [possibly] be democracy,” but was so necessarily. By contrast, a nation composed of independent
and dependent men, citizens and servants, was o f necessity “either monarchy or aristocracy.”
(Harrington, A System o f Politics, p. 270) For both Aristotle and Harrington, independence required
landed wealth. This was not the case with Machiavelli, whose legislators came from an active and
productive urban elite. See Harrington, A System o f Politics, Pocock, ed., pp. 269-270; Harrington,
The Commonwealth o f Oceana, pp. 67-71; Machiavelli, The Discourses, Discourse 1.55, in Crick, p.
247.
7 Both Plato and Aristotle condemned the participation o f commercial men in the civic sphere on
grounds that their pursuit o f money led to their easy corruption. Harrington adopted a similar position.
Thomas Aquinas likewise objected to profit-making and money-lending, but deemed rents and leases,
which provided a material good in the exchange for money, acceptable. He also acknowledged that
commercial profits could be used frugally to good ends. In this way, he invited the development of a
commercial ethic. Machiavelli, by contrast, praised the productivity o f merchants and condemned the
idleness o f leisured gentry. See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 387-388; Machiavelli, The
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The intellectual and psychological foundations for political change were thus
already in place when Britain faced the collapse of monarchy.8 As Pocock describes
it, Englishmen had already begun to “restate the terms on which [they] as civic beings
lived with one another.”9 Because of this, Cromwell’s soldiers could cast themselves
as public defenders of individual “rights and liberties,” invoking a narrative
conducive to republicanism.10 However, as the pragmatic absolutism of
Machiavelli’s Prince was balanced by the republican ideals of his Discourses, so the
development of British philosophy witnessed harsh dichotomies of opinion. Indeed,
the polarities informing Machiavelli’s Prince and Discourses were resonant in the
writings of Thomas Hobbes and James Harrington. As Hobbes defended a single
sovereign authority and the sacrifice of individual liberties in the interest of social
stability, so Harrington defended a republic of citizen-freeholders in which individual
liberties were preserved in the interest of progress and virtue.11 Their work thus
stands as useful evidence of the conflicting influences informing seventeenth-century
narratives.

I. The Royal Subject: Thomas Hobbes

Discourses, Discourse 1.55, in Crick, p. 247; Plato, Republic, pp. 6-7; Plato, Laws, pp. 159, 162;
Aguinas, The Summa o f Theology, II-II, Qu. 77,4 and Qu. 78, 1, in Sigmund, pp. 73-74.
8 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 335, 339-341, 351, 355, 372, 377.
9 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 348,
10 These rights and liberties included those which belonged to the individual’s ‘first’ nature—Locke’s
life and liberty—and those which were bom o f society—concerned primarily with property. The
question was: how much of the individual’s ‘first’ rights transferred with him into the social state? See
Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 367, 395, 428-429; Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 374-376.
11 Like Machiavelli, Harrington emphasized the importance o f custom in the founding o f a republic.
Unlike Machiavelli, however, he linked this custom with land. See Pocock, The Machiavellian
Moment, pp. 376-377.
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Like Ockham and Machiavelli before him, Hobbes’s philosophy was
pragmatically influenced by the political conditions plaguing contemporary Britain.
Faced with civil-war tensions, he searched for a political science consistent with
natural law—“a basic hypothesis about the nature of things, which could embrace the
actions of men in society and their relations with each other.”12 Concluding that
power was the central ingredient of social engagement, he set out to know the
appropriate distribution of power in society, ending with an endorsement of absolute
sovereignty.13 This was the topic of his controversial and popular Leviathan (1651).14
In framing this natural law of social relations, Hobbes employed both
empiricism and rationalism. Indeed, his theory borrowed widely from nominalism,
science—particularly from a mechanistic view of Nature—, and even Augustine.15
For example, while denying the intelligibility of divine reality, he nonetheless
supported a harmonious natural order. At the same time, he deemed society the by
product of convention rather than nature. Finally, unlike Aristotle, who understood
motion to be an externally-motivated pressure towards potentiality, Hobbes, a
Reformed Christian, located the source of motion internally, explaining external
motion as an effect—rather than cause—of highly competitive, acquisitive, and

12 Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 10,27. By such means, as Copleston describes it, “the rules o f conduct and
o f political life”—i.e. “moral philosophy”— might be known. See Copleston, V, p. 3.
13 Hobbes describes two types o f power, one based on natural attributes—intellectual or physical
prowess, for example—the other on material goods. Competition turns on the distribution o f these
powers. It was thus necessary to control them in the interest o f social stability. The best means of
doing so, he concluded, was by way of monarchy. See Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 150; MacPherson,
introduction to Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 33-35, 37; Pocock, introduction to Harrington, The
Commonwealth o f Oceana and A System o f Politics, pp. xiv-xv.
14 MacPherson, in Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 13,21, 23-24, 727-728.
15 MacPherson, introduction to Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 21; Copleston, IV, pp. 25-26, V, pp. 5, 16-20.
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interdependent human desires mutually acting upon one another.16 This removed
knowledge from the exclusive hands of a natural intellectual elite and made it the
inclusive by-product of individual will and human industry.17 At the same time, it
made identity and social order the effect of social interests rather than naturally fixed
standards—“not absolute, but a thing dependent on the need and judgement of
another.”18 The same was true of morality.19
Ultimately, Hobbes posed that society was an artificial convention bom of
selfish interests manifest in the individual drive for power, the stability of which
depended on a Prince-ly absolutism. As the most stable society was one in which
power-relations were managed for the benefit of all, Hobbes supported legal
monarchy—as distinct from (absolute) kingship—as least likely to dissolve into
conflict.20 His primary objective was to remove the self-interested individual—the
subject—from political authority until such time as virtue was cultivated; only then
might a subject assume the authority of a citizen.21

16 As MacPherson describes it, Hobbes’s ‘Theory o f Human Nature in Society’ began with the principle
that ‘“Men are moved by appetites and aversions’.” (Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 30) A similar premise
informed Mandeville’s theory. See Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 19-20,28-32,43, 85-87, 118-119, 192193,201-214; Bernard Mandeville, Fable o f the Bees (1723), ed. E. J. Hundert (Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing, Inc., 1997).
17 As Hobbes wrote, “Reason is not as Sense, and Memory, borne with us; nor gotten by Experience
onely; as Prudence is; but attayned by Industry....” (Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 115) He thus set out to
devise a method of reasoning. See Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 16-18, 21, 26-27, 85-87, 94, 105, 110-112,
115, 682, 688-691; Copleston, V, pp. 3-4, 10-24, 30-31.
18 Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 151-152.
19 As Copleston concludes: “it is the appetites and aversions o f the individual which determine for him
what is good and what is evil.” See Copleston, V, pp. 28-31; quoted from p. 31.
20 Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 24, 37, 41-42,44-45, 48, 50, 52-54, 56, 62, 94-95, 99,227-228,241-243,
295-299, 312, 314-316, 322, 330, 334-335, 372, 376-377, 390, 395-396, 399,405,407,425-426,448,
469,478,498, 512, 520, 522, 524-525, 545-547, 549, 567, 575, 609-611, 613, 615, 623-627,632,
704-708,711-712,717-719.
21 Hobbes’s theory was neither the celebration of ‘private vices’ nor the redefinition o f ‘Good’ to be
found in Bernard Mandeville’s Fable o f the Bees. Rather, it was a reflection o f his cynicism. Hobbes
believed that human corruption was too pervasive to permit a “limited benevolence” to serve as the
foundation o f society. For this reason, he crafted a socio-political structure that managed the negative
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In fact, Hobbes was less at odds with Plato and Aristotle than his criticism
might suggest. Both Plato and Aristotle had recognized the unlikely probability of
philosophical virtue arising with generational regularity and consequently endorsed
the rule of law. Recognizing, too, that laws were only as good as the men behind
them, Aristotle emphasized the lesser, heroic virtue of the citizen as opposed to the
higher, intellectual virtue of the philosopher. Moreover, like Hobbes, both
•

philosophers endorsed education as the means of cultivating reason and virtue.

22

Significantly, however, Hobbes’s rejection of a ‘natural’ aristocracy in whom
society might be safely entrusted reflected not only his cynicism, but the influence of
Reformed Christianity, which defended mankind’s universal capacity for reason and
virtue. As Hobbes described it:
Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body and mind; as that
though there bee found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of
quicker mind then another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference
between man, and man, is not so considerable... P

impact o f competitive instincts through the control o f social relations. See Leviathan, pp. 189-192,
262-264,267-273.
22 Hobbes’s rejection of the classical narrative should not be misunderstood as a rejection o f classical
values: he was an admirer o f human virtue, a believer in divine plan, and an advocate of improvement
through intellectual refinement; he privileged reason—a consequence of general knowledge— over
prudence—the effect o f particular experience—and encouraged philosophical inquiry over booklearning; he recognized leisure as a necessary precondition o f philosophy and placed the security o f the
commonwealth on the opportunity for intellectual development; he was an advocate o f divine law,
premised moral virtue and philosophy on its doctrine, and believed that civil laws should follow their
example. What Hobbes rejected was the realist theory o f intelligible natural progress and its pendant
standards o f identity and social order. As a result, he dismissed with the presumption that a noble-born
elite could lead society towards perfection. Until such time as men were capable o f controlling their
passions, until such time as society had nurtured the kind o f virtue upon which civic leadership might
be based, until such time as society had proven itself to be guided by the moral goals of divine
goodness, the influence o f interest was too great to risk civic order. See Hobbes Leviathan, pp. 37,
162, 168, 173, 178-179, 216, 369, 388, 682-687, 697-699, 726-727.
23 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 183; Copleston, V, p. 32.
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This belief in the commonality of human nature squared with his argument
about social relations; so equal were men in their ambition for power that they needed
social compact for their mutual interest and preservation.24 It also supported his claim
to legal equality and the Reformed emphasis on human will: as men were made equal
by their natural capacities so they were made unequal by their will.25 On these
grounds, identity and authority—at least in theory—became matters of ‘will’ rather
than birth: even the mechanic might aspire to the philosopher.
Ultimately, then, Hobbes’s vision of power as the basis of social relations
informed a self-determined interpretation of identity. But it also advanced the divided
self suggested by Augustinian duality. As Hobbes described it, identity was an
external ‘Face’ or ‘Persona’ assumed by the individual following his engagement with
society; it was not a reflection of his inner self.26 Moreover, an individual’s “Value,"
he wrote, was dependent upon the “Price” of his “Power”—his rate-of-exchange in
the civic sphere.27 This was remarkable not only for being at odds with the dominant
*

*

neo-Aristotelian narrative, but because, while invoking the principle of a divided self,
Hobbes subverted identity to the forces of the marketplace. In other words, having
rejected the intelligibility of a classical narrative based on natural progress and fixed
standards, he turned to the marketplace for an alternative means of evaluating

24 “From this equality o f ability, ariseth equality o f hope in attaining o f our Ends” and, so, competition.
Hence the need for social controls. See Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 27, 160, 184-188,194-195, 198-199,
202, 208,211; quoted from p. 184..
25 Taylor, pp. 124, 141-145, 147-156; Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 58-59.
26 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 217. Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary defined ‘external’ as “having the
appearance but not the essence” o f a thing. See Johnson, Dictionary (London, 1786).
27 Hobbes explained, “The Value, or WORTH o f a man, is as of all other things, his Price; that is to
say, so much as would be given for the use o f his Power....” See Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 151-152.
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individual value.28 The effect was to bridge the gap between Reformed theory and
commercial experience. It was also to make identity more fluid and relative.
Hobbes’s use of commercial language in the evaluation of identity signaled a
changing balance-of-influence between contemporary political and economic forces.

29

As Taylor notes, these developments held particular appeal for “artisan and merchant
classes which were becoming conscious of their new achievements and aspiring to a
new dignity and influence in society. The appeal was all the greater in that their
•

•

•

30

religious faith also stressed the value of work and the equal dignity of all callings.”

But the social and political aspirations of commercially-engaged individuals were also
being addressed in the demands for legal equality that accompanied the development
of the marketplace.31 As James Harrington put it, a drive for legal equality reinforced
the ambitions of industrious commoners, who sought not social parity but legal access
to identities and ranks formerly reserved for the hereditary elite: “Industry of all
things is the most accumulative,” he wrote, “and accumulation of all things hates

28 Hobbes is remarkable for suggesting that social civility and common good might be compatible with
modem commerce, but even more so for suggesting that the market provided the only “moral basis for
establishing the value o f anything.” See MacPherson, introduction to Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 51;
Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 75, 717-718.
29 MacPherson, introduction to Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 47-48, 50, 54-62; Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 127,
228-239,274,277.
30 Taylor, p. 231. By this time, Baumeister writes, “the person [had become] an individual unity with a
separate existence independent o f place in society.” (Baumeister, Identity, p. 41) See Taylor, pp. 211,
231; Baumeister, p. 41.
il The demands of the marketplace—the equality o f exchange relations—necessitated that contracting
individuals have equal legal rights, otherwise exchange values would be biased; as MacPherson writes,
the motivation to engage in commerce and finance “could operate only if men were equally free, had
equal legal rights to use or offer their powers in the market.” See MacPherson, introduction to Hobbes,
Leviathan, pp. 58-59.
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levelling....”32 The result—at least in theory—was a modem social hierarchy based
on inequalities of will (reflected by industry) rather than birth.

II. The Republican Citizen: James Harrington
In response to Hobbes’s Leviathan (1651), the collapse of monarchy, and the
problems of Cromwellian mle, James Harrington crafted the Commonwealth o f
Oceana (1656). Pocock calls it a “moment of paradigmatic breakthrough” insofar as
it propelled the ideals of “civic humanism and Machiavellian republicanism” to the
forefront of British philosophy.33 In an Anglo-Protestant nod to Machiavelli’s
Discourses, Harrington’s Oceana provided Britons with an alternative answer to the
collapse of monarchy: a stable government based on the ‘ancient’ principle of natural
right, as distinct from natural law.34
Harrington’s theoiy of natural rights was important for suggesting both the
primacy of the individual in the state of nature and the virtuous foundations of
society.

On the one hand, he made natural rights an inalienable asset of the

individual, thereby suggesting that liberty and autonomy were as essential to the

32 Harrington continues: “the revenue therefore o f the people being the revenue o f industry, though
some nobility... may be found to have been levellers, yet not any people in the world.” See
Harrington, A System o f Politics, p. 277.
" Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 384. As Pocock explains it, “There is a real sense in which
republican theories were a consequence, not a cause or even a precondition, o f the execution o f the
King and the temporary abolition of the monarchy.” (Pocock, introduction to Harrington, The
Commonwealth o f Oceana and A System ofPolitics, p. xi.) See Harrington, The Commonwealth o f
Oceana, pp. 53,60-62; Pocock, introduction to Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana and A
System o f Politics, pp. vii-xii, xv; Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 384,421.
34 By contrast, Hobbes had argued that, in contracting a sovereign authority, one relinquished one’s
natural rights and received back only those liberties complementary to the civic good. It was therefore
not natural rights but natural laws which followed man into society—notably the Lex Naturalis o f selfpreservation. See Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 189.
35 Pocock, introduction to Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana and A System o f Politics, p. xii.
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social narrative as preservation. This led him to represent natural rights as the proper
foundation of political authority and citizenship.36 On the other hand, in suggesting
the natural foundations of society, Harrington drew on the Aristotelian doctrine of
natural progress. The combination led Harrington to conclude, first, that equality was
the natural promise of all people and, second, that the proper function of government
*

was to secure the natural rights of the individual from negative social interests.

37

In describing the function of government, Harrington employed a language of
“ancient” and “modem” prudence. According to Harrington, when government
shifted its attention from natural rights and the common good to property and interest,
it neglected reason—the “goods of the mind”—and came under the influence of
“Fortune.”38 This regression from the conditions of truth and goodness was equated
with ‘modem’ prudence. In order to restore society’s proper balance, it was necessary
to re-institute ‘ancient’ prudence—the reason and ‘liberty’ of the ‘Ancient’
constitution.

‘Balance’, then, was a consequence of the relationship between rights

36 The result, as Pocock describes it, was a doctrine “in which ...man the political animal was by nature
a citizen and not a subject....” See Pocock, introduction to Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana
and A System o f Politics, p. xii.
J/ Although not a Leveller himself, Pocock writes, “in Oceana he seems to accept an enlargement o f the
voting population as extensive as most Levellers desired.” (Pocock, introduction to Harrington, The
Commonwealth o f Oceana and A System o f Politics, p. viii) Yet, Harrington’s defense o f citizenship
was “universal” only insofar as it applied to independent men—those who had attained a landed selfsufficiency. Hence his insistence on agrarian laws as the best means of keeping the rule of interest at
bay, a position he shared with Machiavelli. See Pocock, introduction to Harrington, The
Commonwealth o f Oceana, p. viii; Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana, pp. 3-4, 13-15.
38 As Pocock describes it, the “history o f property moved men into and out o f the dictatorship of
fortune.” See Pocock, introduction to Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana and A System o f
Politics, p. xxi.
^ Whereas ancient prudence guarded against the corruptive forces o f self-interested men through the
balanced influence o f three estates, whereas ‘ancient prudence’ ensured that all ‘independent’
commoners were granted the rights o f citizenship supportive o f “LIBERTAS”, ‘modem prudence’ (and
its alternative government) was “an art whereby some man, or some few men, subject a city or a nation,
and rule it according unto his or their private interest; which... may be said to be the empire o f men and
not of laws.” (Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana, in Pocock, ed., pp. 9-10.) Harrington cast
Machiavelli as the figurehead o f ancient prudence and Hobbes as the figurehead o f modem prudence.
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and property—that to which one was entitled by nature, and that which one acquired
after compact.40 Where the pursuit of property threatened the liberty of the citizenry,
it was up to a “natural aristocracy” of wise (and, so, virtuous) “Legislators” to enact
laws—particularly agrarian laws41—that protected the naturally ‘independent’ man
•

•

•

•

from the oppression and servitude bom of acquisitive instincts.

42

The distinction between ‘modem’ and ‘ancient’ prudence provided Harrington
with a means of narrating the course of English history within the neo-Aristotelian
context of natural progress. On its premise, he explained the development and
decline of ‘Gothic’ feudalism and its implications for British history: changes in
agrarian law had resulted in the more equitable distribution of ‘dominion’—property
and its attendant authority—, and an attendant class of citizen freeholders; the
resulting ‘balance’ not only relieved the oppressed by restoring their ‘liberty’, it freed
one-time oppressors to pursue reason and goodness—the higher “goods of the

For a further discussion, see Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana, pp. 43-53,185-205,241-244,
256-257.
40 Harrington conditioned balanced social and political relations on a balance between rights and
property. See Pocock, introduction, The Commonwealth o f Oceana and A System o f Politics, pp. xiixvi.
41 As Pocock describes it, the demise of feudalism, and the consequent redistribution of arable land,
marked a pivotal point in the progress towards potentiality. The rise o f militias that resulted from the
decline o f feudalism meant the elevation o f vassals into landowners—into citizens. The zoon
politikon—the local citizen—assumed authority by virtue o f “his sword and his freehold,” and the basis
o f political personality became property. In the end, Pocock writes, agrarian law placed dominion “into
the hands o f independent proprietors, freeholders and gentlemen,” the effects o f which “were
revolutionary because neither monarchy nor nobility controlled them.” (Pocock, introduction, The
Commonwealth o f Oceana and A System o f Politics, p. xix) Borrowing on Bacon’s History ofKing
Henry the Seventh, Harrington cited Henry VII as marking the turning point in English history. See
Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 386; Pocock, introduction to Harrington, The Commonwealth
o f Oceana, pp. xviii-xix.
42 Harrington’s vision o f the ideal legislator, like Plato’s ‘philosopher prince’, combined the attributes
o f authority (reason) and power (riches). This was the premise of a “natural”— as opposed to
“hereditary”— elite. The advantage o f agrarian law was that it restored the divine balance conducive to
a natural elite. See Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana, pp. 13,8, 23; Harrington, A System o f
Politics, p. 281
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mind.”43 Liberty and virtue were thus entwined. In the end, the vacillating swings of
progression and regression—from the Ancient constitution to ‘Gothic’ feudalism and
back again—appeared as a national struggle toward potentiality, an evolution beyond
the acquisitive instincts of illiberal mechanics towards the reason and virtue of the
‘natural’ legislator.44
Identity was necessarily implicated in this narrative. Harrington understood
identity to be a natural consequence of the relationship between rights and dominion
in the social sphere. Because ‘Gothic’ feudalism had confined dominion to king and
nobility, it had obstructed the natural right of individuals to acquire property and
progress themselves towards the higher goods of reason attainable only through
landed leisure.45 Against this, Harrington advocated legal equality and emphasized
the authority of the House of Commons.46 Ultimately, then, Harrington’s definition
of identity was both neo-Aristotelian and Reformed Christian: on the one hand, it
perceived identity in terms of a single, whole, and natural self; on the other hand, it
simultaneously recognized both natural equality and the inequality of will.

43 For Harrington’s analysis o f feudalism, see Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana, pp. 12-13,
43-47.
44 For a full discussion o f this development, see Pocock, introduction, The Commonwealth o f Oceana
and A System o f Politics, p. xv-xxiv. In general, Harrington viewed the collapse o f monarchy as an
opportunity to set Britain back on the proper track toward potentiality. As Pocock explains it, “Oceana
is not a utopia so much as an occasione, a moment of revolutionary opportunity at which old historical
forms have destroyed themselves and there is a chance to construct new forms immune from the
contingencies o f history (known as fortuna):' (Pocock, introduction to Harrington, Commonwealth o f
Oceana, p. xvii) Gordon Wood has made a similar argument for the American Revolution—as
representing an occasione for virtuous progress. (Wood, Creation o f the American Republic, p. 108)
See Pocock, introduction to Harrington, Commonwealth o f Oceana, p. xvii.; Gordon S. Wood,
Creation o f the American Republic, 1776-1787 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1969), p. 108
45 For a description o f Harrington’s model social order, see Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana,
pp. 80-81.
46 The House of Commons being a necessary balance to noble authority and the natural defender of
individual rights, it was essential to the preservation o f civic virtue. See Pocock, The Machiavellian
Moment, p. 407.
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In the end, Harrington’s philosophy conduced to a republic based on
meritocracy, not democracy. Indeed, Harrington opposed democracy on grounds that
it placed power in the hands of ignorant mechanics—men without land, education or
virtue—and, therefore, risked a society based on acquisitive instincts.47 However, if
inequalities of identity were theoretically understood to derive from inequalities of
will, they were—in practice—qualified by a definition of independence that rooted
virtue in land: Harrington’s ‘wise Legislators’ were “gentleman” freeholders.

48

And

this left room for manipulation. Without the advantage of leveling agrarian laws,
Harrington’s theory might as conveniently explain the natural claims of a hereditary
elite as the natural equality of ambitious commoners. Indeed, although Harrington
rejected hereditary authority (based on birth) as an insufficient substitute for a natural
aristocracy (based on wisdom), their distinction was readily blurred.49
In addition to articulating a natural identity based on common attributes and
inequalities of will, Harrington is important for examining the relationship between
imperial politics and colonial identities.50 Harrington described two types of empires:

47 Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana, pp. 36-37.
48 As Harrington explained it, as “the leading o f her armies... seems to be peculiar unto the genius o f a
gentleman... [,] so it is in the universal series of history, that if any man have founded a commonwealth,
he was first a gentleman.” See Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana, p. 38.
49 While Harrington defended the ideal o f the citizen-freeholder, he did not advocate social equality; a
margin o f “social differentiation” was necessary to satisfy the Aristotelian complement between
“political functions” and “social characteristics.” What Harrington endorsed was the replacement o f a
hereditary aristocracy based on birth and custom with a “natural” one based on merit, the latter
supported by a large class o f citizen freeholders. As he described it, a nobility who need not labor for
its livelihood—‘“such as live upon their own revenues in plenty, without engagement either unto the
tilling o f their lands or other work for their livelihood’ ”— is “necessary unto the mixture o f a wellordered commonwealth. For how else can you have a commonwealth that is not altogether mechanic?”
(Commonwealth o f Oceana, pp. 137-138) The principle o f meritocracy continued to inform
perceptions o f social rank through the Revolutionary period. See Harrington, The Commonwealth o f
Oceana, pp. 20, 137-14; Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 394-395; Plato, Republic, p. 83.
50 Colonies were groups o f people “planted” by the State for their mutual benefit. See Machiavelli, The
Discourses, Discourse II.6, in Crick, pp. 292-293.
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one ‘internal’ or domestic, the other ‘external’ and expansive; one characterized by
limited property, the other by acquisitive interests; one capable of a ‘balanced’
dominion conducive to stability and the common good, the other subject to instability
and oppression.51 In being an ‘external’ empire, Britain was vulnerable to the
influence of interest rather than reason, property rather than good, laws rather than
rights, power rather than authority.52 The difficulties attendant this circumstance were
exacerbated by the unequal distribution of legal rights to which external empires were
likewise prone; according to Harrington, the drive for dominion that motivated
external empires wrongly inclined them to compromise the natural rights of provincial
and colonial subjects in the interest of homeland power. The result was an imperial
social hierarchy informed by proximity to the metropolis. Not only was this
inconsistent with natural law, it was inherently unstable: on the one hand, the
isolation of colonial societies made distinctions difficult to enforce and easy to ignore;
on the other hand, it nurtured the rise of local elites to challenge the authority of
distant rivals.53
Harrington’s analysis is interesting for what it implies about the rightful
claims of colonial and provincial subjects. Against Hobbes, Harrington suggested
that colonists and provincials were entitled to the same legal rights as their homeland
compatriots.54 By extension, he suggested that colonial and provincial property was

51 Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana, pp.
52 Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana, pp.
293.
j3 Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana, pp.
Theology, 1-11, Qu. 97, 3, in Sigmund, p. 57.
54 Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana, pp.

11-12.
18-19; Harrington, A System o f Politics, pp. 29016-17; St. Thomas Aquinas, The Summa o f
16-17.
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entitled to the same rights as homeland property. Thus, at least in theory, a colonial
landowner might claim the same social and political privileges as his homeland
counterpart. Yet certain questions were left unanswered: could this hold true if the
land owned by the colonist was employed for commercial purposes as opposed to
being a medium of rents and leases?55 And, indeed, within the context of
imperialism, on what grounds might a colonist claim disinterested independence?

56

For all its theoretical significance, Harrington’s thesis suffered from internal
weaknesses that left it vulnerable to manipulation. On the one hand, Pocock notes,
Harrington failed to foresee the need for a professional army. This prevented him
from reconciling his citizen militia with the need for an imperial military.57 Second,
because his understanding of feudal dominion located power in land, he failed to
consider alternative forms of power—for example, the influence of political
patronage.58 Ultimately, however, it was Harrington’s inability to anticipate the
overwhelming influence of commercial and financial forces on British politics—and
the implications of this influence for the definition of power and property—that
prevented his doctrine from satisfying the needs of a later generation. Harrington
believed that landed wealth was essential to knowledge, virtue and good, not because

55 As Pocock notes, “to make land a source of rentals is not the same as to make it a marketable
commodity.” (Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 433-434.) Nonetheless, once land became a
resource o f trade, the modem freeholder no longer appeared as “independent” as his pre-1675 peer.
See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 433-434,450.
56 A commercial plantation did not carry the same connotations and privileges as a multigenerational
freehold whose income derived from rents and leases. See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp.
433-434,450.
57 Pocock, introduction to Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana and A System o f Politics, pp. xixxx.
58 Pocock, introduction to Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana and A System o f Politics, pp. xxxxi.
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other forms of economic self-sufficiency were unavailable, but because other forms
did not remove the individual from the corrupting influence of private interest.
Harrington endorsed real property as the foundation of virtue, the basis of citizenship,
and the premise for bearing arms because he believed that mobile property failed to
nurture the kind of personal sacrifice essential to common good—“civic personality
was not a commodity”59—, but this presumed that land itself was not marketable.
That this proved unfounded only complicated his legacy.

III. Reforming the Gap
Harrington and Hobbes were not the only thinkers debating the relationship
between the individual and society. British writings of the period invoke a number of
theories, some more influenced by ancient philosophy—the Cambridge Platonists, for
example—and some more grounded in contemporaiy experience—that of John
Locke.60 In general, however, despite the force of Hobbes’s writings, most earlymodern intellectuals were at least minimal realists, conceding at least a modicum of
59 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 390-391. Machiavellian virtu is distinct from virtue: virtu
is about the temporal, civic force that effects a transformation o f power, usually manifest in the sword;
virtue is about the inherent and eternal qualities o f the individual, manifest in the pursuit o f common
good or, more privately, in adherence to a Christian life. Virtu gives way to virtue in neoMachiavellian theory. See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 405.
60 The Cambridge Platonists included Benjamin Whichcote (1609-1683), John Smith (1616-1652),
Ralph Cudworth (1617-1688), Nathaniel Culverwel (c. 1618-c. 1651), Peter Sterry (1613-1672) and
Henry More (1614-1687). In general, Copleston writes, they were Platonists insofar as they drew
inspiration from the “tradition o f spiritualist metaphysics from Plato to Plotinus” and, under the
influence o f Lord Herbert o f Cherbury (1583-1648), posited the existence o f certain a priori truths
“implanted by God and... apprehended by ‘natural instinct’.” (Copleston, V, pp. 53-54) As Copleston
writes, they shared “a belief in the mind’s power o f discerning immutable truths, which bear the
evidence o f their truth within themselves and which are in some sense imprinted on the mind... [,]
interwove[n...] into the principles o f our reason.” (Copleston, V, pp. 62-63) He explains: “They
believed in the power o f the human reason to attain to objective truth about God and to give us insight
into absolute and universal moral laws.” (Copleston, V, p. 56) They thus “emphasized the
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certain knowledge—a knowledge of God, for example—and endorsing natural reason
as an instrument of truth consistent with natural or divine law.61
On the more traditional and conservative front, the Cambridge Platonists were
important less as individual theorists than as a conduit for classicism. As a rule, they
supported the power of reason, the intelligibility of truth, and the existence of
absolute and universal moral laws. Moreover, they advocated contemplation in the
attainment of knowledge and believed benevolence to be an instrument of common
good. At the same time, they dismissed with the ethic of “ordinary life” and denied
the authority of empirical methodologies. Their influence is felt, to varying degrees,
in the writings of George Berkeley and the third earl of Shaftesbury.
On the more contemporary and liberal front, Locke is individually important
as a spokesman for Restoration (Big) Whigs.62 In general, while Locke accepted the
existence of moral standards, endorsed the theory of natural law, and deemed nature a
rational system whose final end was eternal goodness, he simultaneously denied the
notion of innate ideas and rejected customary authority as imperfect convention.
Moreover, while he conceded an innate knowledge of God and deemed “morality...
the proper science, and business o f mankind in general,”63 thereby endorsing some

contemplative attitude.” (Copleston, V, pp. 56-57) Their position was opposed, most notably, by
Viscount Bolingbroke. See Copleston, V, pp. 52-65, 164.
61 This was true o f both Locke and the Platonists. See Copleston, V, pp. 52-53.
62 As suggested, for example, by A Letterfrom a Friend, to a Person o f Quality (London: printed for T.
Davies, 1682), attributed to Locke. His writings were largely influenced by important political figures
like Anthony Ashley Cooper—later the first earl of Shaftesbury—and John Somers— later Lord
Somers. See Laslett, introduction to Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 37 and 53.
63 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, p. 570. Locke’s denial o f innate moral
principles was not a denial o f moral law and its roots in divine reason. Indeed, An Essay for the
Understanding o f St. Paul’s Epistles, By Consulting St. Paul himself defended empiricism only in the
absence o f revelation: “Now we see but by Reflection the dim, and as it were enigmatical
Representation o f things.... Now 1 have but a superficial partial knowledge o f things, but then I shall
have an intuitive comprehensive knowledge o f them, as I my self am known, .. .not by the Obscure and
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rationalist tendencies, he rejected theoretical methodologies in favor of the ‘scientific
method’ advanced by Robert Boyle (1627-1691) and Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727)
that which joined inductive analysis (the compiling of “natural histories” through
observation and experiment) with deductive synthesis (the use of mathematical laws
for the deduction of certain opinions).64 Hence his theory of tabula rasa—that blank
mental tablet progressively impressed by life experience.65
In fact, selective manipulation made numerous combinations of classicism,
Protestantism, empiricism, rationalism, and individualism conveniently compatible.66
For example, if Calvinism deemed grace to arise from a voluntary obedience to divine
laws—piety, temperance, humility, etc.—and the successful fulfillment of one’s duty
or ‘calling’, thereby endorsing a self-determined identity based on will and industry,
so, too, did empiricism endorse what Taylor has called a “Baconian Revolution,” “a
transvaluation of values” in which human industry, “previously stigmatized as lower,”
was made the standard of human virtue—public heroism being newly “convicted of

Imperfect way o f Deduction and Reasoning.” (Locke, An Essay for the Understanding o f St. Paul’s
Epistle’s, p. 84) The point for Locke was that the truths o f God and revelation will complement our
natural reason. See Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, pp. 77, 93-94, 105-106, 109215, 532; Locke, An Essay for the Understanding o f St. Paul’s Epistles, By Consulting St. Paul himself
(London: Printed for Awn sham and John Churchill, 1707), p. 84; Copleston, V, pp. 79-127, 171.
64 Woolhouse, introduction to Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, p. xvii; Copleston,
V, pp. 71-72, 143-153.
65 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, p. 109.
66 Indeed, as Taylor writes, “The Puritan theology o f work and ordinary life provided a hospitable
environment for the scientific revolution.... One can even say that the paradigm authority figure
against which both rebellions were levied was the same[:] Aristotle....” (Taylor, p. 230) This is not to
suggest a uniformity o f thought, but rather a mutual need to identify a secular morality that might fill
the gap left by the decline o f heroic virtue and orthodox Christianity. This conduced to the ‘ethic of
ordinary life’. (Taylor, p. 234) See Taylor, pp. 230,234.
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presumption and vanity”.6' Both, in other words, could be understood to endorse a
self-determined worth based on private industry in pursuit of higher good.68
Nonetheless, while the goals of Lockean empiricism and Aristotelian
classicism could be compatible, Locke’s emphasis on sense-perception as the only
medium of knowledge prior to revelation—as opposed to being a mere Aristotelian
point-of-departure for higher reason—lent empiricism an intellectual significance not
found in the Aristotelian tradition. In addition, moreover, Locke suggested to his
readers a natural capacity for independent reasoning and the autonomy to pursue a
self-determined good.69 This underscored the self-determined nature of reason and
virtue advanced by the Reformation, undermining the authority of inherited customs
and power structures.70 But it also obscured the standards of identity and social order
supporting traditional civic humanism. As the ‘meaning of life’ was made manifest to
the individual in the amalgam of mental imprints—‘sensations’—accumulated during
the course of experience and known through ‘reflection’, so identity became a
byproduct of the relationship between experience and intellect, the effect of which
was impressed on the individual consciousness. Identity was thus internal and
psychological (discovered) rather than external and sociological (prescribed).71

67 Baumeister, p. 52; Taylor, pp. 213-214, 218, 227; Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 162.
68 Taylor, pp. 23, 85, 88, 112,230,232, 234, 278-279; Baumeister, p. 56.
69 As Locke explains, “so far as a man has a power to think, or not to think... according to the direction
o f his own mind, so far is a mart/ree.... So that liberty cannot be, where there is no thought, no
volition, no will.... I think the question is not proper, whether the will be free, but whether a man be
fr e e r (Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, pp. 223-228) See Locke, An Essay
Concerning Human Understanding, pp. 220-245.
,0 For Descartes, the self was manifest in the mind, immaterial but perceptive. For Locke, the self
resided in consciousness, built up over experience. See Canfield, p. 26.
71 Copleston, V, pp. 100-101. As Taylor observes, Locke’s emphasis on self-consciousness offered the
prospect o f self re-making. This distinguished Locke from Hobbes. See Locke, An Essay Concerning
Human Understanding, pp. 297-312; Laslett, introduction to Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 55-57;
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In many ways, Lockean individualism—in which the autonomous and
determining self seeks the general good through communion and cooperation with
other autonomous and determining subjects—represented a reconciliation of
Reformed Christianity with rationalism, empiricism and classicism.72 However, by
rejecting key provisions in classical theory—the possibility of human access to perfect
knowledge, the theoretical nature of truth and reality, and the rightful authority of a
customary elite to determine the parameters of individual improvement and social
progress—Locke undermined the credibility of Aristotelian classicism. Moreover, in
shifting emphasis from an external—i.e. sociological—identity to an internal—i.e.
psychological—one, he reinforced the Reformed emphasis on private virtue as the
measure of individual worth. This introduced a condition of disengagement—the
separation and coexistence of individual and society. At the same time, the definition
of independence was transformed from a privileged disinterest based on educated
leisure to an autonomous pursuit of a self-determined good. Consequently, the selfconscious self-determination, used in Christian doctrine to explain the realization of
individual virtue and goodness in the eternal sphere, became a means of defending the
individual’s right to political and social authority in the temporal one.
Ultimately, then, Locke united elements of Christianity and classicism into a
variation on the classical narrative in which men voluntarily advanced from the state
of nature to the state of society in order to preserve their property—their “Life,

Woolhouse, introduction to Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, p. ix; Taylor, pp.
165-172,235-237; Canfield, p. 26.
72 Taylor, p. 233.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

79

Liberties and Estates.”73 In the process, they relinquished their natural executive
authority to a communal, public will while retaining a legislative right to
*

sovereignty.74 They did not, however, relinquish their individual natural rights.

75

And in this sense, they existed simultaneously as individual private persons—with
natural rights governed by principles of natural law, the mirror of divine law and
human reason—and members of a social community—as public persons with
contracted responsibilities and privileges.76 Significantly, Locke’s vision of equality,
like Harrington’s, was one of capacity and potentiality.77 As such, it was not a denial
of inequalities of industry, will or merit. Nor was it an endorsement of democracy.

78

Rather, Locke’s equality bore political implications of a functional nature. Equality
meant equal legal protection for all members of the community, regardless of birth,
through the general preservation of natural rights. Indeed, if the primary function of

73 Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 367, 395, 428-429. According to Locke, the transformation from
communal to private property resulted from the ‘mixing’ o f labor with material goods. Over time, men
joined together to ensure the security of their property, not only for themselves, but for their posterity.
This guaranteed the right o f inheritance. Eventually, the surplus o f material goods resulted in the
introduction o f money, which became a recognized alternative to material property. (Locke, Two
Treatises, pp. 243-248, 327-344, 374-393) See Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 243-248, 327-344, 374393; Laslett, introduction to Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 115-117.
74 For a description of Legislative, Executive and Federative powers, see Locke, Two Treatises, pp.
401-412,456. As Laslett notes, Locke does not quite argue for the separation o f powers found in
American government. His executive and federative powers likely reside in the same person/ assembly
and may likewise be part o f the legislative branch—as in the British King-in-Parliament. On the other
hand, Locke’s insistence on the sovereignty o f the people went far to change contemporary perceptions
o f citizenship as a universal responsibility rather than an elite privilege. See Locke, Two Treatises, pp.
401-412; Laslett, introduction to Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 123-124, 132-135, 395-398.
75 Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 368-369, 374-375, 381-382; Laslett, introduction to Locke, Two Treatises,
pp. 120, 127-130.
16 In Locke’s case, Laslett writes, “Natural law was... a part o f his rationalism, his conviction that the
universe is to be understood rationally.. . , but at all points it must be compared with, made to fit into,
the observed, the empirical facts about the created world and human behaviour.” See Laslett,
introduction to Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 93-114; Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 81, 106-110, 309-311,
350-353; Copleston, V, pp. 128-140.
77 As Locke himself wrote, “By Common-wealth, I... mean, not a Democracy,... but any Independent
Community.. .”—i.e. one premised on the sovereignty o f independent men. See Locke, Two Treatises,
p. 400.
78 Locke, Two Treatises, p. 346.
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government was to progress the good, Locke suggested that the only means of doing
so was by preserving natural rights.79 In Locke’s view, when a government failed in
this regard, or when it exceeded the limits of its power, it entered upon “a state o f
War” and the people had a right to dissolve it: “Who shall be Judge whether the
Prince or Legislative act contrary to their Trust?... To this I reply, The People shall be
Judge...
Locke’s influence is often cited in tandem with the events of the American
Revolution.81 And, certainly, a much-modified version of his essays on government
was reprinted in Boston in 1773 for an audience of increasingly disaffected colonists,
informing Jefferson’s writing of the Declaration o f Independence. 82 In part, Locke’s
appeal turned, no doubt, on his pragmatism: he seemed to provide answers for
pressing contemporary questions.83 In the portion of his Treatises to hit the colonies,
for example, Locke refers specifically to the issue of representation. In this, he argues

79 Locke wrote: “The end o f Law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge Freedom....”
See Locke, Two Treatises, p. 348.
80 Locke, Two Treatises, p. 476. According to Locke, if a government fails to uphold the good
legislated by the people (through their representatives), its authority can be dissolved while society
remains intact. On this premise, Locke defined two compacts: the first establishing society; the second
establishing its form of government. See Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 401-412, 454-477.
81 Copleston, V, p. 140
82 According to Laslett, the version “read by Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau” and American colonists
was based on a translation by David Mazel which omitted the Preface, first Treatise and a portion o f
the second Treatise. Quietly modified to reflect “the Enlightenment and eighteenth-century
Revolutionism,” it arrived in the colonies as a 1773 Boston reprint o f Hollis’s 6thLondon edition
(1764). See Laslett, introduction to Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 24-26.
83 Locke’s Two Treatises, for example, while printed at the time o f the Glorious Revolution and
intended, at that moment, to serve as a rationale for William Ill’s rule, were initially responsive to
earlier controversies, including the notion o f divine right advanced by Sir Robert Filmer, and the
Exclusion crisis, which turned on Whig efforts to exclude the Catholic James o f York from succeeding
to the throne o f his brother, Charles II. The Exclusion Bill faded—James o f York became James II—
but Whigs continued to consult against James II, resulting in the so-called Insurrection Plot (1682) and
Assassination Plot (1683). In general, then, the Two Treatises were likely written between 1679 and
1683—in three parts rather than two—and only later modified to serve the needs o f the Glorious
Revolution o f 1688-1689. See Laslett, introduction to Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 59-75, 89-90; Locke,
Two Treatises, pp. 173-176, 184, 213.
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that it is the responsibility of the Executive power—a subordinate of Legislative
power—to adjust the balance of representation in accordance with changing times and
demographic trends.84 In fact, however, like most philosophers grappling with the
inherent conflicts between ideology and experience, Locke himself was not always
consistent. Indeed, the ideological differences separating Hobbes, Harrington, Locke,
and others resurfaced in the subsequent debates between ‘Country’ and ‘Court’.85

IV. Country and Court86
The theoretical disengagement of the internal self from the external world lent
new agency to the individual, who was increasingly held responsible for his potential
contribution to—and place within—society. The development of commerce only

84 Locke wrote: “For it being the interest, as well as the intention o f the People, to have a fair and equal
Representative... [;] in time the measures o f representation might vary, and those places have a just
right to be represented which before had none....” See Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 418-420; quoted from
p. 420.
85 These included: the ‘standing army controversy’ or ‘paper war’ o f ca. 1698-1702, which set
‘Country’ representatives Andrew Fletcher and Charles Davenant against Courtiers like Daniel Defoe
and Jonathan Swift; the succession controversy played out in the final four years o f Queen Anne’s
reign, which pit the Tory Jonathan Swift against Whigs Joseph Addison and (in a switch) Daniel Defoe;
the South Sea Crisis (1720), which inspired John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon’s C ato’s Letters and
The Independent Whig; and an opposition movement that pit Lord Bolingbroke’s Craftsman against Sir
Robert Walpole’s London Journal. See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 426-436.
86 The correlation between Country and Court, Tory and Whig is confusing. It was the 1sl Earl of
Shaftesbury who initially outlined the Whig/ Country cause in his attack on Danby in 1675. By the
accession o f William III, however, the success o f the Big Whigs—such as Shaftesbury—had placed
them in power, encouraged them to modify their cause, and relegated the Tories to the Country
position. Some Whigs, however, called ‘Old’ or ‘Independent’ Whigs, opposed the platform of the
Modem Court Whigs and allied themselves with the Tories, thus forming a Country party made up of
Tories and Independent Whigs. Under the reign o f Queen Anne, however, when the Tories once again
assumed executive power, the Modem Whigs resumed an Opposition position. By 1714, however,
with the Tories again in decline, the Independent Whigs faced a choice between the high-church
interests o f the Tories, which upset their religious sympathies, and the patronage and professional
armies o f the powerful Court Whigs, which upset their political sympathies. In the end, they opted in
support o f the Court Whigs, instigating a long period o f powerful Whig rale under the administration of
Sir Robert Walpole (1721—1742). Only with the rise o f George III (1760-1820) did the Tories, once
again, acquire power. At no time, however, did County or Court become marginal. In general,
however, the Country party represented the old-style, landed civic humanists. See Pocock, The
Machiavellian Moment, p. 478.
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reinforced these changes, putting pressure on the balance-of-influence between social
and political authority. The problem was twofold: a civic humanist narrative no longer
representative of the dramatic changes affecting the social, economic, and political
order;87 and the emergence of a commercial authority whose very existence
•

contradicted inherited notions of the proper foundation for society.

88

Essentially, while all sought to retain the purpose of common good, visions of
the “good” diverged in the face of socioeconomic change.89 On the one hand, a
Country party continued to stress the means to goodness—the civic virtue bom of
Aristotelian classicism. Composed largely of freeholders, it likewise persisted in
basing this means—civic virtue—on land.90 On the other hand, a Court party stressed
the ends of goodness—the happiness that accmed to individuals and the State.91
Moreover, composed largely of officials, nobility, and commoners invested in the

87 As Pocock observes: “The Augustan journalists and critics were the first intellectuals on record to
express an entirely secular awareness o f social and economic changes going on in their society, and to
say specifically that these changes affected both their values and their modes o f perceiving social
reality. They used largely Machiavellian paradigms to articulate and express this awareness.” Pocock,
The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 458-459, 462; quoted from p. 462.
88 “Solutions were o f course to be found in seeking to depict society as an economic mechanism, in
which the exchange o f goods and the division o f labor operated to turn universal selfishness to
universal benefit,” examples of which can be found in “Addison, Mandeville, and Montesquieu.” Yet
“there was an important sense in which all this was either beside the point or the admission o f a
necessary evil....” (Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 460,465) See Pocock, The
Machiavellian Moment, p. 451,460-461, 465.
89 If, at least initially, all civic humanists supported what Pocock describes as the “paradigmatic image
o f the freeholder founded upon real or landed property which was inheritable rather than
marketable...[,] protected by the ancient... common law, [and supported by]... membership in the
related structures o f the militia and the parliamentary electorate, thus guaranteeing civic virtue,” the
influence o f new economic circumstances encouraged change and compromise. Pocock, The
Machiavellian Moment, p. 450.
90 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 408. Around 1675, a ‘Country’ platform can be said to have
emerged as a result o f a growing recognition o f the threat to civic humanism, a recognition resonant in
Shaftesbury’s attack on Danby’s ministry. This platform endorsed “frequent parliaments, exclusion of
placemen, a qualification in landed property for members o f the House of Commons.” See Pocock,
The Machiavellian Moment, p. 478.
91 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 403-404.
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pursuit of empire, it was prepared to envision an alternative medium of goodness—an
alternative to civic virtue.92 In the end, because the ‘Court’—guided by the demands
of an external empire—was more willing to make compromises conducive to
commercial expansion and material gain, it appeared to prioritize property and
interest above land and reason, at the risk of corruption.

93

While many Britons were willing to adopt Court practices—and its promise of
happiness—, few were willing to accept Court theory.94 By the late seventeenthcentury, the struggle to assimilate a modem economy and its market man into a civic
humanist ideology traditionally opposed to commerce and trade was yielding
inadequate and ambiguous results. On the one hand, the Country platform became
increasingly hierarchical and conservative. For example, whereas the principle of
balanced authority between legal equals mutually engaged in the pursuit of higher
good was intended by Flarrington as a liberating doctrine, by the 1690s, it had been
manipulated by a neo-Country ‘Opposition’ who, while defending the authority of a
landed and liberal elite against the corruptive influence of power and property, blurred
the line between a ‘natural’ and ‘hereditary’ aristocracy, thereby subverting

92 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 407.
93 Without denying the link between independence and virtue, and while continuing to define virtue as
the pursuit o f common good, the Court denied the existence o f ‘ancient’ principles and rejected the
necessary correlation between independence and land, at the same time recognizing the influence of
interest. It also deemed the king’s engagement in the House o f Commons—by way of patronage— a
necessary tool o f modem politics. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 406-407, 416-420, 483.
94 The Court ideology “accurately identified the forces making for historical change and explained how
government must and did work on its new foundations, but which supplied neither polity nor
personality with a coherent moral structure...; its moral and philosophical theory affirmed that the
mainsprings o f both motivation an perception in human beings were pride and passion, fantasy and
self-interest. Hard as it was to reconcile the philosophies..., the conditions o f British politics in the
eighteenth century... commanded that some such attempt be made....” Pocock, The Machiavellian
Moment, p. 467.
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Harrington’s vision of merit to one of birth.95 At the same time, Harrington’s vision
of legal equality was subverted to a more feudal interpretation of Crown and nobility.
In this “patriotic” vision, the negative content of “Gothic England” was subverted to
the ideology of an “Ancient English” past. This was made evident in the elevated
association between Gothic England and Grecian virtue.96 As Henry Fielding
described it in his novel, Tom Jones, “The gothic style of building could produce
nothing nobler than Mr. Allworthy’s [—read Mr. Virtue’s—] house. There was an air
of grandeur in it that struck you with awe, and rivalled the beauties of the best
Grecian architecture....”97 In this paradoxical twist on ‘ancient’ prudence, ‘modem’
•

•

Gothic feudalism became the national variant on ‘ancient’ Greek classicism.

98

The

result was a “neo-Country” narrative inconsistent with Harrington’s intentions.99

95 As Pocock explains, “Down to 1688, ...the Whigs were still a near-rebellious opposition....
[However, the] amalgam which was Whig ideology in the eighties disintegrated during the decade
following the Revolution; and the neo-Harringtonian thesis became an instrument of radical reaction in
an era o f devastating economic change.” (Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 421-422)
Following the Glorious Revolution and the ascension o f William HI, England’s engagement in global
commerce and the Nine Years War (1689-1697) nurtured a distrust o f modem interests and the
wherewithal o f republican ideals to contain them. The failure o f the Rump Parliament to enact frequent
elections, and to separate the military from the Executive branch, nurtured dissatisfaction with classical
republicanism, opening the way for “ideological retrenchment” and a return to monarchy.
Consequently, a neo-Harringtonian Country Party emerged that subverted the mle o f law to an
aristocracy o f landed Public Men. See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 380-383,406, 414,
421-422,446; Locke, Two Treatises, p. 287; Laslett, introduction to Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 37-53.
96 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 429-432.
97 Henry Fielding, Tom Jones (1750), ed. Douglas Brooks-Davies (Rutland, Vermont: Charles E.
Tuttle, 1998), p. 28.
98 In a significant departure from Harrington’s doctrine, for example, Andrew Fletcher described the
decline o f “ancient” feudalism as causing two key shifts in the social order: the birth o f courtiers
concerned more with refinement and politeness than military prowess, and the elevation of industrious
commoners increasingly vested in an expanding marketplace. From this he concluded that culture and
commerce went hand-in-hand, each a catalyst in the loss o f independence and virtue. This required the
institution o f ‘modem’ prudence. Hence the rise o f “frugality... [:] the surrender o f private
satisfactions... and in short the virtue, which the social order itself no longer guarantees.” See Pocock,
The Machiavellian Moment, p. 432; Hundert, introduction to Mandeville, Fable o f the Bees, p. xvi.
99 As Harrington’s position on real and mobile property came face-to-face with an expanding
commercial economy, a concern “with virtue as the moral as well as material foundation of social and
personal life” led to the development of a neo-Harringtonian civic humanism that replaced Harrington’s
‘natural aristocracy’ with a hereditary nobility. (The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 414, 446) In the
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On the other hand, the Court platform became increasingly individual and
liberal. If neo-Country advocates subverted ‘ancient’ to ‘modem’ pmdence, the more
liberal Court dispensed with ‘ancient’ virtue altogether, maintaining that liberty and
balanced government were modem developments bom of the elevation of the House
of Commons.100 This served a practical purpose. Once freed from the need for
‘ancient’ justification, the Court could defend the Bank of England and the
professional army as necessary consequences of imperial progress. At the same time,
while acknowledging the traditional distinction between freeholder and market-man,
men like Defoe—borrowing on the example of Locke—could present cash rather than
land as the political currency of modem Britain.101
Consequently, however, a different form of virtue was required, one that
maintained a legal ‘balance’ between power (based on riches) and authority (based on
reason). Poised on the theoretical threshold between Harrington and Hobbes, men
like Defoe, Addison, and Fletcher were mutually challenged to fabricate a narrative
that integrated modem commercial interests into a traditional structure of civic

process, the radical elements o f Harrington’s theory were supplanted by an agenda compatible with the
conservative objectives o f the hereditary elite. In the end, Pocock argues, Harrington’s neoMachiavellian Aristotelianism became the basis for a conservative civic humanism responsive to the
effects o f “Court, corruption, [and] office” unfamiliar to Harrington. (Pocock, The Machiavellian
Moment, p. 409.) See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 380-383,409,414,416,421-422,446.
10CIAccording to Pocock, Defoe’s Court Argument (1698) presented ‘mixed government’ as a modem
development, not an ancient one. See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 435.
101 Locke had argued that the introduction o f money—an arbitrary medium o f exchange— nurtured the
transition from a natural economy based on self-sufficiency and bartering to a political economy of
property relations. (Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 341-344) Among neo-Country advocates, however,
“land .. .was understood as the necessary economic foundation o f the virtuous citizen... [;] money was
one o f the major dangers to the maintenance o f freedom and public virtue.” (Hundert, introduction, The
Fable o f the Bees, p. xvii.) See Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 341-344; Hundert, The Fable o f the Bees, p.
xvii; Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 435-436,447.
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virtue.102 Yet, their effort to construct an alternative ideology was weakened by the
dominance of the civic humanist paradigm, which had already taught them that
commerce was founded on dependence and, hence, was naturally prone to
corruption.103 It was thus necessary to identify an alternative source of virtue, an
alternative form of humanism, what Pocock calls a “civic morality of investment and
exchange,” which injected commerce with compassion and equated “the commercial
ethic with the Christian.”104 Enter self-control.105
By fabricating a system of credit based on “sympathy and opinion,”
encouraging a frugality that restored excess to the common stock, and eliminating the
102 Defoe, for one, tried to dampen fears o f instability by positing the logic o f credit itself. Credit, he
argued, arose “only where men have confidence in one another and in the kingdom.” (Pocock, The
Machiavellian Moment, p. 454) Addison likewise argued that credit was the child not o f “popery,
tyranny, and republicanism,” but o f “liberty, moderation, and the Protestant succession,” and that the
Royal Exchange was “not... a place o f dealing in stocks and funds, b u t... a concourse o f solid
merchants exchanging real commodities through the medium of money.” (Pocock, The Machiavellian
Moment, pp. 455,457; Addison, Spectator, 3) By these means, Credit itself might be presented as its
own brand o f virtue. As Pocock observes, “The ideological thrust was constantly toward the absorption
o f stockjobber into merchant: the rentier... into the entrepreneur...; in Locke’s terminology, the
emphasis is switched from ‘fancy’ to ‘agreement’. The latter, of course, is social, where the former is
arbitrary and egocentric, and this makes it more rational and virtuous. But the rationality is only that of
opinion and experience.” (Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 456-457) See Pocock, The
Machiavellian Moment, pp. 454-457; Joseph Addison and Richard Steele, The Commerce o f Everyday
Life: Selections from The Tatler and The Spectator, ed. Erin Mackie (New York: Bedford/ St.
Martin’s, 1998).
103 While Defoe and Addison aimed to “validate the commercial world by appeal to conceptions o f
public virtue,” they “found themselves confronted by the paradigm o f a citizen whose virtue did not rest
upon a capacity for exchange.” (Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 451, 457-458) Moreover,
they “knew no theory o f civic or moral personality which could easily be applied to the new
society...[;] the ‘liberal’ or ‘bourgeois’... shift toward privatization [meant]... the admission that in a
commercial society the individual’s relation to his res publica, could not be simply civic or virtuous.”
(Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 436) See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 436, 449451,457-458.
104 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 440-441. As Pocock explains, “the civic or participatory
ideal had come to be expressed in terms o f an agrarian mode o f property acknowledged to exist mainly
in the past... [and] employed a theory of social personality in which virtue was held to be civic and
was grounded on material bases which could not be bartered away without the loss o f virtue itself.”
(Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 436)
105 Plato described self-control as the evidence o f reason subduing passion. Frugality was its modem
guise. See Hundert, introduction to Mandeville, The Fable o f the Bees, p. xvii-xviii. In 1721, the
Bishop George Berkeley published An Essay towards preventing the Ruin o f Great Britain , which
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public debt—through, for example, the restoration of the militia, which did not
require cash pay and, hence, public investment—, interest and speculation might be
curtailed, the rightful place of the Public Man restored, and the common good
secured.106 But self-control and frugality were negative virtues—those of restraint
rather than action. They were thus more social and less heroic.107 This contradicted
the privileged place of civic virtue in the discourse of civic humanism.108 Indeed,
against the heroic ideal, the Court posited a socio-economic one, arguing in support of
a strong executive power to police human passions against the threat of corruption.109
Hence, as the market man was transformed, ideologically-speaking, into the
freeholder, a public-minded “civic” humanism gave way, at least in part, to a private-

contained a call to religion, industry, frugality and public spirit in view o f the calamities caused by the
South Sea Bubble.” (Copleston, V, p. 203) For more on Berkeley, see Copleston, V, pp. 203-248.
106 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 445.
10' “Augustan political economics,” Pocock writes, “mark the moment when the trader—and, still more
pressingly, the financier—was challenged to prove that he could display civic virtue in the sense that
the landed man could.” (Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 445) See Pocock, The Machiavellian
Moment, p. 445; Hundert, introduction to Mandeville, Fable o f the Bees, p. xviii.
108 Bolingbroke, for example, was less concerned with locating individual or social virtue and more
with identifying political virtue. The conservative Opposition leader whose Craftsman waged a verbal
campaign against Sir Robert Walpole and the Court, Bolingbroke accepted “the constitutional
implications o f the Glorious Revolution o f 1688,” but opposed what he perceived to be the “corruptive
influences o f the Financial Revolution that had inseparably attended it.” (Pocock, The Machiavellian
Moment, p. 479) In an effort to offset the ‘corrupting’ influences o f executive power, he sought to
“restore” the ‘Ancient’ constitution by assimilating the republic-in-monarchy (defined by a king, lords,
and commons) into the classical paradigm o f three estates (the one, few, and many) and, in so doing, to
separate their functions—forging an executive, judicial, and legislative—and curtail the seepage of
influence. As Pocock explains, since he and “conflated the languages of function and morality” and
viewed independence as a key to moral balance, a separation o f powers might be seen as a means of
assimilating the English system into a classical paradigm, however unsuited to the British King-inParliament format, which turned on the processes o f “debate” and “result.” In fact, although his
program failed in Britain, it did influence Montesquieu, and it may well have informed—directly or
indirectly—the American constitution. See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 479-485,488.
109 As Pocock explains, “Since it did not regard virtue as politically paradigmatic, it did not regard
government as founded upon principles of virtue.” See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 487488.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

88

minded “commercial” humanism.110 Ultimately, faced with the realities of
commercial imperialism, more moderate civic humanists rearticulated the standards
of moral virtue and social good in a language which conduced to the ‘Protestant work
ethic’.111
Indeed, by 1720, when Trenchard and Gordon were penning Cato’s Letters,

i 12

both Country and Court had acknowledged the commercial conditions of modem
society.113 Where the Country party diverged was in its insistence that modem
commercialism be held hostage to the higher ideals of civic humanism.114 Thus
separate “landed” and “moneyed” interests emerged to distinguish those who
benefited from a traditional land-based economy from those whose future was vested
in global commerce and trade.115 Whereas the former was represented by the

110 What Pocock describes as a “bourgeois ideology, a civic morality for market man,” that nurtured
‘ancient’ prudence in the face of modem commerce. See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 429431.
111 “In what scholars have called a ‘Protestant ethic’ o f frugality, self-denial, and reinvestment, trading
society could even be permitted its own version o f that classical virtue which consisted in placing the
common good... above one’s personal profit. B u t... the ethic... was compelled to take second place
to the ethic o f self-interest
” Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 464.
112 From 1720 to 1724, John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon published Cato’s Letters in the London
Journal. Both this and the Independent Whig (1714-1719) were widely read by Britons and
Americans. Targeting corruption, specifically the “monied interest” held responsible for the South Sea
Crisis, C ato’s Letters employed a “Machiavellian and neo-Harringtonian” rhetoric to represent England
as a modified version o f the classical polis. The effect was to bring the monarchy and nobility into an
interdependence typical o f the “Gothic” or feudal past. Within this context, it was the function of
virtue to protect independence from corruption, largely by barring those invested in public credit from
serving as public representatives. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 467-470, 473-474.
1 “We find it repeatedly conceded that a trading society possesses a psychology o f its own ...[;]
Cato’s vision presupposes no agrarian utopia.... But the transition from unpolished virtue to politeness
must be made, and made with the assistance of commerce ” Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p.
470.
114 In fact, the “passions now appear as the pursuits o f private and particular goods” that can
simultaneously serve the public—a transformation o f the Aristotelian ethic in which the defense of the
public interest simultaneously satisfies a private desire for glory. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment,
pp. 471-472.
115 According to Pocock, the origins o f the “grand antitheses between the ‘landed’ and the ‘monied’
interests” are in Swift and Bolingbroke. (Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 447) As Hundert
writes, the “landed interest” represented families who lived off rental income “and who derived few
supplementary revenues from office holding, commerce or finance.” On the other hand, the “monied
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conservative Country platform, which dictated rule by an elite group of independent
patriots, the latter was represented by the more liberal Court platform, which vested
authority in laws rather than men.116
Thus, Pocock notes, the “Augustan debate did not oppose agrarian to
entrepreneurial interests, the manor to the market, and cannot be said to have arisen
from a crude awareness of collisions going on between them.”117 Rather, difficulties
arose from a common investment in the language and values of civic humanism, and
the inability to conceive an alternative language or ideology by which to redefine
contemporary society in equally-appealing terms. In the absence of an alternative
language, one offering a positive view of modem, commercial society, ideas and
arguments were often unclear and inconsistent, a condition which explains occasional
shifts in allegiance.118

interest” represented those who engaged either directly or indirectly in finance, commerce and politics.
See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 447; Hundert, introduction, The Fable o f the Bees, pp.
xvii-xviii.
116 Patriots were public heroes like Cincinnatus, “whose virtue was thought to derive from their
devotion to patriotic principles, and was sustained by an aristocratic, landed independence from
material need.” (Hundert, ed., in Mandeville, The Fable o f the Bees, pp. xvi-xvii) In the absence o f
such patriots, the ancient philosophers had contended, the rule o f law rather than men. See Hundert,
introduction to Mandeville, Fable o f the Bees, pp. xvi-xvii; Machiavelli, The Discourses, Discourse 1.2,
III-1,111.25,111.34, and Crick, introduction and Notes 2, 8, 14, in Crick, pp. 24-25,27-28, 110, 386390, 475-476,497, 529-531
117 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 448. While the neo-Country Opposition might attack
creditors and the National Debt, they did not condemn merchants, trade, or the Bank of England, all of
which were necessary to the health o f Britain. (Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 439-441, 447)
By the same token, while Court Whigs might present the neo-Country Opposition “as enemies o f trade”
and promote the image o f “virtuous and benevolent merchants... as emblems o f their cause,” they did
not condemn landowners and aristocrats. (Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 448) Indeed, by
1776, Adam Smith had defined the “monied interest” as something distinct from the “landed” and
“manufacturing” interest; it represented those who dealt solely in money—and the interest accrued
from loans o f money—rather than goods and, therefore, excluded traders, merchants, and
manufacturers. (Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, pp. 451-452) Hundert stresses a more clear-cut
dichotomy between land and trade interests. See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 439-441,
447-448; Adam Smith, The Wealth o f Nations (1776), ed. Andrew Skinner (New York: Penguin Books,
1970), pp. 451-452; Hundert, introduction to Mandeville, The Fable o f the Bees, p. xviii.
118 Fielding, Defoe and Trenchard are examples of changing party allegiance. As Pocock warns, the
effects were “highly ambivalent... replete with alternatives, conflicts, and confusions, o f which they
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All this affected the definition of independence. On the one hand, Country
advocates continued to define independence in terms of an intellectual disinterest
based on landed self-sufficiency—evolving in form from a Harringtonian to a neoHarringtonian narrative. In this version, independence became the preserve of British
‘patriots’—those “willing both to enjoy no source of income but their estates,”
Pocock writes, “and to eschew either the possession or the pursuit of executive
power.”119 By contrast, the Court recast independence in the form of inter
dependence, a clear nod to market relations.
Ultimately, the debate between Court and Country turned on a question of the
meaning of life and its implications for social and political authority. But behind the
theoretical issues attendant the demise of the freeholder ideal, there also lurked a
thorny question: in the absence of landed independence, upon what standard would
identity be based?120 The landed advocates of the neo-Country narrative faced
socioeconomic changes whose very nature threatened their social and political
authority.121 As England made the transition from a landed to a commercial

were very well aware and in which they were to some extent entrapped.” See Pocock, The
Machiavellian Moment, pp. 446, 474-476.
119 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 409.
l2° As Pocock observes, the resulting gap between ideology and experience fostered “the age’s intense
and nervous neoclassicism. The dominant paradigm for the individual inhabiting the world of value
was that o f civic man; but the dominant paradigm for the individual as engaged in historic actuality was
that of economic and inter-subjective man, and it was peculiarly hard to bring the two together.”
(Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 466) Ultimately, Pocock writes, “The freeman must desire
nothing more than freedom, nothing more than the public good to which he dedicated himself; once he
could exchange his freedom for some other commodity, the act became no less corrupting if that other
commodity were knowledge itself.” (Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 431) See Pocock, The
Machiavellian Moment, pp. 431,466.
121 As Hundert writes, the Court’s platform “directly threatened its members’ political power, social
standing and self-esteem.” (Hundert, introduction to Mandeville, The Fable o f the Bees, p. xviii) He
explains: Sections o f the established ruling orders ... felt endangered by persons recently propelled into
power by a mysterious finance capitalism whose imperatives seemed at once to subvert traditional
morality and threaten their social standing. Most fervently expressed during the financial crises of
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economy, it compromised its emphasis on landed independence as the measure of
virtue and identity.122 Without this standard, identity lost its footing. As E.J. Hundert
writes: “The prospect of moveable wealth amongst the newly monied, and of land
treated as capital in a volatile market of anonymous risk-takers, conjured up the
specter of public opinion alone as the measure of one’s standing....5,123 As Pocock
likewise notes, “Once property was seen to have a consensual value, expressed in coin
or in credit, the foundations of personality themselves appeared imaginary or at best
consensual: the individual could exist, even in his own sight, only at the fluctuating
value imposed upon him by his fellows....” 124

1696,1710 and 1720, [neo-Country] ideas retained their force well into the 1760’s and beyond as the
vagaeries of fortune initiated by a revolution in public finance loomed as a threat to a landed, antique
ideal of civic freedom and public personality. (Hundert, introduction to Mandeville, Fable o f the Bees,
p. xviii) See Hundert, introduction to Mandeville, Fable o f the Bees, p. xviii.
122 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 426-427.
12j Hundert, introduction to Mandeville, The Fable o f the Bees, p. xvii.
124 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 464.
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CHAPTER IV
NARRATIVES AND IDENTITIES: THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

According to J. G. A. Pocock, the dominant narrative of eighteenth-century
Britain was an Anglo-Protestant neo-classicism rooted largely in the legacies of
Aristotle, Machiavelli and Harrington.1 Harrington, for example, had crafted a realist,
neo-Aristotelian ideology that presented modem England in terms of a natural
progress from ignorance, interest and passion to reason, virtue and independence, and
a variation on this doctrine continued to inform the narratives and identities of
eighteenth-century Britain, however much modified. Yet the dominating influence
of classical language has tended to obscure the nuances of compromise and reform
that characterized the development of British civic humanism and the competing

! According to T. A. Sinclair, Plato dominated thought until the fifteenth century, when the influence o f
Aristotle began to increase. In fact, both Plato and Aristotle provided early modem theorists with a
body of free-standing principles upon which to draw in the construction o f ideological narratives.
Subsequent theorists selectively blended these principles with others drawn, for example, from
Christian theology, resulting in the development o f neo-Platonic and neo-Aristotelian forms of civic
humanism. For a discussion of this development, see Ross, Aristotle, pp. 2, 21-22, 26-31, 37-57, 6566, 69, 91, 98, 101, 130; Aristotle, The Politics, translated by T. A. Sinclair, revised and re-presented
by Trevor J. Saunders (New York and London: Penguin Books, (1962,1981) 1992), pp. 15-17. For a
discussion o f Aristotelian influence on Renaissance and early modem thought, see J.G.A. Pocock’s
three works: The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican
Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975); Politics, Language and Time: Essays on
Political Thought and History (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, (1971) 1989); and Virtue,
Commerce, and History: Essays on Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1985) 1995).
2 Pocock, introduction, The Commonwealth o f Oceana and A System o f Politics, p. xix.
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influence of alternative narratives.3 Bishop Berkeley, for example, was critical of
deist “free-thinkers” like Shaftesbury and denied the existence of a natural moral
sense, deeming will and reason the mediums of moral rectitude, and moral law a
divine—as opposed to natural—standard of human virtue.4 Yet Berkeley’s effort to
formulate a moral science of mathematical certainty bore inconsistent results: in the
absence of revelation, how could one know universal, moral laws without looking to
nature for example?
As in the seventeenth century, when Country and Court advocates were
marked by their different emphases on means and ends, so the eighteenth century
witnessed the continuation of differences. Neo-Country advocates of the eighteenth
century—generally New Tories/ Independent and disaffected Whigs—continued to
define virtue in neoclassical terms of an absolute Platonic ideal, emphasizing the
natural motivations and character of the active agent—the Public Man (oligarchic
descendent of the disinterested freeholder)—in the attainment of common good. By
contrast, advocates of imperial commerce and trade—generally Walpolean/ Court
Whigs—defined good in civic terms that emphasized national interest at the expense
of virtuous motivations and ideals. Whereas the former presumed the existence of a
virtuous good that transcended the self-love and material satisfactions of the secular
realm, and located its source in the internal, feeling self—-a narrative at least

3 As Gibson-Wood has rightly noted: “Partly because o f Barrell’s important study[, The Political
Theory o f Painting from Reynolds to Hazlitt (1986)], and partly because o f its relevance to discussions
o f both the public sphere and taste, the concept o f civic humanism has dominated the ways in which
early eighteenth-century English art and writings about art have been theorized in recent scholarship.”
See Gibson-Wood, p. 8.
4 For an outline of Berkeley’s theory, see Copleston, V, pp. 199-200, 253-256.
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theoretically compatible with more traditional Christian dogma—, the latter relegated
such presumptions to a superior, imperfectly-intelligible reality, making virtue a
social construct informed largely by public perception. The resulting narratives
endorsed alternative—and potentially conflicting—models of identity.
In general, three schools of thought emerged: a “moral-sense” school, which
recognized modem, autonomous and reasoning subjects, each acting with varying
degrees of internal virtue and vice, within a singular, natural and progressive reality
based on fixed moral standards resonant in a harmonious natural order and the
necessary perfection of its divine creator;5 a “utilitarian” school, which recognized
modem subjects as uniformly guided by their private passions and interests within an
artificially-constructed social reality based on fluid, legally-enforced standards
designed to bring happiness to the greatest number;6 and a “common-sense” school,
which recognized modem subjects uniformly (if not consistently) guided by natural
reason to support the moral laws empirically (if imperfectly) evidenced by human
nature, these being properly instituted and enforced by the artificial forms of justice
undergirding society.7

5 Shaftesbury, for example, joined a Lockean subject—autonomous and reasonable—with “antiLockean moral views”—akin to those o f the Cambridge Platonists— into a single, intelligible narrative
o f natural progress. In Shaftesbury’s case, as Taylor explains, “The goal o f loving and affirming the
order of the world could also be described as bringing our particular minds into harmony with the
universal one....” See Taylor, pp. 244-253; quoted from pp. 252-253.
° Mandeville is the best example o f this school. See The Fable o f the Bees and Other Writings (1723),
ed. E. J. Hundert (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, Inc., 1997). Others, like William Paley (17431805), adopted a tempered utilitarian interpretation of virtue. See Copleston, V, pp. 196-199.
7 John Erskine of Camock engaged in a full analysis o f natural law—for him a byproduct of divine law
manifest in our conscience—and its proper role as the foundation o f positive or civil laws and laws
between nations. He distinguished between public laws—those “which hath more immediately in view
the public weal, and the preservation and good order o f society....”—and private laws—“that which is
chiefly intended for ascertaining the civil rights o f individuals.” (Erskine, An Institute o f the Law o f
Scotland, in Broadie, p. 611) For a full discussion o f his analysis, see John Erskine, An Institute o f the
Law o f Scotland (1773), excerpted in Broadie, pp. 600-613.
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The result was three broad standards of identity and social order: a social
hierarchy of complementary identities descending from the disinterested, benevolent
and polite Public Man—a member of the landed, leisured, and educated elite—to the
interested, selfish and vulgar masses, each properly assuming his rightful place; legal
equality among competing individuals, each qualified by circumstances and
opportunities to assume varying degrees of social and economic stature; and, finally,
legal equality among individuals simultaneously conditioned by reason and feeling to
attain varying degrees of personal happiness (competitive) and make varying
contributions to the social good (complementary).8
In the end, conflict emerged between advocates of complementary
sociological identities based on fixed standards of reality and potentiality, and
advocates of dynamic psychological identities based on the fluid standards attendant
dual realities and potentialities.9 Broadly speaking, then, how one responded to the
question of identity was a mark of one’s ideological position: those who held tight to
natural, fixed and intelligible moral standards operating in the civic realm likewise
recognized a natural inequality of progress among individuals and the higher virtue of
Public Men;10 those who deemed society the consequence of convention and interest

8 Of course, the actual divisions were not so tidy. For example, men like Adam Smith straddled the gap
between “moral-sense” and “common-sense,” conceding morality to be a product o f feeling rather than
reason, while making its relationship to divine law a matter of imperfect deduction. See Taylor, p. 259.
9 The result was a face-off between internal/ psychological and external/ sociological identities.
Suddenly, as Taylor observes, “frameworks” were “problematic” because “no framework [was] shared
by everyone.” See Taylor, pp. 17-18.
10 For Shaftesbury, for example, the issue was one o f moral inequality among men. As Copleston
writes, although Shaftesbury believed that “all men possess conscience or the moral sense” and,
consequently, considered every man “capable, to some degree at least, of perceiving moral values, of
discriminating between virtue and vice,” they were not equally progressed in their capacity to do so.
See Copleston, V, pp. 174-175.
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tended to deny the natural premise of social inequalities and society’s necessary
foundation in moral order, vesting civic authority in laws rather than men.11
All this affected the presentation of identity.12 Conscious of discrepancies
between one’s self-determined worth and one’s socially-prescribed place, an
ambitious commoner might assume an ‘improved’—i.e. ‘polite’ or aristocratic—
personality consistent with his desired identity. Employing dancing masters and
private tutors, the ambitious could obscure their “humble origins” through an
education in social refinement.13 Ultimately, as the classical conflation of knowledge
and virtue with wealth and birth appeared increasingly oppressive, alternative
narratives gained footing.14 As Baumeister notes, a “person’s place in society was [no
longer] defined by a rigid social structure based on birth and heritage” and “identity
was thus [no longer] predominantly determined by society... .”15 In the end,
Baumeister continues, “the social identity components (family, lineage, social rank)

11 Shaftesbury derided “modern Reformers” like Hobbes for denying the natural laws and virtues
essential to common good. (Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, p. 97.) Among such men, he wrote, “only
Force and Power ... constituted Right.” (Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 90-91) See Shaftesbury,
Characteristicks, I, pp. 90-91,97; Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 62.
12 Canfield, pp. 1-10, 35-36; Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 333, 401-402.
13 Once society was freed from customary authority and its armory o f fixed standards, the individual
was freed to fashion an identity consistent with his desires. In keeping with this, Baumeister notes,
“boarding schools... trained young, middle-class girls to pass for upper-class young ladies.”
(Baumeister, p. 54) At the same time, theorists like Shaftesbury cautioned against the falsities o f selffashioning, drawing a clear line between the effects o f fashion—a form of dependence— and Gentlemen
o f Fashion—those guided by good breeding. (Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, p. 83) Only the latter
shared attributes with the philosopher. (Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, III, p. 161.) In the end, as
Baumeister notes, the social ambiguities attendant self-fashioning resulted in a confusion o f identities
aggravated by intermarriage between the noble and commercial classes. (Baumeister, p. 54) See
Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 83, 124-125, 129-130,135, and III, p. 161; Baumeister, Identity,
pp. 54, 154, 256,258-259.
14 Although in theory this distinction was conditioned upon natural attributes, it became, in practice, a
condition of leisure. See Plato, Republic, pp. 17-23, 30-31.
13 Baumeister, Identity, p. 170.
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began to undergo trivialization and destabilization... as identity became a matter of
social negotiation.16

I.

“Moral Sense ” versus Social “Utility

Shaftesbury, Mandeville and Hutcheson

As the writings of Hobbes and Harrington served to highlight the ideological gaps
informing seventeenth-century British narratives, so the writings of Shaftesbury and
Mandeville suggest the narrative polarities informing the imag[in]ing of identity in
eighteenth-century Britain. The prospect of divided realities and identities posed by
disengagement rested uneasily with Shaftesbury, for it undermined the premise of a
harmonious and natural social order.17 Indeed, if disengagement nurtured individual
autonomy and self-determination, it had a corrosive affect on early Christian and neoPlatonist visions of a fixed social hierarchy in which everyone occupied their
preordained place. While it conduced to industry and commerce, it likewise effected
an unstable social order. All of which affected the evaluation of identity. As
Baumeister explains:
16 Baumeister, p. 154. Beginning in the late mediaeval period, social mobility “transformed a relatively
fixed and stable basis for identity into a changeable and problematic one,” as “rank ... became ...
contingent on circumstances other than birth.” See Baumeister, pp. 33-34, 154, 158-159,258-259. In
the end, Taylor adds, “the social order ... is more and more seen as based properly on contract....” See
Taylor, p. 229.
17 The separation o f the individual into objective and subjective selves permitted the detachment of the
perceiving self from its subjective experience. In conjunction with the internalization o f the gaze,
however, this allowed for self-examination from “the first-person perspective.” (Taylor, pp. 256-258)
The result was two variations on disengagement: one based on principles o f reason, which argued that
certain first principles can be abstracted by an emotionally-unencumbered intellect; and one based on
principles o f sensibility, which argued that certain first principles are perceived by the moral sense.
Unlike the Cambridge Platonists and other rationalists, who held “that the human reason apprehends
eternal and immutable moral principles,” Shaftesbury and Hutcheson relied on the “moral sense.”
(Copleston, V, p. 199) On these grounds, the two theorists could argue for the sympathetic relationship
between feeling and reason and their mutual engagement in the progress towards virtuous potentiality.
As Copleston notes, the idea of the self-perfection o f man or of the harmonious and complete
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The rise of the middle class during the early modem period gradually eroded
this [social] stability.... After centuries of accepting the social order as stable
and legitimate, people began to use violent means to change it. Beneath this
change in behavior lay a radically altered view of how person and state ought
to be related.... At issue was the legitimacy of the system of social rank,
which had for centuries been perhaps the most important basis of identity....
The decline of Christianity was not the only reason that the system of identity
based on social rank became problematic.... Practical and economic trends
also put it in jeopardy.... Social rank had traditionally been defined by a
combination of wealth, power, lineage, title, and social connections, all of
which were intercorrelated. The rise of the middle class disrupted those
correlations.... Some middle-class individuals became quite wealthy... [and]
some aristocratic families... became poor. 18

Shaftesbury thus set out to ameliorate the effects of disengagement by
containing the negative influences of its perceived origins.19 On the one hand, for
example, blending influences from Aristotle and Harrington, Shaftesbury warned
against the immoderate pursuit of wealth threatened by commercial imperialism.20 At
the same time, he approved the commercial ethic of “fair dealing” and the benefits of
refinement and improvement that accrued to society through commerce and
industry.

")

1

Indeed, in many respects, conversation, “fair-dealing” commerce, and

correspondence, each being mediums of ‘improvement’, all carried similar meaning
for Shaftesbury, and one might cautiously conclude that his primary objective was to

development of human nature ... has remained one o f the characteristic features of British thought.”
(Copleston, V, p. 201) See Taylor, pp. 174-175,178-182,254-258; Copleston, V, pp. 199-201.
18 Baumeister, pp. 52-53.
19 As Taylor remarks, moral-sense theorists saw in “Lockean self-disengagement... a sure way of...
losing contact with... the good. That is why Shaftesbury has to combat the extrinsic theory as an
abomination. It stands in the way o f re-engagement with our own love of the whole.” See Taylor, p.
254.
20 On the classical premise that luxury begets dependence, Shaftesbury deemed British imperialism
unwieldy and prone to corruption. See Shaftesbury Characteristicks, I, pp. 108, 111, 113, and II, pp.
150-151, 161.
21 Taylor, p. 305; Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, II, p. 155.
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control commerce in a compromised variation on civic humanism—a commercial
humanism conducive to individual improvement and social good.
In general, however, Shaftesbury’s narrative reflected new pressures on the
•

«

99

•

civic humanist narrative and its corporate meaning of life. Once society became a
conglomerate of autonomous and self-determined individuals, the only hope of
securing the classical ideal was by identifying some natural urge within the individual
that satisfied the classical commitment to natural virtue and progress.

Shaftesbury

thus struggled to free the narrative of social progress from the taint of social
relativism.24 But even Shaftesbury was forced to make necessary concessions. The
blurring of public and private that accompanied the demands for legal equality, and
the emergence of a commercial environment in which virtue was carried out in an
interdependent community of producers and consumers rather than a landed
environment of autonomous heroes, could not be ignored.25 They required that virtue
be recast in social terms, in the liminal space between private and public life: in clubs
rather than battlefields. As a consequence of this compromise, however, the
traditional definition of ‘independence’—-a virtuous and objective disinterest bom of
intellectual and economic autonomy (landed birth and leisure)—-was called into
22 Taylor, pp. 341-342.
23 According to Shaftesbury, the propensity towards goodness is a natural inclination instilled in man
by a divine being to foster a general social affection for all mankind. See Taylor, p. 255.
24 Shaftesbury’s theory o f self-improvement did not always square with the classical doctrine o f
‘nature’ over ‘nurture’, for it allowed education by example. See Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, II, p.
64.
25 Commercial virtue necessarily differed from the Aristotelian heroic ideal in being social rather than
civic, involving interactive rather than autonomous practices, and industry rather than leisure. The
conversational manner was based on the polite ease and familiarity o f the club. But ultimately its
parameters were expanded. For example, Mandeville describes his Fable o f the Bees as being written
in “as easy and familiar a manner as I am able” and compliments Sir Richard Steele on “the usual
elegance o f his easy style.” (See Mandeville, The Fable o f the Bees, pp. 20 and 41) See Taylor, pp.
238-240; Mandeville, The Fable o f the Bees, pp. 20, 41.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

100

question: who might claim disinterested independence in a world infused by
commercial and conversational relations?26
By the eighteenth century, conservative civic humanists like the third earl of
Shaftesbury were combining the unifying Christian vision of the neo-Platonists—that
which set out to reconcile Plato with Christianity and Aristotle with Plato in a theory
more cohesive and consistent than its ancient counterpart—with a neo-Aristotelian
vision of civil society 27 The resulting narrative endorsed two tenets important to the
evaluation of identity: a classical theory of natural progress; and a notion of public
virtue that wed the private attributes of Christian goodness—those affiliated with
internal feeling—with the heroic attributes of the Public Man—those affiliated with
external action—in a secular doctrine of moral ethics 28 They were further compelled
to amend political theory. Whereas Harrington—like Aristotle—had located civic
good in the balance of virtues attendant a ‘mixed’ government of three estates, relying
on agrarian laws and annual elections to secure this balance, neo-Harringtonians like
Shaftesbury located civic good in the moral virtues of Public Men. In the end, the
“moral theorists” deemed civic virtue a condition of moral ethics, the byproduct of
26 See Copleston, V, p. 184. Plato, like Socrates, believed that conversation—or ‘dialectic’—was the
medium o f philosophy; not only was his “Republic... in dialogue form and its style ... conversational,”
but it was the method o f education he endorsed at his Academy. (Lee, introduction to Plato, Republic,
p. liv) This was more true of Socrates and Plato than their “successors”; Cicero’s dialogues, for
example, are mostly lectures in philosophical doctrine. See Lee, introduction to Plato, Republic, pp.
xxxvii, liv-lv.
27 As Taylor notes, Shaftesbury’s neo-Platonism was distinct from traditional Platonism in its attention
to one’s “inward Nature” as the source of religious and moral feeling, an attention influenced by a neoAugustinianism. Moreover, although contemplation featured prominently as a medium of virtue, it was
also distinguished by its emphasis on the public actions—as opposed to private contemplations—of
virtuous men. See Taylor, pp. 242, 251; Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 41-42, 54-55.
28 Baumeister writes: “With the transition to the Romantic period, we see a great decline in the power
and influence of Christianity. Two important consequences o f this decline were a serious revision of
basic political beliefs and a deterioration o f the Christian moral scheme. These two consequences
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fixed moral laws resonant in natural sentiments and manifest in individual acts of
public good.29
One consequence of this development was an emphasis on feeling as the
medium of virtue, the external evidence of one’s quality, and the proper measure of
social rank.30 Another was the equation of moral virtue with aesthetic taste.31
Ultimately, refinement became equated with virtue.32 As Shaftesbury described it,
“outward Manners and Deportment” parallel “inward Sentiments and Principles.”^
Moreover, “improvement”—the process of refinement by which the individual
progressed from ignorance to knowledge, self-interest to social affection—became
dependent on “the business of Self-dissection”—i.e. the examination of one’s “inward
Recess” through “magical Glasses.”34 This bore relevance for portraiture.

raised several problems for individual identity, including the search for proper models.” See
Baumeister, p. 58.
29 Copleston writes: “Shaftesbury and Hutcheson had laid emphasis on ‘moral excellence’, on virtue as
a state o f character, on ‘affections’.... But conscience and moral decision are concerned primarily with
actions. So with [Joseph] Butler we can see a tendency to shift the emphasis from affections to
actions,... actions as informed by motives....” See Copleston, V, pp. 174, 199-201; quoted from p.
200 .
30 In a harmonious social order, each individual fulfilled his naturally-prescribed place according to his
moral virtue. Although the good is both passive and active—a matter of character or action—,
Shaftesbury’s emphasis is on character. See Copleston, V, pp. 173-176.
Shaftesbury’s interpretation reflected a Platonic bias. Plato understood style in terms o f beauty,
beauty in terms of uniformity, uniformity and harmony in terms o f virtue, and virtue in terms of
character—and, so, identity. (Plato, Republic, pp. 102-103) The purpose o f a liberal arts education was
thus to train individuals in good taste—in the recognition of true beauty—that they themselves might
also become beautiful and virtuous. (Plato, Republic, p. 106) As Shaftesbury concluded, “the most
natural Beauty in the World is Honesty, and moral Truth. For all Beauty is TRUTH.” (Shaftesbury,
Characteristicks, I, pp. 141-142) See Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 121-122, 135-136, 138-142,
II, pp. 40, 74-76, and III, 179; Plato, Republic, pp. 102-103, 106, 132, 219.
32 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 68-70, 72, 90.
33 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 121-122, and III, p. 179.
34 Charles Taylor has termed this introspection “radical reflexivity”—a fracturing o f the self into
subjective and objective parts as a means o f coming face-to-face with one’s potentiality. See Taylor,
pp. 174-175, 178-182; Shaftesbury Characteristicks, I, pp. 173-174; Hutcheson, Reflections upon
Laughter, in Reflections upon Laughter and Remarks upon the Fable o f the Bees (Glasgow, 1750), in
Broadie, pp. 226-227.
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In part, Shaftesbury’s emphasis on feeling reflected the influence of
Augustinian neo-Platonism, which likewise turned inward to find the source of moral
virtue.35 As Augustine advocated introspection and contemplation as a means of
being enlightened to the Word and, by extension, the existence of God, thereby
improving one’s self and society through a knowledge of His love, so Shaftesbury
advocated introspection and contemplation as a means of nurturing one’s natural
affections and, thereby, improving one’s self and society through the love of mankind.
But Shaftesbury also reclaimed the principle of a progressive self resonant in Plato
and Aristotle. Indeed, the distinction between a progressive—natural to perfect—and
a divided—natural versus social—self was a key point of controversy in eighteenthcentury narratives.
On the one hand, the principle of a progressive self supported the notion of
natural inequalities and a natural social hierarchy. On the other hand, the principle of
a divided self—i.e. public or social and private or autonomous—, bom of
“disengagement,” separated the matter of the secular, social self—legally equal and
relative—from the matter of the eternal self—divine and fixed.36 To amend the gap,
and reaffirm the narrative of the progressive self, Shaftesbury subordinated the

35 As Taylor notes, “The ancient theories that Shaftesbury drew on, those o f Plato and the Stoics,
weren’t expressed in the language o f inwardness.. . Inwardness, a consequence o f Augustinian
Christianity, was intensified during the Renaissance, when the self-conscious “I” emerged as an
expression o f one’s “inner” personhood. See Taylor, pp. 255-256.
36 Baumeister defined ‘disengagement’ as the “conceptual separation of the person lfom his or her
position in the social order.” It was this “separation o f public and private domains of life,” and its
accompanying separation between the public (now problematic) and private (now ‘true’) selves, which
“laid the foundation for a view o f the self as being in conflict with society, a view which became widely
influential in the nineteenth century.” (Baumeister, pp. 41-42) See Baumeister, pp. 41-42; Taylor, p.
265.
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divided self to the classical theory of natural progress.37 As he explained it, “our
Doctrine of Two Persons in one individual S e lf recognized the ‘natural’ self not as a
separate, a-social self, but as the point of departure—“the Underparts or Second
Characters’’—for the potential self.38 Moreover, this potential self was not merely a
social self bom of compact and convention relevant only in the civic sphere, but the
“Philosophical Hero ...in himself a perfect Character” towards which man
progressed according to divine plan.39 Through self-reflection in one’s “PocketMirrour,” he wrote, one might begin to comprehend this relationship and enter upon
that course of improvement through which the divided self attained its full and unified
potential.40
Shaftesbury’s defense of an intelligible, harmonious, and fixed moral order
responded, in part, to the threat of dual realities and divided identities attendant
nominalist and empirical thinking; as Copleston notes, empiricists denied “objective
standards of morality and objective moral values.”41 For Shaftesbury, however, only
a single, fixed, and intelligible moral law could serve as the premise for natural
progress and a natural and harmonious social hierarchy. Once the marketplace

37 By 1710, the third earl o f Shaftesbury had subsumed the concept o f a divided self into the classical
principle of a progressive self. See Shaftesbury, “TREATISE HI.: Soliloquy: or, Advice to an Author”,
in Characteristicks, I, pp. 158-161, 173-174,179, 185-188,190-191,194-197,200-201,204-207,239240, 250, 277-283,298.
38 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, p. 185. Smith likewise employed a notion of self-improvement
dependent on the principle o f a divided self. “Hence,” Copleston quotes, “‘I divide myself, as it were,
into two persons.... The first is the spectator.... The second is the agent, the person whom I properly
call myself, and o f whose conduct, under the character of spectator, 1 was endeavouring to form some
opinion’.” Copleston, V, p. 359.
j9 For Shaftesbury, in other words, the relationship between parts o f the divided self represented a
relationship akin to ‘Pupil’ and ‘Preceptor’, the complementary components o f the progressive self.
See Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 170, 195-196.
40 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 194-196.
41 Copleston, V, p. 177.
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assumed greater authority vis-a-vis the political sphere, once individualism and
empiricism challenged the necessary correlation between birth and rank, once reason
was deemed a universal capacity among men, neo-Country advocates were challenged
to find another attribute by which to distinguish and defend the credibility of Public
Men and the traditional principles of social hierarchy.42
To this end, Shaftesbury recast the moral rectitude of the Public Man in social
terms, shifting the emphasis from heroic virtue to friendship and benevolence, from
the external sword to internal feeling.43 At the same time, he confined this attribute
to the landed elite. As the neo-Country Public Man demonstrated his natural and
superior virtue through a platonic love of mankind and an innate desire to advance the
public good, so his ability to do so continued to turn on his unique capacity for
leisured introspection.44 By upholding this traditional relationship between
disinterested leisure and civic virtue, Shaftesbury secured a social order in which only
the landed bore access to the universal mind conducive to social affection and public
good.45 In other words, whereas Harrington had argued for a natural equality among

42 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, II, p. 63.
43 Rooted in Enlightenment dialogues on virtue and vice begun in seventeenth century France,
benevolence filled the gap left by a collapsed religious and social order, serving to Christianize and
unify the secular sphere. (Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 106-107) Indeed, Shaftesbury remarks,
“Can any Friendship... be so heroick, as that towards Mankind?” (Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, II, p.
238) Plato and Aristotle had likewise correlated friendship with statesmanship. And certainly it
informed subsequent notions of patriotism. (Plato, Laws, pp. 334-335 and Aristotle, Rhetoric, p. 100)
According to Shaftesbury, was in its failure to support the political implications o f this principle. See
Shaftesbury Characteristicks, I, pp. 39-41, 98-99, 104-107, 109-110,117-118, and II, p. 9,15, 78, 8687, 90, 98, 107, 113-114, 126, 136-140, 147-148, 150, 175-176, 238, 246-247, 278; Plato, Laws, pp.
142, 334-335; Aristotle, The Rhetoric, in Corbett, p. 100; Taylor, pp. 249-254, 256, 26, 305, 311-312;
Copleston, I, pp. 347-348, and V, pp. 157-170.
44 Shaftesbury wrote: “If there be a general Mind, it can have no particular Interest.” See Shaftesbury,
Characteristicks, I, p. 40.
43 Baumeister writes: “A conceptual connection between personality and social rank already existed by
the early modem period. Evaluative traits, including moral traits, were thought to derive from physical,
family heritage (‘blood’). People believed that the aristocracy were innately better people than were
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men based on natural rights and the universal capacity for reason, neo-Harringtonians
like Shaftesbury, while conceding Harrington’s position with regard to natural rights
and reason, defended natural inequalities on grounds of man’s unequal propensity for
benevolence.46
Significantly, however, in equating internal benevolence with external
politeness, Shaftesbury inadvertently opened the way to an alternative standard of
identity. While Shaftesbury deemed politeness the attribute of a disinterested,
liberally-educated elite—those who employed the “free and familiar Style” of ancient
dialogues and treatises in private, clubby settings—, there was little to prevent others
from adopting like modes of behavior and, hence, from displaying—however
falsely—the evidence of moral virtue.47 Indeed, while Shaftesbury might extol
ancient poetry for educating men in the matter of human potentiality and advancing
“the business of Self-dissection” by which men were enlightened and, so, ‘improved’,
while Shaftesbury might, therefore, condition the business of ‘self-dissection’ and
improvement on leisure and, so, like both Plato and Aristotle, make improvement the
privilege of a landed elite, others might forego the poetry while donning its effects.48

the common people, with superior moral and personal traits .... By implication, a commoner
pretending to be an aristocrat did not ‘really’ have those traits, regardless o f how he or she acted.”
(Baumeister, p. 258) See Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 40,98; Baumeister, pp. 54,258.
46 Eighteenth-century “moralists...,” Copleston writes, “opposed not only Hobbes’s interpretation of
man as essentially egoistic but also all authoritarian conceptions o f the moral law and o f moral
obligation....” (Copleston, V, p. 171) He continues: “As against Hobbes’s idea o f man they insisted on
man’s social nature; and as against ethical authoritarianism they insisted on man’s possession o f a
moral sense by which he discerns moral values.... They also gave a social interpretation o f morality, in
terms o f a social rather than a private end.” (Copleston, V, pp. 171-172) See Copleston, V, pp. 171173.
47 Like Plato, philosophers as varied as Hobbes, Shaftesbury and Rousseau encouraged a “Liberal
Education” as a means of nurturing virtue; unlike Rousseau, however, Shaftesbury deemed it suited
only to gentlemen. See Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, p. 75.
48 The soliloquy was a particularly potent medium of improvement—one that readily compared with the
portrait. “By virtue o f this SOLILOQUY,” Shaftesbury wrote, the subject “becomes two distinct
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The result was a confusion of identities. In traditional classical and Christian
discourse, social harmony resulted when each member of society assumed and
performed his natural role, advancing society through a complementary network of
social relations. Because birth was understood to be an index of function, harmony
was deemed dependent upon ‘keeping one’s place’. By shifting attention from public
to private virtue, by making private virtue—in the form of benevolence—public, and,
perhaps most importantly, by allowing for the possibility of a nurtured benevolence,
conservative civic humanists of the moral-sense school made two significant
concessions. First, they implied that the stability of modem society relied more on
inter-dependence than independence, thereby undermining the notion of natural
hierarchy descending from the leisured and reasoning few (the independents) to the
working and passionate masses (the dependents). Second, they opened the way for
‘nurture’ over ‘nature’ and the possibility that any individual might rise above (or fall
below) his birth ‘place’, thereby conceding a modicum of social fluidity. These
concessions proved compatible with the arguments of convention theorists, who
deemed society a compact between autonomous, legal equals motivated by private
interests to acquire property and “improve” themselves. In the end, extremists like
Mandeville could dismiss with the principle of natural moral standards as unnecessary
to the circumstances of modem life: ambition filled the void left by classical virtue.49
Combining his medical studies of human nature with his interest in social
relations, the physician Bernard Mandeville presented a vision of society in which the

Persons. He is Pupil and Preceptor. He teaches, and he learns.” (Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, p.
158) See Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 158, 196, and III, p. 155.
49 Hundert, introduction to Mandeville, The Fable o f the Bees, p. xv; Copleston, V, p. 177.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

107

moral objectives of civic humanism were abandoned as ill-suited to modem
happiness.50 In “An Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue” (1732), Mandeville
deemed morality a political tool employed by the elite to manipulate the masses.51 So
successfully ingrained was the principle of morality that even the most oppressed
were unwilling to deny it.52 Yet, Mandeville argued, the moral ideals advanced by
Anglo-Protestant civic humanism were unnecessary to stability and happiness in
modem society. As he described it, the circumstances of modem Britain have made
man’s “vilest and most hateful qualities ... the most necessary accomplishments to fit
him for the largest and, according to the world, the happiest and most flourishing
societies,” one resembling the fabled “hive.”

^ -2

This had not always been the case. As Mandeville explained, at some point in
the transition from feudalism to modernism, “an unacknowledged historical
transformation” had occurred that changed the demands on the individual and society
and made the narrative of moral virtue obsolete.54 As he described it, the
transformation of commodities into sources of commercial exchange and profit—
wealth—shifted the balance-of-influence between real and mobile property,
expanding the means by which to attain power, reducing the inclination for violent

50 Mandeville’s theory o f self-love borrowed from the work o f earlier scholars like Pierre Nicole and
Pierre Bayle. See Hundert, in Mandeville, The Fable o f the Bees, pp. 1-18.
51 See Mandeville, “An Enquiry into the Origin o f Moral Virtue,” in The Fable o f the Bees, pp. 36-41;
Hundert, introduction to Mandeville, Fable o f the Bees, p. xxi; Copleston, V, pp. 177-181.
52 Part o f Mandeville’s criticism was directed against the false face o f Christian virtue; his Letter to
Dion (1732) responded to Bishop Berkeley’s attack on free-thinkers in Alciphron; or, The Minute
Philosopher (1732). See Mandeville, The Fable o f the Bees, pp. 1-18, 39-42; Hundert, introduction to
Mandeville, The Fable o f the Bees, pp. x, xv.
53 See Hundert, introduction to Mandeville, The Fable o f the Bees, p. x. The “hive” metaphor found in
Mandeville’s Fable o f the Bees had roots in Hobbes’s Leviathan. See Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 225-227.
54 Hundert, introduction to Mandeville, The Fable o f the Bees, p. xix. In the end, Mandeville deemed
pride the basis o f social relations. See Hundert, in Mandeville, pp. xxi, xxxii; Copleston, V, p. 178.
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revolt—that which made necessary a counter-narrative of virtue—, and putting
pressure on the standards by which individual ‘value’ was measured.55 One
consequence of these “new mechanisms of exchange” was “the relegation of... civic
ideals to the realm of nostalgia, and the adoption of an intransigently egoistic
morality.”56
Ultimately, Mandevillean interest challenged Shaftesburian virtue;57
Mandeville’s analysis rendered suspect any claims to social virtue and self-sacrifice.
But it also challenged the ethic of frugality. As Mandeville saw it, commercial
society depended upon consumption, and consumption depended on the demand for
goods. To premise a commercial society on frugality was to deny its motivation as
well as its mode of “happiness.” Unlike his more conservative peers, then, for whom
the threat of corruption required some element of virtue, Mandeville did not attempt
to assimilate the demands of commerce into the ideals of civic humanism or make
commerce compatible with virtue. He did not attempt to make common happiness
the same as common good.58 It was this rejection of higher good that made his

55 Hundert, introduction to Mandeville, The Fable o f the Bees, p. xxiv.
56 Hundert, introduction to Mandeville, The Fable o f the Bees, p. xix,
57 Significantly, Copleston remarks, “his general idea that private egoism and the public good are not at
all inconsistent... is an idea which is implicit in the laissez-faire type of political and economic
theory.” (Copleston, V, p. 178) For a discussion o f its impact on philosophical development,
particularly in the writings o f David Hume, Adam Smith, and Immanuel Kant, see Hundert, in
Mandeville, The Fable o f the Bees, pp. xix-xxxii.
58 Mandeville, “An Enquiry into the Origin o f Moral Virtue,” in The Fable o f the Bees, pp. 43-44.
Shaftesbury and Rousseau also distinguished between a higher, virtuous good and baser forms of
happiness—what Shaftesbury called “Dreams of Grandure, Titles, Honours, and a false Magnificence”
that turn men into “the merest Drudges, and most abject Slaves.” See Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I,
p. 139.
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argument so radical and helped to nurture his nickname—“Man-devil”—, which,
according to Hundert, “became a synonym for immorality.”59
As Hundert argues, Mandeville faced head-on “the eighteenth-century ’s
intense and prolonged dispute about how to understand and evaluate the liberation of
acquisitive instincts engendered in modem polities by the infusion of commercial
relations into the centers of public life.”60 Once awakened to the dramatic
implications of advancing commercial and financial power on the credibility of civic
humanism and its corresponding social and political structures, contemporary
theorists struggled to stretch the parameters of classicism, dispensing with its
unwieldy ideals while preserving its pursuit of common good. Ultimately, industry
became the medium of influence and rank, and symbols of industry became signifiers
of identity.61 As Hundert explains, “outward displays of wealth alone were now
widely accepted as a direct index of social power...
All this informed the evaluation of identity. Over time, the civic humanist
identity, as defined by Harrington, adopted by Restoration Whigs, modified by neoCountry conservatives, and articulated by the third earl of Shaftesbury, was mutated
into a standard increasingly guided by the external evidence of internal morality: the

59 Hundert, introduction to Mandeville, Fable o f the Bees, p. xv. See also Mandeville, “An Enquiry
into the Origin o f Moral Virtue,” in The Fable o f the Bees, p. 43; Hundert, introduction to Mandeville,
Fable o f the Bees, pp. xiv-xv, xviii.
60 Hundert, introduction to Mandeville, Fable o f the Bees, p. xi.
61 Hundert writes: “Mandeville claimed that his work for the first time systematically comprehended
from the perspective o f society ... monied wealth [for]... moral and social identities.” (Hundert, p. xxv)
Indeed, he goes on, Mandeville “showed that the aggressive pursuit o f wealth had now to be
understood... as central to the self-definition o f urban and commercial populations.” (Hundert, p. xxv)
It was this interpretation o f the monied interest that merchants and tradesmen were loath to adopt. See
Hundert, introduction to Mandeville, Fable o f the Bees, pp. xx-xxv.
62 This “render[ed] absurd ... the conventional condemnation of luxury as immoral.” See Hundert,
introduction to Mandeville, The Fable o f the Bees, pp. xxiv-xxv.
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mask of politeness. As virtue became submerged into industry, as industry became
the medium of identity, politeness and benevolence were subverted to its influence.63
As Mandeville suggested, men adopted polite manners and an interest in the social
welfare because they earned the bearer a reputation for public virtue that enhanced his
influence—to the benefit of his personal ambitions.64 In other words, the appearance
of refinement was emphasized at the expense of its proper cause—internal virtue 65
Thus, Mandeville could write, “in great commercial cities, where strangers are
regularly encountered, people gain public esteem by their clothes and other
accoutrements of wealth, ‘not as what they are, but what they appear to be’.”66
This proved a boon to the business of portrait-making. At the same time these
‘attributes’ became signifiers of public worth, they were readily assimilated into the
language of portraiture. Costume, gesture, hairstyle, stance: all became signifiers of
individual progress and identity. In fact, the new emphasis on external modes of
politeness meant that portraiture became a means not only of recording one’s person,

6j Hundert concludes, “Modem manners thus comprised the last stage in the history of pride, and the
most efficient way to manage [commercial society].... Once men were able to distinguish themselves
by mannered social pretense underwritten by the marks o f wealth, the stem and self-denying morality of
virtue which first made communal life possible was effectively reduced to a nostalgic remnant o f the
politically defeated and downwardly mobile....” (Hundert, pp. xxix-xxx) See Hundert, introduction to
Mandeville, The Fable o f the Bees, pp. xvi, xxix-xxx.
64 As Pocock notes, ‘“manners’, which had once, in the form o f custom and tradition, served to retard
the wheel of fortune, have now become progressive and corrupting.” Pocock, The Machiavellian
Moment, p. 533.
65 As Hundert observes, “civility and politeness” became “regulatory devices governing an
unprecedented... process o f conspicuous consumption” in which “symbols” were appropriated “for the
promotion of self—a relentless accumulation of emblems that could be acquired by wealth in a
commercial market o f marks o f esteem.” He goes on: “men could now indulge themselves in the world
of commerce because in it they were free to compete in non-violent ways for the most valued ‘tokens’
o f public approbation.” See Hundert, introduction to Mandeville, Fable o f the Bees, p. xxix.
66 Hundert, introduction to Mandeville, The Fable o f the Bees, p. xxv.
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but of constructing and asserting an ‘improved’ personality through the selective
rendering of a narrative context suited to one’s desired identity.
In the wake of Mandeville’s analysis, the principle of friendship promoted by
Shaftesbury was adopted and refashioned by his theoretical successor, Francis
Hutcheson.67 On the one hand, Hutcheson struck a middle chord between the
competing emphases on means and ends—virtuous causes and good effects—,
affiliating the formal goods of the internal sense with the virtue of moral
benevolence.68 On the other hand, Hutcheson suggested that it was moral sensibility,
not benevolence, that was innate and, further, that, as sensibility was innate to all
men, benevolence, which “is thoroughly internalized in sentiment,” might be
cultivated—theoretically speaking—by anyone.69 This was to boost the position of
‘nurture’ over ‘nature’ and bring the neo-Country platform dangerously close to a
condition of social fluidity.

70

What saved it was Hutcheson’s interpretation of

individual will as the complement to social hierarchy: though individual will
determined the degree to which one’s sensibility might be elevated towards
benevolence and virtue, will itself was subject to the natural inequalities necessarily

67 While rooted in Shaftesbury’s ‘friendship’, the theory of moral benevolence was perhaps most
forcefully articulated by his theoretical successor, Francis Hutcheson. Like Shaftesbury, Hutcheson
deemed morality a social virtue. (Taylor, pp. 259,262 and 280) But he further distinguished between
its internal and external forms. As Copleston writes, “By external sense the mind receives, in Locke’s
terminology, simple ideas o f single qualities o f objects.... By internal sense we perceive relations
which give rise to a feeling or feelings which are different from the seeing or hearing or touching of
separate related objects.” (Copleston, V, p. 179) ) “Thus,” Copleston concludes, “Hutcheson tends to
make virtue synonymous with benevolence... [;] the desire o f universal happiness, becomes the
dominating principle in morality.” (Copleston, V, pp. 180-181) See Copleston, V, pp. 179-182; Taylor,
pp. 258-259, 261-262,264,280.
68 Taylor, p. 261.
69 Taylor, p. 264.
70 Taylor, pp. 260-261.
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informing the harmonious universe.71

II.

Internal Feeling/ Artificial Convention: Jean-Jacques Rousseau and David Hume
The emphasis on benevolence and sentiment in eighteenth-century ideology is

significant for what it suggests about the growing influence of private attributes in the
evaluation of identity.72 By the mid-eighteenth century, feeling, once negatively
associated with ‘passion’ and ignorance, had become “the touchstone of the morally
*

*

good,” providing guidance to reason, which served to filter emotional distortions.

73

The full effect of this reversal was felt in the Romantic ethic, which encouraged the
individual’s internal reunion with his pure potentiality. Through feeling, Rousseau
argued, man re-engaged with his internal, noble self and was thereby motivated to
throw off the negative effects of disengagement, reconnect with others, and
consequently improve and advance both himself and society.74
Rousseau’s analysis, which located the moral self in the “voice within,” served
to highlight the implications of the divided self: the coexistence of higher (natural)
and lower (artificial) realms of existence; and the accompanying coexistence of higher
(virtuous) and lower (social) selves.75 On these grounds, Rousseau rejected the

71 Unlike Locke, Hutcheson regarded one’s place in the social order as already prescribed: one comes
to know it through one’s internal reengagement with God’s will. Taylor, pp. 264-265.
72 In complement with this development, “human nature” emerged as a primary subject o f eighteenthcentury philosophy. This was particularly true in the case of David Hume. For a discussion o f Hume,
see Copleston, V, pp. 258-298, 305-317.
73 Previously, although a handful o f philosophers, such as Descartes, had credited feeling with the
power to unite body and soul, reason was still privileged as the medium of virtue. See Taylor, pp. 283284.
74 Whereas Lockean empiricism employed disengagement as a means o f examining the general self in
relation to a representational model o f the world, a second model o f individualism employed
disengagement as a means o f reunion with the particular self. See Taylor, pp. 283-284.
75 Jean-Jacques Rousseau highlighted the gap between the moral and social self and, hence,
“dramatically and scandalously pointed out a contradiction that others were trying to live with.”
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utilitarian narrative of “organized egoism,” and its emphasis on happiness, as an
alternative form of enslavement.76 For Rousseau, the meaning of life was not
happiness, but the good. And the good was manifest not in pleasure, but in freedom
and, so, morality, for only in our capacity as moral agents do we bear the capacity for
freedom.77 In part, then, Rousseau sought to reconcile the implications of
disengagement—the isolation of the individual from society and the consequent gap
between the moral and social self—by urging a return to nature as the venue of re
engagement. This return to nature was not a regression to a dependent, primitive state,
but a progression towards an independent, unadulterated self, the point-of-departure
for individual and social good. 78
As Rousseau’s writings suggest, the narrative of internal feeling informed by
Augustine and advanced by the “moral sense” theorists was expanded during the
course of the century. As Taylor explains it, the “feeling for nature” expressed first as
the idealized “virtues of simplicity or rusticity,” became the “sentiments which nature
awakens in us”—we “return to nature, because it brings out strong and noble feelings
in us... ”79 This development is resonant in the visual differences between Thomas
Gainsborough’s John Plampin (Fig. 4-1; ca. 1753-1754; oil on canvas, 19-3/4 x 23(Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 504) See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 503-505;
Taylor, pp. 174-175, 182, 300-302, 356-358.
76 Taylor, p. 364.
77 Taylor, pp. 364-365.
78 “Goodness is identified with freedom, with finding the motives for one’s actions w ithin oneself....
Rousseau is actually pushing the subjectivism o f modem moral understanding a stage further.” See
Taylor, pp. 359-361; quoted from p. 361.
79 Taylor, p. 293, 296-297,299. According to Taylor, the change was resonant in four key aspects of
English culture: commerce, with its attendant politeness; literature and “the rise o f the novel,” with its
egalitarian language, audience, subject-matter (domestic and particular rather than civic and general),
and virtues (social rather than heroic, for example, or based on common men doing heroic deeds);
domesticity and the emphasis on marriage, family and emotional commitments; and the role of
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1/4 inches; National Gallery, London) and Joseph Wright’s Brooke Boothby (Fig. 4-2;
1781; oil on canvas, 58-1/2 x 81-3/4 inches; Tate Britain).

Fig. 4-2
sentiment. Significantly, all were reflective o f social rather than heroic ideals. See Taylor, pp. 286301,361, 380; Baumeister, pp. 60-63.
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In the former, the country subject is seated in a natural landscape, the base of his torso
supported by the base of a weathered tree, his legs extended like roots into the bare
•

•

earth, arm draped casually—and possessively—across a low-lying limb.

80

*

In this

relaxed posture, garbed in fashionable attire trimmed in gold braid, Plampin meets our
gaze with a proprietor’s air, his confident ease highlighted by the contrasting rigidity
of his statuesque pointer. In this image of the country squire, nature is subordinate
and complementary to the subject, a symbol of rustic values and, more particularly,
the implications and ideals of property-ownership—of roots in land. In this role, it
supports—literally and figuratively—the person and pursuits of the sitter.
In Boothby, by contrast, figure bends and flows at one with the landscape, the
sitter’s left ankle all but rooting beneath the underbrush while his head emerges like a
sprout of new growth. As Stephen Daniels notes, visual precedent for the reclining
figure can be found in Elizabethan images, while literary examples include Henry
Mackenzie’s Man o f Feeling*1 Against the material—artificial—richness of
Plampin’s dress, Boothby’s costume assumes the tones and shadows of nature, the
glints of light in the distant sky echoed in the whiteness of stockings, collar and cuff.
Moreover, against Plampin’s conversational posture, Boothby’s is decidedly
contemplative, the split of the index finger signaling the sitter’s engagement with his
internal self, a point reinforced by the volume, marked Rousseau, that rests on the

80 According to Kalinsky, the origins ofPiampin’s pose derived from an engraving o f Watteau’s
Antoine de la Roque, the influence o f which had already affected Hayman’s paintings at Vauxhall
Gardens. See Nicola Kalinsky, Gainsborough (London: Phaidon Press, 1995), pp. 44-45.
81 Daniels, Joseph Wright, pp. 23-24.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

116

bank in front of him.82 In other words, if Plampin casts nature in economic (propertyownership), social (the setting of leisurely pursuits like walking, hunting and
conversing), and political (landed) terms, Boothby casts nature as the venue of
metaphysical engagement with the internal self, the site of self-knowledge and moral
improvement.83 In this guise, Boothby’s reunion with the virtuous matter and
potentiality found in natural man prior to his adoption of the artificial and prideeffecting ‘attributes’ endorsed by ‘civilization’84 recalls Shaftesbury’s “Magical
Glasses;” quoting Buffon, Rousseau wrote: “it is this [internalized] sense that we
must use if we wish to know ourselves; it is the only one by which we can judge
ourselves.”85
Ultimately, Taylor writes, the Romantic narrative subverted “the hierarchical
order of reason” to the “providential design of nature.”

or

By mid-century, the external

disengagement that characterized the first stage of internalization and informed the
Lockean split between reason and passion in the pursuit of scientific reason, assumed
new focus on internal self-discovery and re-engagement with the external world.87 In
the process, feeling, as the conduit of engagement, assumed new stature as the
medium of virtue; whereas Locke invoked reason as the medium of feeling, Rousseau

82 In feet, Boothby published Rousseau’s bibliography in 1780, and the folio in front o f him likely
refers to this manuscript. See Stephen Daniels, Joseph Wright (London: Tate Gallery, 1998), pp. 2223.
83 Taylor, pp. 362-363, 374-375.
84 Rousseau, A Discourse on Inequality, Remark O, p. 167.
85 Unfortunately, Rousseau argued, ‘“we seldom make use of that inward sense which reduces us to our
true dimensions, and separates us from all that is not part o f us’.” See Buffon, Histoire Naturelle,
generate et particuliere, vol. IV (Paris, 1752), p. 151; quoted in Rousseau, A Discourse on Inequality,
Remark B, p. 139.
86 Taylor, pp. 283-284.
87 Indeed, there was a shared sense that everything was ultimately reducible to one’s inner self and the
outer world. See Taylor, pp. 348-349, 351, 353-354.
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invoked feeling as the medium of reason.88 Indeed, that the ‘natural’, feeling self
existed prior to the social, reasoning self, that the pursuit of virtuous improvement
required re-engagement with this natural, feeling self, represented an essential
component of the “romantic theory of personality.”89 Whereas morai-sense deists like
Shaftesbury looked externally to locate the evidence of moral laws, and transformed
the will accordingly, the Romantic personality located the evidence of morality
internally and, so, looked inward to discover the good.90
In part, Rousseau blamed philosophy for the distorted emphasis on reason that
had caused the decline in human compassion and nurtured the prevalence of pride
over pity, interest over benevolence.91 As with the moral-sense theorists, benevolence
marked the difference between the higher love of amour propre informing natural
rights and common good, and the lower love of amour de soi informing selfinterest.92 It was this gap which necessitated the artificial social contract, one
consequence of which was the subversion of natural pity to social pride, another of
which was the sacrifice of natural rights for positive laws.93 Ultimately, having
rejected the premise of a natural general will—i.e. a natural association of men—,
88 Taylor, pp. 366-367.
89 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 401-402.
90 Taylor, pp. 368-375.
91 As he explained it, “all the social virtues ... flow from this quality [of pity] alone.... Benevolence,
and even friendship, correctly understood, is only the outcome o f ’ pity. (Rousseau, A Discourse on
Inequality, p. 100) See Rousseau, A Discourse on Inequality, pp. 100-101; Rousseau, The Geneva
Manuscript, in Rousseau, The Social Contract, p. 155.
92 Rousseau writes: “One must not confuse pride and self-love.... Self-love is a natural sentiment
which prompts every animal to watch over its own conservation and which, directed in man by reason
and modified by pity, produces humanity and virtue.” (Rousseau, A Discourse on Inequality, Remark
O, p. 167) See Rousseau, A Discourse on Inequality, Remark O, p. 167; Taylor, p. 305, 356, 361, 386389.
93 As Victor Gourevitch explains, Rousseau denied that men spontaneously act in conformity with
common natural rights. And it is this weakness which necessitated the formation o f society and the
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Rousseau endorsed an artificial one, a convention of general laws by which each man
was freed from the will of another and all were held mutually subject to a single,
uniform, and just standard, the security of which depended upon an elected
aristocracy of wise men.94
On the one hand, this required the institution of legal equality.95 On the other
hand, it required a ‘natural’ aristocracy—a meritocracy of wise men guided by amour
propre (patriotism)—to secure the general will.96 Indeed, Rousseau’s platform was
not an endorsement of social parity or a denial of individual merit and virtue, but
rather a denial of wealth and birth as the necessary foundations of civic virtue.

07

While he celebrated “enlightened patriotism” as the highest form of virtue and the

institution o f positive laws. See Gourevitch, introduction to Rousseau, The Social Contract and other
later political writings, pp. x-xix.
94 Rousseau defined social compact as that “form o f association that will defend and protect the person
and goods of each associate with the full common force, and by means of which each, uniting with all,
nevertheless obey only himself and remain as free as before.” (Rousseau, O f the Social Contract, pp.
49-50) Within this structure, Rousseau endorsed the common liberty and sovereignty o f all men under a
self-imposed legislation—the general will— enacted by an executive. (Rousseau, The Geneva
Manuscript, pp. 156-161) See Rousseau, The Geneva Manuscript, O f the Social Contract and
Discourse on Political Economy, in Rousseau, The Social Contract and other later political writings,
pp. 6,49-51, 54-60,156-161; Gourevitch, introduction to Rousseau, The Social Contract and other
later political writings, pp. xx-xxi.
95 Gourevitch, introduction to Rousseau, The Social Contract, pp. xviii.-xix. According to Rousseau,
“the fundamental pact... substitutes a moral and legitimate equality for whatever physical inequality
nature may have placed between men... [so] that while they may be unequal in force or in genius, they
all become equal by convention and by right.” (Rousseau, O f the Social Contract, p. 56) As Taylor
likewise notes, Rousseau opposed the leveling tendencies of Enlightenment deism. (Taylor, p. 355)
See Rousseau, O f the Social Contract and Discourse on Political Economy, in Rousseau, The Social
Contract and other later political writings, pp. 3-6, 56-61, 67; Gourevitch, introduction to Rousseau,
The Social Contract and other later political writings, pp. xviii.-xix.
96 According to Rousseau, morals are the most important impetus to virtue and good government; “the
mainspring o f public authority,” he wrote, “is in the hearts o f the citizens, and... nothing can replace
morals in sustaining government.” (Discourse on Political Economy, p. 13) This is alternately
described as “patriotism.” See Rousseau, O f the Social Contract and Discourse on Political Economy,
in Rousseau, The Social Contract and other later political writings, pp. 9, 11, 13, 78, 93; Gourevitch,
introduction to Rousseau, The Social Contract and other later political writings, p. xxi-xxv.
97 Rousseau, Considerations on the Government o f Poland, in Rousseau, The Social Contract, pp. 186188.
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ingredient most essential to Public men, he never excluded the common man from
greatness.98
Rousseau’s vision alternately supported and challenged moral-sense theory.
On the one hand, Rousseau denied the possibility of achieving potentiality in the civic
realm. He also subverted the universal vision and goals of the Christian religion to
the goals and interests of the secular, political State; without denying the superiority
of Christian dogma for the higher objectives of humanity, he denied their feasibility
for “men as they are.”99 On the other hand, even though he deemed a hereditary
aristocracy the worst form of government, Rousseau reinforced the objectives of
moral-sense theory insofar as he privileged an agricultural economy above a
commercial one—land over money—on grounds that a preoccupation with commerce
risked liberty and virtue.100 Moreover, while he tempered his landed bias by denying

98 According to Rousseau, “while [aristocracy] ... involves a certain inequality of fortune, ...s o that in
general the administration o f the public business be entrusted to those who can best devote all of their
time to i t ,... [it is] not, as Aristotle contends, so that the rich always be preferred. On the contrary, ...
an opposite choice should occasionally teach the people that men’s merit offers more important reasons
for preference than do riches.” (Rousseau, O f the Social Contract, in Rousseau, The Social Contract
and other later political writings, pp. 82 and 94) Indeed, he wrote, “It is patriotism that produced the
many immortal actions whose brilliance dazzles our weak eyes, and the many great men whose antique
virtues are treated as fables ever since patriotism has been turned into derision.” (Discourse on
Political Economy, p. 16) See Rousseau, O f the Social Contract, Considerations on the Government o f
Poland, O f the Social Contract and Discourse on Political Economy, in Rousseau, The Social Contract
and other later political writings, pp. 16, 19-20, 70, 82,94,183, 188-189; Gourevitch, introduction to
Rousseau, The Social Contract and other later political writings, pp. xxii-xxiii.
99 Rousseau did not deny either God or our sense of His presence in us. Rather, Rousseau argued, if the
philosophical ideal were possible, men would be as one “moral Being” and society would be
unnecessary (Rousseau, The Geneva Manuscript, p. 155) See Rousseau, The Geneva Manuscript,
Letter to M. de Franquieres, Letter to Usteri, and O f the Social Contract, in Rousseau, The Social
Contract and other later political writings, pp. 144-151, 155, 266, 273-275; Gourevitch, introduction
to Rousseau, The Social Contract and other later political writings, pp. xxv-xxix and xxxi; Baumeister,
p. 59.
100 One problem with commercial economies was that they encouraged the institution of representative
government, which undermined the primacy of participatory politics. But, Rousseau suggested, they
also served as a damper to virtue. See Rousseau, Considerations on the Government o f Poland and O f
the Social Contract, in Rousseau, The Social Contract and other later political writings, pp. 113-123,
224-229.
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the principle of a naturally fixed social order, he nonetheless endorsed public honors
as a means of enticing heroic virtue and common good.101
Ultimately, as Taylor explains, the Platonism that defined the individual
according to his reasoned connection “with the order of things” gave way to a new
“sense of human identity” in which “we are defined by purposes and capacities which
we discover within ourselves.”102 Consequently, as the individual assumed
responsibility for his own meaning of life, as the right to identify himself was
increasingly asserted, he likewise became responsible for knowing himself. 103 It was
•

•

•

this pursuit of self-knowledge that generated the renewed emphasis on internalization
and the evolution of nature as the Romantic “Pocket-Mirrour.” Ultimately, identity
became not a publicly-prescribed face, but the translation of the internal self into a
persona legible to the public sphere. By these means, Romanticism released the
individual from his primary responsibility to the ideals of the classical Public.104
By the end of the eighteenth century, the pragmatic approach to art (concerned
with the end result) was supplanted by what M. H. Abrams terms an “expressive
theory” of art.105 In the process, the mirror was repositioned to reflect the internal

101 Rousseau, Considerations on the Government o f Poland, in Rousseau, The Social Contract and
other later political writings, pp. 227-229,244.
102 Taylor, p. 302.
1(b In this environment, Taylor writes, a “new moral culture radiates outward and downward from the
upper middle classes o f England [and] America” characterized by a growing personal “autonomy”, a
“self-exploration, in particular o f feeling,” and “visions o f the good life generally involv[ing] personal
commitment.” (Taylor, p. 305) This also occurred in France. See Taylor, pp. 300, 305.
104 Taylor, p. 346.
105 By “expressive theory” of art, Abrams defines one “in which the artist himself becomes the major
element generating both the artistic product and the criteria by which it is to be judged....” He goes on:
“A work o f art is essentially the internal made external, resulting from a creative process operating
under the impulse of feeling, and embodying the combined product of the poet’s perceptions, thoughts,
and feelings.” (Abrams, p. 22) See M. H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and
the Critical Tradition (New York and London: Oxford University Press, (1953) 1971), pp. 21-22;
Taylor, pp. 183-192, 197-198.
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thoughts of the subject—the ‘mirror’ becomes a ‘lamp’.106 With its physical
immediacy, pointedly engaging gaze, and dramatic play of light and shadow, Allan
Ramsay’s David Hume (Fig. 4-3; 1766; oil on canvas, 30 x 25 inches; Scottish
National Portrait Gallery) is suggestive of this development.

Fig. 4-3

106 Once the balance tilted away from external imitation in favor o f internal feeling, the hegemony of
the neoclassical model was weakened and “the basic orientation o f all aesthetic philosophy”
overturned. In its stead, the heroic figure became—as in Henry Mackenzie’s novel— The Man o f
Feeling (1771), free to discover his meaning o f life. See Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp, pp. 45,
52-53, 69.
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On the one hand, Hume’s dependence on the external evidence of human
merit in the judgment of individual worth is invoked by the physical intimacy
between sitter and spectator achieved by the sitter’s gaze and his proximity to the
picture plane.107 As Wind notes, “merit is transformed from a hard-won right based
on exceptional achievements into a directly perceivable, natural quality which appeals
to the beholder’s feelings in the same way as physical beauty.”108 At the same time,
Hume’s emphasis on internal feeling as the site of morality, an emphasis which biased
him against the pretentious grandeur of heroic imagery, is highlighted by the
Rembrandtesque illumination of head and heart.109 Indeed, the image appears as a
metaphorical allusion to enlightenment itself—the emergence from darkness into
light—attained by way of social virtues.110
In general, Hume followed Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Rousseau in locating
morality in internal feeling. He likewise privileged feeling above reason.111 But, like
Rousseau, he departed from moral-sense theory in deeming society the effect of
human convention rather than nature, substituting particular, subjective standards of
107 According to Wind, “When Hume attacked that view o f human dignity which sees an exalted
existence as the only one fitting for man, and when he rejected the absolute urge to perform heroic
deeds as a senseless and presumptuous attempt to exceed the limits imposed upon man by Nature, he
came into conflict not only with moralists like Johnson and philosophers like Beattie, but also with
painters like Reynolds.” (Wind, p. 2) In fact, Wind continues, Hume’s theory “can be reduced in the
last analysis to one maxim, that personal merit consists in nothing other than possessing qualities
‘useful or agreeable to ourselves or others’.” (Wind, p. 6) See Wind, Hume and the Heroic Portrait, p.
2, 6.
108 Wind, p. 6.
109As Copleston remarks, Hume believed “that moral distinctions are derived ultimately, not from
reasoning, but from feeling, from the moral sentiment.” See Copleston, V, p. 319; Wind, Hume and the
Heroic Portrait, p. 6.
110 For Hume, moreover, as for Rousseau, the “end o f self-exploration is not disengaged control”— as it
is for Locke—“but engagement, coming to terms with what we really are....” See Taylor, pp. 344-345.
111 As Hume explained: “first, ...reason alone can never be a motive to any action o f the will; and
secondly,... it can never oppose passion in the direction o f the will.” (Hume, Treatise o f Human
Nature, p. 413) Thus, he concludes: “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave o f the passions, and
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identity for abstract, universal ones.112 This was not to deny either the existence of
general ideas or their superiority to particular ones, but to deny the possibility of
abstracting general ideas from properties in nature.113
In fact, Hume’s analysis presented general difficulties for the interpretation of
morality and identity.114 Having confined human knowledge to the effects of
observation and experiment, Hume limited the knowledge of morality and identity to
the evidence of passive observation.115 As the study of identity depended on the
principle of individuation—on knowing the self as a distinct entity, disengaged from
its external environment— Hume’s insistence that the human mind cannot distinguish
real substance, but only the perception of real substance, meant that identity could not
extend “beyond what is immediately present to the senses.”

i 1/-

t

Ultimately, as sense-

perception became the only basis of knowledge, external actions became the only
evidence of internal feeling, and interpretations of improvement and virtue came to
can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.” (Hume, Treatise o f Human Nature,
p. 415) See Hume, Treatise o f Human Nature, pp. 413-415.
112 According to Hume, because all knowledge stems from subject, because there are no external
qualities in the object but only a subjective analysis thereof, there is no essential abstract quality to
serve as the foundation o f universal ideas. Hence, Hume writes: “all general ideas are nothing but
particular ones, annexed to a certain term, which gives them a more extensive signification, and makes
them recall upon occasion other individuals, which are similar to them....” (Hume, Treatise o f Human
Nature, p. 17) See Copleston, VI, pp. 408-415; Hume, Treatise o f Human Nature, pp. xiii-xiv, 1, 1720, 66-68, 180-181, 266-268; Taylor, pp. 344-345; Baumeister, p. 58.
llj Hume, Treatise o f Human Nature, pp. xv-xix; Hume, O f Commerce, in Broadie, pp. 387-388.
114 Rejecting “the entire providential view o f the world,” only partially assimilating the principle of
disengagement, and adopting the language o f sentiment, Hume represents a curious blending o f Locke
and Hutcheson. (Taylor, pp. 343-344) For a discussion o f Hume’s importance to the development of
British thought, see Taylor, pp. 343-344; Copleston, VI, pp. 406-412.
115 Hume, Treatise o f Human Nature, p. xvi.
116 Hume, Treatise o f Human Nature, p. 73. Whereas Augustine, following Plato, made form or soul
the principle o f individuation, whereas Aquinas, following Aristotle, made matter or body the principle
o f individuation. Hume denies both. According to Hume, the individual is not reducible to the simple
unity and continuity demanded by true identity. Indeed, o f the seven philosophical relations Hume
describes, identity ranks among the three that cannot be known with mathematical certainty, whose
“necessary connexion” cannot be demonstrated. (Hume, Treatise o f Human Nature, pp. 69-77) See
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depend on appearance alone.117 Consequently, identity became little more than the
summary character ascribed by the spectator to the subject, according to his composite
•

perception of various impressions and his interpretation of their cause and motive.

118

On the surface, Hume’s analysis appeared to support moral fluidity and deny
identity.119 Yet, while conceding the evolutionary nature of moral principles, Hume
denied the principle of moral relativism, defending the natural premise of right and
wrong on the evidence of the immediacy of pleasure and pain.120 A similar argument
informed his defense of natural beauty—the corollary of virtue.121 What Hume did
not presume was that moral and aesthetic feelings affected all men equally.

One

man naturally derived more or less pleasure from the evidence of moral good than
another. This difference informed his level of Taste and virtue.

1

•

As with Rousseau,

it was this inequality of virtue—evidenced in inequalities of Taste—-that informed the
need for social compact.124 At the same time, Taste—the external manifestation of

Copleston, V, pp. 302-305; Broadie, The Scottish Enlightenment, pp. 19-20; Hume, Treatise o f Human
Nature, pp. 69-77, 189, 216-262.
117 Copleston, V, p. 319.
118 Hume, Treatise o f Human Nature, pp. 216-217,251,253,259-262.
119 Remarkably, Hume argued that the “general principles o f taste are uniform in human nature,” but
that the “case is not the same with moral principles.... They are in continual flux and revolution. The
son embraces a different system from the father.” (Hume, O f the Standard o f Taste, in Broadie, pp. 259
and 261) See Hume, Treatise o f Human Nature, pp. 296, 574-575; Hume, O f the Standard o f Taste, in
Broadie, pp. 259,261.
120 “Let a man’s insensibility be ever so great,” Hume wrote, “he must often be touched with the images
o f Right and Wrong; and... [know] that others are susceptible of like impressions.” Hume, Theory o f
Moral Sentiments, quoted in Broadie, p. 145.
121 Hume, Treatise o f Human Nature, pp. 298-299.
122 While all men bear the capacity for sympathy and, so, virtue, few act solely according to its dictates.
See Copleston, V, pp. 331-333, 336-337.
123 Taste was a measure of one’s love for beauty in all its manifestations, including virtue, as well as a
measure o f one’s ability to judge. As Hume explained: “’Tis only by taste we can decide concerning
[morality and beauty], nor are we possessed o f any other standard, upon which we can form a judgment
o f this kind.” See Hume, Treatise o f Human Nature, p. 297.
124 Hume denied both the Tory view of government—based on a natural authority—and the Whig view
o f government—based on contract. Government, he argued, is bom o f an interest to protect mind,
body and property. It is supported by a sense o f obligation and duty. Justice is the artificial means by
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internal sympathy—became the signifier of “moral sense” and the standard of human
virtue.125 Ultimately, then, one could judge a man—the “right-ness” or “wrong-ness”
of his character—through the evidence of his politeness—by the way he looked and
acted.126 Still, Hume could not deny the risks attendant such a superficial analysis of
human value.127 He consequently reaffirmed the importance of wisdom in discerning
virtue, in distinguishing “great men” from the masses of false pretenders. Reason
thus reemerged as the necessary brace to feeling. 128
In the end, Hume, like Rousseau, made access to social rank a matter of merit
rather than birth (at least theoretically), supporting the principle of social hierarchy as
a necessary consequence of human nature, with attendant implications for the
distribution of property and social rank.129 As he explained it:
The skin, pores, muscles, and nerves of a day-labourer are different from those
of a man of quality. So are his sentiments, actions and manners. The different
which this balance is settled equitably and legally in the interest o f happiness. (Copleston, V, p. 343344, 346, 348) The ideal republic was thus a fiction suited only for the establishment o f civil standards.
(Copleston, V, p. 352) If government fails to meet its obligation to public liberty, it may be rightfully
dissolved. (Hume, Treatise o f Human Nature, pp. 551-564) As Copleston observes, “Hume, therefore,
will not allow that there are eternal laws of justice, independent o f man’s conditions and o f public
utility.” (Copleston, V, p. 338) See Hume, O f the First Principles o f Government, in Broadie, pp. 507512; Hume, O f the Origin o f Government, in Broadie, pp. 513-518; Hume, OfJustice, in Broadie, pp.
579-597; Hume, Treatise o f Human Nature, pp. 477,486-505, 526, 533-538, 551-564, 619-620;
Copleston, V, pp. 336-338, 343-349, 352.
125 With regard to sympathy, Hume wrote: “Thus it appears, that sympathy is a very powerful principle
in human nature, that it has a great influence on our taste o f beauty, and that it produces our sentiment
o f morals in all the artificial virtues.” See Hume, Treatise o f Human Nature, pp. 577-578.
126 Copleston, V, p. 340.
127 As Hume explained: “’Tis evident, that when we praise any actions, we regard only the motives that
produced them, and consider the actions as signs or indications o f certain principles in the mind and
temper.... We must [therefore] look within to find the moral quality. This we cannot do directly; and
therefore fix our attention on actions, as on external signs.” (Hume, Treatise o f Human Nature, p. 477)
See Hume, Treatise ofHuman Nature, p. 477; Hume, An Enquiry concerning the Principles o f Morals,
in Broadie, p. 147.
128 As Copleston writes, “the more our knowledge is increased, the clearer become the connections
between character, motive and choice.” See Copleston, V, p. 325.
129 As Hume wrote: “’Tis necessary, therefore, to know our rank and station in the world, whether it be
fix’d by our birth, fortune, employments, talents or reputation. ‘Tis necessary to feel the sentiment and
passion of pride in conformity to it, and to regulate our actions accordingly.” See Hume, Treatise of
Human Nature, p. 599.
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stations of life influence the whole fabric, external and internal; and these
different stations arise necessarily, because uniformly, from the necessary and
uniform principles of human nature.130
For Hume, social rank was contingent upon property, itself an effect of government
jurisdiction.
For all their similarities, Hume and Rousseau departed on their views of
commerce. Indeed, in his denial of an “ancient constitution” to which England might
return, in his support for a strong executive power, in his concessions to passion and
interest, all of which conduced to the progress of commerce, Hume aligned himself
with a Court narrative at odds with the cause of ‘true’ (Harringtonian/ Common
wealth) Whig “Patriots” and “republicans.”131 Against Rousseau’s vision of
agricultural self-sufficiency, Hume cautiously supported the civility bom of controlled
commerce. To reconcile the inherent conflict between commercial imperialism and
republicanism, Hume, like Montesquieu, sought to police interest with virtue—to
assimilate a degree of imperial interest into an otherwise virtuous republic.132 To this
end, he endorsed the social virtues of benevolence, politeness and frugality.133 It was

130 Hence, Hume concluded: “Men cannot live without society, and cannot be associated without
government. Government makes a distinction o f property, and establishes the different ranks o f men.”
See Hume, Treatise o f Human Nature, p. 402.
131 “Ideally,” he conceded, “a perfect commonwealth would consist o f a one, few, and many of the
classic type; but in reality, and even in ideality, there must be means of bringing the interests o f all
three into identity, and this involved the presence o f a patronage-dispensing authority, which must
always be in some degree o f tension with the forces making for liberty.” See Pocock, The
Machiavellian Moment, p. 495.
1;>2 Indeed, Pocock claims, Montesquieu opened the way for “commerce, and therefore passion, [to]
contribute to liberty and civic values,” not in the sense o f a republican civic virtue, but in the sense of
private or social virtues. “Virtue, he laid down, was the principle o f republics.... Montesquieu knew
that virtue in this sense did not necessarily coincide with private values or personal morality.... Like
Machiavelli, he knew that the Christian ethos made demands to which the civic ethos might refuse to
give way....” (Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 491) See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment,
pp. 490-491.
133 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 492.
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this position, hinted in the writings of Shaftesbury and advanced by Hume and
Montesquieu, that was taken up and developed by Adam Smith and common-sense
theorists into a narrative of commercial humanism.134

III. Adam Smith and the Scottish School o f “Common-Sense ”135
That the cultivation of politeness—the outward appearance of internal moral
sensibility—was affiliated with a civility bom of conversation and commerce was, if
latent in Shaftesbury’s theory, an important tenet in common-sense theory and a key
means by which commerce became assimilated into a narrative of civic virtue and
social progress.136 Although David Hume assisted in this development, insofar as he
allowed for a commerce whose language and behavior served to benefit others, it was
Adam Smith who crafted the narrative into a commercial variation on civic

134 As Pocock observes, the Enlightenment appears to have advanced ahead o f itself in England, being
“already engaged [in] .. .examining the impact of social change on a humanist theory of the social
personality which was already wholly secular... [; in fact,] the Augustans... were possessed o f a
thoroughly social and secular theory o f the civic personality, whose parameters suggested that for some
centuries social change had been undermining its foundations.” (Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment,
p. 477) Indeed, he continues: “the primary threat to social order continued to be understood in terms of
an “historical dialectic between virtue and commerce.” (Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 497)
See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 477, 495-499, 504.
135 According to Andrew Skinner, the “Scottish School” included Francis Hutcheson, David Hume,
Adam Ferguson, Henry Home (Lord Kames), George Turnbull, Thomas Reid and Dugald Stewart.
What united them was a Newtonian methodology—i.e. the ‘experimental method’ of synthesis, “a
union between the inductive approach associated with Bacon and the more purely deductive tradition of
which Descartes was the representative.” (Skinner, p. 15) They also “shared a common interest in two
questions.... First: ‘by what means does it come to pass, that the mind prefers one tenour of conduct to
another?’ And secondly: ‘wherein does this virtue consist?’ Or what is the tone o f temper and tenour
of conduct, which constitutes the excellent and praiseworthy character?” (Skinner, p. 16) Unlike Hume,
however, Adam Smith and the common-sense theorists insisted that the “‘propensities’ o f human
nature... exist independently of our knowledge of them” and are not simply the byproduct of our
imagination and ideas. (Skinner, p. 16) As Skinner notes, “The School in fact generally adopted the
position that certain characteristics are implanted in man by the Author of Nature, thus providing the
means by which a Rational Plan, whose purposes are not always known to man, is unfolded.” (Skinner,
p. 16) See Skinner, introduction to Adam Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, pp. 15-16.
136 Significantly, as politeness became associated with Taste, Taste itself became a measure o f one’s
aesthetic sensibilities. See Gibson-Wood, p. 232.
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humanism.137 As Andrew Skinner writes, "The Wealth o f Nations seemed to lend a
certain sanctity to the self-interested pursuit of gain, by showing that such activity was
productive of benefit to society at large....” 138
Smith’s thesis turned on two assumptions relevant to the interpretation of
identity. First, against Rousseau and Hume, Smith reclaimed the more traditional
Aristotelian description of man as a social animal intended for society by nature, not
by contract. In Smith’s narrative, there is something in man—the “Invisible Hand” of
conscience—which naturally motivates him towards society. This society serves, on
the one hand, as a venue of social activity suited to man’s natural ‘sympathy’. On the
other hand, through instruments of justice, it also serves as a means of protecting man
from the selfish inclinations of himself and others.139 Hence, for Smith, human
engagement in society represented the natural unfolding of true happiness—i.e.
goodness—, a happiness resonant in nature, consistent with reason, manifest in
general rules of morality, and prescribed by Divine plan.140
Significantly, however, to this Aristotelian narrative, Smith added a

137 Hume distinguished between disinterested and interested commerce, as well as the social—as
opposed to civic—“promise,” the honor code o f commercial men. (Hume, Treatise o f Human Nature,
p. 522) Unlike Rousseau, moreover, Hume accepted the compatibility o f individual and social good.
(Hume, O f Commerce, quoted in Broadie, p. 388) At the same time, he cautioned against great
disparities o f fortune, endorsing the advantages o f a large middle class; “In this circumstance consists
the great advantage o f England above any nation at present in the world.” (Hume, O f Commerce,
quoted in Broadie, p. 395) See Hume, Treatise o f Human Nature, p. 522-523; Hume, O f Commerce, in
Broadie, pp. 395-396; Broadie, p. 386.
138 Skinner, introduction to Smith, The Wealth o f Nations (1776; 1789) (New York: Penguin Books,
(1970) 1974), p. 11.
139 The rules o f justice necessarily changed in accordance with developments in man’s socioeconomic
circumstances. As the propensities o f men in a commercial state differed from those in a hunting state,
so the rules o f justice need reflect those differences. (Skinner, introduction to Adam Smith, The Wealth
o f Nations, p. 22) See Skinner, introduction to Adam Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, pp. 22-23, 29-31.
140 Skinner, introduction to Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, pp. 16-28, 77-80; Smith, Theory o f Moral
Sentiments, in Broadie, pp. 289-295; Broadie, The Scottish Enlightenment, pp. 286,476-477.
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commercial variant: a description of human progress necessarily informed by
economic development.141 According to Smith, the priorities and circumstances of an
agricultural society will naturally conduce to a different social structure than that of a
commercial society. The degree of human improvement and happiness in a society
will thus depend on the level of its economic progress. Moreover, whereas a purely
agricultural society will conduce to a more vertical hierarchy than a purely
commercial one, so a commercial society will provide more equality, more liberty
and, hence, more happiness to a greater number of individuals than an agricultural
one.142 What is interesting about Smith’s analysis is its implied progress from a state
of dependence to independence to interdependence, a circumstance only tacitly
suggested by the theory of sympathy found, for example, in Shaftesbury, Rousseau,
and Hume. Ultimately, Smith wrote, “Every man ... lives by exchanging, or becomes
in some measure a merchant, and the society itself grows to be what is properly a
commercial society.”143
As the economic structure of society changed, so too, Smith argued, did the
political structure. Changes in the nature of wealth and birth necessarily affected
individual claims to political authority and this, in turn, affected identity and social

141 Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, in Broadie, pp. 621, 626; Broadie, p. 615.
142 As Smith explained: “The difference between the most dissimilar characters, between a philosopher
and a common street porter, for example, seems to arise not so much from nature as from habit, custom,
and education... till at last the vanity o f the philosopher is willing to acknowledge scarce any
resemblance.” (Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, p. 120) See Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, p. 120;
Skinner, introduction to Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, p. 14; Broadie, p. 433.
143 Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, pp. 126, 388. Yet, Smith cautions, there will always be those who
will become victims o f mind-numbing tasks. It is therefore essential that government provide greater
educational and cultural opportunities for its citizens, not only because it is the right thing to do, but
because it benefits the state. See Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, pp. 179,461; Pocock, The
Machiavellian Moment, p. 464.
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order.144 On the one hand, the transition from a pasturing (nomadic) to a farming
(settled) state made land the primary form of wealth and authority, and this lent
landowners a privileged identity.145 With the development of cities, however, and the
emergence of a commercial ‘citizen’ class, the authority of landowners was slowly
eroded.146 At the same time, “liberty” and independence reached a wider
population.147 Ultimately, as political authority was made to accommodate more
varied forms of wealth and property—rental income (the wealth of the landowner),
wage income (the wealth of the laborer) and profit income (the wealth of the
“capitalist”)—, a new model for social order, based on a structure of interdependence
and exchange, diluted the value of land.148 On the one hand, the received wealth of
the landowner continued to suggest a more disinterested condition—his property
came to him with “neither labour nor care”—, a circumstance that lent him a political

144 Skinner writes: “As before, Smith explained the existence of patterns o f authority and subordination
in terms o f inequalities o f wealth and thus birth....” (Skinner, in Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, p. 35)
In all cases, he suggests, wealth—and, so, the circumstances (as opposed to the bloodlines) o f birth—
was the medium of authority guiding the “patterns of subordination and dependence.” (Skinner, in
Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, p. 34) See Skinner, introduction to Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, pp.
34-35.
145 Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, pp. 507-520; Skinner, introduction to Smith, The Wealth o f Nations,
pp. 34-35.
146 The effects of manufacturing were three-fold: an increased market for agricultural production which,
in turn, stimulated agriculture and encouraged improvements; the transformation of land from a source
o f power to a source o f investment; and the spread o f urban liberty to the country. (Skinner, in Smith,
Wealth o f Nations, p. 38) The implications were different in Scotland. “In Scotland,” Smith wrote, “...
as no leasehold gives a vote for a member o f parliament, the yeomanry are... less respectable to their
landlords than in England.” (Smith, Wealth o f Nations, p. 492) See Skinner, introduction to Smith, The
Wealth o f Nations, pp. 37-39; Smith, Wealth o f Nations, p. 492.
147 By the reign o f Elizabeth I, English policy was becoming favorable to commerce. Initially, this
worked to the advantage o f the reigning authority. Eventually, however, commerce gave rise to
“economic, political, and sociological effects o f a broadly liberalizing kind.” See Skinner, introduction
to Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, pp. 37,41.
148 As Skinner explains, while “men are generally disposed to admire and respect the great, well bom,
and wealthy ... [with] the advent o f the exchange or ‘commercial’ economy, we ... find society divided
into three ‘great constituent orders’, landlords, capitalists, and wage labour... linked by a complex
pattern o f interdependencies, a pattern which is compatible with a considerable degree of personal
freedom....” See Skinner, introduction to Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, pp. 42-47; Pocock, The
Machiavellian Moment, p. 464.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

131

edge.149 On the other hand, however, the industrious capitalist benefited from a drive
to improve himself and a consequent propensity to save and invest, a circumstance
that conduced to the progress of the state.150 The function of government was to
resolve the resulting tension.
For all the importance he ascribed to economics, Smith’s analysis ultimately
depended upon the power of social virtues—his “Invisible Hand” of conscience,
Rousseau’s “voice within,” and Hume’s instinctive pleasure and pain—to curb the
negative effects of commercialization.151 Although not a moral-sense theorist,
Smith’s Theory o f Moral Sentiments endorsed the importance of human “sympathy”
to the successful progress of society.152 As Smith explained it, the more aware the
individual became of his natural sympathy, the more he cultivated his natural virtues,
the further he advanced the public good.153 But Smith’s was an “active” or
Aristotelian (as opposed to contemplative or Platonic) sympathy insofar as its benefits

149 Skinner, introduction to Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, p. 64. Indeed, Smith cautioned against the
political influence o f capitalists: “legislative proposals emanating from members o f the mercantile
classes: ‘ought always to be listened to with great precaution.... It comes from an order o f men, whose
interest is never exactly the same with that o f the public, who have generally an interest to deceive and
even to oppress the public....” (Skinner, in Smith, p. 80) See Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, p. 519;
Skinner, introduction to Adam Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, p. 80.
150 Smith wrote: “As the capital of an individual can be increased only by what he saves from his annual
revenue or his annual gains, so the capital o f a society, which is the same with that of all the individuals
who compose it, can be increased only in the same manner.” (Smith, Wealth o f Nations, p. 437)
Society thus progressed on the coat-tails o f the self-improving commoner. See Smith, Wealth o f
Nations, pp. 429-449; Smith, The Rules o f Morality, in Broadie, p. 293; Skinner, introduction to Smith,
The Wealth o f Nations, pp. 67, 75.
151 According to Andrew Skinner, Smith’s was a “general philosophy,” one important facet of which
was economic. See Skinner, introduction to Adam Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, pp. 11, 13, 81-82.
152 As Smith explained it: “How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some
principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness
necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure o f seeing it.” (Smith, Theory o f
Moral Sentiments, in Broadie, p. 157) See Smith, Theory o f Moral Sentiments, in Broadie, pp. 157164; Copleston, V, pp. 356-357.
153 See Smith, The Theory o f Moral Sentiments, in Broadie, The Scottish Enlightenment, pp. 159, 164,
172-173; Broadie, The Scottish Enlightenment, p. 155; Copleston, V, p. 359.
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were tied to its effects in the public sphere. There thus re-emerged two standards of
virtue: the ideal standard of the “impartial spectator”—that of Christianity and the
“Philosophical Hero;”154 and the human standard—that of “men as they are” or their
“undercharacter.”155
Smith’s more positive take on commercialism, as an advanced stage of social
progress, prepared the way for common-sense theorists to endorse reason and industry
as the conduits of moral virtue and the proper foundations for a narrative meaning of
life, thereby giving voice to the so-called “Protestant work ethic.”156 In many
respects, Richard Price (1723-1791) was a bridge to this school and Thomas Reid an
important contributor.157 Without denying the role of feeling, particularly in the
judgment of character, action, and aesthetics, Price, for example, deemed reason the
foundation of moral virtue and public good.158 But there were other influential
adherents, including the Rev. Hugh Blair, George Campbell, Lord Kames, Sir James

154 What Smith described as “the idea of complete propriety and perfection, which... no human conduct
ever did... come up to; and in comparison with which the actions of all men must for ever appear...
imperfect.” See Smith, The Theory o f Moral Sentiments, in Broadie, p. 175. See also Shaftesbury,
Characteristicks, I, pp. 170, 195-196; Rousseau, Letter to Usteri, dated 18 July 1763, in Rousseau, The
Social Contract and other later political writings, p. 266.
155 Smith, The Theory o f Moral Sentiments, in Broadie, p. 175; Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp.
170, 195-196; Rousseau, Letter to Usteri, dated 18 July 1763, in Rousseau, The Social Contract and
other later political writings, p. 266.
155 According to Taylor, “A new model o f civility emerges in the eighteenth century in which the life of
commerce and acquisition gains an unprecedentedly positive place.” (Taylor, p. 214) He goes on:
“commerce is a constructive and civilizing force, binding men together in peace and forming the basis
of ‘polished’ mores. The [Aristotelian] ethic o f glory is confronted here with a fully articulated
alternative view, o f social order, political stability, and the good life.... The ‘bourgeois’ ethic has
obvious levelling consequences, and no one can be blind to the tremendous role it has played in
constituting... the modem identity.” (Taylor, pp. 214-215) See Taylor, pp. 214-215; Copleston, V, pp.
361,392-393.
157 Copleston, V, pp. 363-364. Reid insisted on the separate existence of qualities in objects that served
as the source o f individual attributes. For a discussion of Reid’s position and excerpts o f his writings,
see Broadie, pp. 73-114, 264-282.
158 Copleston, V, pp. 362, 389-391.
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Steuart, Sir John Sinclair, John Millar, Adam Ferguson, and John Erskine of
Camock.159
Employing a Newtonian methodology—that which proceeded from effect to
cause, from the particular to the general, from analysis to synthesis160—, the commonsense theorists occupied a middle position between the moral-sense theorists and the
utilitarians, embracing God as the Author of nature and natural law, but locating
knowledge in the evidence of particular experience.161 In general, all shared a
commitment to an internal “common sense”—a sense without intelligible cause—that
served as the seat of moral principles, guiding the good acts, self-restraint, and
propriety conducive to common good.162 They similarly shared a classical notion of
progress in which society served as the natural venue for a prescribed human
development from ignorance to knowledge, vice to virtue, misery to happiness.163 On

159 A more complete list would include William Robertson, James Dunbar, John Gregory, William
Smellie, James Hutton, and Colin MacLaurin. For excerpts o f their writings, see Broadie, pp. 675-682,
715-729, 750-795.
160 For a full discussion of Newtonian methodology, see Colin MacLaurin, An Account o f Sir Isaac
Newton’s Philosophical Discoveries (1748), excerpted in Broadie, pp. 782-795.
161 Dugald Steward (1753-1828), for example, criticized the moral-sense emphasis on self-love and
social affection, deeming morality a distinct and separate faculty, and actions—as opposed to
affections— its proper subject. Moreover, Steward, like Price, held moral judgments to be rational, not
intuitive. All rejected the authoritarian stance, which deemed the human narrative an arbitrary matter
o f divine will. For a discussion o f Steward’s ideas, see Copleston, V, pp. 380-382.
162 Henry Home, Lord Karnes, for example, modified Hume’s position, allowing for the existence of
“principles implanted in our nature”—our common sense— which permit knowledge without causation.
(Broadie, p. 345) On such grounds he could argue that morality is reasonable insofar as good acts are
agreeable and bad acts are not, in accordance with divine plan. (Karnes, Sketches o f the History o f Man,
in Broadie, p. 640) See Karnes, Sketches o f the History o f Man, in Broadie, pp. 640-646; Broadie, p.
630.
153 As John Millar explained it, “There is..., in human society, a natural progress from ignorance to
knowledge, and from rude to civilized manners, the several stages o f which are usually accompanied
with peculiar laws and customs.” (Millar, Origin o f the Distinction o f Ranks, in Broadie, pp. 491-492)
Adam Ferguson shared this position, additionally allowing for a natural standard o f human perfection
based on “the best conceptions o f his understanding, in the best movements o f his heart... .’’(Ferguson,
An Essay on the History o f Civil Society, in Broadie, p. 506) The progress o f mankind was thus
conceived to be linear and cumulative, for “the species has a progress as well as the individual; they
build in every subsequent age on the foundations formerly laid; and, in a succession o f years, tend to a
perfection in the application of their faculties, to which the aid o f long experience is required, and to
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this premise, the Reverend Hugh Blair, for one, urged a narrative of progress and
improvement in which the meaning of life was cast as a pilgrimage away from the
original state of natural innocence, through the corruption effected by the Fall,
towards a final, divine state of virtuous happiness.164 In this he supported not only a
common-sense narrative—i.e. one based on the rationality of moral principles and
man’s divine end—but a Protestant ethic of ordinary life.165
In addition to advocating a narrative of natural progress and an ethic of
individual industry, the common-sense theorists also seem to have shared Rousseau’s
Aristotelian love of patriotism as the most heroic form of public action and the
highest measure of human virtue.166 Indeed, patriotism served as a barometer of
social progress.

1 f\1

Inversely, factionalism, tyranny, and luxury were deemed evidence

of the subversion of public virtue to private interest.168 Commerce, as a conduit of

which many generations must have combined their endeavours.” (Ferguson, An Essay on the History o f
Civil Society, in Broadie, p. 502) See Broadie, pp. 488-489; Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History
o f Civil Society, in Broadie, pp. 499-506.
164 As Blair described it, “this life was intended for a state o f trial and improvement to man. His
preparation for a better world required a gradual purification, carried on by steps o f progressive
discipline.” (Blair, Sermons, in Broadie, p. 337) Religion helps to make this process both possible and
bearable. On the one hand, it provides us with guidelines for a moral life—“the goods o f the mind.”
(Blair, Sermons, in Broadie, p. 196) On the other hand, it encourages our attention to the duties of
ordinary life and, hence, nurtures the discipline and control essential to virtue. (Blair, Sermons, in
Broadie, p. 197) As Broadie notes: “The emphasis throughout his pulpit writings is on what lies
naturally within our power, the exercise o f civic virtue, rather than on what is ours by an act o f divine
grace.... We are to be good citizens, faithful friends, and loving to our family.” (Blair, Sermons, in
Broadie, p. 331) See Blair, Sermons, in Broadie, pp. 185-198, 331.
165 Society, he wrote, “requires every man to do his own business.” (Blair, in Broadie, p. 336) Thus, he
concluded, “let us carry on our preparation for heaven, not by abstracting ourselves from the concerns
of this world, but by fulfilling the duties and offices o f every station in life... that we may then acquire
purity and dignity o f manners suited to our divine hopes.. . . ” (Blair, in Broadie, pp. 342-343) See
Blair, Sermons, in Broadie, pp. 335-336, 342-343.
166 Karnes, for example, deemed patriotism the foundation o f heroic virtue worthy o f the highest social
esteem. “In fact,” Kames wrote, “wherever [patriotism] prevails, the morals of the people are found to
be pure and correct.” (Kames, Sketches o f the History o f Man, in Broadie, p. 521) See Kames,
Sketches o f the History o f Man, in Broadie, pp. 521-523; Broadie, p. 520.
167 Broadie, p. 520.
168 Kames, Sketches o f the History o f Man, in Broadie, pp. 524-525.
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interest, was necessarily implicated in this narrative.169 Hence, Sir James Steuart’s
emphasis on the necessary balance between individual interest and public good, and
his consequent examination of the relationship between subordination, dependence,
liberty, and commerce.170 Significantly, mutual dependence—i.e. interdependence—
emerged as the necessary premise of liberty and “the only bond of society....”

171

At

the same time, one’s proper political authority turned on the level of one’s
independence.172 The difference resided in the definition of independence, which was
increasingly regarded as a matter of autonomy rather than birth. Consequently, any
form of government which supported fixed standards of subordination and, hence,
denied or ignored the rewards of progress that rightfully accrued to individuals

169 Kames, Sketches o f the History o f Man, in Broadie, pp. 526-528.
170 Steuart shared this position with Adam Ferguson and others. “It has been found,” Ferguson wrote,
“that, except in a few singular cases, the commercial and political arts have advanced together.”
(Ferguson, in Broadie, p. 548) See Steuart, An Inquiry into the Principle o f Political Oeconomy
(1767), in Broadie, pp. 401-402; Ferguson, An Essay on the History o f Civil Society, in Broadie, pp.
546-552.
171 Steuart, pp. 413-414. He explained: “By a people’s being free, I understand no more than their
being governed by general laws... for reasons which regard the body of the society, and not through
favour or prejudice to particular persons, or particular classes....” (Steuart, An Inquiry into the
Principle o f Political Oeconomy, in Broadie, pp. 413-414) He consequently defined three degrees of
dependence to accompany the incremental stages o f economic progress: the natural dependence o f a
child on a parent; the political dependence of an inferior on a superior—that o f the slave, feudal
servant, or subject (though slave and subject actually represent different economic phases); and the
commercial dependence o f the industrious worker on the employer. (Steuart, pp. 414-415) Thus, he
wrote: “He who depends totally upon the sale o f his own industry, stands in the fourth degree: this is
the case o f tradesmen and manufacturers, with respect to those who employ them.” (Steuart, in Broadie,
p. 415) Nonetheless, by the final stage o f commerce, he noted, “liberty [was] extended to the lowest
denominations o f a people, without destroying that dependence necessary to serve as a band of
society— ” (Steuart, in Broadie, p. 414) See Steuart, An Inquiry into the Principle o f Political
Oeconomy, in Broadie, pp. 413-415.
172 “All authority,” he wrote, “is in proportion to dependence, and must vary according to
circumstances.” (Steuart, An Inquiry into the Principle o f Political Oeconomy, in Broadie, p. 416)
Thus, he went on, “In proportion... as certain classes, or certain individuals become more dependent...,
in the same proportion ought their just subordination to increase: and in proportion as they become less
dependent than formerly, in the same proportion ought this just subordination to diminish.” (Steuart, p.
415) See Steuart, An Inquiry into the Principle o f Political Oeconomy, in Broadie, pp. 415-419;
Millar, Origin o f the Distinction o f Ranks, in Broadie, p. 534.
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through human industry, was deemed unnaturally oppressive.17^ Thus, Steuart
concluded, it was the nature of progress that industry succeed servitude, that
commerce succeed feudalism and, finally, that wealth succeed birth as the medium of
independence—read “interdependence”—and authority.174
Of course, the nature of Steuart’s “progress” conduced more to political
competition than social equality.175 As the leisured landowner spent more of his
income on luxury goods and less on hospitality and a household of retainers, as his
retainers become wage-earning laborers, artisans, and tradesmen, the landowner’s
vulnerability to increased debts, coupled with the wage-eamer’s opportunity for
increased savings, made the competition for power both more intense and less
relenting.176 As his contemporary, John Millar, likewise described it, the landowner’s
estate therefore, being more and more incumbered with debts, is at length
alienated, and brought into the possession of the frugal and industrious
merchant, who, by success in trade, has been enabled to buy it, and who is
desirous of obtaining that rank and consequence which landed property is
capable of bestowing.177

173 This included those governments that continued to endorse political dependence—to base authority
on birth rather than industry—after the economic transition to a commercial economy—i.e. those in
which “liberty and independence were confined to the nobility.” (Steuart, An Inquiry into the Principle
o f Political Oeconomy, in Broadie, p. 420) As Taylor aptly notes, in some respects, the Enlightenment
was little more than a reactionary movement “defined above all by the aspiration to destroy the
established order.” (Taylor, p. 343) See Steuart, An Inquiry into the Principle o f Political Oeconomy,
in Broadie, p. 420; Taylor, p. 343.
174 As Steuart observed, “industry must give wealth, and wealth will give power.... It was consequently
very natural for the nobility to be jealous of wealthy merchants, and o f every one who became easy and
independent by means o f his own industry....” (Steuart, in Broadie, p. 420) See Steuart, An Inquiry
into the Principle o f Political Oeconomy, in Broadie, p. 420; Sir John Sinclair, The Statistical Account
o f Scotland, in Broadie, p. 467.
173 See Millar, Origin o f the Distinction o f Ranks, in Broadie, p. 535; Broadie, pp. 532-533.
176 Adam Ferguson made a similar claim: “The passion for independence, and the love o f dominion,
frequently arise from a common source: There is, in both, an aversion to controul; and he, who, in one
situation, cannot bruik a superior, must, in another, dislike to be joined with an equal.” See Ferguson,
An Essay on the History o f Civil Society, in Broadie, p. 553.
177 Millar, Origin o f the Distinction ofRanks, in Broadie, p. 541. See also Millar, Origin o f the
Distinction o f Ranks; or, An Inquiry into the Circumstances which give rise to Influence and Authority
in the Different Members o f Society, 4th ed. (Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1806), pp. 220-242.
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The result was not a mere recycling of the feudal landowner-laborer relationship, but
an entirely different and more fluid social and political structure.178 In the end, Millar
wrote, as the nature of property changed, money became, “more and more the only
•

• *

means of procuring honours and dignities....”

179

Ultimately, the political demands of economic progress aggravated the clash
between landed and monied interests.180 Completed in 1766 and published in 1767,
Steuart’s

w ritin g s

appear prophetic in light of the ensuing American Revolution.

Such revolutions, he wrote, “have been owing to the short-sightedness of statesmen;
who, inattentive to the consequences of growing wealth and industry, foolishly
imagine that hereditary subordination was to subsist among classes, whose situation,
with respect to each other, was entirely changed.”181 As Millar likewise recognized,
“Where-ever men of inferior condition are enabled to live in affluence by their own
industry, and, in procuring their livelihood, have little occasion to court the favour of
178 As Millar argued, “This fluctuation o f property, so observable in all commercial countries,... must
necessarily weaken the authority o f those who are placed in the higher ranks of life. Persons who have
lately attained to riches, have no opportunity o f establishing that train of dependence which is
maintained by those who have remained for ages at the head of a great estate. The hereditary influence
o f family is thus, in a great measure, destroyed....” (Millar, Origin o f the Distinction o f Ranks, in
Broadie, p. 541) As Adam Ferguson observed, the social order was not at all like the “good order of
stones in a wall,” but was rather more fluidly composed of “living and active members.” (Ferguson, An
Essay on the History o f Civil Society, in Broadie, p. 555, note 1) See Millar, Origin o f the Distinction
o f Ranks, in Broadie, p. 541; Ferguson, An Essay on the History o f Civil Society, in Broadie, p. 555.
179 Millar, Origin o f the Distinction o f Ranks, in Broadie, p. 542.
180 Indeed, Steuart warned, in like circumstances, where compromises failed to be enacted, “a wealthy
populace has broken their chains to pieces, and overturned the very foundations o f the feudal system.”
(Steuart, An Inquiry into the Principle o f Political Oeconomy, in Broadie, p. 421) See Steuart, An
Inquiry into the Principle o f Political Oeconomy, in Broadie, pp. 420-421; Ferguson, An Essay on the
History o f Civil Society, in Broadie, p. 549; Kramnick, Bolingbroke and his Circle, pp. 55, 80-83.
181 Steuart, An Inquiry into the Principle o f Political Oeconomy, in Broadie, p. 421. As John Millar
explained it, as the increase in arts provided new forms o f employment, giving rise to the trades and
professions, dependence gave way to a commercial independence— i.e. one based on mutual
interdependence....” (Millar, in Broadie, p. 540) Significantly, Millar noted, two further consequences
resulted: “While, from these causes, people o f low rank are gradually advancing towards a state o f
independence, [so] the influence derived from wealth is diminished in the same proportion.”(Millar, in
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their superiors, there we may expect that ideas of liberty will be universally
diffused.”182 In the end, as the implications of commerce tended towards democracy,
so the need to preserve power tended towards oppression, as the implications of
commerce tended towards a more inclusive and fluid social hierarchy, so the need to
preserve conventional modes of political authority and social rank tended to reinforce
a more exclusive and fixed one.183 As Ferguson aptly notes, the natural progress of
liberty was readily thwarted by the pursuit of empire.

184

Broadie, p. 540) See Steuart, An Inquiry into the Principle o f Political Oeconomy, in Broadie, pp. 421423; Millar, Origin o f the Distinction o f Ranks, in Broadie, pp. 539-540.
182 ^-phis happy arrangement of things,” he went on, “is naturally produced by commerce and
manufactures. . . ” See Millar, Origin o f the Distinction o f Ranks, in Broadie, p. 545.
183 As Millar explained: “It cannot be doubted that these circumstances have a tendency to introduce a
democratical government. As persons of inferior rank are placed in a situation which, in point of
subsistence, renders them little dependent upon their superiors; as no one order of men continues in the
exclusive possession of opulence; and as every man who is industrious may entertain the hope of
gaining a fortune; it is to be expected that the prerogatives of the monarch and o f the ancient nobility
will be gradually undermined, that the privileges o f the people will be extended in the same proportion,
and that power, the usual attendant o f wealth, will be in some measure diffused over all the members of
the community.” Millar, Origin o f the Distinction o f Ranks, in Broadie, p. 542.
184 “Among the circumstances... which in the event o f national prosperity, and in the result of
commercial arts, lead to the establishment of despotism,” Ferguson wrote, “there is none, perhaps, that
arrives at this termination, with so sure an aim, as the perpetual enlargement of territory.” (Ferguson,
An Essay on the History o f Civil Society, in Broadie, p. 557) See Ferguson, An Essay on the History o f
Civil Society, in Broadie, p. 557; Rousseau, O f the Social Contract, in Rousseau, The Social Contract
and other later political writings, pp. 106-109.
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PART TWO
CONSTRUCTING IDENTITY: THE CONTENT
CHAPTER Y
THE BRITISH PORTRAIT

.. .while she consulted her glass after what manner she should dress, her eyes,
the gay, the languishing, the sedate, the commanding, the beseeching air were
put on, a thousand times, and, as often rejected; and she had scarce determined
which to make use of, when her page brought her word, some ladies who were
going to Court desired her to accompany them;... so went immediately, armed
with all her lightnings, but full of unsettled reflections.
Eliza Haywood, 17191

By the middle of the eighteenth century, empiricism had undermined the
classical correlation between realism and ignorance, the implications of which were
felt in portrait painting. The elevation of sensory perception into a recognized
medium for making—as opposed to recovering—knowledge, meant that realism
might be understood as a conduit of truth. This undermined classical distinctions
between particular and general styles.2 It was now possible to argue that the close

1 Haywood, Love in Excess (1719-1720), David Oakleaf, ed. (Orchard Park, NY: Broadview Press
(1994), 1997), p. 45.
2 On the one hand, Jean-Jacques Rousseau argued that painting (or anything subject to visual
mediation) could never be truly ‘general’: “All general ideas are purely intellectual; if the imagination
intervenes to the least degree, the idea immediately becomes particular.... Purely abstract entities ..
he explained, “are conceivable only by means o f words.” (Rousseau, A Discourse on Inequality, p. 95)
Thus, Shaftesbury concluded, “A PAINTER, if he has any Genius, understands the Truth and Unity of
Design; and knows ... that Particulars... must yield to the general Design....” (Shaftesbury,
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observation of nature was the only means to knowledge—that “meaning” and
“potentiality” began with the particular. By extension, the “mechanical” efforts of
artists might be understood to advance knowledge. Thus Jonathan Richardson (16671745) could style himself an art theorist, twisting classical doctrine into an ideological
formula compatible with his “mechanical” interests.
Yet, the analysis of painting continued to be informed by stylistic categories
like “grand” and “historical.”4 Likewise, a standard of beauty, distinct from a “sense
of beauty,” and characterized by natural and intelligible standards of moral perfection

Characteristicks, I, pp. 142-143) Likewise, in his sixth and eleventh Discourses, Reynolds defended
the superiority o f the general style: “A Hand thus exercised ... will permit the lower painter... to
exhibit the minute discriminations... ; while he, like the philosopher, will consider nature in the
abstract, and represent in every one of his figures the character o f the species.” (Reynolds, Discourses
on Art, p. 50) Nonetheless, the eighteenth-century witnessed a move towards the ‘particular’. As
Abrams observes, “In the Age o f Johnson,... we find standards for art running the gamut from a
primary emphasis on typicality, generality, and ‘large appearances’, to the unqualified recommendation
o f particularity, uniqueness, and a microscopic depiction o f detail.” (Abrams, The Mirror and the
Lamp, p. 41) He goes on: “Some o f Johnson’s contemporaries ... gave greater emphasis to the role of
particularity in achieving poetic excellence. Thus Joseph Wharton said that ‘the use, the force, and the
excellence o f language, certainly consists in raising, clear, complete, and circumstantial images’....
Edward Young’s plea for originality, novelty, individuality, and ‘singulars’ is not qualified by reference
to the need for contrary qualities....” (Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp, p. 42) See Rousseau, A
Discourse on Inequality, p. 95; Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 142-143; Reynolds, Discourses on
Art, Robert R. Wark, ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press (1959), 1997) p. 50; Abrams, The Mirror
and the Lamp, pp. 41-42.
3 Richardson was the son o f a silk-weaver, a citizen o f London who owned his own loom. His father
died in 1672, when Richardson was a child. After some grammar school, at the age o f 14,
Richardson’s step-father set him up as an apprentice with a scrivener (notary). Following his tenure as
an apprentice, Richardson began his training as a painter in the studio of John Riley, who practised a
more realistic or native style o f portrait painting—wh ich included “the rendition o f individual
appearance and character”—than his foreign-born contemporaiy, Sir Godfrey Kneller. Moreover, for
Richardson, Riley also represented the finer qualities o f a liberal artist—modest, educated and genteel.
Riley and Kneller served jointly as Principal Painter to William and Mary. See Gibson-Wood, pp. 2530.
* For Reynolds, the “historical” style served as a more contemporary and narrative variation on the
universal and philosophical “grand” style. The demands o f the “Historical Style”—compositional
consistency and unity, the generalization of the subject, the use of “permanent” (i.e. classical) dress—
occupied much o f Reynolds’s fifth Discourse (December 1772). “When a portrait is painted in the
Historical Style,” he wrote, “as it is neither an exact minute representation o f an individual nor
completely ideal [— i.e. ‘grand’ or ‘great’— ], every circumstance ought to correspond to this
mixture.... [Wjhen this is accomplished to a high degree, it becomes in some sort a rival to that style
which we have fixed as the highest [— i.e. the grand style].” (Reynolds, Discourses on Art, pp. 88-89)
See Reynolds, Discourses on Art, pp. 57, 60, 88-89; Broadie, p. 29.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

141

or “Taste,” continued to support fixed aesthetic ranks.5 Thomas Reid, for example,
located the quality of beauty, like other qualities, in the object itself, Taste being,
therefore, a matter of sensibility and judgment.6 Even Hume conceded that “there are
certain qualities in objects” that naturally predispose the sentiments towards beauty
and, therefore, naturally distinguish men of superior intellect.7 He thus pursued a
Standard o f Taste—“a rule, by which the various sentiments of men may be
reconciled”8—to assist in the making of aesthetic judgments and the nurturing of
moral improvement.9 Such assumptions predisposed like-minded theorists to conflate
beauty and virtue into a principle of “Taste”—what Reid described as “That power of
the mind by which we are capable of discerning and relishing the beauties of Nature,

5 According to Shaftesbury, beauty represented the formal manifestation o f absolute truth and
harmony— Aristotle’s“Grea/ness with Order.” (Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, 1, p. 143) Hutcheson
added: “As to the most powerful beauty... we shall shew ... that it arises from some imagined
indication o f morally good dispositions o f mind.” (Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original o f our
Ideas o f Beauty and Virtue, in Broadie, p. 214) See Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 142-143;
Broadie, pp. 201-202; Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original o f our Ideas ofBeauty and Virtue, Af
ed (1738; Glasgow, 1772), in Broadie, pp. 207-210, 214,219-220.
0 Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers, in Broadie, pp. 270-271. Reid denied Hume’s claim that
“beauty and deformity ... belong entirely to the sentiment,” arguing instead for qualities in objects.
(Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers, in Broadie, p. 264) Sentiment was thus an effect, rather than
a cause, o f such qualities. (Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers, in Broadie, pp. 270-271) He thus
distinguished between two types o f Taste: “In the external sense o f taste, we are led by reason and
reflection to distinguish between the agreeable sensation we feel, and the quality in the object which
occasions it.” (Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers, in Broadie, p. 266) He continues: “In a like
manner, our internal taste ought to be accounted most just and perfect, when we are pleased with things
that are most excellent in their kind, and displeased with the contrary. The ... faculty o f discerning ...
beauty... is what we call a good taste.” (Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers, in Broadie, p. 268)
See Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers, in Broadie, p. 266-271.
7 “Though it be certain,” he wrote, “that beauty and deformity... are not qualities in objects, but belong
entirely to the sentiment, internal or external; it must be allowed, that there are certain qualities in
objects, which are fitted by nature to produce those particular feelings.” (Hume, O f the Standard o f
Taste, in Broadie, p. 252) He added: “Though men o f delicate taste be rare, they are easily to be
distinguished in society, by the soundness o f their understanding and the superiority o f their faculties
above the rest o f mankind.” (Hume, O f the Standard o f Taste, in Broadie, p. 259) See Hume, O f the
Standard o f Taste, in Broadie, pp. 251-259.
8 Hume, O f the Standard o f Taste, in Broadie, p. 248.
9 Broadie, pp. 243-244.
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and whatever is excellent in the fine arts... .”10 The objectification of beauty by
theorists like Reid lent further credence to the empirical aesthetic resonant in the
Richardsonian—as opposed to Shaftesburian—“abstract.”11 Moreover, for all the
emphasis on a fixed standard of beauty, acknowledgement was made of its less
perfect—human—form. Even Hutcheson conceded the merits of “relative beauty”—
the beauty of human experience—at the expense of “original” or perfect beauty. This
allowed for a modicum of “undercharacter” in the rendering of human identity.

12

On the one hand, then, modes of painting continued to be informed by fixed
standards of beauty rooted in ideals of virtue and excellence. On the other hand, the
failing credibility of a theoretical methodology meant that such ideals might be known
through more empirical methodologies. The cultivation of virtue and Taste might
thus be effected by looking as opposed to “imagining.”

1T

By extension, mediums

(and makers) of beauty that depended upon “looking” might thereby claim stature as

10 Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers, in Broadie, p. 266. See also Reid, An Inquiry into the
Human Mind on the Principles o f Common Sense and Essays on the Intellectual Powers, in Broadie,
pp. 266-270; Hume, O f the Standard o f Taste, in Broadie, p. 257; Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, III, p.
303.
11 On these grounds, Reid encouraged the painter to capture on canvas that which was seen, as opposed
to that which was thought and, hence, to render visible the abstract signs of the perceived object
“whereof every man understands the meaning.” By this means, Reid continued, “we pass from the sign
to the thing signified, with ease, and by natural impulse....” See Reid, An Inquiry into the Human
Mind on the Principles o f Common Sense, in Broadie, p. 277.
As Hutcheson explained: “we have more lively ideas o f imperfect men with all their passions, than of
morally perfect heroes such as really never occur to our observation;... we are more nearly touched
and affected by the imperfect characters; since in them we see represented, ... the struggle between the
passions o f self-love and those o f honour and virtue, which we often feel in our own breasts. This is
the perfection of beauty for which Homer is justly admired, as well as for the variety o f his characters.”
(Hutcheson, in Broadie, pp. 220-221) Hence, Hutcheson concludes, a painter might achieve beauty not
by “attainting] the highest perfection o f original beauty separately considered,” but by combining the
“relative beauty” o f human experience “with some degree o f the original kind.... The like reason may
influence artists, in many other instances, to depart from the rules o f original beauty, as above laid
down.” (Hutcheson, in Broadie, pp. 222-223) See Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original o f our
Ideas o f Beauty and Virtue, in Broadie, pp. 220-223.
13 In the neo-Platonic narrative informing Reynolds’s Discourses, imagination served as the catalyst for
higher truth. He takes this up in his ninth Discourse. See Reynolds, Discourses on Art, p. 171.
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mediums (and makers) of virtue. In other words, portrait-painters like Jonathan
Richardson might claim the stature of liberal artists. Richardson’s theory is thus
interesting not only because its influence was felt from the highest reaches of the
Royal Academy to the self-taught painters of the American colonies, but because it
suggests how a civic humanist methodology might be manipulated to the benefit of
ambitious commoners.

I. Jonathan Richardson and Eighteenth-Century Portraiture
Active in the founding of the Queen Street Academy, and the first British
artist to contribute significantly to art theory, Jonathan Richardson provides an
excellent point-of-departure for exploring the imag[in]ing of identity in eighteenthcentury portraiture.14 Blurring the lines between landed and learned, nature and
nurture, his selective reformation of continental theory, coupled with his aspirations
for English painting—and painters—, earned him a significant following.15 Indeed,
while borrowing much from Shaftesbury’s civic humanist discourse, while accepting
the continental hierarchy of painting genres, Richardson, in challenging the

14 Also known as Kneller’s Academy, the Queen Street Academy was a resource for artists in need of
models as well as a venue for the transmission of ideas. Here, the influence o f Sir Godfrey Kneller,
Richardson, and, in its incarnation into the St. Martin’s Lane Academy (a.k.a. Hogarth’s Academy)
Hogarlh, Ramsay and others found a feeding ground. According to Gibson-Wood, Richardson ranked
with Kneller and the Swedish-born Michael Dahl as one o f the three most prominent painters in the
period. See Gibson-Wood, Jonathan Richardson, p. 36.
15 “The most direct English heir to the substance o f Richardson’s Essay on the Theory o f Painting was
Joshua Reynolds.... Reynolds reiterated and developed in his Discourses many o f the same
neoclassical principles that Richardson had promoted in his Theory o f Painting.... Most important of
all is the unprecedented thoroughness o f Richardson’s analysis o f the sources o f ‘grace and greatness’
in relation to Reynolds’ preoccupation with ‘the grand style’ o f painting.” See Gibson-Wood, pp. 232233.
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ideological barriers between history and portrait painting, advanced the cause of
English painting and painters.16
Richardson published three art-theoretical treatises in the course of his career:
An Essay on the Theory o f Painting (London, 1715; second edition, with revisions,
1725); Two Discourses. I. An Essay on the whole Art o f Criticism as it relates to
Painting... II. An Argument in Behalf o f the Science o f a Connoisseur (London,
1719); and An Account o f some o f the Statues, Bas-reliefs, Drawings and Pictures in
Italy, &c. with Remarks (London, 1722).17 While books on art criticism were not
new, a number of traits distinguished Richardson’s work from that of his
predecessors: its author was an artist, not a philosopher or dilettante; its format was
based on the rational essay; its approach was based on empirical as opposed to
theoretical reasoning—one that worked from the particular to the general; its purpose,
as Gibson-Wood notes, was not so much to foster patronage—already giving way to
the influences of the marketplace—as to elevate the stature of English painting and
the status of the English artist and, so, to promote “connaissance” (connoisseurship)
among Englishman; and its intended audience—like that of Addison’s Spectator—
included a learned (if artistically uninformed) middle class, which he loosely referred

16 Unlike his predecessors, for example, Richardson did not consider invention the unique claim o f the
history painter, but rather heralded the portrait painter’s ‘improvement’ on likeness as another form of
invention. For a discussion o f Richardson’s theory, see Gibson-Wood, pp. 13-14, 87-88, 139-143,
212-213,222,225-229; Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting, pp. 42-52, 218-229.
17 Jonathan Richardson outlined a complete program for the rendering o f character under the headings
of Invention, Expression, Composition, Drawing, Colouring, Handling, and Grace and Greatness.
According to Gibson-Wood, the three treatises represent “a process of increasing radicalization, from
the acceptance o f established continental precepts to the rejection of their authority....” (Gibson-Wood,
pp. 138-139) For a full discussion o f his aesthetic principles, see Richardson, An Essay on the Theory
o f Painting, pp. 38,43-213; Richardson, Two Discourses, II, pp. 27-30; Gibson-Wood, pp. 138-139.
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to as “gentlemen.”18 In Richardson’s view, the study of art—the establishment of art
academies and the promotion of connoisseurship—was a ready means by which to
advance social good.19 Moreover, the makers of liberal art were not excluded from
the circle of men who might enact such improvement.20 Nor, significantly, were
portrait painters excluded from the makers of liberal art.
Indeed, whereas Shaftesbury embraced continental theory as both the proper
standard of English painting and the exemplar for its improvement, Richardson
emphasized empirical and Reformed influences at the expense of continental theory.
For example, while supporting a continental technique based on the ‘idealization’ or
‘improvement’ of the sitter—what Vertue called “the ‘great Manner’”—Richardson
rejected its loose treatment of likeness.21 Similarly, while embracing the principle of
‘improvement’ and its manifestation in ‘idealization’, he subverted the continental
emphasis on theory and birth to the evidence of experience and the effects of industry.

18 Indeed, Gibson-Wood remarks, “Richardson had been calling himself a gentleman since the
1690s....” (Gibson-Wood, p. 148) See Richardson, Two Discourses, II, pp. 42-52, 218-229; GibsonWood, pp. 14-17,44-46, 72-73, 88-89, 94,139-142, 148, 180-181,195-196,202-204.
'* By acting the connoisseur, by adopting a scientific approach to art—by learning to distinguish
similarities and differences and thereby formulate and defend rational ideas (a “Lockean
epistemology”)—an artist or spectator refined his reason and improved himself. As Gibson-Wood
observes, “Richardson’s radical assertion, that knowing who painted a picture and how good it was
could be deduced empirically by all clear-thinking persons who devoted themselves to such study, was
particularly appropriate for an audience o f fledgling English consumers who had little experience of
painting, but who did have a firm devotion to the principle o f self-advancement.” (Gibson-Wood, p.
184) See Gibson-Wood, pp. 184-185, 193, 198, 200-201, 203.
20 Unlike Shaftesbury, for example, who “views the artist as essentially a mechanic, whose taste and
aspirations must be guided by informed citizens who have dedicated themselves to the cause o f public
virtue,” Richardson argued for the artist’s authority over the improvement o f his subject and spectator.
See Gibson-Wood, p. 173.
21 Gibson-Wood writes: “In 1731 George Vertue compared the painting styles o f some o f his
contemporaries, and characterized Richardson as having ‘a great Manner’ .... By classifying
Richardson along with Dahl, Kneller, Lely, Riley, Dobson and Van Dyck as having a ‘great’ manner,”
she continues, “Vertue was referring to the adoption o f both idealized forms or figure types, and the
bold application o f paint.” (Gibson-Wood, pp. 60-61) At the same time, Richardson was critical o f
Kneller’s loose brush. See Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting, pp. 41-42, 161-163,175,
177; Gibson-Wood, pp. 9, 60-61, 171.
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These principles carried over into his notion of social order. While he
supported a hierarchical social order, he emphasized industry at the expense of birth.
As a result, the ideal he set before the portrait painter was based on the potential
relationship between the sitter’s attributes and social place, as determined by his will.
In other words, while Richardson’s ideal conceived the potential self in terms of the
sitter’s social elevation in the ‘great chain of being’, while his theory of “Grace and
Greatness” reaffirmed the liberal progress from imitation to idealization and the
necessary transformation of a ‘realistic’ or ‘actual’ subject into a ‘truthful’ or
‘potential’ likeness—“‘Thus to raise the Character: To divest an Unbred Person of his
Rusticity, and give him something at least of a G e n t l e m a n . —, his notions of
improvement and potentiality were themselves informed by an ‘ethic of ordinary life’
in which self-determining individuals achieved their potential through industry and
piety.

Hence, in dissent from continental and Shaftesburian tradition, Richardson

constructed a social order based on merit rather than prescription. And this informed
his evaluation of portrait-painting.
Eighteenth-century portraits served a number of functions. On the one hand,
they represented the sitter’s person—and, by extension, his values, beliefs, interests,
allegiances and history—when he was present, absent or dead.23 At Britain’s Temple
Newsam house, for example, an imposing wall of family portraits once opposed a

22 Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting, p. 175. As Gibson-Wood aptly notes, “In place o f
the view that idealizing a figure essentially amounts to making it look like an antique statue,
Richardson thus posits one that alludes to the visible hierarchy of the English social order”— i.e. one of
social versus theoretical improvement. (Gibson-Wood, pp. 169-170) See Richardson, An Essay on the
Theory o f Painting, 161-163,175, 177; Gibson-Wood, pp. 163, 169-171.
Samuel Richardson, “An Apology for Portrait Painting,” Town and Country Magazine (November
1771), p. 601; also quoted in Michael Rosenthal, The Art o f Thomas Gainsborough: 'a little business
fo r the Eye ’ (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 155.
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wall of royal images in the center of a public drawing room.24 The arrangement
served to assert the family’s lineal heritage and political allegiance to a large and
varied audience. On the other hand, portraits also served a moral function. As
Richardson explained it, they “raised” and “improved” their subjects and spectators
by casting them as models of human potentiality.25 This suited the Aristotelian notion
of emulation.26 In all cases, however, the function of portraits was to make their
subjects accessible to a body of spectators in the form of a visual text, the reading of
which engaged sitter, artist and spectator in a visual conversation.

27

Moreover, by

employing an established visual language to shape background, setting, costume and
accoutrements, the portrait painter communicated a context within which the
portrait’s ‘conversation’ was conducted and the sitter’s identity understood.
The elevation of visual imagery to the elite status of language was an
important marker in the progress of painting. Whereas the ancients defended the
superiority of the written word, whereas Shaftesbury esteemed poetry’s superior

24 Based on the original eighteenth-century picture plan o f Temple Newsam Picture Gallery. James
Lomax, Attingham lecture, the Picture Gallery, Temple Newsam House, Leeds, England, July 13,
1997.
Whereas Shaftesbury invoked the improving influence o f poetry, Richardson endowed portraits with
a didactic ability to advance the public good: ‘“tis rational to believe,” he wrote, “that Pictures o f this
kind are subservient to Virtue; that Men are excited to imitate the Good Actions, and persuaded to shun
the Vices o f those whose Examples are thus set before them.. . (Richardson, An Essay on the Theory
o f Painting, p. 16) See Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 240, 278; Richardson, Two Discourses, II,
pp. 12, 39-40,42; Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting, pp. 15-17.
The arts were intended to foster “emulation.” As Aristotle explained it: “Emulation is pain caused by
seeing ... good things [in other persons]... not because others have these goods, but because we have
not got them .... Emulation makes us take steps to secure the good things in question.... Further...,
moral goodness in its various forms must be such an object... : for men honour those who are morally
good....” See Aristotle, The Rhetoric, in Corbett, pp. 120-121.
27 As Taylor observes, “the self is constituted through exchange in language.” See Taylor, p. 509.
28 As Gibson-Wood notes, Richardson replaced the traditional correlation between painting and poetry
with “a Lockean conceptual scheme in which visual imagery takes its place alongside verbal language
as ‘one o f the means whereby we convey our Ideas to each other’.” See Gibson-Wood, p. 147;
Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting, p. 6.
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29

merits, contemporary comparisons increasingly blurred their differences. When
Richardson remarked in 1719 that “Painting is but another sort of Writing,” he went
so far as to rank visual above verbal in the economy and depth of its expression.

30

By

the same token, whereas Shaftesbury confined a liberal status to the history painter—
for “We may conclude,” he wrote, “That in a real History-Painter, the same
Knowledge, the same Study, and Views, are requir’d, as in a real P oef”—the way
was opened for a more inclusive analysis in which portrait painters practicing in a
liberal—i.e. “grand” or “historical”—manner might likewise assume a liberal
stature.31 In fact, Shaftesbury’s description of ancient poetry’s “Imitation chiefly of

29 Because Shaftesbury’s neo-Aristotelian interpretation o f poetry and painting was biased by a Platonic
demand for the philosophical ideal— one derived from a transcendental or metaphysical experience of
the ‘imagination’—he could not admit of particularity either in the mind o f the philosopher or a true
‘Likeness’. As a result, he necessarily privileged verbal over visual language and poetry over painting,
the latter being limited by its objective reference to material form. On these grounds, he dismissed
portraiture as the superficial manufacture o f ignorant mechanics. By contrast, Richardson insisted that
“We PAINTERS are upon the Level with Writers, as being Poets, Historians, Philosophers, and
Instruct equally with Them.” (Richardson, Two Discourses, II, p. 42) Though he distinguished between
its polite and “Vulgar,” liberal and mechanical forms, he explained: “Painting is but another Sort o f
Writing;” “To read it,” he went on, “is not only to know that ‘tis such a Story, or such a Man, but to see
the Beauties o f the Thought, and Pencil; o f the Colouring, and Composition; the Expression, Grace,
and Greatness that is to be found in it; and not to be able to do This is a Sort o f Illiterature, and
Unpoliteness.” (Richardson, Two Discourses, II, pp. 221-222) Hogarth, too, deemed painting a
language. (Bindman, Hogarth, p. 55) Nonetheless, he considered portrait artists “men o f very middling
natural parts.” (Gowing, Hogarth, p. 42) See Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 144-145,
Richardson, Two Discourses, II, pp. 42,221-222; Bindman, Hogarth, p. 55; Gowing, Hogarth, p. 42.
30 Both Shaftesbury and Richardson invoked a ‘pragmatic approach’ to art, which, rooted in rhetoric,
was concerned with ‘ends’ rather than ‘means’— i.e. “Pleasure, and Improvement....” (Abrams, The
Mirror and the Lamp: romantic theory and the critical tradition, p. 21, and Richardson, An Essay on
the Theory o f Painting, p. 6, and Two Discourses, II, pp. 39-40-, 42) In this way, Abrams writes, “the
work of art continues to be regarded as a kind o f reflector.... The artist himself is often envisioned as
the agent holding the mirror up to nature... to invent (in the root sense of ‘discover’) aspects o f the
universe and o f human nature hitherto overlooked....” (Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp, p. 42) But
whereas Shaftesbury privileged words, Richardson privileged imagery. As Gibson-Wood explains,
Richardson based the superiority o f painting on “Locke’s discussion o f ‘the imperfection o f words’ in
Book 3 o f the Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Locke had observed that the leading qualities
o f substances are better conveyed by demonstration than description.” (Gibson Wood, p. 147) See
Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting, p. 6, and Two Discourses, II, pp. 17, 39-40, 42. See
also M. H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp: romantic theory and the critical tradition, pp. 15-16,
21, 34, 42, and Gibson-Wood, p. 147.
31 For Shaftesbury, only the well-educated history painter might qualify as a liberal artist; the portrait’s
concern with material qualities precluded portrait painters from advancing beyond the “merely natural”
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Men and Manners” as “character being wrought to a Likeness” invited the claim that
portraiture, too, was “a sister to poetry.”32 Hence, Richardson had only to bridge the
gap between portraiture and history painting to make the link between portraiture and
poetry: “A Portrait is a sort of General History of the Life of the Person it represents,”
he wrote, “not only to Him who is acquainted with it, but to Many Others, who upon
Occasion of seeing it are frequently told, of... their General Character at least;” a
portrait, therefore, is a type of “Historical Picture.”33 Thus, by 1758, Samuel Johnson
could remark that “poetry and painting... differ only as the one represents things by
marks permanent and natural, the other by signs accidental and arbitrary.”34 The same
held true in America, where Mathew Byles noted in “To Mr. Smibert on the Sight of
his Pictures”: “’Alike our Labour, and alike our Flame,/ ‘Tis thine to raise the Shape:/
‘Tis mine to fix the Name’.”35

to the liberal stature accorded “historical and moral” imagery. Reynolds assumed a similar stance in
his Discourses. See Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, III, pp. 387-391; Gibson-Wood, pp. 14,20, 182,
185-186.
Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 196-197. It was widely recognized that paintings were mediums
for instruction and improvement. (Gibson-Wood, p. 145) But whereas Shaftesbury confined this
attribute to history painting, Richardson expanded its application to include portrait painting.
Richardson thus encouraged the portrait painter to study the grace and greatness o f classical
exemplars—as did the history painter—so as to arrive at a knowledge of the aesthetic qualities
informing moral improvement. See Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 196-197, 206-207; GibsonWood, pp. 95-96,98-99, 103,144-147.
33 See Richardson, Two Discourses, II, pp. 45-46. In a separate essay, he wrote: “To be a good FacePainter, a degree of the Historical and Poetical Genius is requisite, and a great Measure o f the other
Talents and Advantages which a good History-painter must possess.” See Richardson, An Essay on the
Theory o f Painting, pp. 23-24.
34 Samuel Johnson, “Punch and Conversation,” in The Idler, 2 vols, 34 (London: Printed for J.
Newbery, 1761), pp. 190-191. These parallels elicited frequent comment in the eighteenth century. For
example, Plutarch was often quoted (citing Simonides) as saying “that ‘painting is mute poetry, and
poetry a speaking picture’.” The popular recitation o f Horace’s “«/ pictura poesis” further linked the
two arts. See Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp, p. 33.
” Probably first published in the Boston Gazette, January 1729/1730, as quoted in Jessie Poesch, “’In
just Lines to trace’— The Colonial Artist, 1700-1776,” in Ellen G. Miles, ed., The Portrait in
Eighteenth-Century America (Newark, DE: University o f Delaware Press, 1993), p. 72.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

150

In part, the changing relationship between verbal and visual language reflected
the growing concession to sense-perception as a necessary point-of-departure in the
acquisition of knowledge. Once conceded, an artist’s observation of space, gesture,
posture and gaze might be defended as the visual matter of a narrative ‘meaning of
life’ informing his sitter’s identity. This empowered both the portrait and the painter.
For example, by placing his audience in a passive or active role, an artist might
manipulate the relationship between subject and spectator according to the perceived
or desired relationship between the sitter and his audience and the degree and type of
engagement that relationship entailed. Ultimately, then, the success of an image
turned on the artist’s fabrication of a convincing and complementary ‘reality’, for
acceptance of the claimed identity presumed acquiescence to its prescribed
narrative.36
The declining credibility of theoretical methodologies and universal narratives
informed a significant shift in the interpretation of identity and its representation in
portraiture. On the one hand, the growing influence of empirical theory challenged
the premise of “fixity,” freeing identity to become something fluid and ‘negotiated’.
At the same time, visual imagery assumed new authority as a medium for making
meaning.

This lent portraits an import not found in the pre-modem period. Indeed,

the growing popularity of portraits may have turned, in part, on their capacity to

36 As Juliet Steyn writes: “Judgment is a critical activity, a way o f determining the mode o f presenting
and establishing ... reality....” See Steyn, “Painting another; other-than-painting,” in Steyn, ed., Other
than identity: the subject, politics and art (New York: Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 217.
j7 Whereas Shaftesbury’s more theoretical (neo-Platonic) approach limited the potential role o f art to
one o f inspiration, Richardson’s more empirical (neo-Aristotelian) approach made art itself a medium
of human progress. See Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, p. 332; Gibson-Wood, p. 201.
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advance, modify, or undermine the prescribed identities of the civic humanist
narrative. A close study of portraits might thus reveal not only the standards
informing identity-making, but, by extension, the perception of artists and sitters visa-vis the dominant narrative.

II. The issue o f ‘Likeness ’
According to Jonathan Richardson, “to sit for one’s Picture is to have an Abstract
of one’s Life written, and published.”38 Richardson’s use of the term “Abstract” is
important, for it suggests a highly selective summary of a subject’s key attributes—
* 39
presumably those bearing significance for the portrait’s reading public.
It also

suggests an Aristotelian (non-Humeian) frame of reference—a belief that qualities
inhere in objects themselves and, hence, that they can be abstracted, rendered, and
“known” visually through portraiture.40
According to Richardson, the portrait was ideally suited to making legible
one’s “character”—what Samuel Johnson defined as the public evaluation of one’s
private attributes according to their social value.41 This was to invoke a sociological
interpretation of identity. Less clear, however, was the relationship between
38 He explains: “Upon the sight o f a Portrait, the Character, and Master-Strokes of the History of the
Person it represents, are apt to flow in upon the Mind, and to be the Subject o f Conversation: So that to
sit for one’s Picture, is to have an Abstract o f one’s Life written, and published, and our selves thus
consign’d over to Honour, or Infamy.” (Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting, p. 16) See
Jonathan Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting, pp. 16-17.
j9 Abrams writes: “Dr. Johnson held that on moral grounds, the mirror must be selective: it is
necessary ‘to distinguish those parts o f nature which are most proper for imitation’....’” (Abrams, The
Mirror and the Lamp, p. 36) Yet the precise content of this ‘abstract’ has long impeded the
interpretation of portraiture. Was it a generalization o f attributes common to the species or the selective
blending o f traits unique to the individual? See Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp, p. 36; Copleston, I,
p. 258; Brilliant, Portraiture, pp. 13-14.
m Gibson-Wood, pp. 168-169.
41 See definitions number four, seven and eight in Samuel Johnson, Dictionary (London, 1786).
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“character” and “likeness,” for interpretations of “likeness” were rarely consistent.
Plato, for example, understood likeness to be a mimetic copy of sensory perception,
an ignorant “shadow image” of a “false” reality bearing dangerous implications.42 On
the one hand, this Platonic correlation between realism and ignorance informed the
civic humanist bias against portraiture.43 On the other hand, however, Shaftesbury
differed from Plato in distinguishing between a mimetic portrait and a true “likeness;”
unlike Plato, Shaftesbury defined “likeness” as “Imitation,” not “Mimickry ”44
Borrowing from Aristotle, who envisioned the “mirror” as a mediating device
through which the particularities of nature were absorbed by the intellect and
transformed into general principles—the essential ingredients of Plato’s divine
Forms—, Shaftesbury equated “likeness” with the “mirrored”—i.e. abstracted—
qualities of a general style.45 This neo-Platonic—i.e. more Aristotelian than
42 Plato, Republic, p. 79.
** Those who rejected empirical methodologies as a credible basis for knowledge, and privileged
contemplation above observation, necessarily derided the value o f portraiture, the truths o f which were
premised on the effects of sense-perception—“For ‘tis not certainly by virtue o f our Face merely, that
we are ourselves.” See Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 279-283; quoted from p. 283.
44 According to Lee, “The Greek word mimesis covers both ‘imitation’ or ‘copying’ and dramatic and
artistic representation in the widest sense.” (Plato, Republic, footnote 2, p. 90) By contrast,
Shaftesbury extolled “Poetry ... [as] an Imitation chiefly of Men and Manners,” distinguishing between
“Imitation” and what “in a low [art form] ... we call Mimickry.” (Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, p.
196) As Abrams observes: “In recent criticism (as, to some extent, in the early Renaissance theory o f
painting) the concept that art is imitation, together with its analogy to a mirror, usually signalizes a
demand for artistic realism, but in neo-classic criticism these concepts were standard components in the
theory that art is ‘ideal’, in the general sense that it properly represents an improvement upon things as
we find them.” (Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp, p. 36) See Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp.
144,196; Plato, Republic, p. 90; Abrams, p. 36.
43 According to Abrams, the correlation of the mirror with imitation—as distinct from mimicry—and,
so, generalization—as opposed to realism—was “a favorite with aesthetic theorists long after Plato. In
Renaissance speculation the reference to a looking-glass is frequent and explicit.” (Abrams, The Mirror
and the Lamp, p. 30) He goes on: “As late as the middle o f the eighteenth century important critics
continued to illustrate the concept o f imitation by the nature o f a looking-glass. (Abrams, The Mirror
and the Lamp, p. 32) By contrast, he concludes, this interpretation was abandoned; “post-Aristotelian
theories ... almost without exception, reverted to concepts o f mimesis much closer to the attributes o f a
literal reflector.. . (Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp, p. 34) Fora discussion o f this development,
see Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, III, pp. 350-353; Abrams The Mirror and the Lamp, pp. 30-36;
Canfield, pp. 174-179.
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Platonic—interpretation resulted from Shaftesbury’s different understanding of the
relationship between sense-perception and knowledge. For Plato, external nature was
but an imperfect allusion to the Forms, whose truth and reality existed only on a
metaphysical level. Because sensory perception was at two or three removes from
this metaphysical truth, it was dangerously misleading as a source of knowledge.
Aristotle, on the other hand, while agreeing that truth was accessible only through the
intellect, disagreed with Plato’s assessment of the Forms. While he, too, located truth
in general principles, he held that the essential substance of such principles could be
known through the evidence of nature. Observation, coupled with intellectual
abstraction—i.e. with the translation of matter into its “likeness”—, might thus result
in knowledge.47
In keeping with this Aristotelian analysis, Shaftesbury invoked the trope of the
mediaeval “mirror” in his evaluation of likeness.48 As the medieval “mirror”
functioned to transform the imperfect private self into a more noble public character,
so Shaftesbury’s “Pocket-Mirrour” functioned to transform the imperfect, ignorant
self into its more perfect philosophical form.49 According to Shaftesbury, the “PocketMirrouf ’ “teaches me to distinguish between [Philosophy’s] Person”—the matter of
sense—“and her Likeness”—the matter of potentiality—, “and shews me her
immediate and real self, by that sole Privilege of teaching me to know my-self, and

46 Richard Kraut, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Plato (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1992), p. 710.
47 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, III, pp. 303, 379.
■"*Shaftesbury’s “mirror” was not precisely the same as Aristotle’s insofar as the point o f introspection
conducive to “Mirrour- Writing' represented a higher, Platonic stage o f intellectual perfection than that
invoked by the ancient philosopher. See Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, 1, pp. 204-205.
49 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 204-205.
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what belongs to me.”50 He thus coined the term “Mirrour-Writinf— "designing after
the life”—to describe the linguistic process by which one arrived at the
“Philosophical Hero,” commending “The good Painter...do as the good Poet” in
adopting this method.51
On the one hand, then, Shaftesbury’s distinction between “Person” and
“Likeness” paralleled his distinction between one’s lower “undercharacter” and
higher “Philosophical” self. On the other hand, it was his correlation of portraiture
with “Person” and “undercharacter,” and “Person” and “undercharacter” with the
particular and sensory, that precluded his recognition of portraiture as a liberal art. 52
'

*

As Plato had argued, any likeness taking only the “Person” into account was nothing
more than a “shadow” image, a characterization of man’s inferior self that
dangerously obscured the higher good of philosophical virtue as the foundation of
social order. Among advocates of the Shaftesburian narrative, a true likeness, one
informed by a liberal understanding of reality and identity, might be attained only by
way of a “general” style—i.e. by abstracting those virtues conducive to potentiality.53
It is thus worth noting that Sir Joshua Reynolds, an outspoken opponent of realism,
employed a mirror in his portrait-making; according to the Duchess of Rutland, he
would “look at the general effect in a distant glass, chiefly making his picture from
that.”54

50 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, p. 298.
31 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, III, p. 375.
52 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, III, pp. 348-353.
33 Shaftesbury held that a truly general painting was expressive o f “the grand Event," a theme “wholly
philosophical and moral" in which “the highest Tone ofVoice and strongest Action are employ’d.” See
Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, III, pp. 350-353.
54 Quoted in Richard Wendorf, Sir Joshua Reynolds: Painter in Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, (1996) 1998), p. 116.
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Yet Aristotle’s analysis also suggested alternative possibilities for the
interpretation of likeness. Aristotle described the mirror as a pre-Socratic or naturalist
device used to mediate between external nature and the internal intellect. A mirrored
likeness might therefore represent the translation of sensory data into general
principles—i.e. the abstraction of external qualities into ideas, made visually manifest
in imagery. An Aristotelian likeness might therefore emphasize not just the
abstraction of ideas but their generalization in material forms. Indeed, according to
Ross, Aristotle’s endorsement of the universal in the Poeticks should not be
misunderstood as a condemnation of particularity. He writes:
There is, of course, danger in this notion of poetry as universal. It easily
degenerates into the view that poetry should present general types of character
denuded of the individual traits which make both real people and fictitious
characters interesting and delightful. But to interpret him so is to think of the
universal simply as that which ‘can be predicated of more things than one’ and
to forget that for Aristotle the universal is the necessary.55
In other words, for Aristotle, as distinct from Plato and Shaftesburian civic humanists,
a visual likeness composed of general forms and “necessary” particularities was not of
necessity void of intellectual merit and might even compared with an “abstract”
poem.56 This, I think, was Richardson’s intent when he employed the term
“Abstract.”57

55 Ross, Aristotle, p. 288.
” As Abrams aptly observes, “the particular and the circumstantial were not employed as simple and
exclusive contraries o f the general and the uniform; as Reynolds puts it, ‘he that does not at all express
particulars, expresses nothing’; and in many passages, these critics proposed achieving the general by
the just selection o f those particulars which are most widely possessed.... Taken in its M l context, the
recommendation of the typical, general, and familiar as basic requirements o f art usually turns out to be
accompanied by a statement o f the need for the leavening qualities o f individuality, particularity, and
novelty as well.” (Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp, pp. 39-40) See Abrams, The Mirror and the
Lamp, pp. 39-42.
37 Richardson’s concern with this principle o f an abstract ideal is interesting for being so closely
aligned with Aristotle and yet absent in other writings on portraiture. As Gibson-Wood observes,
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Richardson’s interpretation of an abstract likeness was not an endorsement of
“Mimickry.” While he agreed in principle that realism alone—i.e. analysis without
synthesis—served little purpose, he did not believe that the inclusion of particularities
necessarily obscured general truths, or that particularities in portraits rendered them
necessarily illiberal. For Richardson, it was but a small step from “Mirrour- Writing”
to portrait-painting and, so, from the true likeness made by the poet, to the true
likeness rendered by painter. Indeed, Richardson argued, a good portrait served much
the same purpose as Shaftesbury’s “Magical Glasses”: bringing the spectator face-toface with his potential and thereby inspiring his pursuit of knowledge and virtue. To
this end, he, like Shaftesbury, encouraged the painter to be as the poet: “the Painter
must imagine his Figures to Think, Speak, and Act, as a Poet should do in a Tragedy,
or Epick Poem.. . Ultimately, then, the portrait “Abstract” was for Richardson, as
the verbal “abstract” was for Aristotle and Shaftesbury, both a product and medium of
knowledge. It was this which allowed for the liberal merits of portraiture.59
In the end, Richardson’s likeness was one in which the self was recognized to
be a singular example of a larger species, defined by those principles to which the
species itself was held universally subject; it was one in which the attributes selected
were those whose perceived social value made them most representative of mankind’s

“Although classical idealization was frequently upheld as the highest aim o f art, no previous writer had
regarded this as a distinctive and analyzable part o f painting.” See Gibson-Wood, p. 141.
38 Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting, p. 21. See also Richardson, Two Discourses, II, pp.
20-21,33.
59 Richardon, Two Discourses, II, pp. 13, 16; Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting, pp. 47,
50, 52-54.
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potential and, so, most conducive to inspiring virtue in others.60 In this neoAristotelian context, the portrait became a philosophical medium for the advancement
of public good: “The Great, and Chief Ends of Painting,” he posited, “are to Raise,
and Improve Nature; and to Communicate Ideas;... whereby Mankind is advanced
higher in the Rational State, and made Better... ,”61 He thus encouraged that “a
Peasant have more of the Gentleman, and so of the rest.”62 In part, then, where
Richardson diverged from more conservative, Shaftesburian—i.e. neo-Platonic—
civic humanists was in his empirical endorsement of “necessary” particularity—that
which impressed “upon the Mind of him that sees it an Idea of its self, distinguish’d
from every Other of its Kind.”63
But differences between Shaftesbury and Richardson also turned on their
perceptions of “nurture.”64 Shaftesbury’s theory turned on a belief in the progressive
nature of identity towards a perfect self—the “Philosophical Hero.” A similar notion
of improvement informed the ideas of Richardson. Significantly, however, whereas
Shaftesbury emphasized the role of nature—i.e. birth—Richardson emphasized the
role of nurture—i.e. industry; through a close study of nature, he argued, supported by
60 In this way, Richardson reconciled the demand for empirical resemblance with the demand for a
general form—i.e. with the demand for evidence o f intellectual and moral virtue. See Richardson, Two
Discourses, II, p. 16.
61 Richardson, Two Discourses, II, p. 12. As he explained, “if my Ideas are raised, the Sentiments
excited in my mind will be proportionably Improved.” (Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f
Painting, p. 15) See Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting, p. 15; Richardson, Two
Discourses, II, pp. 15, 39-40,42.
Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting, p. 164.
63 Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting, p. 162.
64 Differences between Shaftesbury and Richardson suggest certain influences on Richardson’s
philosophy: the reformation ethic, which empowered the individual to determine his own ‘potentiality’;
empiricism’s penchant for conversation; Locke’s vision o f the autonomous reasoner; and the
transforming influence o f commerce on society. These encouraged his endorsement o f “ordinary life”
values. As Gibson-Wood notes, “The traits he is proud to possess include industry, a concern for self-
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readings in philosophy, the individual might cultivate a liberal knowledge and thereby
determine his own improvement. Richardson’s allegiance to empiricism thus effected
a modified version of civic humanism: it substituted the autonomy of the empiricist
for the disinterest of the contemplator as the premise of independence; and it
substituted “nurture”—learning (by way of industry)—for “nature”—birth (by way of
wealth)—as the medium of knowledge.65 By these means, Richardson enhanced
individual control over identity and social order.66
On the one hand, then, Richardson wed classical principles with individual
self-determination to arrive at an ideological narrative compatible with the interests of
a landless commoner with intellectual, social and economic ambitions. 67 At the same
time, his position should not be misunderstood as a rejection of social hierarchy or its
presumption of inequalities among men. Richardson, too, cautioned against ‘fashion’
and ‘flattery’ and the prospect of false identities arising from the absence of fixed
standards.68 He, too, envisioned the progress of virtue to derive from liberal thinking.
He likewise supported the subordination of individual interests to the higher ideals of
improvement without ambition, independence, honesty, benevolence, temperance, rationality and
contentment.” (Gibson-Wood, pp. 42-43) See Gibson-Wood, pp. 1-2, 39-43, 46, 49, 54.
65 Gibson-Wood, p. 42.
06 Indeed, as Gibson-Wood remarks: “his aims as a writer can be meaningfully understood only in
conjunction with his professional aspirations, which, in turn, cannot be separated from his social and
intellectual ambitions. Richardson sought to exemplify in the conduct of his own life, I believe, many
o f the central doctrines o f his writings: that portrait painters should be as learned as history painters;
that professional artists o f all types could be ‘gentlemen’; that the English need not succumb to
continental authority in the arts; that Everyman could be an authority through the exercise o f sound
reasoning and hard work.” See Gibson-Wood, p. 5.
67 Richardson’s social aspirations are suggested by the distribution of his estate; rather than divide it up
equally among his children, as most middle-class families did, he gave the bulk to his son Jonathan in
order to set him up as a gentleman. See Gibson-Wood, pp. 39-40,46,49, 54.
m Although Richardson conceded that “A Painter is allow’d sometimes to depart even from Natural,
and Historical Truth” he cautioned against flagrant fabrications: “History must not be corrupted, and
turn’d into Fable, or Romance; Every Person, and Thing must be made to sustain its proper Character,

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

159

social good. But one cannot ignore the implications of his empirical and Reformed
bias for the civic humanist narrative.
Like Shaftesbury, Richardson believed in the existence of divine plan and its
manifestation in the moral good. He also believed that, ultimately, this plan might be
made known to man through the compatibility of reason with nature. Unlike
Shaftesbury, however, Richardson held that human knowledge prior to revelation was
necessarily imperfect and, so, unsuited to a paradigm of ‘fixed’ abstract principles.
Hence, borrowing from Locke, Richardson argued that secular truth was dynamic
rather than fixed and, so, “purely Relative.”69 It was this which underscored his
empirical methodology and his rejection of customary authority: the only knowledge
secular man might hope to acquire was that which might be deduced from the
application of general principles initially developed from the evidence of external
nature; since no one man or group of men could shore up the evidence of all nature,
customary authority was ever imperfect and, therefore, a poor pretext for making
fixed pronouncements about the individual, society, and larger world.70 In the end,
while accepting the hierarchy of reason over passion, Richardson granted a privileged
place to the autonomous, reasoning man.71

and not only the Story, but the Circumstances must be observ’d ....” See Richardson, An Essay on the
Theory o f Painting, pp. 47, 50, 52-53.
69 Richardson, Two Discourses, II, pp. 98 and 117.
0 He writes: “Since all men are perpetually on the wrong side o f truth, by virtue o f imperfect
knowledge and reason, we are all part wiseman and part fool. Each o f us—and the whole o f us—can
only benefit from the opinions o f others, that our own ideas might be tested and raised.” (Richardson,
Two Discourses, II, p. 120) He later added: “nothing should be Borrowed, nothing Supposed, or taken
for granted.” (Richardson, Two Discourses, II, p. 167) See Richardson, Two Discourses, II, pp. 120,
167.
71 That men might think for themselves— might claim intellectual independence— was, for Richardson,
a promise o f the Reformation. In this way, he is aligned with the Country narrative. See Richardson,
Two Discourses, II, p. 231.
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Once freed of theoretical methodologies and a neo-Platonic bias, an abstract
likeness based on observation and idealization might bridge the gap between
“mechanical” and “liberal” advanced by the writings of Shaftesbury and others. At
the same time, common-born artists and sitters might participate in the higher reality
bom of liberal knowledge and thereby assume a philosophical stature. In the end, for
all his commitment to virtue and progress, Richardson’s narrative of nurture over
nature, industry over birth, was more responsive to the experience of British
commoners than that of Shaftesbury. It also anticipated, in part, the ideas of Ramsay
and Hume.72

III. Interpreting Likeness
When Shaftesbury spoke of “likeness,” he understood the (primarily) verbal
expression of those philosophical virtues to which men aspired in common.73 When
Richardson spoke of “likeness” he understood, in addition, the visual expression of
those virtues manifest in the individual. On one level, then, likeness was about
similarity: a means of articulating those attributes that united men and made them
similar in their potentiality. On the other hand, likeness was about difference: a

72 Significantly, Broadie remarks, Hume’s analysis supported the notion o f nurtured progress; “Hume
plainly believed that we are not glued to the level o f refinement o f sensibility at which we find
ourselves. One purpose o f [his O f the Standard o f Taste]... is to describe what we have to do to move
to a higher level. In that respect the essay might be seen as contributing to that search for improvement
that so characterized the Enlightenment in Scotland.” (Broadie, p. 245) A similar theme informed
Ramsay’s Dialogue on Taste. See Broadie, The Scottish Enlightenment, p. 245; Hume, O f the
Standard o f Taste, in Broadie, pp. 251-259; Smart, Allan Ramsay: Painter, Essayist and Man o f the
Enlightenment (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 224, 226, 270-272.
73 “Although Shaftesbury, like Richardson, maintained that painters should ideally be able to think like
philosophers in portraying the essential significance o f actions, he clearly felt that painters were not
actually qualified to command this sort o f intellectual authority.” See Gibson-Wood, p. 153.
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means of distinguishing the individual from others of like kind. These varying
emphases reflected different ways of seeing the world, one of which subordinated the
individual to a theoretical ideal, the other of which subordinated the theoretical ideal
to the individual. They likewise conduced to degrees of stylistic generality and
particularity. In the case of Shaftesbury, who stressed the potentiality of mankind,
likeness was best rendered in the “general” style, which translated essential matter
into its potential, universal form.74 But among those who emphasized the potentiality
of the individual, likeness might best be rendered in a “mixed”—i.e. “historical” or
even “conversational”—style, one which combined general ideas with the “necessary”
particularities of the individual. By the same token, those who rejected the classical
principle of potentiality, and based all knowledge and good on experience, might
adopt a purely particular style.
Thus the manner in which one rendered a portrait reflected a certain
perception of reality and its corresponding narrative and identity. Among civic
humanists, a general style of painting reflected a classical perception of reality based
on progress and potentiality in which virtue, truth and beauty were affiliated with a
universal, disinterested and independent mind desirous of public good. In this
narrative, an excess of particularities was understood to reflect an ignorant mind
preoccupied with material and sensual interests.73 Hence, those artists who employed
an abstract or general style were esteemed liberal and virtuous, while those who

74 Shaftesbury Characteristicks, vol. 2, pp. 285-286.
15 As Plato described it, “the particulars are objects o f sight but not o f intelligence, while the forms
[from which generals are abstracted] are the objects o f intelligence but not o f sight.” See Plato,
Republic, p. 246.
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employed a particular style were deemed mechanical and interested.76 This informed
the neoclassical hierarchy of painting, which descended in rank from history painting
(the only “liberal” genre) to portraiture, animal painting, landscape, and still life.77
By the same token, variations in the visual language of eighteenth-century
portraiture suggest dissent from the classical perception of reality and the civic
humanist narrative. Although the superior merits of a general style continued to be
touted throughout the eighteenth century, the style itself was more loosely and
variously interpreted. For example, while both Allan Ramsay and Joshua Reynolds
were versed in grand-manner theory, and while both drew inspiration from the
writings of Richardson (notably his theory of “grace and greatness”), their varying
emphases—Ramsay on “grace,” Reynolds on “greatness”—, encouraged different
narrative ends.78 At the same time, although Reynolds, like Shaftesbury, believed that
intellectual ideals were attainable only through the “imagination”—a transcendental
state of contemplation—, and accepted the superior merits of history painting, thereby

76 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 142-144, and vol. 2, pp. 290, 358-359; Abrams, The Mirror and
the Lamp, pp. 36-38.
77 As Gibson-Wood notes, the hierarchy o f painting—and the civic humanist, theory o f art—was well
established in continental theory, and “was in turn premised on the acknowledgement of the supremacy
of humanist learning over all other forms o f knowledge.” She goes on: “The notion that the demands
o f different types o f subject matter determined the relative esteem in which genres o f painting were
held had been implicit in Italian Renaissance and baroque art theory. Within the dictates o f the French
Academie Royale it became official doctrine, and was articulated in print in 1669 by Andre
Felibien....” See Gibson-Wood, p. 11.
/S Ultimately, Richardson defined two sets o f rules for the models o f grace and greatness: “The
Contours must be Large, Square, and Boldly pronounc'd to produce Greatness; and Delicate, and
finely Waved, and Contrasted to be Gracious.... The Draperies must have broad Masses ofLight, and
Shadow, and noble large Folds to give a Greatness; and These artfully subdivided, add Graces.”
(Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting, pp. 181-182) See Richardson, An Essay on the
Theory o f Painting, pp. 181-182; Gibson-Wood, p. 141.
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basing his “great” style on neo-Platonic ideals, even he demurred from strict
• •
79
adherence to Shaftesbunan neoclassicism.

There is no question that Reynolds drew upon Richardson’s theory of “grace
and greatness” in the formulation of his “grand-style” portrait.80 At the same time, it
would be misleading to suggest that Reynolds likewise adopted a Richardsonian
narrative. Richardson’s claims for the intellectual ability of the artist, his intent to
grant liberal status to a select body of British painters, his defense of the potential
importance of English painting and the consequent need to establish an academy, all
find reiteration in the writings of Reynolds. But the influence of Shaftesbury is
likewise apparent—in the privileging of history painting, for example, and the
reluctance to confer upon portraiture the status of a liberal art. It was, in fact,
Reynolds’s shared belief in the neo-Platonic correlation between a general style, a
general mind and a metaphysical, universal truth attainable only through the
imagination that underscored his opposition to the particular and prompted his effort
to reconcile portraiture with the demands of liberal art. These subjects find

79 For example, Reynolds recognized the necessity o f balancing universal ideals with more particular
elements, a concession that may help to explain the oft-cited inconsistencies between his Discourses
and his pictures. According to Nicholas Penny, Reynolds “repeatedly insisted on the ‘true dignity’ of
[history] painting ‘which entitles it to the name o f a liberal Art, and ranks it as a sister o f poetry’.”
(Penny, “An Ambitious man: The career and the achievements o f Sir Joshua Reynolds” in Penny,
Reynolds, p. 30) Yet, in his essay on Shakespeare, for example, Reynolds advocated less rigid
standards of generalization, recalling Dr. Johnson’s praise o f the English bard—that he ‘“holds up to
his readers a faithful mirrour o f manners and o f life’.” (Quoted in Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp,
p. 32) See Penny, in Penny, Reynolds, p. 30; Reynolds, Discourses on Art, p. 239; Abrams, The Mirror
and the Lamp, pp. 32, 39-40.
80 See Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting, pp. 24-30, 161-163, 181-182; Gibson-Wood,
pp. 166, 168, 173-174.
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expression in his Discourses—a series of annual lectures delivered to students,
academicians and patrons of Britain’s Royal Academy between 1769 and 1790.

81

IV. Reynolds’s Discourses
As his first Discourse (January, 1769) makes clear, Reynolds considered painting
to be a manufactured—“mechanical”—product, but distinguished it from other
•

*

•

manufactures on grounds that its purpose was more than utilitarian.

82

As the degree

to which a painting exceeded its mercantile function was, for both Richardson and
Reynolds, a measure of its intellectual value and liberal status, so the goal of both
artists was to nurture the educational value of art towards the improvement of English
“Taste.”83 However, whereas Richardson premised Taste on general principles
derived from empirical observation, Reynolds premised Taste on a fixed ideal
accessible only by way of the imagination—a mental transcendence into the
metaphysical realm of the ideas.

84 .

In fact, one purpose of the newly-founded Royal

Academy (1769) was to establish the standards by which high—liberal and good—art

81 Sir Joshua Reynolds, Discourses on Art, Robert R. Wark, ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press
(1959), 1997).
82 Reynolds, Discourses on Art, pp. 13-21.
8j “The value and rank o f every art,” Reynolds wrote in his fourth Discourse (December 1771), “is in
proportion to the mental labour employed in it, or the mental pleasure produced by it. As this principle
is observed or neglected, our profession becomes either a liberal art, or a mechanical trade.” Reynolds,
Discourses on Art, p. 57.
84 Imagination represented the highest level o f intellectual achievement; it transformed mere
“generalization”— the process o f selective imitation and invention conducive to higher truth—into a
neo-Platonic manifestation o f the ideal. As he argued in his ninth Discourse: “the beauty o f which we
are in quest is general and intellectual...[;] it is an idea that exists only in the mind...: it is an idea... the
artist... is always labouring to impart, and which he dies at last without imparting; but which he is yet
so far able to communicate, as to raise the thoughts, and extend the views o f the spectator... through
successive stages o f excellence, till that contemplation o f universal rectitude and harmony which began
by Taste, may, as it is exalted and refined, conclude in Virtue.” (Reynolds, Discourses on Art, p. 171)
See Reynolds, Discourses on Art, pp. 17-20, 27, 42-47, 50, 141, 171, 204, 232,235-236, 244, 252.
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was rendered and judged.85 As Reynolds wrote, “the present institution will at least
contribute to advance our knowledge of the Arts, and bring us nearer to that ideal
*

9986

excellence which it is the lot of genius always to contemplate and never to attain.”
Hence, whereas Richardson rejected the principle of received authority, Reynolds
reinforced it. 87
All of this affected the analysis of portraiture. On the one hand, Reynolds,

like Richardson, endorsed painting as a medium for the advancement of human virtue,
thereby invoking a classical narrative of progress and good. Moreover, to this end,
both endorsed a variation on ‘grand-manner’ imagery.88 On the other hand, however,
Reynolds, like Shaftesbury, denied portraiture a liberal stature on grounds of its
concern with the particularities of matter. This precluded it from contributing to the
progress of truth and goodness.89 In an effort to remedy this deficiency, Reynolds
85 This program, which endorsed the notion o f progress from a mechanical to an intellectual condition
and supported a hierarchical order descending from the “intellectual dignity” o f the liberal artist to the
ignorance o f “the mere mechanick,” was divided into three phases. (Reynolds, Discourses on Art, pp.
42-43) The first two phases represented the student’s mechanical development: the rudiments of
drawing, color and composition; and the study of old master works. In general, Reynolds advocated
the serious study o f other masters and nature as a means o f learning the rules o f art and improving taste,
a position he asserts in the sixth and twelfth Discourses. The third stage represented the artist’s
intellectual training: a comparison of art and nature by which one “corrects what is erroneous, supplies
what is scanty, and adds by his own observation what the industry o f his predecessors may have yet left
wanting to perfection.” (Reynolds, Discourses on Art, p. 27) This was further divided into ‘invention’
and ‘imagination’. On the one hand, ‘invention’ represented the successful abstraction and
combination o f selected elements into what Reynolds termed a ‘general’ style. On a higher level,
‘imagination’ represented the successful translation of generalization into the truth o f the perfect ideal.
See Reynolds, Discourses on Art, pp. 17,27-30,42-43, 50, 52, 58-59,93-97, 192,199,232-236,259261,272.
80 Reynolds, Discourses on Art, p. 14.
87 For example, Reynolds recommended “obedience to the Rules o f Art, as established by the practice
of the great Masters.” (Reynolds, Discourses on Art, p. 17) At the same time, he deemed genius beyond
“the reach o f rules.” (Reynolds, “False Criticisms on Painting,” p. 130) See Reynolds, Discourses on
Art, p. 17; Reynolds, “False Criticisms on Painting,” in Samuel Johnson, The Idler, II, 76 (London:
Printed for J. Newbery), p. 130.
88 Reynolds, Discourses on Art, pp. 41-43, 59,62, 70-71,259,270.
89 As the “ornamental” style was inferior to the “grand” style, so portraiture was inferior to history
painting; whereas history painting was suited to the “grand” style, portraiture was handicapped by its
subject-matter, which demanded a degree o f material realism. Reynolds explained: “A painter o f
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sought some means by which a subject might be rendered so as to instruct and
improve the spectator.90 The result was Reynolds’s “grand-style” portrait. Modeled
on the example of history painting, and recalling the “historical” styles of earlier
theorists, the “grand-style” portrait was rendered in a general, heroic and elevated
manner while being simultaneously located in historic—as opposed to universal—
time.91 Blurring the line between portrait and history painting, Reynolds formalized
and institutionalized ideas originating in Shaftesbury and Richardson. In the process,
portrait and painter were mutually elevated.
The tenor of Reynolds’s Discourses was broadly indicative of his support for
the principle of ideal form and the merits of a theoretical methodology. This
philosophy distinguished him from Richardson and aligned him with advocates of
neo-Platonism.92 At the same time, however, Reynolds, like Richardson, advocated

portraits retains the individual likeness; a painter of history shews the man by shewing his actions.”
Reynolds, Discourses on Art, p. 60.
90 Reynolds writes: “no subject can be proper that is not generally interesting.” Reynolds, Discourses
on Art, p. 57.
91 Reynolds, Discourses on Art, pp. 72-73, 88-89,200. In other words, the “historical style” of the
Public Man celebrated the universal virtues o f the classical hero in secular time. As he explained it: “It
ought to be either some eminent instance o f heroick action, or heroick suffering. There must be
something either in the action, or in the object, in which men are universally concerned, and which
powerfully strikes upon the public sympathy.” (Reynolds, Discourses on Art, p. 57) Moreover, he
adds, no “defects ought to appear in a piece o f which [the subject]... is the hero.... I call this part of
the art History Painting; it ought to be called Poetical, as in reality it is.” (Reynolds, Discourses on Art,
p. 60) See Reynolds, Discourses on Art, pp. 57, 60, 275.
92 In general, Plato distinguished three modes of poetry: first-person narrative; representation (tragedy
or comedy); and mixed. The first, “narrative” style was characterized by uniformity and an emphasis
on the “good man.” Suggestive o f “courage, self-control, piety, freedom of spirit and similar qualities,”
it informed the grand-manner narrative. (Plato, Republic, p. 94) The second, representational style
boasted unlimited “variety.” Characterized by a third-person perspective that required the spectator to
assume the position o f the subject, it was deemed dangerous by Plato, insofar it risked the
impersonation o f inferiors by the Guardian class. (Plato, Republic, p. 96) The third, “mixed” style, he
writes, while “very pleasant,” is unsuitable, for it undermines Platonic principles (Plato, Republic, p.
97) A discussion of Plato’s stylistic analysis can be found in his Republic, pp. 90-97.
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“nurture.”93 This more inclusive interpretation of neo-Platonic theory reflected the
Reformed subversion of ‘nature’ to ‘nurture’ and the implications of Shaftesbury’s
concessions to the pressures of contemporary experience. A similar concession
informed Reynolds’s analysis of trade. In his ninth Discourse (October 1780),
Reynolds examined the relationship between art and trade within a larger social and
international context. Here, he, like earlier civic humanists, defended the superior
merits of intellectual pursuits and the social dangers inherent to the elevation of trade.
Trade, Reynolds argued, benefited man insofar as it provided economic support for
intellectual improvement—i.e. ‘progress’—, but it must necessarily be controlled at
the risk of social degeneration.94
Ultimately, Reynolds’s ninth Discourse—indeed, the Discourses in general—
signaled the uneasy relationship between civic humanism and modem life. The
concession to nurtured genius invited self-improvement and social mobility,
suggesting that the social order was not fixed and, consequently, that universal
principles did not, of necessity, inform an individual’s temporal identity. This was to
suggest that historical identities were, at least in part, self-determined and,
consequently, that the temporal social order was fluid rather than fixed—a stance
contrary to civic humanist prescription.

93 He writes in the seventh Discourse (December 1776): “success in your art depends almost entirely on
your own industry;... not the industry o f the hands, but o f the mind....” (Reynolds, Discourses on Art,
p. 117) See Reynolds, Discourses on Art, pp. 35, 117-118.
94 For “a people whose whole attention is absorbed in those means, and who forget the end, can aspire
but little above the rank o f a barbarous nation.” See Reynolds, Discourses on Art, p. 169.
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V. Naturalism and the Conversational Style
On the one hand, Reynolds’s emphasis on “greatness” aligned him with the
“heroic” ideals informing the neo-Aristotelian narrative of “Great” or Public Men.
On the other hand, while Richardson, too, privileged “greatness” above “grace,” his
concession to “grace” lent more credibility to a social or ‘conversational’ style based
on naturalism. This influence is felt, in varying ways, in the work of Kneller,
Hogarth, Highmore, and Ramsay.
Shaftesbury outlined a “natural” style to complement his civic humanist
objectives. As he explained it, the process by which social affection was elevated to
civic virtue was one of Taste. Hence, aesthetics—the rules of art (and life) conducive
to beauty and virtue as informed by natural law—became the science of Taste
alternately resonant in external signs of politeness. “To live aesthetically,” he wrote,
“is to conduct oneself in a manner ‘naturally’ responsive to pleasure but governed,
from within, by law.”95
Wed to this aesthetic correlation between virtue, beauty, politeness and Taste
was a discourse of “conversation” that united the ideals of contemplation and heroic
action into a modem model of social behavior. Essentially, “conversation” was the
modem variation on the Socratic dialectic, the medium and engine of Platonic
dialogue by which the individual was advanced towards greater self-knowledge and
society was advanced towards greater good. In other words, it was the group
variation on Shaftesbury’s “Soliloquy.”96 In aesthetic terms, the ideals of

95 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, p. 125.
96 On the one hand, Shaftesbury endorsed Platonic contemplation—the form o f disinterested virtue
attained through intellectual reunion with nature. On the other hand, he embraced Aristotelian civic
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conversation were best rendered (in Shaftesbury’s opinion), in a natural, neoclassical
style.

Fig. 5-1
John Closterman’s Maurice Ashley-Cooper and Anthony Ashley-Cooper, 3rd
Earl o f Shaftesbury (Fig. 5-1; 1702; oil on canvas, 95-3/4 x 67-1/4 inches; National
action—the form o f disinterested virtue attained through heroic engagement in defense o f public good.
Bridging the gap between Platonic and Aristotelian virtue was a theory of social affection—
benevolence—in which individual attained potentiality through engagement in a Platonic-Aristotelian
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Portrait Gallery, London), in which Shaftesbury was directly involved,97 is suggestive
of his vision of a “conversational” painting, in which nature, conversation and
neoclassicism all converge in the depiction of Public Men. In ideological terms, two
neo-Platonic philosopher-types stroll through a classicized “temple” of Nature, the
younger brother on the left regaling his companion (the 3rd Earl) in the meaning of the
harmonious cosmos that surrounds them, their resulting ‘elevation’ engendering not

Fig. 5-2

“dialogue” that harkened them to their intellectual and moral capacities and advanced them toward
their virtuous potentiality.
97 As suggested by his later involvement in a work by Paolo de Mattheis. See David Solkin, Painting
fo r Money: The Visual Arts and the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century England (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1992), p. 6.
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only their mutual improvement but foreshadowing the friendly improvement they will
bring back to the Public sphere upon re-entry.

98

But a natural style could take an alternative form. Sir Godfrey Kneller’s
Thomas Pelham-Holles, 1st Duke o f Newcastle and Henry Clinton, 7th Earl o f Lincoln
(Fig. 5-2; ca. 1721; oil on canvas, 50 x 58-3/4 inches; National Portrait Gallery,
London), captures the Big Whig brothers-in-law seated in a domestic interior beside a
window-view of Newcastle’s estate, Claremont?9 In this last of the Kit-cat portraits,
which record the members of this prominent Whig club,100 Kneller has dispensed with
direct allusion to Platonic contemplation—the classical banyan and robe of the
Ashley-Coopers gives way, for example, to powdered wigs and be-medaled frock
coats. Moreover, he has removed his sitters from the realm of Nature and planted
them in a domestic interior. Indeed, borrowing on Van Dyck’s established convention
for aristocratic men-at-ease, Kneller further privatizes the effect by reducing the
barrier between sitter and spectator, one effect of which is to engage the spectator in
the imag[in]ed conversation.101 In other words, whereas Closterman’s image of the
3rd Earl and his brother exudes the detached disinterest of Platonic philosophy,
Kneller’s highlights his sitters’ “interest” through the visual engagement of the

98 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, p. 279; Solkin, Paintingfo r Money, pp. 9-10,15.
99 Solkin, Painting for Money, p. 38-39.
100 As Solkin writes, “here the politics of whiggery and the culture o f politeness merged... [among]
virtually every important Whig potentate o f the period....” (Solkin, p. 28) Founded in the 1680s as part
o f the growth o f political clubs that thrived on the contest between Tories and Whigs, they initiated a
cultural propaganda campaign designed to support constitutional change and the new relationship
between monarchy, lords and commons. This cultural campaign involved “building a broad ideological
consensus based on ‘social, cultural, and commercial values’.” (J. G. A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce and
History, p. 235; quoted in Solkin, p. 29) The result was a model o f politeness based on “social and
moral end[s].” See Solkin, Painting for Money, pp. 28-29.
101 Solkin, Painting for Money, pp. 32, 36.
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spectator’s gaze. This is not the negative “interest” of civic humanist narrative the
interest of acquisitive pride—but rather the positive “interest” of an alternative,
“conversational” narrative—the social interest in one’s fellow-beings threatened by
the alienation attendant disengagement.

102

Fig. 5-3

In other words, between 1702 and 1721, Shaftesbury’s conversation lost its
civic—Public—edge to a more social—public—one. At the same time, its premise of
disinterested independence was subverted, in part, to a notion of interested inter
dependence. This suggestion is compounded by the allusion to equality implied by

102 Solking, Painting for Money, pp. 36-37.
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the seated posture and the hospitality of shared drink, all of which function to engage
the conversational spectator in the sitters’ image. A similar effect is suggested by
Joseph Highmore’s Mr. Oldham and his Guests (Fig. 5-3; ca. 1735-1745; oil on
canvas, 41-1/2x51 inches; Tate Britain), which casts the ‘middling sort’ in a
similarly “clubby” guise. Yet the image bears closer examination. Here, the striding
posture and rhetorical gesture of the Ashley-Coopers, which became the upright
seating and social pleasantries of Newcastle and Lincoln, become the leaning and
slouching figures of smoking and drinking men. By the same token, the timeless
classical banyan and robe, which became the public be-medaled frock coats, become
the modest dress of private commoners. Likewise, La Belle Nature with classical
temple, which became a baroque interior with view of country estate, becomes a
simple domestic interior. Aesthetically-speaking, formal symmetry and uniformity
have given way to informal asymmetry and fluidity, something akin to the nature—as
opposed to Nature—of Dutch art.
During the course of the eighteenth century, these images suggest, the
implications of “conversation” grew increasingly social and egalitarian, becoming a
medium for the elevation of the middle-class sitter rather than a celebration of
communal soliloquy. Indeed, the three images march in tempered progression from
landed to propertied, elite to common, Public to public, ending in what Jurgen
Habermas has described as “a more inclusive public of all private people, persons
who—insofar as they were propertied and educated—as readers, listeners, and
spectators could avail themselves via the market of the... objects that were subject to
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discussion.”103 The significance of this development is made dramatically evident in
the work of Hogarth.

VI. Hogarth
The theoretical descent from Shaftesbury to Richardson to Reynolds was
paralleled by alternative modes of descent from, for example, Shaftesbury to
Richardson to Ramsay and, more radically, Mandeville to Hogarth. Mandeville
suggested in his controversial Fable o f the Bees an alternative mode of nature—
“abject, low, pitiful and mean”—affiliated with Dutch painting.104 Moreover, in an
effective allusion to the mute tongue—and Taste—of the common man, he set up the
alternative as a dialectical opposition to Shaftesburian Nature—that of civic
humanism— by pitting the marginalized female, Fulvia, against the Shaftesburian
Cleomenes.105 In the process, he unmasked the pretentious conflation of moral virtue
with elite Taste as the self-interested drive for money and power undergirding the
Whig narrative.106
While Hogarth did not endorse Mandeville’s ideological vision for modem
society, he did share Mandeville’s view of the elite. Recalling Mandeville’s
distinction between ancient virtue and modem happiness, Hogarth proposed that
ancient and modem life—and, consequently, ancient and modem art—were premised

103 Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation o f the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category
o f Bourgeois Society (1962), trans. Thomas Burger with the assistance of Frederick Lawrence
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), quoted in Solkin, Paintingfor Money, p. 3.
,0* Mandeville, Fable o f the Bees, II, pp. 32-34, quoted in Solkin, Painting for Money, p. 15.
105 Solkin, Painting for Money, p. 15.
106 Solking, Paintingfor Money, pp. 16-17, 37.
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on different narrative ends. Because the ancients understood the purpose of life—and
art—to be the nurturing of natural progress through a knowledge of universal order,
they advocated instruction in theoretically-fixed standards by which human virtue was
thought to be advanced.107 On this premise, Shaftesbury, while conceding the
empirical origins of knowledge and, so, admitting a science of aesthetics,108 had
perpetuated a theory of art based on fixed standards of beauty and Taste, thereby
laying the groundwork for the academic prescriptions of Reynolds’s Discourses.109
In theory, however, Shaftesbury’s aesthetics derived from an ancient division
between what Giovanni Lomazo later described as the “order of training” and “the
order of nature.” In the former, would-be artists were instructed in those ideal
standards to which art (and life) were subject. In the latter, the artist worked from the
particularities of nature in order to arrive at his own generalities—his own standards
for art and life.110 Although classical biases against autonomous reasoning and

107 Giovanni Lomazzo had called this the “order o f teaching,” which worked from established
principles. See Giovanni Paolo Lomazzo, A Trade Containing the Artes o f Curious Paintinge,
Carvinge & Buildinge (1590), trans. Richard Haydocke (Oxford: printed by Joseph Barnes, 1598)
108 According to Ronald Paulson, “Aesthetics, though it dwelt on the beautiful, was an empiricist
philosophy based on the sense rather than reason or faith. The first aesthetic treatises were the third
earl of Shaftesbury’s Charaderisticks (1711, collecting essays that went back as far as the late 1690s)
and Joseph Addison’s ‘Pleasures of the Imagination’ essays in The Spedator of 1712.” (Paulson, The
Analysis o f Beauty, pp. xix-xx) What distinguished aesthetics from previous art theory was not only its
concession to an empirical methodology, but its consequent attention to the role o f the spectator in the
judgment o f beauty. See Paulson, The Analysis o f Beauty, pp. xix-xx.
109 As Paulson argues, Shaftesbury recognized that all knowledge began with a sense-perception, but
not that all sense-perception resulted in knowledge. Only those who were sensitive to the relationship
between external nature and divine plan, and esteemed the virtues o f Nature, were capable o f making
knowledge out o f sensory information. Moreover, as this esteem was conditioned upon a love of moral
goodness, it was necessarily confined to those whose leisure allowed for the disinterested
comprehension o f public good. This distinguished Shaftesbury from Locke, for whom experience was
the only basis o f meaning. (Paulson, The Analysis o f Beauty, p. xx) See Paulson, The Analysis o f
Beauty, p. xx; Reynolds, “The true Idea of Beauty,” in Samuel Johnson, The Idler, II, 82, pp. 166-169.
110 Lomazzo wrote: “There is a two-folde proceeding in all artes and sciences: the one is called the
order o f nature, and the other o f teaching. Nature proceedeth ordinarly beginning with the unperfect, as
the particulars, and ending with the perfect, as the universals. Now if in searching out the nature o f
things, our understanding shall proceede after that order, by which they are brought forth by nature,
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empirical methodologies deemed “the order of nature” beyond man’s capacities,
modem concessions to an autonomous and reasoning subject opened the way for
alternative claims.
Supported by the individualist biases informing empirical methodologies, as
well as the Reformed “ethic of ordinary life,” Hogarth rejected the inaccessibility of
the “order of nature,” devising a theory of art based on the evidence of formal
properties in material things.111 At the same time, he denied the necessary correlation
between beauty and morality, a definition of “grace” without foundation in reality,
and the superiority of a technique based on the copying of received ideas. 112 Against
*

•

•

•

•

the classical model of beauty, for example, Hogarth argued for a form of beauty
enhanced not by symmetry and simplicity, but by variety, color, and light made
pleasing through intricacy, quantity, novelty and asymmetry—his serpentine line of
beauty.113 Indeed, against the classical (Shaftesburian) ideal of ancient Hercules,

doubtlesse it will be the most absolute and ready method that can bee imagined. For we beginne to
know things by their first and immediate principles, &c. and this is not only mine opinion but
Aristotle’s also’, ... [though] ‘he resolves to follow the order o f teaching’, which all the writers on
painting have in like manner since done.” See Lomazzo, A Trade Containing the Artes o f Curious
Paintinge, Carvinge & Buildinge (1590), quoted in Hogarth, “The Analysis o f Beauty: Written with a
view of fixing the fluctuating IDEAS o f TASTE,” in The Analysis o f Beauty, pp. 12-13.
111 Hogarth’s empiricism was more Lockean insofar as it located knowledge in the formal properties of
nature prior to their transformation into ideas. Consequently, Lawrence Gowing writes, Hogarth sought
‘“to make formal values both the starting point and basis o f a whole aesthetic theory’.” See Gowing,
Hogarth, p. 74. See also Paulson, Hogarth, p. xxiii; Hogarth, “The Analysis o f Beauty,” in Paulson,
The Analysis o f Beauty, p. 18; Bindman, Hogarth, p. 86
112 Hogarth, “The Analysis o f Beauty,” in Paulson, The Analysis o f Beauty, pp. 1,2, 10; Paulson, The
Analysis o f Beauty, p. xxv; Gowing, Hogarth, p. 42.
113 “The principles I mean, are FITNESS, VARIETY, UNIFORMITY, SIMPLICITY, INTRICACY,
AND QUANTITY;— all which cooperate in the production o f beauty, mutually correcting and
restraining each other occasionally.” (Hogarth, “The Analysis o f Beauty,” in Paulson, p. 23) See
Hogarth, “The Analysis o f Beauty,” in Paulson, pp. 27-28, 30,32, 35-36,41-42,45, 48, 83, 87.
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Hogarth advanced a modem alternative—the ‘natural’ ideal of the English streetwalker—, invoking the contemporary euphemism of sexual ‘conversation’.

114

In fact, Hogarth’s portraits reflect a compelling manipulation of the “natural”
style and “conversational” discourse advanced by Shaftesbury. Whereas Shaftesbury
confined “conversation” to polite, Public Men, the way was opened for a more
inclusive interpretation. Hogarth’s expansion of the “Public” to include not only the
disinterested elite—Hercules—but the marginalized body politic—the Harlot—meant
that the “conversational” model set forth by Shaftesbury might be expanded to
embrace the “dialogue” of the masses—the “conversation” of the coffee house (as
opposed to the club), novels (as opposed to poetry), and the marketplace (as opposed
to the assembly). In fact, Bindman writes, Hogarth’s “modem moral progresses”
were also called “novels in paint.”115 Hence his endorsement of the “natural”
style.116 As Reynolds later articulated, whereas Nature in the Italian school “attends
only to the invariable, the great and general ideas which are fixed and inherent in

114 Against Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, Paulson writes, “His version o f Addi sonian aesthetics is the
surprising discovery o f the utmost variety within apparent uniformity.” (Paulson, The Analysis o f
Beauty, p. xxxiv) It is interesting to note Mandeville’s similar use o f a female subject to convey the
trope of the outsider. According to Solkin, this was common practice in early eighteenth-century essayperiodicals. See Bindman, Hogarth, pp. 154, 158, 162; Paulson, The Analysis o f Beauty, pp. xxii,
xxvii, xxiv; Solkin, Paintingfor Money, p. 14.
115 Bindman, Hogarth, p. 55. As Taylor notes, “The new modem novel stands out against all previous
literature in its portrayal o f the particular. It... breaks with the classical preference for the general and
universal. It narrates the lives of particular people in their detail... [;] its characters have ordinary
proper names....” Moreover, Taylor adds, the story is no longer ‘received’ but ‘discovered’; “its
meaning is seen as something that unfolds through the events.” See Taylor, pp. 287-288; Paulson, The
Analysis o f Beauty, pp. xlix-1.
116 Hogarth’s concern with an individualistic record of common human traits and the “thinking and
feeling” aspects o f humanity were not conducive to the civic humanist model on the Shaftesburian
example o f naturalism. See Gowing, Hogarth, pp. 77, 79.
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universal Nature; ... Dutch [naturalism], on the contrary, [attends] to literal truth and
a minute exactness ... [and hence to a] naturalness... of a lower order....”

11T

Indeed, Hogarth’s naturalism, which supplanted the theoretical ideal with a
“representational” alternative, marked his dissent from modem classicism.

118

Assisted by an uncanny ability to memorize and record the features of everyday life,
Hogarth’s empirical approach to his subject-matter tended to the socialization—rather
than the veneration—of the sitter.119 A similar intent informed contemporary
•

literature, which likewise played out in the “representational world.”

120

In Tom Jones

(1745), for example, the paradigm icons of classicism and Christianity—-the Classical
narrative, represented by Mr. Square, and the Christian narrative, represented by
Reverend Thwackum—are dismissed in favor of a more natural, social narrative
invoked by the persons of Squire Allworthy—i.e. Country Virtue—, Sophia Western,
and the fallible—Harlot-like—Tom.121

117 Reynolds, “Grand Stile o f Painting,” in Samuel Johnson, The Idler, II, 79 (London: Printed by J.
Newbery, 1761), p. 150.
118 See Bindman, Hogarth, p. 98, and Gowing, Hogarth, pp. 77-79.
119 As Gowing writes: “The drive that made Kneller a connoisseur o f egotism was transformed in
Hogarth into a solid appreciation o f the social and sociable solidity o f a man.... He showed the aspect
that a man presented to his fellows and the place that he occupied in his world with a completeness that
invented what was virtually a new kind o f image.” (Gowing, p. 42) As Bindman notes, however, “only
a minority o f patrons wanted to be painted with Hogarthian directness, not so much because his
portraits were thought to be unflattering but because their assertiveness offended the prevailing sense of
decorum.” (Bindman, Hogarth, p. 126) Moreover, in conveying the various nuances o f everyday life,
Hogarth leveled his subjects, making them equally valuable and accessible. See Bindman, Hogarth,
pp. 30, 125-126; Gowing, Hogarth, pp. 42, 51; Paulson, The Analysis o f Beauty, pp. xxvii-xxviii. With
regard to the French influence on Hogarth’s work, see Bindman, Hogarth, pp. 47-48, 111.
120 In lieu of the ‘internal’/ ‘external’ dichotomy, Hogarth’s modem subject seems to occupy what
Joseph Sandler has termed the ‘representational world’, which “has the advantage o f recognizing the
relational function o f representation, [without opposing],.. inner to outer....” See Sandler, “From safety
to superego” in Selected Papers o f Joseph Sandler (London: Kamak Books, 1978); quoted in
Pajaczkowska, “The ecstatic solace o f culture: self, not-self and other; a psychoanalytic view,” in Juliet
Steyn, ed., Other than identity: the subject, politics and art (New York: Manchester University Press,
1997), p. 103.
m Henry Fielding, Tom Jones (1750), Douglas Brooks-Davies, ed. (Rutland, Vermont: Charles E.
Tuttle, 1998)
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Hogarth’s penchant for naturalism likely encouraged his expansion into
“conversation” pieces.122 In part, his preference for this more intimate and informal

Fig. 5-4

mode of group portraiture probably turned on its more social bias. On the one hand, it
provided a suitable format for his representational talents. On the other hand, it also

122 “Dissatisfaction with engraving, Hogarth explained, ‘made him turn his head to painting portrait
figures from 10 to 15 inches high, often in subjects o f conversation. It had some novelty... [and] it
gave more scope to fancy than the common portrait... See Gowing, Hogarth, p. 19. For a discussion
o f the development of the English conversation piece, see David Piper, The English Face (London:
National Portrait Gallery, 1978), pp. 130-139.
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provided a narrative format conducive to unmasking social pretensions about family
life, political stability, and social order.123 Ultimately, the discourse of “conversation”
and Hogarth’s natural style merged in his compelling portraits of the late 1730s and
early 1740s.124
In George Arnold (Fig. 5-4; ca. 1738-1740; oil on canvas, 35-2/3 x 27-7/S
inches; Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge University), for example, the self-made man
is captured in an informal, seated pose, hat in hand, but there is a crowding to his
figure and a deference to the gesture that precludes a sense of ease. While he is well(if conservatively) attired in slate wool and white linen, he appears a bit constrained
by his trappings. At the same time, there is a warmth to his face and an openness to
his posture that invites the addresses of the spectator. It is as though he has stopped to
listen to an adjacent viewer, displaying his “interested” capacity for “conversation.”
But the conversation he intends is of a ‘bourgeois’ type, defined by Addison as one of
intimate “particulars:” “that which passes between two persons who are familiar and
intimate friends.”125

123 These pictures appealed to men o f taste who were coming to terms with the Rococo style. Hogarth
never enjoyed such an elegant patronage again. But there was also something innocent in his
expectation that he could both satirise the establishment and serve it. Having allied himself with
Thornhill, he necessarily shared in Thornhill’s defeat. The double rebuff to his ambition as a court
portraitist in 1733 marked a turning-point in his career. Henceforward the patrons for his paintings
were bourgeois or eccentric. His distrust o f fashionable cosmopolitan taste was confirmed and the
sardonic independence of his view developed unchecked.” See Gowing, Hogarth, p. 19. See also
Bindman, Hogarth, pp. 41, 45.
124 As Bindman observes, the “early single-figure portraits employ essentially the same conventions as
the conversation pieces of the 1730s.” (Bindman, Hogarth, p. 128) By the late 1730s, however,
“Hogarth’s interest in a grander and more ambitious type of portrait began to grow..., perhaps
stimulated by his experiments with History painting, as well as by a desire to present himself as the
leader and spokesman o f his profession.” (Bindman, Hogarth, pp. 130-131) See Bindman, Hogarth,
pp. 128-131.
125 Quoted in Solkin, Paintingfor Money, p. 40. As David Piper notes, “Hogarth himself insisted... on
the fundamental difference between his art, which he called that o f character, and that o f caricature....”
(Piper, The English Face, p. 133) Hogarth may have influenced a similar development in the work of
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Like Shaftesbury, Richardson, and Mandeville before him, Hogarth’s art
theory was imbedded in a social and political narrative.126 Having rescued his
“liberty” as an autonomous and reasoning individual from the hands of a landed elite,
he worked both within and against the civic humanist paradigm.127 Whereas
Richardson’s dissent from customary authority turned on a desire to make the
privileges and prestige of higher ranks more accessible to deserving commoners,
Hogarth’s more radical intent turned on unmasking the interested relationship
between modem aesthetics and elite politics.128 Whereas Shaftesbury’s philosophy—
part aesthetic, part political, part social, part religious—sought to rationalize the
replacement of religious and royal authority—h igh church Toryism—with a

Highmore and Gainsborough. Indeed, although he never set up a painting factory or took on
apprentices, Hogarth did have his adherents, among them Gainsborough, Zoffany, Joseph Wright of
Derby and George Stubbs. As Bindman observes, “Hogarth inevitably tended to emphasize his
differences from other painters o f portraits and to contrast his own independence with the servility of
the ‘face painters ’ o f his time. Recent reconsideration of English portraiture in the first half o f the
eighteenth century has, however, .. .revealed that many others were capable o f a high degree of
individuality.” (Bindman, Hogarth, p. 144) See Piper, The English Face, p. 133; Bindman, Hogarth,
pp. 125, 144; Paulson, The Analysis o f Beauty, p. xlix.
126 This would have appealed to Hogarth; “Hogarth... came from a dissenter family, joined the
anticlerical wing o f the Whig opposition to Sir Robert Walpole, was a Freemason o f the freethinking
sort, and invoked the deist Thomas Woolston in A Harlot's Progress, shortly after the publication o f
which he showed his scorn for organized religion by relieving himself against the door o f a church in
Kent.” See Paulson, The Analysis o f Beauty, p. xxii.
127 Like Hume, Paulson notes, Hogarth looked to his own capacities to make sense o f what appeared in
life experience. See Paulson, The Analysis o f Beauty, p. xxxviii.
,2S According to Paulson, “In practical terms aesthetics served as an aspect o f the Whig reaction to
Stuart absolutism and High Church Anglicanism. It was introduced by Shaftesbury in the empiricist,
anticlerical, and Whig context o f the 1690s.” (Paulson, The Analysis o f Beauty, p. xx) However, he
adds: “As Hogarth ... recognized, Shaftesbury’s aesthetic disinterestedness had a political underside:
the alliance of monarch and church is corrected by a government of gentlemen; royal patronage of art is
corrected by similarly disinterested connoisseurs (the same persons). The only people who can afford
to appreciate virtue and beauty are the Whig oligarchs....” (Paulson, The Analysis o f Beauty, p. xxiii)
In fact, neither circumstance suited Hogarth, whose “bull-dog patriotism” opposed anything that denied
Englishmen their rightful liberties. (Gowing, Hogarth, p. 82) Ultimately, then, in the process of
undermining the authority of civic humanist aesthetics, Hogarth tampered with the broader political
agenda with which they were concerned. (Gowing, Hogarth, p. 26) See Paulson, The Analaysis o f
Beauty, pp. xx-xxiii; Gowing, Hogarth, pp. 26, 82.
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‘disinterested’ elite—a landed oligarchy— Hogarth’s Analysis aimed to curtail the
authority of the landed elite by reclaiming the liberties of the English people.

129

To this end, Hogarth subverted the “high” art and ideology of the oligarchs,
symbolized by the ancient virtue of the “straight-and-narrow” Hercules, with the
“low” art and ideology of the people, symbolized by the modem virtue of the “curvy
and commercial” Harlot. At the same time, he linked the lust for political power
affiliated with the “conversational” Public Man with the lust for sexual power
affiliated with the “conversational” Public Woman. Mandeville had made a similar
point, but whereas Mandeville had sought to expose the anachronism of social
morality as a mode of social cohesion, Hogarth sought to expose moral declension
and, indeed, the dangers of modem politics to art and society. 130 In other words,
Hogarth’s Analysis aimed to expose the failings that had accrued to modem England
as a result offoreign influences, which subordinated the ideals of tme English
classicism to the aesthetic and ideological degeneracy of a continental-style ruling
elite.131

129 By extension, as Gowing writes: “It was Hogarth, more than anyone, who identified the right o f the
artist, ...as a right to resist the tyranny o f the instituted idea of art.” See Gowing, Hogarth, p. 56.
130 As Paulson observes, “In the 1724 edition o f his Fable o f the Bees Mandeville’s strategy was to
expose the desire, economic and sexual, under the supposed disinterestedness o f Shaftesbury’s civic
humanism....” (Paulson, The Analysis o f Beauty, p. xxiv) Hogarth undertook a similar strategy.
However, Gowing notes, “Below politics and patronage, underlying the dilemma o f the styles,
Hogarth’s criticism dealt most forcefully with the moral constitution of society.... English life at a
crucial juncture was seen as greedy, merciless, sanctimonious, improvident and treacherous, with the
privileged oligarchy presiding in its blindness, at once noble, pathetic and deeply frivolous.” (Gowing,
Hogarth, p. 82) See Paulson, The Analysis o f Beauty, pp. xxiv-xxv; Gowing, Hogarth, pp. 16, 82.
131 Paulson writes: “In the eighteenth century Elizabeth [I] was a symbol o f the Country Party, the
opposition to Sir Robert Walpole which had in many ways shaped Hogarth’s relationships to aesthetic
theory as one o f opposition satire with an anti-authoritarian and anticlerical bias. In the discourse of
opposition, Elizabeth was one of the ideals o f the past to which the English were urged to return....”
(Paulson, The Analysis o f Beauty, p. xlii) See Paulson, The Analysis ofBeauty, p. xlii; Bindman,
Hogarth, pp, 17, 26; Gowing, Hogarth, p. 82.
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Ultimately, Hogarth’s serpentine “line of beauty” became the metaphorical
equivalent of an expanded Public—the body politic—and the will and authority of the
English people.132 Implicit to this presumption was a shift in the balance-of-authority
between the political (civic and elite) and commercial (social and common) spheres.
Indeed, Hogarth’s Analysis, with its allusions to ancient English liberty, equality and
virtue, bore the radical imprint of modem “Patriots” and British freemasonry.133 This
may explain contemporary objections to Hogarth by Reynolds and others.134 On the
other hand, it is precisely this concern with the relationship between man and
society—what Gowing describes as “the aspect that a man presented to his fellows
and the place that he occupied in his world”—that makes his Analysis so relevant to a
study of eighteenth-century portraiture.135 Despite his general disregard for portrait

132 According to Paulson, “Hogarth’s aesthetics is based on the human body and a political model—the
body politic, as represented in the frontispiece o f Hobbes’s Leviathan. The Tory-Jacobite model
subordinated the many to the one (the monarch); the Whig model replaced the one with the oligarchic
few; but Hogarth, while invoking the familiar topos o f concordia discors, defines it as the pleasure of
discovering the greatest variety in uniformity, or the greatest number of parts within a whole. He might
have called this formula... an aesthetics o f the crowd....” (Paulson, The Analysis o f Beauty, pp. xli-xlii)
See Paulson, The Analysis o f Beauty, pp. xli-xlii; Hogarth, “The Analysis of Beauty,” in Paulson, p. 11;
Gowing, Hogarth, p. 54.
133 Hogarth’s commitment to English liberties and a “patriot” king allied him with Harrington and
Bolingbroke’s Country party. (Paulson, The Analysis o f Beauty, p. xxxiv) Borrowing on the example
of Addison and Toland, Paulson writes, he reacted “against the aristocratic fraternity of civic humanists
[whom] Toland had adapted as a counter [to] the model o f Freemasonry, which claimed to be
democratic, capable o f including members o f the artisan classes as well as the aristocracy.
Freemasonry, of which Hogarth was an observing member at least in the mid-1730s... may have been
the ultimate source o f his serpentine Line of Beauty.” (Paulson, The Analysis o f Beauty, pp. xxxvxxxvi) See Bindman, Hogarth, p. 189; Paulson, The Analysis o f Beauty, pp. xxxiv-xxxvi.
134 In his Apology for Painters, Hogarth concluded that Greek art was unsuited to a “trading” nation.
(Bindman, Hogarth, p. 150) Reynolds’s counter-position resulted in his attacked on Hogarth’s theory in
the Idler essays o f 1759, which laid the foundation for his later Discourses. (Paulson, The Analysis o f
Beauty, p. xlix) See Bindman, Hogarth, pp. 150-151, Paulson, The Analysis o f Beauty, pp. xlviii-xlix,
Sir Joshua Reynolds, Discourses on Art, pp. 47-49,61, 69, 277; Gowing, Hogarth, p. 39.
135 Gowing, Hogarth, p. 42.
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painters,136 Hogarth’s contemporaries were programmed, he tells us, to know the
•

individual by reading his face.

137

VII. Ramsay
As Bindman notes, “it is perhaps indicative of the limitations of artistic theory
in the eighteenth century that Hogarth and Ramsay could to such a large degree share
a similar theoretical position.”138 To very different ends, Ramsay likewise borrowed
on the “natural” style of Shaftesburian ‘conversation’, uniting it with Richardsonian
“grace.”139 Ultimately, however, whereas Hogarth used a “natural” style to counter
the ideologies and tastes of an elite, employing an empirical methodology to
emphasize the private (common) qualities of his individual English subjects, Ramsay
used it as a means of redressing traditional civic humanism so as to highlight the good
that accrued to society by way of politeness, “often depicting,” as Bindman observes,

136 Gowing, Hogarth, p. 42.
s’7 As he explained it, “the face is the index o f the mind....” (Hogarth, “The Analysis of Beauty,” p. 95)
Consequently, Hogarth proposed a two-part method for reading identity in portraits: a methodical
comparison of facial lines— cautious physiognomy; and the examination of bodily motions. See
Hogarth, “The Analysis o f Beauty,” in Paulson, The Analysis o f Beauty, pp. 95-96, 106.
138 Bindman, Hogarth, p. 147. In addition to his aesthetic and political writings, Ramsay was active in
the administration o f his profession. He held the position o f Principle Painter in Ordinary to the King
jointly with John Shackleton until the latter’s death in 1767, when he became the sole Principle Painter,
providing a mass o f coronation portraits for offices, ambassadors and foreign dignitaries around the
globe. He was also Vice President o f the Incorporated Society o f Artists. For a further examination of
Ramsay’s work, see Allan Ramsay, Dialogue on Taste (London, 1755) and Alistair Smart, Allan
Ramsay: Painter, Essayist, and Man o f the Enlightenment (New Haven and London: Yale University
Press, 1992).
139 In the example o f John Sargent (1753; Holbome Museum, Bath), Smart wrote, there is clearly some
influence o f Hogarth, “a realism o f presentation, together with a breadth o f handling, that would have
been unthinkable apart from Hogarth’s example.” See Smart, Allan Ramsay: Painter, Essayist and Man
o f the Enlightenment, p. 101.
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“people who saw naturalness as a rejection of pomp and who sought to combine ease
of manner with intellectual seriousness.

140

In fact, Ramsay’s variation on the “natural” style drew from a number of
sources.141 Significantly, however, it joined Shaftesbury’s correlation between the
natural and the polite with Richardson’s theory of “grace,” their combination effecting
a suitable framework for examining the private individual as a medium of
improvement and social good. This attention to the private, social self distinguished
Ramsay from traditional civic humanists, whose emphasis on “greatness” reflected a
preoccupation with the “public” man.142 But in fact, Ramsay’s style provided a
much-needed bridge between the standards of identity invoked by Shaftesburian civic

140 Bindman, Hogarth, p. 147. As Bindman explains, Ramsay’s “paintings are refined, with a
brushwork in the contemporary Roman manner [of Pompeo Batoni], concealed under a smooth surface
(in Vertue’s words, ‘rather lick’t than pencilled’).... His conception o f naturalness is, however, quite
different from Hogarth’s; his best works are ‘natural’ in the cultivated sense of the French and Scottish
Enlightenment....” See Bindman, Hogarth, pp. 146-147.
141 In addition to the influences o f Shaftesbury and Richardson, Ramsay’s work appears to reflect the
narrative interests of Scottish painting—what Smart describes as “that primary concern with the
individual personality which distinguishes the art o f Aikman and the Scottish tradition as a whole.”
(Smart, Allan Ramsay, pp. 20, 110) It also reveals the technical influence o f Pompeo Batoni and the
compositional intimacy o f French painters like Chardin. (Smart, Allan Ramsay, pp. 192-193) See
Smart, Allan Ramsay, pp. 20, 110, 192-193.
142 Whereas Ramsay privileged a conversational model o f moral sensibility—the social ideal of
individual gentility and politeness— , Reynolds, for example, privileged the grand-manner model and
its Aristotelian heroic ideal. In fact, Ramsay returned to England and enrolled at St. Martin’s Lane
Academy during the height o f Richardson’s theoretical influence. As Richardson was retiring, the
informal, polite portrait was on the rise. In general, Richardson’s “grace and greatness” represented
two modes o f idealization, the former based on the selective presentation o f nature’s best parts, the
latter on their theoretical improvement. That Ramsay was likewise versed in the “great” style is
suggested by his portraits Mead and MacLeod, which have been credited has introducing the “grand
style” to England. (Smart, Allan Ramsay, pp. 83-84) As Smart concludes: “on the one hand no portrait
painter of the period was more deeply concerned with the evocation o f individual character,.. .while on
the other hand a retrospective survey of his artistic development reveals the single-mindedness o f his
quest of a mode o f portraiture capable o f containing feeling within an ordered and rational whole.”
(Smart, Allan Ramsay, p. 3) See Alistair Smart, Allan Ramsay, pp. 3, 83-84.
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humanism and the demands of a commercial people intent on assuming greater
authority yet unwilling to accept a landed model of virtue.143
Alistair Smart has divided Ramsay’s career into two periods, according to his
stylistic progress away from the grand-manner towards more individuality and
naturalism.144 This development was accompanied by an increasingly empirical
approach to knowledge and likeness.145 But it also suggests the influence of a
‘commercial humanist’ ethic. Indeed, as the political platform of the Augustan Whigs
turned increasingly towards a broad-based combination of landed and commercial
interests, way was made for a more inclusive interpretation of virtue based on the
social interaction of the commercial sphere. Blurring the lines between public and
private, general and particular, civic and social to accommodate the demands for an
alternative narrative of social—rather than civic—virtue, Ramsay’s “second style”
543 As Lord Chesterfield implied, the social ideal of the conversational individual embraced a broader
sector o f the community than the civic ideal o f the heroic public man, permitting individuals to define
themselves “not... with regard to their birth; but with regard to their merit....” (Chesterfield, p. 17.
Borrowing on Shaftesbury, Chesterfield wrote: “Good-breeding... does not consist in low bows, and
formal ceremony, but in an easy, civil, and respectful behaviour.” (Chesterfield, p. 37) He continued:
“In short,.. .politeness and good-breeding are equally necessary to render us agreeable in conversation
and common life....” (Chesterfield, pp. 141-142) Like Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, Chesterfield
emphasized the correlation between character and virtue: “virtue makes us pity and relieve the
misfortunes o f mankind; it makes us promote justice and good order in society; and, in general,
contributes to whatever tends to the real good o f mankind.” (Chesterfield, pp. 113-114) See
Chesterfield, Advice to his Son, pp. 17, 37, 102,113-115, 141-142.
144 As Smart observed, “henceforth the ideal at which he aimed was the expression o f ‘the graceful in
nature’.” (Smart, Allan Ramsay, p. 100) Indeed, Smart continued, “The ‘natural’ idiom of Hogarth and
La Tour now becomes the foundation o f Ramsay’s radical rethinking o f the art o f portraiture, as he
discards the conventions o f Italianate Baroque and creates a new style capable on the one hand of
reflecting his refined sensibility and on the other o f doing justice to that ideal of unaffected truthfulness
....” (Smart, Allan Ramsay, p. 102) See Smart, Allan Ramsay: Painter, Essayist and Man o f the
Enlightenment, pp. 52,102.
145 See Smart, Allan Ramsay, pp. 100 and 102. According to Smart, by the late 1740s, Ramsay had
embarked upon his “second style,” which culminated in his mature work o f the 1760s. These images
are characterized by a growing sense o f individuality, informality, and a richness o f color that combines
the grace o f well-bred politeness with the selective handling o f French and Italian painting. As Smart
wrote: “He was to forge this new manner during a long absence from London between 1753 and 1757,
first in Edinburgh and thereafter in Italy....” (Smart, p. 91) See Smart, Allan Ramsay: Painter, Essayist
and Man o f the Enlightenment, pp. 84, 88, 91-92.
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marks the culmination of the “conversational” portrait whose inklings were earlier felt
in the work of Kneller, Highmore, and Hogarth.
Once again, the seated, facing posture and engaged gaze of Lord Drummore
(Fig. 5-5; 1754; oil on canvas, 50 x 39-1/2 inches; Scottish National Portrait Gallery)

Fig. 5-5

highlights the mutual engagement between sitter and spectator, each simultaneously
assuming the posture of “Pocket-Mirrour” and friend. Left hand raised slightly in the
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tense promise of gesture, the intensity ofDrummore’s concentration—highlighted by
the pierce of his left eye and the vertical line that marks his brown—is palpable while,
at the same time, his person remains in polite control. The commanding presence of
the sitter is reinforced by the absence of unnecessary color and detail. The splash of
red is but a spark of ignition, the relief of the pilasters a mere surface undulation,
while the black of his corpulent frame anchors the image and calls attention to the
lightness of his face and hands. At the same time, the subtle allusions to classicism
remain, reminding us that the ideals of classical virtue and progress have not been
sacrificed to the intimacy and sociability of the image. Rather, they have
converged.146
As Drummore suggests, the ‘conversational’ style of Ramsay’s work—as
distinct from that of Hogarth—did not dismiss with the classical ideals of virtue and
goodness, but rather stressed their social—as opposed to heroic or aristocratic—
merits.147 In keeping with this emphasis, Ramsay rendered his sitters in private,
domestic settings, their informal gestures and visual engagement with the spectator
offset by a controlled use of line and color and the inclusion of classical details. The
result was something entirely removed from Reynolds’s “greatness” and Hogarth’s

146 Smart, Allan Ramsay, pp. 52, 105-106, 128-129.
147 From the earlier versions of his ‘second style’, Ramsay further developed the ‘natural portrait’ in the
late 1750s, following his return from Italy, 1754-1757, when he addressed the issue o f how to anchor
“the informal portrait within an appropriately unpretentious but firmly structured design.” (Smart, p.
128) In complement with this burgeoning interest in moral sense and politeness, books like Nivelon’s
Rudiments o f Genteel Behaviour provided a visual vocabulary from which artists might draw in the
formulation o f models of grace. See Smart, Allan Ramsay: Painter, Essayist and Man o f the
Enlightenment, pp. 128-129,174. See also Francis Nivelon, The Rudiments o f Genteel Behaviour
(London, 1737).
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naturalism.148 On the one hand, against the classical aesthetic of the general, he
advances the superior merits of the particular.149 At the same time, his notion of the
particular is less concerned with the rendering of individual novelty than with
conveying the intimacy of social relations and their dependence upon individual
virtues. 150
Much of Ramsay’s ideological intent was suggested by his Shaftesburian
Dialogue on Taste, published two years prior to Hume’s Of the Standard o f Taste and
likely informed by conversations between the two friends.151 In general, the
Dialogue between Colonel Freeman and Lord Modish sets the Lockean free-thinking
and free-speaking Englishman (Ramsay or Hume, presumably) against the arbiters of
Augustan taste—i.e. Shaftesbury.152 According to Smart, “The central thesis—that
taste cannot be measured or judged by any absolute standard, being merely a matter of

148 As Smart observed, Ramsay’s “unprecedented view of the ‘negative’ value o f the classical ideal
goes wholly against the accepted canons o f eighteenth-century aesthetics.... [As Reynolds] was to
declare years later in his Fourth Discourse, ‘If a portrait-painter is desirous to raise and improve his
subject, he has no other means than by approaching it to a general idea’. Ramsay’s Dialogue reflects
an exact opposite viewpoint, which corresponds precisely to the new direction o f his art.” (Smart, Allan
Ramsay, p. 141) Consequently, there is marked intimacy and naturalness to Ramsay’s domestic
interiors absent in Reynolds’s more dramatic settings. And yet, clearly Reynolds was not immune to
his influence, as the intimate examples o f Samuel Johnson and Laurence Sterne suggest. (Smart, Allan
Ramsay, pp. 182-183). See Smart, Allan Ramsay: Painter, Essayist and Man o f the Enlightenment, pp.
141, 182-183,192-193.
149 As Smart observed, “Especially from the year 1754 onwards, the beauty of Ramsay’s portraits is the
beauty of the particular....” (Smart, p. 141) He goes on: “In every sense his portrayals o f his sitters
have as little in common with the ideal generalizations of Reynolds as with the glancing brilliancies of
Gainsborough.” He explains: “Ramsay’s concern for Truth is as much a leading feature o f his art as of
his Enlightenment philosophy, and it is only on exceedingly rare occasions that we may suspect any
departure from his obedience, in his father’s phrase, to the ‘justice of the eye’.” See Smart, Allan
Ramsay: Painter, Essayist and Man o f the Enlightenment, pp. 141, 278.
150 Ramsay’s ideas may have been influenced by George Turnbull’s Treatise on Ancient Painting,
which revised Shaftesbury’s more “heroic” and civic model into one more “social” and suited to the
demands of a commercial society. See Solking, Painting for Money, pp. 171-172.
151 Smart, Allan Ramsay, p. 139.
152 Smart, Allan Ramsay: Painter, Essayist and Man o f the Enlightenment, p. 139.
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individual preference”—invokes a Lockean program of autonomous reasomng.

153

In

fact, Ramsay’s ‘conversational’ style sat comfortably with his developing political
and social opinions, which stressed tolerance and individual liberty.154 In these, he
(once again) distinguishes his interests from those of Hogarth. Rejecting the notion of
Magna Carta as the source of English liberty, and equating its ‘ancient’—i.e. ‘Gothic’
origins—with the absolutism and popery of a Catholic monarchy, Ramsay argued,
instead, that English liberty owed its origins to subsequent reforms, notably those of
the Glorious Revolution, and to William Hi’s ‘“being a Dutchman, and not.. .a
philosopher...’.”155
Ramsay’s success in refining the conversational mode is suggested by its
extensive influence. Until the late 1750s and the growing prominence of Reynolds—
signaled by his role as first President of the Royal Academy and his influential
institutionalization of an English “grand-manner”—, even the latter was affected, as
Samuel Johnson (Fig. 5-6; 1756-1757; oil on canvas, 50-1/4 x 40 inches; National

153 Smart, Allan Ramsay, p. 140. See Smart, Allan Ramsay: Painter, Essayist and Man o f the
Enlightenment, pp. 140-141.
134 Conveniently, Ramsay complemented his writings on taste with political essays. His best-known
work, Essay on the English Constitution, published in 1765, was followed by his Thoughts on the
Origin and Nature o f Government. Occasioned by the late Disputes between Great Britain and her
American Colonies (1766; not published until 1769). Significantly, in Thoughts on the Origin and
Nature o f Government, Ramsay defended Britain’s right to tax the colonies on grounds that the
colonists were not Englishmen and, therefore, could not invoke the rights of other Englishmen. In
general, Ramsay defended free thought and religion and opposed restrictions on non-Anglicans,
arguing in his essay, On Ridicule (1753): “We can never be said to be altogether in that state o f liberty
and common sense, to which the constitution of this kingdom has been verging for this hundred years
past, while there is any law in force to punish those who differ in opinion from their rulers in matters
merely speculative.” (Ramsay, On Ridicule-, quoted in Smart, Allan Ramsay: Painter, Essayist and
Man o f the Enlightenment, p. 99) For a further discussion o f his political views, see Smart, Allan
Ramsay: Painter, Essayist and Man o f the Enlightenment, pp. 99,224,226,270-272.
153 Smart, Allan Ramsay, p. 213. See Smart, Allan Ramsay: Painter, Essayist and Man o f the
Enlightenment, pp. 212-213.
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Portrait Gallery, London) suggests.156 Here, slouched in a boldly-checked, slip
covered chair, lips slightly parted, left hand contorted in an awkward gesture, righthanded poised with quill, the mental giant seems caught mid-thought, while the

Fig. 5-6

spectator perches in anxious anticipation. All pretense at elegance is sidelined.
Indeed, in an ironic twist, it seems to defy the Shaftesburian claim that “outward

156 While Reynolds’s style matured into a different direction, the significance o f Ramsay’s theory may
be generally underestimated. For example, “In Gainsborough’s case,” Smart writes, “the influence of
Ramsay’s new manner may be said to have been more dramatic, since it occurred at the very moment
when he was turning from the painting o f exquisite conversation pieces (comparable with the work o f
Hayman) to full-scale portraiture. That decisive event in his artistic development has been illuminated
by Hayes, who has demonstrated Gainsborough’s interest in the 1750s in Ramsay’s portrait style as a
model worthy o f emulation; and it is significant that Gainsborough adopted at the same time the kind of
free brushwork which Ramsay had learned from La Tour.” (Smart, p. 110) See Smart, Allan Ramsay:
Painter, Essayist and Man o f the Enlightenment, pp. 110, 170,239,278.
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Manners and Deportment” parallel “inward Sentiments and PrinciplesA157 At the
same time, it likewise suggests the sitter’s own form of heroism—what Wind
describes as “a desperate struggle of the spirit to free itself from the shackles of the
flesh.”158 And this makes it all the more intimate and revealing in a way unusual in
Reynolds’s oeuvre, though peculiarly suited to the likes of Johnson, who, for all his
support of heroic imagery, exclaimed: “He only will please long, who, by tempering
the acid of satire with the sugar of civility, and allaying the heat of wit with the
frigidity of humble chat, can make the true punch of conversation.”159

VIII. The Liberal Artist-Commoner
Ultimately, dissent from the civic humanist tradition was likely due to a
modem gap between ideology and experience.160 As John Barrell has convincingly
137 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 121-122, and III, p. 179.
158 Wind, p. 11.
139 Samuel Johnson, “Punch and Conversation,” The Idler, II, 34 (London: Printed for J. Newbery,
1761), p. 194.
160 In her analysis o f Richardson, Gibson-Wood gives repeated emphasis to the influence o f Locke. She
writes: “It was the philosophy o f John Locke, not Lord Shaftesbury, that most powerfully shaped
Richardson’s thought, and which makes his divergences from the doctrines o f both Shaftesbury and
continental academic theory particularly significant. As Neal Wood [in The Politics o f Locke’s
Philosophy (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1983)] has demonstrated, Locke’s writings, notably his Essay
concerning Human Understanding o f 1690, were ‘a vehicle for the conveyance, o f the values and
sentiments, of the emergent bourgeoisie’. Its two central doctrines, o f the empirical origins of
knowledge (versus the presence o f innate ideas) and the need to re-examine critically all beliefs based
on authority and/or received opinion, both opposed the idea o f a ‘natural’ inequality and ruling order in
society. Knowledge was acquired through experience and reflection; hence, actual ability was
determined by education and environment, not birth, and this could partially be self-determined through
industry and the practice o f reason.” (Gibson-Wood, pp. 8-9) While I would not disagree with her
overall evaluation o f Richardson, her reading o f Locke’s influence leaves her open to criticism.
As Laslett notes, Locke is often “called... the spokesman o f a rising class, the middle class,
the capitalists, the bourgeoisie.... But at the same time Locke profoundly mistrusted commerce and
commercial men... and though he approved the Bank o f England, there is [a deep suspicion]... o f the
capitalists who floated it.... [Moreover,] he despised medical men... [as] a profession and he shared
Shaftesbury’s contempt for lawyers.” (Laslett, introduction, Two Treatises, pp. 55-56) Nonetheless,
Locke was one o f a rising “order o f free individuals.... He is perhaps best described as an independent,
free-moving intellectual, aware as others were not o f the direction o f social change. This is evident in
the central issue of the Two Treatises, which is primarily concerned with the structure o f the family and
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argued, Reynolds’s version of the ‘general’ style made art the handmaiden of
politics.161 But this very concern to defend and institutionalize grand-manner
imagery signals unease. Under such circumstances, compromising variations on the
general style suggest changing perceptions of reality and a growing uncertainty about
the principles informing the classical narrative—notably, the universal ideal and its
theoretical premise. A number of conditions converged to make this possible: a
Reformed separation of the temporal and eternal spheres and its effected division
between the internal and external self; a resulting elevation of the individual vis-a-vis
society and an emphasis on self-determination that was augmented by empiricism and
its endorsement of autonomous reasoning; the rhetoric of liberty invoked by
Commonwealth Whigs, advanced by Harrington, assumed and modified by
Restoration Whigs and revived through Patriot and republican ideologies; and, along
with the development of commerce, the emergence of the marketplace as a sphere of
engagement and authority distinct from the Assembly. Effected by these influences
was the elevation of portrait painting and the portrait painter. Whereas Shaftesbury,
like Aristotle, deemed an artist’s ability to render truth—and thereby advance the
common good—to be necessarily conditioned upon his natural (birth-related)
capacities—the proper measure of his progress towards potentiality—and,
consequently, all but excluded the common-born painter from a liberal status, the
ideological variations advanced by Richardson and others offered hope to the portrait

its relevance to social and political authority.” (Laslett, introduction, Two Treatises, p. 57.) See
Gibson-Wood, pp. 5, 8-9, 153-154,230; Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting, p. 197;
Laslett, introduction to Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 55-57.
161 See John Barrell, The Political Theory o f Painting from Reynolds to Hazlitt, particularly his
introduction, “A Republic o f Taste,” pp. 1-68.
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painter. A common-born artisan bold enough to publish his own theories on art,
Richardson insisted that the aptitude for producing a general style and, by extension,
the aptitude for liberal knowledge, might be acquired through industry. He therefore
implied that an ambitious commoner of any rank might raise himself to the level of a
liberal man.
The implications of Richardson’s argument—and its legacy in the work of
Ramsay and others—thus went beyond painting. Once a portrait painter could bridge
the gap between a particular likeness and a ‘true’ one—once he could bridge the gap
between cultivated reason and intellectual independence, private industry and public
good—, on what grounds could one defend civic authority as the birthright of a
landed elite? The principle of ‘improvement’ that informed Richardson’s ‘grace and
greatness’ thus bore specific implications for narrative and identity. First, by
transforming the portrait painter, for example, into an empirical scientist, one
studying, recording and improving upon the evidence of human nature, Richardson
invested him with the intellectual significance requisite to a liberal artist.162 In so
doing, he placed portrait painting on a level with history painting.163 But he also
removed the taint of commerce from the virtues of industry. Whereas Shaftesbury’s
insistence on the “interest” of labor precluded the commoner from claiming
“independence,” Richardson’s correlation between independence and industry denied
the necessary link between industry and interest. In Richardson’s view, earning an

162 See Gibson-Wood, pp. 148, 169-172.
163 In fact, Richardson gives the edge to portrait painting. “Richardson’s account o f grace and
greatness in portraits registers his conviction that it is actually more difficult for the face painter than
the history painter to succeed in this, the most honourable part o f painting.” See Gibson-Wood, p. 171.
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honest wage to support oneself and one’s family was very different from being paid to
represent someone’s interest—the bane of patronage. The former was virtuous as
long as the individual remained autonomous, living by his own industry and his own
conscience; the latter, by contrast, was always dependent and, so, always corrupt.
Moreover, as Gibson-Wood explains: “What determines the honourableness or
otherwise of an occupation is not the acceptance of money, but ‘the Kind, and Degree
of Abilities’ required, and its usefulness to mankind.”164
Indeed, Gibson-Wood observes, Richardson’s novelty rests, in part, on his
timely defense of the respectability of paid employment.165 This provided an
ideological middle-ground between the disinterested leisure of civic humanism and
the interested acquisitiveness of Mandevillean utilitarianism. On such grounds,
successful commoners could construct a credible meaning of life suited to their
experience and desired identities, to which end, Richardson asserted: “I hope it will

See Gibson-Wood, pp. 148-149.
1(0 He wrote: “But perhaps, tho’ for a Gentleman to paint for his Pleasure without any Reward is not
unworthy of him, to make a Profession of, and take Money for his Labor o f the Head and Hand is the
dishonourable Circumstance, this being a sort o f letting himself to Hire to whosoever will pay him for
his Trouble. Very Well! And is it more unbecoming for a Man to employ himself, or be more Useful
to his Family, or to whomsoever else he sees fit, than so as it shall turn to less account, or none at all?
... if this has something Low and Servile in it, we ... have good Company, that is, all those that receive
Money for the Exercise o f their Abilities o f Body or Mind.” (Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f
Painting, pp. 31-32). As Gibson-Wood observes: “In Augustan England, especially in London,
distinctions between the levels o f the social hierarchy were becoming increasingly blurred. Many
younger sons o f country gentry were entering a profession or trade, and intermarrying with the
middling classes, while members o f the commercial classes like Richardson himself acquired the
material trappings o f the gentry and sought to improve their family’s station by entering their sons into
more genteel occupations. This confusion o f the social ranks challenged accepted definitions of what
constituted a gentleman, including the fact that gentlemen did not need to work for their income.”
(Gibson-Wood, p. 148) See Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting, pp. 31-32; GibsonWood, p. 148.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

196

appear that they may be placed amongst those whom all the World allow to be
Gentlemen, or of Honourable Employments, or Professions.”166
Ultimately, although Richardson’s ideological commitment to classicism
supported natural progress and a hierarchical social order based on intellectual and
moral virtue, he stopped short of endorsing the landed interest, transforming the
freeholder-citizen into the industrious commoner.167 In other words, Richardson
aimed not to overthrow the dominant order or level the social hierarchy, but to expand
its accessibility and the conditions upon which its privileges were said to depend—i.e.
from landed birth to educated industry. In the process, he asserted the individual’s
liberty—as an autonomous and self-determining subject—to attain potentiality. 168
•

•

*

While placing the burden for identity on the individual, he granted the opportunity for
social mobility through self-improvement, thereby making the virtues of classical
theory—and their manifestation in art—accessible to the common man.169

166 Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting, p. 33.
167 In other words, while Richardson continued to subscribe to an Aristotelian version of the ideal in
nature and to the primacy of classicism in general, while his ideas about self-improvement, refinement,
and politeness—the “Social Virtues”— were indebted to the theories of moral sentiment articulated by
Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and others, while his vision o f self-improvement stemmed from an
understanding of a goodness or self-love that found happiness in contributing to the common good,
while he deemed virtue and the common good complementary, Richardson’s omission of land as the
basis o f virtue and good marked a significant departure from the civic humanist narrative. Richardson,
Two Discourses, II, pp. 172- 173, 175-176; Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, p. 364.
168 Richardson’s opinion o f women and economically-dependent men precluded their autonomy and,
hence, their participation in Lockean reason. See Gibson-Wood, pp. 39-40, 46, 49, 54.
169 By the same token, as Gibson-Wood remarks, “it is the private virtue of the artist, not the public
virtue of the ruling elite that Richardson identifies as the source o f England’s potential greatness in
painting.” (Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting, pp. 211-212; quoted in Gibson-Wood, p.
173) “Richardson’s loathing of subservience re-emerges in two of the poems published in Morning
Thoughts. In one he declares how glad he is to have escaped ‘curs’d dependence on another’s will’, to
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IX. Imag[in]ing Identity
Insofar as the mirror was both a metaphor and a tool for the construction of
identity, it shared similarities with the portrait: both relied on the demand for likeness;
both presented a ‘representative’ or ‘objective’ self for public view; and both
transformed the ‘unrepresented’ self into a spectator. By the same token, while both
mirrored and painted images invoked, at least in part, ‘received’ identities, both were
likewise understood to present the spectator with an ‘improved’ interpretation of the
subject—his physical features, values, beliefs, and allegiances.
Yet, portraits harbored a notable advantage. Whereas reflected images forced
upon their subjects a likeness prescribed by the standards of an extant narrative,
portraits presented—indeed, ‘imposed’—upon the spectator narrative standards
conducive to a desired likeness. Hence, if one could not remove oneself entirely from
the particularities of bad skin or an unfashionable house, one could mask them by
generalizing flesh and adopting an imaginary setting, thereby visually emulating—and
thus claiming right to—‘superior’ attributes or environments suited to a desired
identity.170
The portrait’s ability to impede the influence of social contingencies thus gave
it an edge in the negotiation for identity. Portraits had the ability not merely to record
identity, but to shape and, therefore, to claim it—and hence to claim alternative
identities. This meant that eighteenth-century portraits could assume for their sitters
which his son added the footnote, ‘Perhaps there never was a man who had a more rooted aversion to
dependence’.” See Gibson-Wood, pp. 44-46, 72-73, 173, 184.
170 Indeed, as Baumeister notes, instead o f subverting the individual to society, “Romantic writing
emphasized the assertion of the individual self against society as never before.” (Baumeister, p. 65)
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identities that denied social convention, that trespassed on the privileges and
responsibilities of others, that contested not only social prescription, but the
ideologies that shaped them and (perhaps more compel lingly) the authority of those
who formulated them. Controlling public perception of one’s attributes became a
means by which to control one’s place in the social order. This reduced the sitter’s
vulnerability to the spectator’s own interest and improved his defense against less
desirable interpretations, thereby enhancing his balanee-of-power against the
community o f ‘others’ invested in his image’s meaning. 171
On the one hand, then, portraits empowered their sitters in ways that reflected
images could not; rather than obsessing over her daily ritual before the mirror, the
Wicked Queen might have commissioned a portrait that presented her identity as
“fairest of all,” perpetually laying claim to an otherwise contested title. On such
grounds, it could be argued, whereas ‘reflected’ images should be understood within
the context o f the social sphere, ‘constructed’ images should be understood in
response to the social sphere.

179

On the other hand, the audience for portraits was not

only larger than that for mirrored images, it was more heavily invested in the effected
meaning; family and friends, neighbors and servants, tradesmen and colleagues,
tenants and constituents: the audience of the portrait might include a broad crossAnd this had bearing on identity. “If the identity that society offered you was unacceptable, you battled
to get society to offer you something better....” (Baumeister, p. 66) See Baumeister, pp. 65-66.
171 Patrick Coleman raises a similar point in “Property, politics, and personality in Rousseau,” in Early
Modern Conceptions o f Property, John Brewer and Susan Staves, eds. (London and New York:
Routledge, 1996), pp. 256-257.
172 According to Richard Brilliant, “Portraits reflect social realities. Their imagery combines the
conventions of behaviour and appearance appropriate to the members of a society at a particular time,
as defined by categories of age, gender, race, physical beauty, occupation, social and civic status, and
class.” See Brilliant, Portraiture, p. 11. While this is true, it seems, too, that portraits “conceive” social
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section of the community, each of whom was implicated in the assessment of the
sitter’s claims.
Highlighted by the writings of Haywood, Hobbes, Mandeville, and Hogarth is
the degree to which eighteenth-century identity was a contest played out between rival
parties mutually invested in a collective personality.17J Navigating contingencies
became a contest of wit and influence in which the interests and identities of one or
more parties became subordinate to the interests and identities of others—“in a
word,” Rousseau writes, “there is competition and rivalry on one hand, conflicts of
interest on the other, and always the hidden desire to gain an advantage at the expense
J

of other people.”174 Ultimately, this meant that, for all their freedom to manipulate
the narrative context of identity, portraits could not protect the individual from public
critique; portraits could advance the interests of their sitters and patrons by involving
them in the construction process, but they could not protect them from the effects of
competition: the success or failure of the image, and the credibility of its claims,
turned on acceptance by the spectator.175 Indeed, as the very act of imag[in]ing
identity suggested a need for social approval, so each new spectator presented a
realities, insofar as they wed individual perceptions o f extant reality with a reality thought conducive to
their social aspirations.
173 The collective identity or personality is used here to suggest the total social hierarchy to which a
community o f individuals belongs. It is conceived as being divided into identity types that are assumed
by individuals as manifestations o f their ‘place’ or rank. The collective identity, then, is the cumulative
total o f all such ranks.
174 Rousseau, A Discourse on Inequality, p. 119.
n'J Indeed, Greg Dening uses the term “Closure” to distinguish the point at which the completed
portrait becomes “the platform for somebody else’s critique.” (Dening, “Texts o f Self,” p. 159) As
Rousseau explained it, “social man lives always outside himself; he knows how to live only in the
opinion o f others, it is, so to speak, from their judgement alone that he derives the sense o f his own
existence.” (Rousseau, A Discourse on Inequality, p. 136) See Dening, “Texts o f Self,” in Through a
Glass Darkly: Reflections on Personal Identity in Early America, Hoffinan, Ronald, Mecha! Sobel, and
Fredrika J. Teute, eds. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Omohundro Institute of
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challenge to the sitter because each was necessarily interested in securing his own
related identity.176
Hence, as more inclusive and fluid standards of identity freed the individual to
assert himself, so competition grew increasingly fierce, perpetually suspending the
attainment of a stable identity. By the same token, as individuals scrambled to
assume the ‘polite’ attributes of their peers, Rousseau noted, “it soon became
necessary either to have them or to feign them.”177 In the end, Rousseau concluded,
“Being and appearance became two entirely different things.,.,”178 and identity
became ever subject to re-negotiation.
Ultimately, aesthetic differences between Shaftesbury, Richardson, Hogarth,
Ramsay, and Reynolds turned on their perception and reception of numerous
contemporary developments: the mass commercialization of a previously agrarian
society, which initiated a shift from individual to market relations, patronage to
clientage, and the isolation of producer from consumer; the corresponding shift from
independent/dependent (patron/ artisan) to interdependent (buyer and seller) relations;
a shift in the balance-of-influence between political and economic forces; a
consequent shift in emphasis from the political to social realm and, by extension, a
blurring of civic and social authority; the resulting influence of more egalitarian and
“conversational” (“plain-speaking,” commercial and polite) modes of interaction in

Early American History and Culture, 1997), p. 159; Rousseau, A Discourse on Inequality, p. 136;
Brilliant, Portraiture, p. 14; Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 151.
176 As Bushman reminds us, “Provincials paid heed to the English upper classes... because so much
power was focused in their persons... [;] they exercised that most compelling o f human authorities, the
power to confirm identity.” See Bushman, Refinement o f America, p. 405.
177 Rousseau, A Discourse on Inequality, pp. 118-119.
178 Thus, he adds: “It was necessary in one’s own interest to seem to be other than one was in reality.”
Rousseau, A Discourse on Inequality, pp. 118-119.
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the public sphere; the private nurturing of individual potentiality and autonomy—in
complement with Reformed Christianity—and, hence, the perceived expansion of a
‘middling sort’ distinct from the lower class in its economic autonomy, yet removed
from the upper class in its economic interdependence; the growing recognition of
differences between this middle class and the ‘vulgar’ masses; the elevation of the
private man as the active agent in the social sphere and the consequent imposition of
individual identity onto the public domain; the resulting tension between social—
relative—and political—fixed—identities, as individuals assumed the authority of
self-determination. Combined, these developments undermined the fixed and stable
order fundamental to civic humanism. Increasingly, modifications to the classical
narrative appear to have turned on a perception of liberty in which independence was
the acquired privilege of self-sufficient intellectuals, merchants, and artisans—the
modem freeholders of a commercial humanism. The implications of these
developments were likewise felt in the American colonies.179

179 In his thirteenth Discourse, Reynolds drew a parallel between the slavish copying of the mechanic
and barbarism and the truth-seeking o f the liberal artist and civility. In this, he employed the example
of the American colonies: “Painting .. .ought to be as far removed from the vulgar idea of imitation as
the refined civilized state in which we live, is removed from a gross state o f nature; and those who have
not cultivated their imaginations... may be said... to continue in this state o f nature. Such men will
always prefer imitation to that excellence which is addressed to another faculty that they do not
possess; but these are not the persons to whom a Painter is to look, any more than a judge of morals and
manners ought to refer controverted points upon those subjects to the opinions of people taken from the
banks o f the Ohio, or from New Holland.” See Reynolds, Discourses on Art, pp. 232-233. It is worth
noting that Reynolds has dismissed with the Shaftesburian definition of “imitation” in favor o f one
comparable to “mimicry.”
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CHAPTER VI
JOHN SINGLETON COPLEY’S MAJOR HUGH MONTGOMERIE

F ig , 6 4

High against a turbulent backdrop of dark, billowing smoke, Major Hugh
Montgomerie (Fig. 6-1; 1780; oil on canvas, 94-1/2 x 59-3/4 inches; Los Angeles
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County Museum of Art) of the 77th Regiment poses before his troops in a
commanding posture. Right foot forward, left arm extended, right hand grasping his
basket-hilted sword, Montgomerie rises above the fray, the tiered tassels of his
leopard-skin sporran neatly keeping their line, while twelve feet of Black Watch
tartan cascade in well-ordered pleats around him. Below his elevated position, a
tangle of Indians on hands and knees make a last-ditch effort to thwart his soldiers’
pistols.1 Victory, for the Major, appears imminent.
This 1780 portrait by John Singleton Copley (173 8-1815)2 is a dialogue of
contrasts: against the muted palette of the background, Montgomerie appears in clear,

1 Indians might be depicted as ignorant barbarians or ‘noble savages’. Reynolds’s thirteenth Discourse
emphasized the barbarism of America. (See Reynolds, Discourses on Art, pp. 232-233) But, ass
Saunders writes, “We may also note the belief, common in the ancient world, that primitive man, being
untouched by civilization, was morally ‘better’.” (Saunders, in Plato, Laws, p. 118) A similar position
was held by Rousseau insofar as primitive man was uncorrupted by pride. See Reynolds, Discourses
on Art, pp. 232-233; Saunders, introduction to Plato, Laws, p. 118; Plato, Laws, p. 122; Rousseau,
Considerations on the Government o f Poland and O f the Social Contract, in Rousseau, The Social
Contract and other later political writings, pp. 113-123,224-229.
2 Copley (1738-1815) was the son o f Irishman Richard Copley and his wife, Mary Singleton Copley,
who emigrated to Boston in 1735. Following the death o f Richard Copley in the mid-1740s, Mary
Copley remarried Peter Pelham in 1748, an artist-schoolmaster best known for his engravings. From
Peter Pelham, Copley received his first artistic instruction. After Pelham’s death in 1751, Copley
assumed a more professional stature, working largely from prints to produce his own mezzotints,
portraits, historical pictures and miniatures. By 1763, he had set up his first studio. In 1765, Copley
exhibited for the first time in London, sending his now-famous Boy with a Squirrel to the Society of
Artists exhibition. The picture was well-received, and Copley was encouraged to exhibit regularly.
Copley married Susanna Clarke, the daughter o f the English-born merchant, Richard Clarke,
in 1769. With war pending, he left his family in 1774 to study in London, Paris and Rome. By 1775
he had settled in London and was joined by his family. The following year, he was made an Associate
Member o f the Royal Academy; he was granted full membership in 1779. Overall, Copley’s career
was peppered with mixed reviews—the negative reception of The Copley Family (1777) and the
Family o f George 7/7(1785) was balanced by absolute sensations like Watson and the Shark (1778)
and The Siege o f Gibraltar (1791). By 1783, he was charging 100 guineas for a full-length portrait.
He died o f a stroke in 1815. For information about Copley and his work, see Werner Busch, “Copley,
West, and the Tradition o f European High Art,” in Gaehtgens and Iekstadt, eds., American Icons:
Transatlantic Perspectives on Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century American Art (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press for the Getty Center for the History o f Art and the Humanities, 1992), pp. 35-59;
Wayne Craven, Colonial American Portraiture: The Economic, Religious, Social, Cultural,
Philosophical, Scientific, and Aesthetic Foundations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986);
Emily Neff, John Singleton Copley in England (Houston, TX: Museum of Fine Arts, Houston, 1995);
Jules Prown, John Singleton Copley, 2. vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966); Carrie
Rebora and Paul Staiti, et. al., John Singleton Copley in America (New York: The Metropolitan
Museum o f Art, distributed by Harry N. Abrams, 1995).
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bold color; against bare-skinned Native Americans, his rich ivory waistcoat, ruffled
cuffs, bold red coat, and rhythmically-patterned plaid sing with the material richness
of color and texture; against the frenzy of tomahawks, the zig-zag of smoldering
flames, and the barely-contained tension of protruding muscles and outstretched
fingers, Montgomerie stands erect, his balanced pose and authoritative gesture
achieved with the grace of a dance master. Directing the actions—and, so, the
opinions3—of his subordinates, Montgomerie’s posture and gesture suggest a
classical vocabulary with civic humanist objectives.4 As Shaftesbury prescribed, the
principal figure, set apart from his subordinates, unites the accoutrements of battle,
the stance of the orator, and the self-restrained hero’s “Majesty and Superiority,” all
in keeping with “Decorum.”5
The choice of military theme recalls the heroic virtue of the neo-Aristotelian
Public Man; as a military Major, Montgomerie bears arms in defense of his state and
inspires his inferiors to defend the common good. These neo-Aristotelian elements
are complemented by Montgomerie’s landed status and corresponding leisure, the
combination of which entitled him to claims of disinterested independence and
positions of leadership. Such claims distinguished Montgomerie not only from the

3 As Shaftesbury explained it, “outward Manners and Deportment' parallel “inward Sentiments and
Principles." See Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, 1, pp. 121-122, and III, p. 179.
4 Against earlier references to the Apollo Belvedere, recent research by David Mannings suggests that
Montgomerie’s pose derives from a French bronze statuette of Apollo, after Legros. (Mannings,
Reynolds, I, p. 288) Regardless o f its origins, the gesture served not so much to recall the original as to
express the meaning the lifted feature had come to assume within contemporary visual conventions:
the authority o f the Public Man. See David Mannings, Sir Joshua Reynolds: A Complete Catalogue o f
his Paintings, 2 vols. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 288; Neff, John
Singleton Copley in England, p. 114.
3 As Shaftesbury described it, the principal figure “being plac’d in the middle... shou’d by a skilful
Master be so drawn, as ... it shou’d appear by the very Turn... that this young Hero had not wholly
quitted the balancing or pondering part.” (Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, III, p. 358) In Aristotelian
terms, virtue was the harmonious balance or ‘mean’ between two extremes. Shaftesbury,
Characteristicks, III, pp. 358, 361, 366.
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ignorant and uncivilized men who fall in a tangle around him, but from the line of
dependents who rightfully follow their elevated commander.
Indeed, color, posture, gesture, accoutrements, composition: all serve to
reaffirm a natural, hierarchical social order, from the impassioned physicality of the
American ‘savages’ to the rational civility of the British Major. This is no
coincidence. As Hobbes observed, the clearest means of establishing one’s own
identity was by comparison with someone else’s.6 By subjecting the ‘other’ to a
cultural narrative in which one’s own self assumed the defining role—in which one’s
own interpretation of reality became the standard against which others were judged-,
visual imagery provided a ready means by which to impose upon an ‘other’ those
traits that best demonstrated—often through contrast—the attributes with which one
wished to be identified.7 According to Homi K. Bhabha, this was a common practice
of colonialism, which aimed to rationalize the superior identities of British colonizers
by ‘fixing’ the rank of non-British ‘others’.8 Of course, the success of this
undertaking was dependent upon two things: the audience’s belief in a ‘fixed’ natural
order; and the credibility of the visual narrative.
In addition to illustrating the role of narrative in the imag[in]ing of identity,
the portrait of Montgomerie is interesting for its Shaftesburian interpretation of the
divided self. As a foil for articulating Montgomerie’s own progress towards a higher
and more virtuous self, the savages represent the ‘undercharacters’ to Montgomerie’s
6 “For let a man (as most men do,) rate themselves as the highest Value they can,” Hobbes wrote, “yet
their true Value is no more than it is esteemed by others.” See Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 15 1.
7 Pajaczkowska, “The ecstatic solace o f culture: self, not-self and other; a psychoanalytic view,” in
Steyn, ed., Other than identity: the subject, politics and art, p. 110.
8 He writes: “colonial discourse produces the colonised as a fixed reality which is at once an ‘other’
and yet entirely knowable and fixible....” See Homi K. Bhabha, “The other question,” Screen, 24 (6),
Nov.-Dee. 1983, p. 23; quoted in Gange, “Beyond Identity? The Beyond in Beyond Japan,” in Steyn,
ed., p. 209.
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‘Philosophical Hero’.9 As Shaftesbury might describe it: “In this, there were Two
Faces which wou’d naturally present themselves to our view: One of them, like the
commanding Genius, the Leader and C h i e f t h e other like that rude, undisciplin’d
and head-strong Creature, whom we our-selves in our natural Capacity most exactly
resembled.”10
Significantly, Montgomerie commissioned this image twenty years after the
depicted event, on the eve of what became his successful bid for Parliament.11 In this
he followed the recommendations of Aristotle: “In political oratory there is least
opening for narration; nobody can narrate what has not yet happened. If there is
narration at all, it will be of past events, the recollection of which will help the hearers
to make better plans for the fixture.”12 That Copley should render the now middleaged man in the events of his youth signals Montgomerie’s particular interest in
exploiting the correlation between military command and political leadership—

9 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, p. 170, 185,195-196. Equally evident is Montgomerie’s superiority
to his own troops, as indicated by his compositional placement above his soldiers, the stronger colors
o f his dress, and his commanding pose and gestures. Copley reiterates this superiority in the inferior
placement o f the spectator—it is as though we, too, numbered among Montgomerie’s soldiers.
10 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, p. 194.
11 Exhibited at the Royal Academy in 1780 as Portrait o f a Highland Officer. Montgomerie is shown
leading his uncle Archibald’s regiment (Montgomerie’s Highlanders) against the French and Indians in
the Seven Years War (1756-1763). Archibald Montgomerie was the 11thEarl o f Eglinton and it was to
his title that Montgomerie succeeded in 1796. The son of Alexander Montgomerie of Coilsfield in
Ayrshire, and his wife, Lilias Montgomerie, daughter of Sir Robert, 11thBaronet of Skelmorlie, Hugh
Montgomerie joined the 77th Regiment in 1756 and was engaged in battle at Fort Ticonderoga, Fort
Duquesne and elsewhere, earning a reputation for distinguished action, “in the destruction o f the
Cherokee Settlements...” (see Artist 1780, no. 172, p. 26; quoted in Neff, p. 116, fii. 12). He was
repeatedly elected to Parliament as Member for Ayrshire between 1780 and 1796, when he assumed
the title o f 12th Earl o f Eglinton. In 1806 he became a peer of Britain (as opposed to just Scotland),
assuming the title Baron Ardrossan. See Emily Ballew Neff, John Singleton Copley in England, exh.
cat. (London: The Museum o f Fine Arts, Houston, in association with Merrell Holberton, 1995), p.
116, fit. 12; William L. Pressly, “The Challenge o f New Horizons,” in Neff, p. 48. For a full summary
of the portrait, see Neff, pp. 114-117.
12 Aristotle, The Rhetoric, in Corbett, p. 17. Unlike Plato, Aristotle emphasized the positive potential of
rhetoric—notably, its endorsement of “good sense, good moral character, and goodwill.” See Aristotle,
The Rhetoric, in Corbett, pp. 17, 91, 164; quoted from p. 91.
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patriotism and statesmanship—in the promotion of his public identity.13 Clearly,
Copley and his patron felt the most effective means of conveying Montgomerie’s
credibility as a political figure resided in his one-time identity as a military Major
conquering a ‘savage’ people.
On the one hand, then, Copley presented Montgomerie as a detached,
controlled and elevated figure—a member of the disinterested elite. On the other
hand, he borrowed on the Aristotelian narrative of public action—a narrative that was
supported and developed in the eighteenth century by Rousseau and the Scottish
common-sense theorists—, thematically subverting the contemplative virtues of the
philosopher to the heroic virtues of the patriotic statesman. Copley thus advanced a
neo-Aristotelian social hierarchy descending in rank from the intellectually
disinterested and socio-economically independent citizen-hero to the interested and
dependent man.
Yet there is more to this image. Aristotelian pragmatism suggested that
individual Public Men were motivated by honor to achieve virtue. An autonomous
individual displayed his military abilities in the public arena and was consequently
rewarded with public glory. Aristotle’s brand of heroism, then, required the overt
display of courage—physical engagement with the enemy, for example. But
Copley’s portrait balances this heroic attribute with the tempering influence of private
contemplation. Although present in the field of battle, Montgomerie is not in the
trenches, nor is he engaged in combat. Indeed, situated above the conflict,

13 As Lord Kames wrote, “Patriotism ... is the great bulwark o f civil liberty.... Those actions only that
flow from patriotism are deemed grand and heroic; and such actions, above all others, rouse a national
spirit.” See Kames, The Rise and Fall o f Patriotism, in Broadie, pp. 522-523.
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Montgomerie’s sword appears more emblematic—suggestive of military authority—
than aggressive, a point reinforced by his unlatched pistol.
Copley’s background reinforces this nod to contemplation. The parting
smoke and glint of light that frame Montgomerie’s calm and intelligent face act to
highlight his inner strength and intellectual prowess. While alluding, on the one
hand, to his reasoning powers, this also suggests the influence of ‘internalization’—a
departure from Aristotelian tradition. In the end, Copley’s emphasis appears not
courage in pursuit of glory, but inner strength in pursuit of virtue—the conquest of
barbarism by personal fortitude and public duty. While this, too, honored the agent
and benefited the state, the shift in emphasis suggests Platonic modifications to the
Aristotelian ethic. As Taylor writes: “Strength, firmness, resolution, control, these
are the crucial qualities, a subset of the warrior-aristocratic virtues, but now
internalized. They are not deployed in great deeds of military valour in public space,
but rather in the inner domination of passion by thought. ...”14
Copley’s portrait illustrates the influence of internalization on the civic
humanist narrative. The civic humanist commitment to heroic virtue was tempered
by the internalization of moral rectitude and the consequent privileging of internal
attributes as the primary mediums of common good. This suggests a perception of
reality akin to that of either Shaftesbury or Smith—what Taylor calls a non-utilitarian
blend of classical and Christian principles in which “dignity and esteem [are located]

14 Taylor, pp. 152-153.
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at the heart of... moral vision,” and external actions are perceived as the mirror of
internal sentiments.15
Ultimately, the shift in emphasis from glory to sympathy resulted in
modifications to the definition of Public Man. On the premise that social
benevolence was the medium of civic virtue, the act and appearance of benevolence
assumed new relevance as a measure of one’s identity. Hence, virtue was submerged
into a principle of politeness in which the appearance of social affection—symbolized
by decorous dress, behavior and conversation—became the measure of one’s merit
and social rank. In the case of Montgomerie, the resulting identity is that of a rational
and moral man who risks his life in order to conquer—and thereby to reform—an
infidel people for the common good.
By employing a Reformed, civic humanist narrative as the context for
Montgomerie’s identity, by constructing a composition that positioned the viewer to
receive Montgomerie as a public leader—we are before and beneath him—, Copley
imposed upon his audience a cultural narrative that simultaneously urged their
complicity in Montgomerie’s bid for a public status—a Member of Parliament— and
perpetuated the ideology that made it legitimate. In other words, Copley
simultaneously negotiated and imposed a specific identity and ideology for receipt by
both sitter and spectator. By these means, he visually affirmed and advanced the
credibility of Reformed civic humanism for a varied audience of contemporary
Britons.
15 Taylor, p. 155. Whereas medieval Christians sought grace and salvation in the sacred sphere through
a devotion to God and his ‘Word’, autonomous Reformed Christians sought salvation through
obedience to moral laws active in the secular sphere. If the winning figure in orthodox dogma was the
Christian hero, who sacrificed his life for the glory o f God, the winning agent in Anglo-Protestant civic
humanism was the civic hero, who sacrificed his interests for the common good.
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I*
Fig. 6-2
A comparison of works by Copley, Reynolds, and others serves to highlight
the ways in which classical vocabulary might be used—or not—to endorse civic
humanist objectives. Visual precedent for Montgomerie can be found among works
by Van Dyck—Mountjoy Blount, Earl o f Newport (Fig. 6-2; ca. 1637-38; oil on
canvas, 85 x 51 inches; Yale Center for British Art, New Haven), for example,
similarly blends the attributes of the citizen-soldier with those of the contemplative
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philosopher—as well as those by Copley’s slightly-older contemporaries, Allan
Ramsay (1713-1784) and Sir Joshua Reynolds (1723-1792).16 Like Hugh
16 Sir Joshua Reynolds (1723-1792) was the son o f a Devon schoolmaster. Apprenticed to Thomas
Hudson from 1740-1743, he worked both in Devonshire and London between 1743-1749. As the
guest of his patron and friend, Commodore Augustus Keppel, Reynolds traveled to Algiers, Port
Mahon and Minorca en route to Italy in 1749 before settling in Rome from 1750-1752. There he
studied the old masters, notably Titian and the Venetian colorists, before returning to London by way
of Florence, Bologna, Parma, Mantua, Venice, and Paris in 1753. Settling permanently in London,
Reynolds began painting his important portrait o f Augustus Keppel, which became his catalyst to
fashionable status. He set up a studio, employed assistants and exhibited regularly. In 1768, under the
patronage o f George III, he was selected the first President of the newly-established Royal Academy
and knighted in 1769. Although he had previously published ideas on art in Samuel Johnson’s Idler
(September-November, 1759), his career as president o f the RA initiated a series o f formal writings
that significantly influenced subsequent art criticism. He continued to travel, making journeys through
northern Europe in 1781 and 1785. By 1783, however, his eyesight had begun to suffer, and by 1791
he was nearly blind. Following the death of Allan Ramsay in 1784, Reynolds was made Painter in
Ordinary to the King. Despite a near-rupture with the RA, he continued in his capacity as President
until his death in 1792. His experimentation with pigments and glazes has sadly resulted in the poor
condition o f many o f his works. For more information about Reynolds and his work, see A. Asfour and
P. Williamson, “On Reynolds’s use o f de Piles, Locke and Hume in his Essays on Rubens and
Gainsborough,” Journal o f the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 60 (1997) pp. 215-229; John Barrell,
The Political Theory o f Paintingfrom Reynolds to Hazlitt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986);
John Hayes, “Reflections on Reynolds at the Royal Academy: Two Hundred Years On,” Apollo 124
(April 1986): 246-253; David Mannings, “Reynolds, Hogarth and Van Dyck,” The Burlington
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Montgomerie, Ramsay’s Norman, 22nd Chief o f MacLeod (Fig. 6-3; ca. 1747; oil on
canvas, 88 x 54 inches; Collection of John MacLeod, Dunvegan Castle, Skye)17 and

fig, 6-4
Magazine, 126 November 1984), 689-690; David Mannings, Sir Joshua Reynolds: A Complete
Catalogue o f his Paintings, 2 vols. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000); David
Solkin, “Great Pictures or Great Men? Reynolds, Male Portraiture, and the Power of Art,” The Oxford
Art Journal 9 (1986): 42-49; Nadia Tschemy, “Reynolds’s Streatham Portraits and the Art of Intimate
Biography,” The Burlington Magazine 128 (1986): 4-11; James Northcote, Memoirs o f Sir Joshua
Reynolds: Comprising original anecdotes o f many distinguished persons, his contemporaries, and a
brief analysis o f his discourses. To which are added, varieties on art (London, 1813); Nicholas Penny,
Reynolds, exh. cat. (London: Royal Academy o f Arts, 1986); Sir Joshua Reynolds, Discourses on Art,
Robert R. Wark, ed. (San Marino, CA, 1959); Sir Joshua Reynolds, “False Criticisms on Painting,”
“Grand Stile o f Painting,” and “The True Idea of Beauty,” in Samuel Johnson, The Idler, nos. 76,79,
and 82,2 vols. (London: printed for J. Newbery, 1761), pp. 130-136,148-154, 165-173; Sir Joshua
Reynolds, The Letters o f Sir Joshua Reynolds, John Ingamells and John Edgcumbe, eds. (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2000); Richard Wendorf, Sir Joshua Reynolds: the Painter in Society
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, (1996), paperback ed. 1998).
17 According to Alastair Smart, “There can indeed be no real doubt that Reynolds’s great full-length of
Commodore Augustus Keppel, probably painted in 1753..., was partly inspired by Ramsay’s
composition,” a chalk copy of which he likely saw in Van Aken’s studio. See Smart, Allan Ramsay:
Painter, p. 81.
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Reynolds’s John Murray, 4th Earl ofDunmore (Fig. 6-4; 1765; oil on canvas, 93-3/4
x 57-3/4 inches; Scottish National Portrait Gallery, Edinburgh) belong to the ‘tartan’
tradition. However, comparison of Reynolds’s Dunmore portrait with Copley’s
Montgomerie reveals some compelling differences.
Perhaps the most obvious similarity between Montgomerie and Dunmore is
the theme of the tartaned figure in an austere landscape, and the most obvious
difference the absence of battle in the image of Dunmore. But there are also more
subtle similarities and differences. For example, there is far more movement in
Copley’s image; the direction of Montgomerie’s gaze, his arms, and his stride all
contribute to a criss-cross motion that echoes the action of the background figures and
the zig-zag of ascending smoke. The Dunmore is decidedly quieter. The dark clouds
that fracture the sky, the muted palette, the sparse vegetation and the shattered oak:
these features give the image a doleful aspect not found in Copley’s Montgomerie. It
is as though we face the same landscape, only after the battle, now wizened by its
effects. While the small bits of blue that pepper Dunmore’s sky signal promise for
the isolated figure, this landscape evokes a tension different from that of
Montgomerie.
In fact, differences between Dunmore and Montgomerie suggest the disparate
functions their respective landscapes served. In Montgomerie, the landscape
assumed a narrative function, providing the venue for a historic military event in
which the sitter participated. It was expressive only insofar as its technical devices
heightened the drama of the event. The real tension derived from the physical contest
between the men and their allegorical correlation with concepts of civilization and
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savagery. Indeed, more important than the physical setting was the relationship
between Montgomerie, his soldiers, the Native Americans and the spectator. It was
this human network, and its hierarchy of social relations, that earned for Montgomerie
a civic persona.
Like Montgomerie, Dunmore served as an officer during the French and
Indian War,18 but if the landscape he occupies was also intended to signify the
American wilderness, its implications for the sitter’s identity were likely different.19
Notice the way the clouds absorb the wisps of his hair, the earth absorbs his shadow,
and the vegetation absorbs the colors of his kilt. By contrast, notice his upright
bearing, his steady gait, and the easy cast of his head. Here, the landscape serves a
psychological function; tension derives not from any physical action, but from the
relationship between man and nature. Whereas Copley employed an inter-human
relationship to convey Montgomerie’s identity, Reynolds employed an inner-human
one. As a result, as a metaphor for the emotional and disordered state of nature,
Reynolds’s landscape served as a foil for Dunmore’s reason, highlighting the
intellectual domination of his natural, inner self. Inversely, it likewise alludes to the
passions he controls. Ultimately, in other words, the landscape becomes not a passive
recipient of human action, but a force with which Dunmore—and, more broadly,
Man—must contend.
18 John Murray, 4th Earl o f Dunmore, was the son o f William, the 3rdEarl (d. 1756), and his wife
Catherine. In 1759 he married Lady Charlotte Stewart, daughter o f the Earl of Galloway. In this
portrait he wears the dress o f the 3rd Regiment o f Foot Guards, which he joined, according to the
inscription on the lower left edge o f the portrait, in 1755. He served as the unpopular Governor of
Virginia in 1771. Sittings for the portrait are recorded by Reynolds in April o f 1765, but the picture
was never paid for; it was acquired by the family in the nineteenth century. See Mannings, Reynolds,
I, p. 347.
19 If it were intended to be the American wilderness, the success o f the image is even more pointed.
Dunmore’s confidence translates not merely as his successful subordination o f passion to reason, but
his successful subordination—metaphorically speaking—o f Americans to Britons.
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Despite these contextual differences, both Copley and Reynolds depict Public
Men. Both invoke the inner strength required for public rule. Two additional
features mediate this intention: the use of ‘public’, military costumes; and the visual
disengagement of subject from viewer. In Montgomerie, the viewer is forced into a
position of passive subordination like a soldier awaiting command. In Dunmore, he
is acknowledged not at all. And yet the success of both images necessarily depended
upon the spectator. Copley, for one, relied upon the viewer to intellectualize the
contrast between the well-heeled, calm, and slightly elevated Major and the un
heeled, frantic and subordinate ‘others’. And he depended upon his audience’s ability
to correlate that contrast with principles of social order: as rational and virtuous order
descended from the reasoned rule of an independent and civilized elite, so chaos and
corruption arose from the impassioned fists of savage masses. Dunmore is equally
dependent, but in a different way. Dunmore’s self-absorption translates into an act of
contemplation, the observation of which achieves two ends: by adopting the external
gaze, Reynolds alludes to the Platonic gaze of the truth-seeking philosopher-king,
transforming Dunmore, metaphorically-speaking, into a virtuous leader; at the same
time, by compositionally subjecting the spectator to this act of contemplation, not
only is the viewer made to receive Dunmore as a philosopher-ruler, he is prevented
from engaging in his own act of contemplation and, hence, from assuming the role of
philosopher-king himself.
There is precedent for such tactics. Take, for example, Thomas
Gainsborough’s John Campbell, 4th Duke o f Argyll (Fig. 6-5; 1768; oil on canvas, 92-
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1/2 x 60-3/4 inches; Scottish National Portrait Gallery, Edinburgh).20 Standing fulllength in peers’ robes ornamented by the Order of the Thistle, one hand bearing the

F l l » <S»S

20 Thomas Gainsborough (1727-88) was bom at Sudbury, Suffolk, and attended Sudbury Grammar
School. He began his studies in London in 1740 under the influence of Hubert Gravelot, the French
engraver, and Francis Hayman (primarily at Hogarth’s St. Martin’s Lane Academy). His early works
show the influence o f seventeenth-century Dutch landscape painters. Following his return to Suffolk,
ca. 1746 or 1748, he married Margaret Burr, the natural daughter of the Duke o f Beaufort, whose
annuity brought him some financial independence. Combining landscapes and portraits into
diminutive conversation portraits, he painted for a local clientele until his move to Ipswich (17521759) and then Bath (1759-ca. 1774). Once in Bath, Gainsborough set up a highly fashionable portrait
practice. He was also introduced to the works o f Van Dyck hanging in west country homes.
Gainsborough began exhibiting in London in 1761 and was elected a founder-member o f the
RA in 1768. By 1774, when he settled in London permanently, he was enjoying a fashionable portrait
career. A favorite o f the Royal family, he was distinguished from Reynolds not only in temperament,
but in practice, adopting a wholly individual style. He died in 1788, probably from cancer. For more
information on Gainsborough and his work, see A. Asfour, and P. Williamson, “Splendid Imposition:
Gainsborough, Berkeley, Hume,” Eighteenth-century Studies 31 (1998) pp. 403-432; D. Cherry and J.
Harris, “Eighteenth-century Portraiture and the Seventeenth-century Past: Gainsborough and Van
Dyck,” Art History 5 (September 1982): 287-309; Malcolm Cormack, The Paintings o f Thomas
Gainsborough (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); John Hayes, Thomas Gainsborough
(London: Tate Gallery, 1980); Nicola Kalinsky, Gainsborough (London: Phaidon Press, 1995);
Michael Rosenthal, The Art o f Thomas Gainsborough: ‘a little business for the Eye ’ (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 2000).
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baton of the Hereditary Master of the King’s Household, while the other rests on his
coronet, the Duke of Argyll presents himself as the consummate Public Man.21 The
tight curls of his powdered wig, the ermine of his cloak, the glint of metal and gold
threads, the sheen of velvet, silk and satin: this is a formal image of a man whose
material riches are intended as signifiers of his public, noble status. Even the
22

placement of his feet is indicative of his ‘politeness’.

As in the case of Montgomerie and Dunmore, the setting reinforces
Gainsborough’s intentions. Incorporating a classical arch in an undefined, liminal
space—a popular emblem of noble greatness alternately characterized by a column
and swag23—Gainsborough effected a sense of timelessness that both universalized
his subject and distanced him from the particular and familiar spectator. As
suggested by Harrington, classical and historical time were alternately understood as
the spheres of ‘ancient’—the rule of reason—and ‘modem’—the rule of fortune—
prudence.24 Moreover, like Montgomerie and Dunmore, Argyll assumes a
disengaged gaze. By so detaching the sitter from the spectator, by so presenting him
as a contemplative member of the philosophical elite, Gainsborough forced the
21 John Campbell was a professional soldier who defended western Scotland during Prince Charles
Edward Stewart’s campaign to restore his monarchy in 1745. A year later, he was named commander
in Scotland. It was not until he was sixty-seven that he inherited the dukedom from his cousin. See
Companion Guide to the Scottish National Portrait Gallery (Edinburgh: National Galleries of
Scotland, 1999), p. 70.
22 Books like Nivelon’s The Rudiments o f Gentile Behaviour provided artists with stock poses—based
on ancient gestures and classical dance “positions”— for the signifying o f politeness. See Francis
Nivelon, The Rudiments o f Genteel Behaviour (London: s.n., 1737).
2’ Walter Hippie, The Beautiful, The Sublime, & The Picturesque in Eighteenth-Century British
Aesthetic Theory (Carbondale, IL: University o f Illinois Press, 1957), pp. 16, 18.
24 As already noted (see Chapter Three), whereas ancient prudence guarded against the corruptive
forces of self-interested men through the balanced influence of three estates, whereas ‘ancient
prudence’ ensured that all ‘independent’ commoners were granted the rights of citizenship supportive
of “LIBERTAS”, ‘modem prudence’ (and its alternative government) was “an art whereby some man,
or some few men, subject a city or a nation, and rale it according unto his or their private interest;
which... may be said to be the empire o f men and not o f laws.” (Harrington, The Commonwealth o f
Oceana, pp. 9-10) For a further discussion, see Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana, pp. 9-10,
43-53, 185-205, 241-244, 256-257.
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spectator, literally and metaphorically, to look up to him: to esteem him. Once again,
compositional devices preclude the viewer from engaging in his own act of
contemplation, thereby forcing him into a subordinate—private—position.
In general, the conventions employed by Copley, Reynolds and Gainsborough
drew on a classical visual language that dominated Academic portrait-painting for
most of the eighteenth century. This language included: the superior placement of the
subject, achieved through an elevated composition and a disengaged gaze; the formal
display of the figure, usually achieved by upright stature and public dress (be it noble,
military, judicial or religious); the overt display of intellectual or rational powers,
signaled by posture, gesture, or technical effects (light, for example); the inclusion of
symbols or accoutrements referencing public service (these might be particular, as in
political or military orders, or general, as in classical columns or swags); and the
linking of the subject to a universal time-scheme through the symbolic manipulation
of costume and/or setting.
But the language could be employed to varying ends. For example, the
concern with a universal time-scheme seems to have eased as the eighteenth century
wore on. Although classical costumes and settings continue to appear in eighteenthcentury portraits, the use of ancient costume seems to have waned by mid-century.
Even Shaftesbury conceded a modem dress: “Let his Garb and Action be of the more
modish sort, in order to introduce him better, and gain him Audience” among his
contemporaries, without yet forgetting that he enacts a role comparable to that of the
ancients.25 By contrast, Reynolds defended the superiority of ancient dress for the

25 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 204-205.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

219

general style.26 Ultimately, while the question of dress remained unsettled, the
controversy itself suggested changing ideas about the importance of philosophical
versus historical pursuits—the pursuit of universal truth versus the pursuit of civic
good. For example, ‘acceptable’ modifications to the ‘Grand’ style included the
substitution of official costume for classical dress, and landed property, the assembly,
the battlefield, or the court for a classical liminal space.27 Copley’s Montgomerie
may thus be understood as a “historical” variation on the “grand-style” type.
In fact, Copley’s image provides compelling evidence of the influence of
modem ideas. Changes to Montgomerie during the course of the commission suggest
he consciously opted for the historical style and a more active composition.
According to Emily Neff, Montgomerie’s original gesture served a didactic
function;28 it indicated the events occurring behind the Major rather than guiding the
actions of his unseen soldiers. One effect of this change was to demonstrate
Montgomerie’s leadership abilities as opposed to merely alluding to them. But,
without denying the allegorical reference to the battle between civilization and
savagery that satisfied the demands of grand-style painting, it also served to locate
Montgomerie in historical time. This shift in narrative emphasis—from allegorical
reference to historical record—was a measure of Montgomerie's departure from more
conservative agendas and, indeed, from the more contemplative and neo-Platonic
Dunmore. Further comparisons between works by Copley, Reynolds and others

26 Reynolds, Discourse III, pp. 48-50; Wind, pp. 88-89.
21 Reynolds, Discourses on Art, pp. 57, 60, 88-89.
28 N eff writes: “In an earlier preparatory drawing, Copley positioned Montgomerie closer to the stance
of the Apollo Belvedere, with an arm gesturing back into space, as if to display the background action.
In a subsequent drawing and the finished painting, Copley sprang the figure into action by depicting
him with his left arm stretched in front o f him.” See Neff, John Singleton Copley in England, p. 114.
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suggest that such visual modifications were informed by important shifts in the social
narrative.

F ig ,

6-6

Consider, for example, Commodore Augustus Keppel (Fig. 6-6; 1753-1754;
oil on canvas, 94 x 58 inches; National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, England),
produced by Reynolds more than a decade prior to the artist’s official endorsement of
the academic Grand Style.29 Here, hand on sword hilt, the striding commodore

29 Augustus Keppel was the second son of William Anne Keppel, the second Earl o f Albemarle, and
Lady Anne Lennox. Between 1740 and 1744, he served as a midshipman on Commodore George
Anson’s world voyage. In 1749, already a well-seasoned commodore, he transported Reynolds to Italy
for the artist’s study. His illustrious career earned him the position o f commander of the Channel fleet
in 1778 during the War of American Independence. Sympathetic to the American cause, however, he
was the target o f a court-marshall brought on by his less competent second, Admiral Palliser, who
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ventures into the landscape, undeterred by potential hazards.30 Directing the action of
his unseen attendants, Keppel’s pose and gesture seem to echo those of
Montgomerie.31
According to David Mannings, the Keppel portrait served Reynolds like a
•

diploma piece, marking the artist’s ascension into the ranks of professional painters.

32

More intriguing, however, are the changes Reynolds made while the work was in
progress.33 These changes transformed the piece from a conventional civic humanist
icon into a dramatic, historical variation on the civic humanist type. Mannings
writes:
Recent X-rays have confirmed that Reynolds originally placed Keppel slightly
further to the left against a classical column... with his head at a different
angle.. .lit from the left.... [This first effort] was taken to an advanced stage
of completion before the artist decided that the effect was wrong and
reworked the entire passage, altering the position of the hands at the same
time and overpainting the column with a stormy coastal view.34
employed this tactic as a means of retaliation for blame that was accumulating to himself. Acquitted of
all charges, Keppel retired from his military duties in 1780 and entered Parliament as a Member for
Surrey. In 1782 he was made a viscount and served briefly as First Lord o f the Admiralty during the
Rockingham administration. See Mannings, Reynolds, I, pp. 287-288; Treasure, Who’s Who in Early
Hanoverian Britain (London: Shepheard-Walwyn Ltd., 1992), p. 284.
j0 According to Northcote, a studio assistant to Reynolds, this is the coast o f Brittany where Keppel
and his crew were temporarily shipwrecked while in pursuit o f a French privateer in 1747. Mannings,
Reynolds, I, p. 288
31 The pose o f the striding, downward-gesturing Commodore Augustus Keppel (1753-1754) was
compared by Ellis Waterhouse with the earlier tartan portrait, Norman, 22 Chief o f MacLeod (ca.
1747) by Allan Ramsay, the latter of which was noted as a possible source (Mannings, Reynolds, I, p.
288). He later dismissed this claim as an impossibility. Alistair Smart restored the point on grounds of
a chalk drawing of MacLeod by Joseph Vanhaecken located in Vanhaecken’s studio. This drawing
was thought by Smart to have informed both Keppel and Thomas Hudson’s Charles Douglass. (Smart,
Allan Ramsay, 1992, pp. 112-113; also cited by David Mannings, Reynolds, I, p. 288) See Smart, Allan
Ramsay, pp. 112-113; Mannings, Reynolds, I, p. 288.
32 As one writer recalled in 1794, it was “the first thing that distinguished him after his return to his
native country” and was the catalyst for his subsequent rise to fame. (Edmond Malone(?), The
European Magazine and London Review, Feb. 1794, p. 91; quoted in David Mannings, p. 287) In his
1797 essay for Reynolds’s Works, Malone noted that the portrait o f Keppel “attracted the publick
notice” and positioned Reynolds to become “the greatest painter that England had seen since
Vandyck.” (Quoted in Mannings, Reynolds, I, p. 288) See Mannings, Reynolds, I, pp. 287-288.
j3 Davies writes: “’With this picture, says Farington, in his Memoir o f Reynolds published in 1819, ‘he
took great pains; for it was observed at the time that after several sittings he defaced is work and began
again’.” Quoted in Davies, Reynolds, pp. 20-21.
34 Mannings, Reynolds, I, p. 288.
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What was Reynolds thinking when he dismissed the traditional column for the rugged
landscape? What prevented him from employing—as he later did in Frederick
Howard, 5th Earl o f Carlisle (Fig. 6-7; 1769; oil on canvas, 94-7/8 x 59 inches; Castle
Howard Collection, Yorkshire, England)—the classical emblems with which his
audience was familiar?

Fig. 6-7
Lifelong friends of Reynolds,35 both Keppel (1725-1786) and Howard (17481825) were noble-born. Against KeppePs “second-son” military career, however,
Howard was a “first-born” politician: the eldest son of the 4th Earl of Carlisle, he held
the title of Lord Morpeth until he succeeded his father as the fifth earl in 1758; from
35 In fact, Howard was a pall-bearer at Reynolds’s funeral. See Mannings, Reynolds, I, p. 265.
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1780-1782, he served as Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland. Here, a similar stride, posture,
gesture and gaze—even a comparably monochromatic color scheme—are employed.
•

36

Although military dress is replaced by robes signifying the Order of the Thistle, the
effect is essentially the same: the donning of official uniform by a public man. What
makes the comparison so striking is the difference in their settings.37
While the Aristotelian ethic acknowledged both the battlefield—patriotism—
and the assembly—statesmanship—as proper venues for the exercise of virtue, the
display of public virtue in the battlefield was obviously different from that of the
assembly. By the same token, neither image gives particular attention to an actual
battle or an actual assembly. Indeed, that Reynolds opted for a classicized liminal
space in the image of Howard suggests that his ideal of statesmanship transcended
historical time and, hence, that it was more theoretical than particular.
While the decision to modify Keppel seems, on first view, to contradict the
grand-manner prescriptions of his later Discourses, the changes actually represented
modem variations on the civic humanist model. In the case of Dunmore and Keppel,
for example, if not for Montgomerie, the landscape is notably sublime.3* In
referencing the sublimity of nature—in presenting its rugged, impassioned force—,
Reynolds only revised the context of greatness with which his sitters were identified.
According to Walter Hippie, the sublime was representative of “the great,” appealing

36 Howard assumed this honor in 1768. See Mannings, Reynolds, I, p. 266.
37 A setting which John Woodward aptly termed “in the manner o f Veronese.” See exhibition
catalogue, Birmingham, 1961, no. 45; quoted in Mannings, Reynolds, I, p. 266.
38 “Indeed, the ‘tempestuous sea and stormy shore’ in the background were cited by Henry Fuseli as an
example o f that favourite aesthetic category o f the later eighteenth century, the Sublime...
See
Mannings, Reynolds, I, p. 288.
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to the spectator’s “higher faculties” of “genius and imagination.”39 This squared with
Reynolds’s demands for the grand-style image.40
Still, that Montgomerie, Dunmore and Keppel all employ natural
environments instead of classical spaces and, consequently, locate their sitters in
historic time is compelling, for it suggests that Reynolds (and/or his sitter) was less
concerned with the issue of timelessness than with attributes of publicness. This shift
in emphasis may well reflect an urgent desire to reclaim for the Public Man a
contemporary significance—and, hence, continued viability—in the face of dissenting
political trends. In other words, it may signal a contemporary movement to restore
the classically-defined aristocrat to his ‘rightful’ place.
What, then, of the country landscape? James Latham’s provincial portrait,
Charles Tottenham (Fig. 6-8; 1731; oil on canvas, 87 x 57 inches; National Gallery of
Ireland, Dublin), suggests the pervasive use of classical architectural motifs as a
means of affiliating the sitter with the discourse of civic humanism: the sitter’s
identity is correlated with a classical social order informed by Aristotelian civic
leadership symbolically conveyed by the ‘pillar-of-the-community’ metaphor. And
yet consider the differences between Tottenham and Howard. Reynolds’s image
engages the sitter in an Italian forum, garbed in his noble robes, instructing the
spectator who stands beneath him, passively observing his intellectual contemplation.
39 Hippie, pp. 142-143.
40 Though often conveyed by way o f classical (noble) architecture, the “great” could also be conveyed
through “the sublime.” Hugh Blair argued, for example, that the “sublime... produces ‘an effect
extremely similar to what is produced by the view o f grand objects in nature; filling the mind with
admiration, and elevating it above itself.” (Blair, quoted in Hippie, p. 126) As Hippie observes, ‘“It
must be remembered’, says Reynolds, ‘that this great style itself... presupposes in the spectator a
cultivated ... state o f mind.” (Hippie, p. 144) For Reynolds, then, “It is an absurdity... to suppose that
we are bom with this taste, though we are with the seeds o f it, which, by the heat and kindly influence
of... genius, may be ripened in us’.” (Reynolds, quoted in Hippie, p. 144) See Hippie, pp. 16,18,7172, 126, 144.
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By contrast, Tottenham is depicted in a private, domestic setting, his boots and crop
suggestive of leisurely country pursuits. Moreover, Tottenham engages the spectator
with his gaze; he meets him, literally and figuratively, on the same level.
The everyday clothes, the polite doff of the cap, the engaged eyes: these
elements suggest a more informal and egalitarian relationship between subject and
spectator, a relationship conditioned by conversational rather than courtly models of
behavior. There is no evidence of the philosophical contemplation that subordinated
Reynolds’s spectator to his sitter. Indeed, emphasis has shifted from intellect to land.
Certainly, property was assumed to undergird all civic humanist prescriptions for a
public man—it was the foundation of independence, both intellectual and
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socioeconomic. But by emphasizing property—and more specifically land—Latham
drew attention to precisely that element of neo-Aristotelian ideology forging a rift
among civic humanists—and precisely that element missing in the other portraits.
Indeed, we confront here two different visions of the public man: the aristocrat whose
birth isolates him from the people and invests him with the intellectual virtues of
independence and disinterest; and the landed gentleman whose property invests him
in the good of the state and its people. In other words, against the neo-Country
directives of Shaftesburian civic humanism, Latham invokes a Harringtonian
‘Country’ principle: that the land itself is the foundation of public virtue. Tottenham
becomes the visual translation of Fielding’s ‘Squire Allworthy’, and one is compelled
to ask: in the absence of title, amidst expanding definitions of property and the
commodification of land, how was the squire to assert his virtue?
On the one hand, then, an artist might revise the civic humanist model without
radically altering its civic humanist objectives: informal poses might replace formal
ones; public spaces might replace classical ones; sublime landscapes might replace
classical architecture. On the other hand, however, selective manipulation of civic
humanist conventions might likewise work to the detriment of its narrative. If, for
example, classical accoutrements imbued the sitter with a public stature, as they did,
for example, in the 4th Duke o f Argyll, or invoked attributes affiliated with the landed
nobility, as they did in the 5th Earl o f Carlisle, even among aristocratic women—as
suggested, for example, by Reynolds’s Georgiana, Duchess o f Devonshire (Fig. 6-9;
ca. 1775-1776; oil on canvas, 94-1/4 x 58-1/16 inches; Huntington Library, Art
Gallery and Botanical Gardens, San Marino, California)—, what of portraits of
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Fig, 6-9

c o m m oners

and merchants, two ‘private’ types that went largely unrecognized in the

public discourse of civic humanism? What, for example, were the implications
attendant Copley’s companion portraits of Mr. and Mrs. Jeremiah Lee (Figs. 6-10, 611; 1769; oil on canvas, 95 x 59 inches (each); Wadsworth Atheneum, Hartford)?
Whereas Georgiana Spencer was the daughter of John Spencer, the 1st Earl Spencer,
and the wife of William Cavendish, the 5th Duke of Devonshire, and might therefore
claim title to the noble—if female—attributes affiliated with a classical setting,
Martha Swett Lee was the daughter and wife of colonial merchants John Swett and
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Jeremiah Lee. As such, she bore no claim either to the classical attributes accorded
aristocratic birth or the public virtues accorded heroic actions. Similarly,

Fig* WO

Fig* M l

although Jeremiah Lee served as justice of the peace, he was neither noble-born nor
landed—indeed, the son of a merchant, he was a radical Whig.41 The images thus
represent a rather paradoxical conflation of ideological elements—public and private,
traditional and modem, exclusive and inclusive, Country and Court.
That civic humanist emblems were employed by individuals like the Lees,
whose social place was a byproduct of money rather than land, suggests that they had
evolved to assume an alternative meaning for their colonial contemporaries. As
41 Prown, John Singleton Copley, pp. 109; Paul Staiti, in Rebora and Staiti, et al, John Singleton
Copley in America, pp. 258-262.
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symbols of certain ‘qualities’ traditionally associated with the aristocracy—those of
character, Taste, intellect, and land, for example—, they were understandably
desirable to a broader audience, but they were also clearly thought to be more readily
accessible. Patrons like the Lees—and artists like Copley—evidently felt safe in
assimilating these symbols into their portraits and, by extension, in claiming their
signified attributes as aspects of their identities. This is compelling, for it suggests
that, at least in the American colonies, private individuals felt free to claim those
virtues traditionally denied them by the civic humanist narrative. The question
naturally arises, then: to what further ends was the language and meaning of civic
humanism modified? Might not the same individuals have felt free to assume the
corresponding privileges of those attributes: the social rank and political authority of
the landed elite?
A conventional vocabulary of postures, gestures, costumes, poses, gazes, and
settings provided a visual language from which artists might draw in the construction
of portrait identities. How the artist employed that language—what he chose to say—
was up to him, but the resulting identity necessarily implied a supporting ideology. In
general, modifications to the civic humanist portrait suggest the coexistence of
various standards and narratives, thereby suggesting the coexistence of alternative
perceptions of reality.
This paper has proposed that the eighteenth-century portrait functioned, at
least in part, to locate its subject—and secure his place—within a larger community.
Portraits thus serve, at least in part, as evidence of the standards informing
contemporary identity and the narrative context within which those standards
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assumed meaning.42 That portraiture witnessed an eighteenth-century boom among
the upper and middle classes is thus compelling.43 On the one hand, if limited control
over a changing cultural narrative was one disadvantage facing the individual,
portraits provided a ready answer: they presented their patrons with the power to
construct cultural narratives supportive of specific standards and identities suited to a
desired identity. By participating in the construction of his own narrative context, a
patron helped to stage the interpretive framework within which his identity was
judged. On the other hand, the deconstruction of portraits might thus advance our
understanding of the values, beliefs and aspirations informing the imag[in]ing of
identity in eighteenth-century Britain and, more particularly, colonial America.

42 As Locke aptly—if inelegantly— noted: “the way to discover something’s nature is to find out what
standard governs identity judgments about it.” Quoted in Canfield, The Looking-Glass Self, p. 99.
43 The quantity and availability o f portraits was argued by Carol Gibson-Wood in “Furnishing with
Faces,” talk delivered at The Huntington/ The Paul Mellon Centre for Studies in British Art
Conference, Facing the Eighteenth Century: New Approaches to British Portraiture, October 25, 2002.
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CHAPTER VII
FACING INDEPENDENCE

Fig, 74

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

232

A quarter-century prior to Major Hugh Montgomerie, when still only
dreaming of a future in the metropolis, Copley hinted at his grand-style aspirations in
one of the most brow-raising images of colonial American origin. Standing before an
architectural landscape of balustraded Romanesque arches regimented by Dorictopped pilasters and graced by classical figures in ancient dress, Nathaniel Sparhawk
(Fig. 7-1; 1764; oil on canvas, 90 x 57-1/2 inches; Museum of Fine Arts, Boston)
occupies a liminal position on the landing of a classical portico, his figure a human
plinth to the fluted column that rises from his shoulders. One might presume from
this interlude that Sparhawk is a pillar of the realm—itself a general and universal
space. And the suggestion is supported by other aspects of the image. For example, a
grand powdered wig boasts fashionable curls that cascade in a whisper behind his
coral velvet suit. Moreover, while the bent knee, jutting hip, and casual placement of
arms and hands—one resting across a columned plinth, the other suspended from his
right pocket—suggest the informal stature of a man “at ease,” so the placement of his
feet recalls the open “third” position of a dance master. The civic humanist
undertones of the classical landscape are thus augmented by a “conversational”
attitude reminiscent of Shaftesbury. And one is tempted to read in Copley’s grandmanner portrait a colonial interest in—and support for—a neo-Country narrative and
identity.1
Although Reynolds had yet to formulate the academic model for the British
grand-style portrait, the manner was well-documented in continental imagery,
allusions to which were resonant in Richardson’s writings as well as the public
1 Carol Troyen alludes to this when she writes: “the resulting work brought a new level of grace and
informality to an august Grand Manner formula.” See Troyen, “John Singleton Copley and the Grand
Manner: Colonel Nathaniel Sparhawk,” Journal o f the Museum ofFine Arts, Boston, 1 (1989), p. 97.
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images and retail prints that found their way to the colonies. It was already apparent,
for example, in the work of John Smibert and Robert Feke, two colonial painters
whose heroic portraits honoring the victors at Louisbourg (1745) were likely familiar
to Copley.2 Indeed, while Reynolds’s Discourses, which codified and modified into
an aesthetic framework many of the ideological tenets informing Shaftesbury’s
narrative, became the English model for grand-manner painting, one could also argue
that the Discourses represented a reactionary response to alternative models and
narratives and the need to snuff their growing influence. This possibility returns us to
the portrait of Sparhawk.

Fig, 74

Fig, 7 4

Unlike Copley’s portrait Major Hugh Montgomerie (Fig. 6-1), and his later,
even grander, George John, Second Earl Spencer (Fig. 7-2; 1799-1806; oil on canvas,

2 Staiti, in Rebora and Staiti, John Singleton Copley in America, p. 204.
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104 x 67 inches; Collection of the 9th Earl Spencer)—itself an echo of Reynolds’s
William Augustus, Duke o f Cumberland (Fig. 7-3; 1758; oil on canvas, 100 x 74-3/4
inches; The Devonshire Collection, Chatsworth House Trust, Derbyshire)—,
Sparhawk records (however inadvertently) elements inconsistent with grand-manner
convention. On the one hand, Sparhawk suffers from an inelegance of features: an
expansive forehead crowns small brown eyes, bulbous nose, thin upper lip, and
plump chin. This suggests the privileging of likeness over grace for which Ramsay
criticized Addison.3 But it also recalls contemporary literary descriptions of self-made
men. 4
In Frances Burney’s Camilla (1796), a retired wig-maker, Mr. Dubster,
presumes the stature of a country gentleman on grounds of money alone.
Subsequently, he is unable to disguise his natural meanness. For all his pretensions,
Camilla can identity Mr. Dubster by his “language and... voice,” through which, “no
longer stiff, starched, and proud, as when full dressed, [he] was sunk into the smallest
significance.”5 When asked to identify himself by an Irish officer (Macdersey) of
“ancient and respectable” family, Dubster replies:
“Who am I, sir? I am a gentleman, if you must needs know.”
“A gentleman! who made you so?!”
‘“Who made me so? why leaving off business! What would you have
make me so?”6

3 Ramsay criticized Addison, “for ‘not establishing a constant attachment to Truth as the leading and
inseparable principle of all... works o f art’.... ‘The agreeable.. [Ramsay] insists, ‘cannot be
separated from the exact; and the posture, in a painting, must be a just resemblance o f what is graceful
in nature, before it can hope to be esteem’d graceful'." Ramsay, “On Ridicule,” 1753; quoted in
Smart, Allan Ramsay, p. 100.
4 What Clarissa Harlowe calls “the upstart man” in reference to Mr. Solmes. See Samuel Richardson,
Clarissa, or the History o f a Young Lady (1747-1748), Angus Ross, ed. (New York: Penguin Books,
1985), p. 81.
5 Burney, Camilla, pp. 276-277.
6 Burney, Camilla, p. 431.
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To this interchange he later adds: “I’m turned gentleman myself, now, as much as the
best of ‘em; for I’ve nothing to do, but just what I choose.”7
Not only has Dubster confused money with birth, he has confused idleness
with leisure, play with improvement, a point confirmed by his “slow and solemn”
literal thinking; on being called “a little dirty fellow,” he exclaims: “If I’m little or
big, I don’t see that it’s any business of his. And as to dirty, I’d put on all clean linen
but the very day before....”8 Mr. Briggs, of Burney’s Cecilia (1782), likewise
highlights the nuances of politeness that distinguished the gentleman of birth from the
monied commoner. A “short, thick, sturdy man with very small keen black eyes, a
square face, a dark complection, and a snub nose,” he removed his wig and wiped his
head in the public company of “gentlefolk” to their “universal horrour.”9
In fact, the contrast between the polite gentleman and monied commoner
illustrates the narrative dissonance between the classical premise of the neo-Country
identity and the English premise of its Country cousin. Against the lean elegance of
Macdersey, Briggs is short and sturdy, against the former’s “conversational”
pastimes—women, wine, hunting, gambling and a natural “disdain” for money—,
Dubster tauts “beef steaks and onions” at “the Globe,” a direct allusion to his English
and mercantile identity.10 Moreover, whereas gentlemen (Shaftesbury) equated
politeness with the external evidence of internal virtue, commoners, Burney suggests,
equated it with a mode of consumption—“a round of toast and butter and a few

7 Burney, Camilla, p. 478.
8 Burney, Camilla, pp. 431,470.
9 Burney, Cecilia, pp. 94, 324.
10 Burney, Camilla, pp. 281,479-480. As Adam Smith likewise noted, “A merchant, it has been said
very properly, is not necessarily the citizen o f any particular country. It is in a great measure
indifferent to him from what place he carries on his trade.” See Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, p. 519.
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oysters, fresh opened....”11 Finally, whereas Macdersey embraces a code of honor,
Dubster invokes the rule of law—the former a celebration of individual discipline, the
latter a supplement for its absence.12 Ultimately, the contrast effects two value
systems, one based on birth (family/ name), education (abstract thought), leisure,
honor, rank, and politeness (of language and behavior), the other on money, training
(literal/ pragmatic thinking), play (work), law, equality, and freedom.

13

In Sparhawk, the “common” absence of natural grace—in Ramsay’s sense of
absent elegance—is compounded by an egalitarian address. Contrary to
Montgomerie, Spencer, Dunmore and Argyll, Sparhawk engages the viewer’s gaze.
Indeed, insofar as his gaze demands reciprocity from the viewer, the spectator’s role
is an active, intellectual one. For all the grandeur of setting, accoutrements, costume
and stance, the subject does not presume to subordinate the spectator, but rather to
impress him with material riches and social polish. This urge to impress implies a
vulnerability not found in grand-manner imagery. It also presumes the viewer’s
capacity for judgment.14 The suggestion of interdependence is further affirmed by
optical differences. Copley’s failure to achieve the convex illusionism by which
Montgomerie and Dunmore are visually ‘elevated’, becomes a measure of
11 Burney, Cecilia, p. 745.
12 Burney, Camilla, p. 433-434.
13 For a literary exemplar o f this dichotomy, see Burney, Cecilia, pp. xxiv-xxv, 118, 186,409-410,
431, 659, 745-746, 883-884. As Clarissa Harlowe explains in a letter to her brother, “the principal end
o f a young gentleman’s education at the university is to learn him to reason justly, and to subdue the
violence o f his passions.” See Richardson, Clarissa, p. 137.
14 This, Skinner notes, was a key component o f the commercial ethic, which turned on the reciprocity
o f social relations. “It is precisely because the individual regards the opinions o f the spectator as
important,” he writes, “and because he seeks approval, that he imposes upon himself a degree of
restraint or self-command.... ” (Skinner, in Smith, pp. 20-21) As Pocock likewise observes: “Once
property was seen to have a consensual value, expressed in coin or in credit, the foundations o f
personality themselves appeared imaginary or at best consensual: the individual could exist, even in his
own sight, only at the fluctuating value imposed upon him by his fellows....” (Pocock, The
Machiavellian Moment, p. 464) See Skinner, in Smith, Wealth o f Nations, pp. 20-21; Pocock, The
Machiavellian Moment, p. 464.
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Sparhawk’s distance from their superior rank. And, indeed, Sparhawk was not a
member of the landed elite.15 In fact, the tradition of a landed elite cast in formal
dress, graced with classical accoutrements and distinguished by references to landed
stature, a tradition that surfaced as early as the Renaissance—as demonstrated by
Robert Peake’s Henry, Prince o f Wales (Fig. 7-4; ca. 1611-1612; oil on canvas, 68 x
44-3/4 inches; National Portrait Gallery, London)—has undergone a paradoxical twist
in the hands of the colonial painter.

Fig. 7-4

15 As Troyen notes, Sparhawk was the son of a Bristol, Rhode Island minister whose death altered the
course o f Sparhawk’s career. Following his mother’s remarriage to a Boston merchant, the path to
Harvard veered to his stepfather’s countinghouse. Prosperity won him the hand o f Elizabeth
Pepperrell and her significant family connections. However, in 1758, a lag in business and increased
taxes combined to effect his financial ruin. It wasn’t until 1759, when his father-in-law died, that
Sparhawk’s circumstances were restored. See Troyen, “John Singleton Copley and the Grand
Manner,” p. 99.
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Nathaniel Sparhawk (1715-1776) was forty-nine when this portrait was
painted. A resident of Kittery, Maine, he earned his keep through a successful trade
in wood and molasses.16 But Sparhawk’s greatest socioeconomic leap came upon his
marriage to Elizabeth, daughter of Sir William Pepperell. The death of Sir William in
1759 won Sparhawk a substantial estate and propelled him into the ranks of the
colonial social and political elite.17 By 1764, when this image was painted, Sparhawk
was comfortably ensconced in Sparhawk Hall, his colonial counterpart to the English
estate. One is reminded of Adam Smith’s subsequent insight (1776):
In our North American colonies, where uncultivated land is still to be had
upon easy terms, no manufacturers for distant sale have ever yet been
established.... When an artificer has acquired a little more stock than is
necessary..., he does not... attempt to establish with it a manufacture for more
distant sale, but employs it in the purchase and improvement of uncultivated
land. From artificer he becomes planter, and neither the large wages nor the
easy subsistence which that country affords to artificers can bribe him rather
to work for other people than for himself. He feels that an artificer is the
servant of his customers...; but that a planter who cultivates his own land, and
derives his necessary subsistence from the labour of his own family, is really a
master, and independent of all the world.18
Copley was not the first to subject grand-manner conventions to a narrative
context that paradoxically undermined its ideological intentions. William Hogarth’s
Captain Coram (Fig. 7-5; 1740; oil on canvas, 94 x 58 inches; Coram Family, in care
of the Foundling Hospital, London) stands as compelling evidence of the influence of
commerce—and the social and ideological progress of the monied interest—on the
aesthetic standards of civic humanism. A seated composition that (yet) measures
16 Staiti, in Rebora and Staiti, John Singleton Copley in America, p. 204.
17 According to Jules Prown, Sparhawk was a moderate Tory whose annual income ranged in the upper
bracket—between 500-1000 pounds. In addition to this economic leap, Sparhawk assumed his fatherin-law’s seat on the Court o f Common Pleas o f York County, Maine. Even more telling, his son,
William Pepperrell, bore the honor of being first in his Harvard class—a sign o f his social rank. See
Prown, John Singleton Copley, p. 114; Troyen, “John Singleton Copley and the Grand Manner,” p. 99.
18 Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, p. 482.
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even larger than Sparhawk, the portrait of Thomas Coram provides visual testimony
to the reforming force of economics and industry.

Fig. 7 4
On first glance, the composition of Coram recalls Sir Godfrey Kneller’s
George I (Fig. 7-6; 1716; oil on canvas, 97-1/4 x 59-3/4 inches; National Portrait
Gallery, London, Beningbrough Hall)—even down to the pinkie ring. But the
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Fig. 7*6
comparison is largely a superficial one. In Kneller’s image, gold-banded velvet
hangings, a fine oriental carpet, and a richly-carved baroque armchair locate the
subject in a grand and fashionable interior. Within a shallow recess to the sitter’s
right, canopied by an ornately-carved shell that foreshadows the growing influence of
Palladianism—“foreign” tastes—, a draped table displays the trappings of monarchy:
crown, orb and scepter.19 Within this grand and formal context, King George I sits

19 As early as the 1720s, the influence o f the English Baroque was giving way to Palladianism—the
neoclassicism patronized by Lord Burlington and celebrated in works of William Kent. Determined
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atop an elevated dais in layers of official dress, the velvet and satin of his endless
robes cascading in folds beyond the picture plane. Yet, his relaxed right hand, the
cock of his bewigged head, and the “easy” placement of his satin-slippered feet betray
a natural confidence and politeness made all the more pointed by his condescending
engagement of the spectator’s gaze. One might recall Mrs. Selwyn’s remark to
Evelina:
chancing... to be bom of a noble and ancient family, [he] thinks
proper to be of opinion, that birth and virtue are one and the same
thing.... Fortunately for the world in general, [he] has taken it into
[his] head, that condescension is the most distinguishing virtue of high
life.
In a compositionally-similar arrangement, classical pillar and swag, gray stone
flooring, and a brass nail-headed and leather-upholstered chair locate Coram in a
domesticated liminal space. Against an architecturally-framed seascape that recalls
earlier portraits of Elizabeth I (Fig. 7-7; ca. 1588; oil on panel, 38-1/2 x 28-1/2
inches; National Portrait Gallery, London), a walnut pedestal table displays the
rewards of his economic success: a scroll marked “The Royal Charter” and the seal of
the Foundling Hospital. Within this context, Coram is likewise supported by an
elevated dais. But in keeping with the economic premise and stature of his identity,
the clothing he wears is private—a great coat, suit and gloves—and the powdered hair
is his own. Moreover, against the ease of the king’s courtly politeness, Coram
appears neither confident nor relaxed: his right hand pointedly labors to give proof of
his success, while his left grasps gloves a bit tightly; his disheveled hair veils an

advocates o f the English Baroque defended its merits on nationalist grounds. Bindman notes: “The
attack on the Palladians and a tendency to invoke the English rather than the classical past shows that
Hogarth was already allying himself with a [particular political] point of view.. . See Bindman,
Hogarth, pp. 17,26.
20 Burney, Evelina (London, 1778), p. 284.
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awkward tilt to his head; and, left foot dangled, his legs fall crudely toward the floor.
Nonetheless, the image casts him as a merchant-prince, his empire “the Globe” at his
feet.

Fig. 7-7
In fact, Thomas Coram was an English-born ship-builder whose self-made
stature turned on the success of his Boston ship-building firm. This earned his return
to London in 1719 and his eventual self-fashioning as an urban philanthropist.
Significantly, philanthropy, which witnessed a boom in mid-eighteenth-century
Britain, was regarded as a form of patriotism conducive to the material and moral
advancement of society.

01

This would have appealed to Hogarth, whose emerging

commitment to the “Patriot” cause turned on a support for “English-ness” manifest as
a dissent from foreign—i.e. Palladian—tastes, Walpolean corruption, and a devotion
21 Paul Langford, A Polite and Commercial People: England 1727-1783 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1989), pp. 485-489.
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to the “ancient”—i.e. Elizabethan—liberties of “true” Whiggism.22 Twenty-years
after Coram’s return, upon the establishment of The Foundling Hospital, Hogarth
commemorated his friend’s greatest legacy with an image that simultaneously
propelled the artist into the ranks of grand-manner portrait-painters.

23

Significantly, however, the image of the commoner-cum-prince conveyed by
Coram suggests not a rejection of social hierarchy or public greatness—indeed, the
“Patriot” cause endorsed a “Patriot King”—but rather, as with Sparhawk, a pressure
to expand the accessibility of social ranks that the honors afforded the traditional elite
might be open to the deserving (propertied) commoner.24 As Burney suggests and
Paul Langford confirms: “tradesmen did not want to think of themselves as tradesmen
but as gentleman.”25 Thomas Coram and Nathaniel Sparhawk might thus be
understood as statements of social fluidity and the empowering and progressive
influence of commercial industry accorded by the principles of a variant narrative.
As such, they would seem to advance the narrative and aesthetic ideals of Jonathan
Richardson. A similar claim might be made of more modest colonial portraits by
Copley and others. John Hancock (Fig. 7-8; 1765; oil on canvas, 49-1/2 x 40-1/2

22 As Bindman describes it: “when culture flourished under a benevolent and patriotic monarch,
surrounded by a court o f public-spirited gentleman.” He goes on: “The 1740s saw Hogarth emerge as
a self-consciously English artist, and in this he reflects the emergence of opposition ‘patriotism’ and its
eventual adoption by all political interests....” (Bindman, Hogarth, p. 46) See Bindman, Hogarth, pp.
46-50.
23 As Bindman aptly notes, the portrait presents a blending o f the French grand-manner brush and
stateliness with English naturalism. However, Hogarth had attempted the “Great Style without a proper
academic training or the experience o f an apprenticeship to a practitioner o f the genre. The problems
of such painting were not just technical, o f making a convincing illusion on a large scale: they also
required an approach to the theoretical question o f the depiction o f the realm o f ideal moral action.”
(Bindman, Hogarth, p. 98) See Bindman, Hogarth, pp. 98,131, 133.
24 Bindman, Hogarth and his Times, pp. 45-50.
25 Langford, A Polite and Commercial People, p. 65. According to a House o f Commons survey of the
parish o f Whitechapel in 1734, “Tradesmen o f Good Credit, Great Dealings, and, most commonly, of
good Understanding” could be numbered among the “polite.” (Langford, p. 75) See Langford, A
Polite and Commercial People, pp. 65-68, 75.
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inches; Museum of Fine Arts, Boston), for example, captures a Boston merchant at
his desk, an account book and quill in hand, before a column and swag cleverly
formed by the shadow of drapery above plinth-like books. Yet the image of Hancock
bears still broader implications.

John Hancock (1737-1793), son of the unremarkable Reverend John Hancock
of North Braintree, Massachusetts, was left poor and fatherless at age seven until
adopted by his merchant-uncle, Thomas Hancock, the highly successful owner of
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Boston’s House o f Hancock.26 By age twenty-six, after years of social indoctrination
and a Harvard education, young Hancock was made a full partner. In 1764, following
his uncle’s death, he succeeded to the ownership of House o f Hancock and his uncle’s
Beacon Hill estate. The portrait by Copley marks his new consequence.
And yet the portrait itself is hardly grand. An avid consumer of English
decorative arts and Madeira wines, “King Hancock” was known to cruise Boston in
ostentatious carriages, decked out in costly finery, to the neglect of his business.

27

But none of this is suggested by this image. Nor is reference made to his political
aspirations. And it is this combination which makes Hancock’s portrait so
compelling. On the one hand, the depiction of Hancock as a hardworking and
successful businessman defies grand-manner conventions, casting the common-born
man in the guise of an ignorant and interested dependent. Inversely, it removes
Hancock from any affiliation with the English upper classes, an affiliation which his
income and lifestyle may well have allowed.28 In other words, Copley presents one
of the wealthiest men in the American colonies, an anchored member of the colonial
elite, in an inferior socioeconomic station; he casts a man who enjoyed the leisurely
pursuits and privileges of inherited wealth as a man dependent on the labors of
industry. In so doing, Copley reversed the conventions of his Sparhawk portrait and,
while borrowing on the language of civic humanism, manipulated its symbols for
alternative ends. The consciousness of this effort is made all the more certain by the
evidence of Hancock’s familiarity with grand-style imagery: shortly before sitting for
26 According to Staiti, House o f Hancock was “the largest transatlantic shipping firm in Boston.” See
Staiti, in Rebora and Staiti, John Singleton Copley in America, p. 213.
27 Staiti, in Rebora and Staiti, John Singleton Copley in America, p. 213.
28 According to Jules Prown, Hancock’s wealth topped the charts, exceeding 1000 pounds per year.
See Prown, John Singleton Copley, p. 108.
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his own portrait, Hancock commissioned a grand-manner image of his Uncle.

29

The

question is: why?
Copley’s presentation probably had more to do with Hancock’s political
leanings than his religious ones.30 The year of Hancock’s portrait marked the year of
the Stamp Act, which, following the Seven Years War, served both practical—
revenue—and political—control—ends. That it set off a train of ardent political
protests, paraded as patriotic assertions of independence and self-sufficiency,
confirmed British fears about growing colonial autonomy,31 as suggested by a letter
from David Hume:
... They voted that the Parliament of England had no Right to impose on them
any Taxes whatsoever; that they had no Right to make any Laws for them
without their Consent; that the Colonies had a Right to trade freely to any Part
of the World where they found their Advantage; that they were determined to
maintain these Principles to the last Drop of their Blood; and that the whole
Militia and Arms be carefully inspected, in order to maintain the Colonies in a
State of Defence against all Invaders.... If this Intelligence hold to the Extent
here related, there will certainly be a considerable Revolution in the Ministry.
Mr. Pitt will be sent for.... He seems the only Man, who can either bring the
Americans to submit peaceably by his Authority; or subdue them by his
Vigour. It does not seem probable that the Repeal alone of the Stamp Act will
suffice.32

As political tensions against the empire mounted, Hancock assumed the

29 Staiti, in Rebora and Staiti, John Singleton Copley in America, p. 213.
30 Staiti compares Wayne Craven’s interpretation o f the image—as one “expressive o f Calvinistic
virtues, especially the idea that material rewards in life are the tangible proof of God’s divine
blessing”— with Gordon Wood’s savvy reminder o f contemporary colonial displeasure with
“flamboyant elites.” See Staiti, in Rebora and Staiti, John Singleton Copley in America, pp. 213-214.
31 Jack P. Greene, “An Uneasy Connection: An Analysis o f the Preconditions o f the American
Revolution, in Kurtz and Hutson, eds., Essays on the Making o f the Constitution (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1987), p. 80. In fact, Hancock used one o f his own ships to bring the repeal to
Boston, where he made the announcement to the local public. See Staiti, “Character and Class,” in
Rebora and Staiti, p. 73.
32 Letter from David Hume to Lord R ... (indecipherable), dated May 8, 1766 (Huntington Library
Manuscript Collection). As Langford notes, “No self-respecting Whig could lightly disregard the
legislative supremacy ofWestminster.” See Langford, A Polite and Commercial People, p. 539.
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stature of a radical Whig.33 In this capacity, he maneuvered for political influence
and authority in colonial Massachusetts, building up a network of political dependents
and, ultimately, serving as President of the Continental Congress (1775-1777).34 This
may explain why, after only a one-year interlude, Hancock departs so significantly
from Sparhawk: the elaborate, highly “public,” architectural landscape with distant
parkland, has given way to the shadowy backdrop of a domestic interior; the
conversational stance of a polite, velvet-clad,35 man-of-leisure has given way to an
industrious, wool-clad,36 businessman; scrolled architectural plans, suggestive of
grandeur and expense, give way to account books, the evidence of investment and
savings. Indeed, whereas Sparhawk recasts the merchant as a member of the landed
elite, implying the exclusive nature of grand-manner imagery and, by extension, the
exclusive stature of the Public Man, whereas Sparhawk thereby conformed to the
neo-Country imperative that commercial affiliations be shed in the assumption of a
public identity, Hancock, while not denying certain ideals within the neo-Country
narrative, suggests that the attributes of the industrious merchant are more worthy of
public esteem than those of the leisured gentleman—that a businessman might be
better received as a Public Man than a member of the leisured elite—, a significant
modification to the civic humanist narrative bearing major implications for identity.

33 According to Komblith and Murrin, the Sugar, Stamp, and Currency Acts o f 1764-1765 “represented
a direct attack on both the elites’ economic interests and their political authority.” See Komblith and
Murrin, “The Making and Unmaking o f the American Ruling Class,” in Alfred F. Young, ed., Beyond
the Revolution: Explorations in the History o f American Radicalism (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois
University Press, 1976) p. 46.
34 Staiti, in Rebora and Staiti, John Singleton Copley in America, p. 214.
35 Most certainly an imported cloth.
36 Possible made in the colonies.
37 Notably the suggestion o f public good signified by the column and swag.
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Gordon Wood has argued that industry was recognized neither as a social
benefit nor a qualification of the would-be elite but was, rather, urged on the
commoner as a corrective to idleness.38 Yet Hancock suggests otherwise. In part, it
could be argued, the presentation of an industrious commoner reflected contemporary
criticism about the moral degeneracy of an ostentatious elite.39 But as Langford
observes, the failings of the elite gave inverse influence to the virtues of a middling
sort.40 In fact, as Wood himself suggests, weaknesses within the elite provided the
opportunity for social advancement and occasioned the remodeling of political
relationships on the example of social ones.41 This invited the inclusion of
commercial attributes—such as industry and ‘fair-dealing’—into the narrative of
public good. Accoutrements like quill and ink, letters and papers, are thus potentially
emblematic of the sitter’s engagement in a larger network of social conversation.
What the portrait of John Hancock suggests, then, is that, by 1765, social engagement
and economic industry had begun to inform an alternative colonial narrative and its
language of visual imagery.
Copley was not alone in celebrating the potentiality of the industrious
individual or in making him a pillar of the classical narrative of public good. Charles
38 Wood writes: “industriousness and hard work were everywhere extolled and the Puritan ethic was
widely preached but only for ordinary people, not for gentlemen, and not for the sake o f increasing
society’s productivity.” He goes on: “Hard, steady work was good for the character o f the common
people: it kept them out o f trouble; it lifted them out o f idleness and barbarism; and it instilled in them
the proper moral values; but it was not thought to expand the prosperity of society.” See Wood, The
Radicalism o f the American Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), p. 33.
39 Langford explains: “the new pageantry o f urban, bourgeois England was developing fast, subtly
transforming the role o f nobleman as principal gentleman, without their realizing it. Ostentatious
display was still permissible, but display which suggested commitment to an open, equal society rather
than one which savoured of lordly superiority.... When aristocrats ... diverged from the patterns of
conformity required by the society around then, they were punished....” See Langford, A Polite and
Commercial People, p. 600.
40 As Langford notes, “Bourgeois respectability and prudery were rising stocks in the 1760s and
1770s....” See Langford, A Polite and Commercial People, p. 582.
41 Gordon Wood, The Radicalism o f the American Revolution, pp. 136, 140, 170-174, 225.
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Willson Peale’s allegiance to radical Whiggism has been convincingly argued by a
number of scholars and is made visually evident in John Beale Bordley (Fig. 7-9;
1770; oil on canvas, 84-7/16 x 58-1/2 inches; National Gallery of Art, Washington).42
Here, a contrast of backgrounds punctuated by a brewing storm suggests an
allegorical landscape meant to be read, like a weathered text, from left-to-right—west
to east. This translates, alternately, into a narrative progress from “what has been” to
“what will be.” On the one hand, a skewed oak tree (a metaphorical reference to
England gone wrong?) frames an image of a British soldier leading a pack-laden
beast (British piracy of colonial goods?)43 On the other hand, the prosperity of fruitbearing peach trees frames an image of the pastoral ideal (the uncorrupted virtue of
independent self-sufficiency). In the same vein, a paper marked “Imperial Civil/ Law
- Sumary / proceeding” (an allusion to trial without jury),44 lies tom and rejected at

42 For further information about Peale and his work, see Theodore Bolton, “Charles Willson Peale, an
Account o f His Life and Work,” The Art Quarterly, vol. I and Supplement, vol. II (Autumn, 1939;
reprint 1989): 354-385,417-445; David R. Brigham, Public Culture in the Early Republic: Peale ’$
Museum and its Audience (Washington and London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1995); Brandon
Brame Fortune, “Charles Willson Peale’s Portrait Gallery: persuasion and the plain style,” Word &
Image 6,4 (October-December 1990): 308-324, and “From the World Escaped: Peale’s Portrait of
William Smith and his grandson,” Eighteenth-Century Studies 25,4 (Summer, 1992): 587-615; Sidney
Hart, “Charles Willson Peale and the Theory and Practice of the Eighteenth-Century Family,” in
Lillian B. Miller, ed., The Peale Family: Creation o f a Legacy, 1770-1870, exh. cat. (New York,
1996), pp. 100-117; Ellen Miles and Leslie Reinhardt, “’Art conceal’d’: Peale’s double portrait of
Benjamin and Eleanor Ridgely Laming,” The Art Bulletin, LXXVIII, 1 (March 1996): 57-74; Lillian B.
Miller and David C. Ward, eds. New Perspectives on Charles Willson Peale: A 250thAnniversary
Celebration (Pittsburgh, PA: University o f Pittsburgh for the Smithsonian Institution, 1991); Charles
Willson Peale, et al. The Collected Papers o f Charles Willson Peale and his Family, 1735-1785,
Lillian B. Miller, ed. (Millwood, NY: Kraus Thomson, Inc., 1980); Edgar P. Richardson, Brooke
Hindle, and Lillian B. Miller, Charles Willson Peale and His World (New York: Harry N. Abrams,
Inc., 1983); Charles Coleman Sellers, Charles Willson Peale (New York, 1969); Horace Wells Sellers,
“Charles Willson Peale: Artist-Soldier,” The Pennsylvania Magazine o f History and Biography, v. 38,
n.3 (1914): 257-286; David Steinberg, “Charles Willson Peale Portrays the Body Politic,” in Lillian B.
Miller, ed., The Peale Family: Creation o f a Legacy, 1770-1870, exh. cat. (New York, 1996), 119-133,
and “’A Rough and Unhewn Virtue’: Charles Willson Peale’s John Beale Bordley,” paper presented at
the Omohundro Institute o f Early American History and Culture, October 1997.
43 Cynthia Mills and Ellen Miles, in Miles, American Paintings o f the Eighteenth Century, pp. 114116.
44 According to David Steinberg, the vice-admiralty courts established in Halifax and elsewhere in
1764 and 1767, were instituted according to Roman civil laws which, unlike common law, operated by

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

250

Bordley’s feet. By contrast, the ‘natural’ premise (rock podium) of mixed
government is precariously reclaimed as a corrective to tyranny and the foundation of
English law upon which justice and liberty depend.45 But Peale’s image also suggests
a looming threat to this natural progress metaphorically rendered as a brewing storm
and a British soldier who moves back into darkness.

summary proceeding—i.e. without juries—, a circumstance which colonists deemed inconsistent with
their rights as British citizens. As Steinberg also notes, however, the confusion plaguing notions of
common (unwritten, by tradition), statutory (written), imperial, natural and divine law complicated the
monographic use o f related emblems, though more so in England than the colonies. See Steinberg, “A
Rough and Unhewn Virtue: Charles William Peale’s John Beale B o r d le y paper presented at the
Omohundro Institute o f Early American History and Culture, October 28, 1997, pp. 3, 8-12.
45 The open book reads “Nolumus Leges Angliae mutari”—we are unwilling that the laws o f England
be changed. As Mills and Miles aptly observe, the words harkened back to the Commonwealth
emphasis on mixed government to which Charles I responded in his Answer to the Nineteen
Propositions (1642). Four years after Bordley’s portrait, John Dickinson invoked the phrase in his
Essay on the Constitutional Power o f Great Britain Over the Colonies. See Cynthia J. Mills and Ellen
G. Miles, in Miles, American Paintings o f the Eighteenth-Century, p. 114.
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Within this context, standing full-length in unadorned brown homespun, the
Maryland lawyer-politician turned gentleman-farmer directs our vision to the pastoral
image that visually and metaphorically backs English law. In so doing, he persuades
our engagement in a political controversy that ultimately turns on a single question;
as Burney’s Cecilia puts it: “Is then this great secret of happiness ... nothing, at last,
but total seclusion lfom the world?” To which Bordley, in the words of Belfied,
might have replied: “No, madam..., it is Labour with Independence.”46 In other
words, while Bordley metaphorically alludes to classical progress and common good,
his version of its landed populace appears more industrious than leisured, more
defensive of the benefits of agricultural activity than the heroic actions and
contemplations afforded noble wealth. One is reminded of Harrington’s Oceana, in
which, quoting Francis Bacon’s essay, “Of the True Greatness of Kingdoms and
Estates,” Harrington wrote:
in making farms and houses of husbandry of a standard; that is, maintained
with such a proportion of land unto them as may breed a subject to live in
convenient plenty and no servile condition, and to keep the plough in the
hands of the owners and not mere hirelings;... you shall attain unto Virgil’s
character which he gives of ancient Italy... .47
As alternately expressed by the Patricians (1773), “birth alone has no pretence, to
Truth, or honour, dignity, or sense’.”48

46 Burney, Cecilia, p. 659. According to Mills and Miles, Bordley retired from public life “determined
to become a self-sufficient patriot farmer and develop a model plantation. He believed that America
needed to establish economic independence from England. While he, like most colonists, had long
imported many luxuries from Britain, he now substituted homemade beer for London ale and porter,
and grew wheat instead o f tobacco, the staple o f Anglo-American commerce. His farm included its
own carpenter and blacksmith shops, as well as looms and spinning wheels that he supplied with his
own fleeces, hemp, flax, and cotton.... In the background graze the sheep from which Bordley
produced his wool in an effort to reduce dependence on British textiles, a major export to the
colonies.” See Mills and Miles, in Miles, American Paintings o f the Eighteenth Century, pp. 113-114;
Richardson, Hindle, and Miller, Charles Willson Peale and His World, p. 38.
47 Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana, pp. 3-4.
48 Quoted in Langford, A Polite and Commercial People, p. 590.
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This visual rendering of a Harringtonian narrative recalls the “Patriot” cause
of Hogarth and Coram. By 1770, it had found literary parallel in the contemporary
work of English ‘republican’ Whigs.49 Indeed, while Peale was putting paint to
canvas, Catherine Sawbridge Macaulay, whose brother, John Sawbridge, founded the
Bill of Rights Society, was dressing down the Rockingham Whigs for their betrayal
of ‘true Whig’ principles.50 Significantly, radical Whigs were unwilling to forego the
narrative link between land and virtue, seeking rather to void it of birth-related
connotations. Like the “Patriot” cause of earlier years, they disassociated the
freeholder from the hereditary elite without disassociating his virtues from
independence and progress. This had particular resonance in the colonies. As Wood
notes, in contrast to their English compatriots, the majority of colonial Americans
were still farmers.51 Indeed, against the elite monopoly on land in England, land was

49 Langford, A Polite and Commercial People, p. 528.
30 Langford writes: “In politics there was always an undercurrent o f republican distaste for the House
o f Lords, which surfaced in times o f turbulence. Catherine Macaulay in her onslaught on the
Rockingham Whigs in 1770, treated the vested interest o f great noblemen as an affront to the
Harringtonian values at least as great as that represented by the corruption at the command o f the
Crown.” (Langford, pp. 590-591) As Langford explains, during the reign o f Walpole Whiggism—i.e.
the Court Whigs o f 1727-1742—, the freeholder ideals originally affiliated with the Restoration Whigs
o f the Glorious Revolution, which celebrated the rights and liberties o f ‘ancient’ England, were being
promoted by the Opposition or Country party under the leadership o f the old Tory, Viscount
Bolingbroke. The ideals continued to find resonance among various groups throughout the eighteenth
century, surfacing again in the guise o f William Pitt. With the accession o f George III, and the return
o f Tories to court, old ideological divisions became convenient means by which to rally support for
one political group or another. In 1768, for example, John Wilkes borrowed on the rhetoric o f Country
liberty to defend a more radical version o f Whiggism incompatible with Court politics. When
Catherine Macaulay published her History o f England (1763-1783), she gave shape to a Whig
narrative that, according to Langford, “resembled those o f generations o f Commonwealth Whigs and
Country Tories who had resisted the oligarchical tendencies o f early Hanoverian government. This
link,” he goes on, “between old style ‘patriot’ ideology, even old Toryism, and the new ‘patriotism’ of
the 1760s and 1770s was important. It was to provide the reformers o f the late eighteenth century with
a fund o f arguments and a sense o f continuity.” (Langford, p. 528) See Langford, A Polite and
Commercial People, pp. 25-27, 230-234, 333-338, 519-529.
51 Wood, The Radicalism o f the American Revolution, p. 59.
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more widely dispersed in the colonies, 60% of American colonists owning 70% of the
land.52
On the one hand, then, that Bordley and Coram—freeholder and merchant—
could draw on similar ideological roots in the construction of their “English”
identities suggests a point-of-departure for reconciling the differences between
Bordley and Hancock. Yet, Coram, like Sparhawk, had “retired” from business prior
to claiming his identity. And this suggests the possibility of unresolved tensions
between the ideological foundations informing the two images—between the
freeholder ideal and a society bom on the coat-tails of commerce. Indeed, the
potential ideological inconsistencies are made all the more pronounced by the striking
contrast between Bordley and Elijah Boardman (Fig. 7-10; 1789; oil on canvas, 83 x
51 inches; The Metropolitan Museum of Art). In fact, painted almost twenty years
later, Ralph Earl’s portrait signifies the influence of post-War developments on the
modeling of American identity.
Elijah Boardman (1760-1823) was the third son of the Connecticut colonists
Sherman Boardman and Sarah Bostwick. Tutored by the local minister, Boardman
served as an apprentice-clerk before setting up as a Connecticut shopkeeper in 1781.
The success of his undertaking was evident in 1792, when he married, bought out his
business partner, and built and outfitted a substantial new home and shop.53 But it is
also resonant in this remarkable image. Here, dispensing with the classical allusions

52 This as opposed to 5% owning 70% in England. See Komblith and Murrin, “The Making and
Unmaking o f an American Ruling Class,” in Alfred F. Young, ed. Beyond the American Revolution,
pp. 43-45.
Komhauser, Ralph Earl: Face o f the Young Republic (Hartford, CT: Wadsworth Atheneum, 1991),
p. 155.
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of grand-manner imagery/4 Earl opted instead for the presentation of a shop interior
whose visible storeroom displays stacks of fashionable foreign and domestic

Fig. 74©
textiles.55 Visually and metaphorically, the storeroom “backs” the foreground
image—the rows of account books, the richness of Boardman’s silk and muslin

54 These would have been familiar to Earl from his London period. Earl studied under West—and
possibly Reynolds— , exhibiting at the Royal Academy from 1783 to 1785. See Brian Stewart and
Mervyn Cutten, The Dictionary o f Portrait Painters in Britain up to 1920 (Suffolk, England: Antique
Collector’s Club, 1997),p. 181; James Thomas V\qwst , History o f American Painting. Volume II: The
Light o f Distant Skies (1760-1835) (New York: Dover Publications, (1954) 1969), p. 68.
55 According to Ribiero, the inventory includes silks, wools, linens, printed cottons and blends, some of
American manufacture. The bottom bolt is marked with a British stamp. See Ribiero, in Komhauser,
Ralph Earl: the Face o f the Young Republic, p. 156; Komhauser, Ralph Earl, p. 155.
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costume, the gold watch and accoutrements, the volumes of literature and, ultimately,
Boardman himself.56 But it does more than finance his material riches.
In Sparhawk—as in Spencer (Fig. 7-2) and Cumberland (Fig. 7-3)—, a
classical liminal space frames a generalized landscape, their combination alluding to
the timeless, ancient virtues of public good bom of the disinterested independence
affiliated with the landed elite. By contrast, Boardman projects a particular and
contemporary architectural interior that frames an individual merchant’s private
storeroom, the combination of which might suggest—in the neo-Country narrative—the selfish and fleeting benefits accrued to the merchant as a result of his ambitious
interests. Yet such would not seem to be Earl’s intent. For all its differences of
setting, the posture of Boardman virtually mirrors that of Sparhawk, the same elegant
ease informing Sparhawk’s “politeness” likewise informs the image of Boardman,
suggesting a comparable degree of virtue.

en

According to Paul Langford, while the phrase “polite and commercial” may
have originated in William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws o f England
(1765-1769), “similar terms were commonplace in the 1760s and 1770s, and suggest
something of a consensus about the central characteristics of mid-eighteenth-century
• •
England.”58 On the one hand, commercialism
had come to be widely accepted as the

“fourth stage” in the progress of civilization. At the same time, its necessary
concession to widespread consumption demanded alternative methods for keeping
corruption at bay. To this end, “politeness” was simultaneously invoked as a medium

56 Ribiero, in Komhauser, Ralph Earl, p. 156.
57 It is interesting to note that Englishmen considered politeness a uniquely English trait, lost on the
rustics of the provinces and colonies. See Langford, A Polite and Commercial People, p. 329.
58 Langford, A Polite and Commercial People, pp. 1-6, quoted from p. 1.
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for social elevation and individual regulation.59 The result was a paradoxical
convergence of “landed” (neo-Country) and “monied” (Liberal) influences. By the
same token, while the balance-of-influence between land and money shifted in favor
of money, the scramble to enhance one’s public stature resulted in the grasping after
minor—but conventionally landed—identities.60
In some respects, Hogarth’s portrait of Thomas Coram, with its similarly
framed view of a merchant’s life-blood, helped to mediate the visual translation of
private merchant into Public Man.61 A similar narrative was subsequently echoed in
59 Langford explains: “In a sense politeness was a logical consequence of commerce. A feudal society
and an agrarian economy were associated with an elaborate code of honour designed to govern
relations among the privileged few.... But a society in which the most vigorous and growing element
was a commercial middle class, involved both in production and consumption, required a more
sophisticated means o f regulating manners. Politeness conveyed upper-class gentility, enlightenment,
and sociability to a much wider elite whose only qualification was money, but who were glad to spend
it on acquiring the status o f gentleman. In theory politeness comprehended, even began with, morals,
but in practice it was as much a question of material acquisitions and urbane manners.... Though it
involved much emulation and admiration o f aristocrats, it did not imply an essentially aristocratic
society.” (Langford, pp. 4-5) See Langford, A Polite and Commercial People, pp. 4-6, 60, 648.
60 Langford writes: “Much significance was attached to the matter o f title. The Leicestershire
clergyman Aulay Macaulay remarked on the extraordinary increase in the second half o f the eighteenth
century, in the numbers who described themselves as ‘Mr’, ‘Mrs’, and ‘Esquire’. In principle, the term
‘Esquire’ continued to be restricted to men o f property or professional standing. It was considered
incompatible with trade, though retired businessmen commonly assumed it as soon as they had
invested their profits in property or an annuity.... The depreciation o f the currency o f title proceeded
still more rapidly with the ‘rank’ o f gentleman, thanks to its wider connotations. Technically it
continued to be a particular rung on the ladder. Small country squires who did not presume to count
themselves among the county gentry used it with pride. Substantial tradesmen and merchants felt free
to resort to it where their courage failed them in regard to ‘Esquire’.... In the countryside a new term
had to be invented to describe the pretensions o f men who owned little or no property o f their own but
enjoyed a measure o f opulence. Henry Fielding used the expression ‘gentleman farmer’ in Tom Jones
in 1749 and Charlotte Lennox did so in The Female Quixote three years later. During the following
decade it was to become commonplace. Agrarian improvement seemed to be raising a new breed of
rural capitalists who demanded equality of status with their landlords.... By the reign o f George III
‘Mr’ and ‘Mrs’ were widely accepted in towns, and increasingly in the countryside, as the automatic
entitlement o f anyone who owned property, hired labour, or simply laid claim to a degree o f rank and
respectability.” (Langford, pp. 65-66) He goes on: “This debasement of gentility is one of the clearest
signs of social change in the eighteenth century, the mark o f a fundamental transformation....” In the
end, Langford writes, England “was not a nation o f gentry, but a powerful and extensive middle class.
This class rested on a broad, diverse base o f property, by no means restricted to land.” It was this
class, he continues, which “decided the framework o f debate and the terms o f tenure on which the
traditional politics of monarchy and aristocracy were conducted.” (Langford, p. 66-68) See Langford,
A Polite and Commercial People, pp. 65-68.
61 Indeed, having acquired significant property and inherited his father’s interest in public life,
Boardman assumed the position o f United States Senator. See Komhauser, Ralph Earl, p. 155.
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grand-style variations like Peale’s William Stone (Fig. 7-11; 1774-1775; oil on
canvas, 100 x 61 inches; Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore) and John
Trumbull’s Patrick Tracy (Fig. 7-12; 1786; oil on canvas, 91-1/2 x 52-5/8 inches;

Fig, 741

Fig,742

National Gallery of Art, Washington). But only in Earl’s portrait are the “goods” of
commerce projected as mediums of virtue and a mode of interdependence
advantageous to social good.

fry

As the Reverend Mr. Tyrold put it in Burney’s

Camilla, “That species of independence which proudly flies at all gratitude, is

62 Commercial virtue necessarily differed from the Aristotelian heroic ideal in being social rather than
civic, “easy” rather than formal, involving interactive rather than autonomous practices. As Taylor
remarks, “A key feature of it is that our service o f self takes productive form, as against the ...
aristocratic, caste-conscious pursuit o f honour and glory through self-display and the warrior virtues.”
(Taylor, pp. 238-240) See Taylor, pp. 238-240,286-301; Mandeville, Fable o f the Bees, pp. 20, 41.
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inimical to the social compact of civilized life, which subsists but by reciprocity of
services.”63
Historians tend to agree that the colonial American narrative was informed
by both ideology and interest.64 However, whereas Bernard Bailyn and Gordon
Wood give emphasis to the influence of Opposition rhetoric in the years preceding
the Revolution, Joyce Appleby has endorsed a more liberal interpretation.65 As she
sees it, the economic policies and practices of the seventeenth-century became the
foundation for a more liberating outlook that, while undermining aspects of the
classical narrative, was encouraged by the Court as complementary to imperial
interests.66 Against “the constitutional ideal of the disinterested citizen,” she writes,

63 Bumey, Camilla, or A Picture o f Youth (London, 1796), p. 232.
64 The colonial elite, they concede, drew on republican and liberal ideals, both Country and Court as
needed, in the fashioning o f a narrative that satisfied colonial experience. As Bailyn observes, “it is
the flexibility o f their ideas... that has proven the most impressive product of the later studies of
Revolutionary ideology.” (Bailyn, p. vi) See Bailyn, The Ideological Origins o f the American
Revolution (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press o f Harvard University Press, 1967), particularly pp.
v-vi, 19, 21, 35, 55, 77, 79, 86, 94, 124, 161, 230, 376; Wood, The Creation o f the American Republic,
1776-1787 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1969), pp. 15-17,45, 50, 53, 65,70-71, 75, 81-83,
91, 108, 114, 117, 123-124.
In his more recent work, The Radicalism o f the American Revolution, Wood gives stronger
emphasis to the liberal component, particularly as it emerged during the Constitutional era, ca. 17761789. Americans were becoming, he argues, “the most liberal, the most democratic, the most
commercially-minded, and the most modem people in the world,” a circumstance he attributes to the
effect of Revolution, which “altered their understanding o f history, knowledge and truth. Most
important, it made the interests and prosperity o f ordinary people—their pursuits o f happiness—the
goal of society and government. The Revolution ... released powerful popular entrepreneurial and
commercial energies that few realized existed and transformed the economic landscape o f the
country.” See Wood, The Radicalism o f the American Revolution, p. 7.
65 Appleby, “The Social Origins o f the American Revolutionary Ideology,” The Journal o f American
History, LXIV (March 1978): 935-958. See also Appleby, Liberalism and Republicanism in the
Historical Imagination (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).
66 Opposition aversion to commercial men turned, in part, on the corruptive influence of profit, which
allowed interested men to influence dependents and thereby subvert the public good. Even Thomas
Paine blamed England’s demise on commerce. (Paine, Common Sense, p. 55) But the Opposition
platform was also largely reactionary. See Wood, The Creation o f the American Republic, 1776-1787,
p. 15; Appleby, “The Social Origins o f the American Revolutionary Ideology,” p. 952.
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imperialism urged industry, wooing the ambitious instincts of common men with the
•

•

promise of profit, social status, and political authority.

67

Yet, as Appleby likewise notes, the “qualities of the liberal model of society
that attracted intelligent but uncultivated men and women on the make” were likewise
sanctioned by a Protestant ethic that lent acquisition-by-industry a modicum of
respectability.68 Hence, the ambitions of profit might be ideologically cloaked in the
guise of virtuous piety. But independence-through-industry might be additionally
perceived as complementary to the promise of English liberty, as variously articulated
by Commonwealth and Restoration Whigs and revived by “Patriots” and
“republicans.” On the one hand, then, the pursuit of profit and rank was attained by
way of imperial policy. On the other hand, the colonial defense of industry and
improvement was premised on an Anglo-Protestant radicalism perversely grounded in
the ideals of an “ancient” constitution—i.e. monarchy. In America, where the
availability of land and the absence of a hereditary elite made advancement by profit
and the ownership of land possible, these variant ideologies appear to have
converged.69 By uniting selective elements of competing ideologies, colonists appear
to have subsumed the “pursuit of happiness” into a narrative of “ancient rights and

67 Appleby, “The Social Origins o f the American Revolutionary Ideology,” p. 939.
68 As Appleby explains it, the Opposition “evoked the classical theory of mixed government to stay the
course of modernization and to forestall an economic development that would undercut the values they
esteemed and the social order that supported those values.” See Appleby, “The Social Origins of
American Revolutionary Ideology,” p. 952.
69 As Wood observes, so absorbed were the Americans in the Commonwealth tradition o f English
radicalism that even the destruction of monarchy and the institution o f republicanism did not clearly
signify a repudiation o f the ancient constitution; for the spirit o f republicanism, the spirit o f the great
men o f the seventeenth century, was “so far from being incompatible with the British constitution, that
it is the greatest glory of it.” See Wood, The Creation o f the American Republic, 1776-1787, p. 45.
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liberties” in which Harrington, Locke and Anglo-Protestantism featured
prominently.70 Within this context, British policy of the 1760s appeared tyrannical.
In other words, differences between Bordley and Boardman may reflect
ideological disparities bom of geographical differences—an agricultural South versus
a commercial North—but they also likely reflect temporal ones.71 In 1770, when
Bordley’s image was painted, the colonial narrative was focused on principles
immediately relevant to the imperial conflict—those which made the case for British
tyranny and American liberties. By 1789, the imperial crisis had passed, and
Americans were celebrating the ratification of a national constitution. In the
meantime, a considerably ideological gap had been breached.
After the Revolution, issues resonant in colonial resistance—particularly the
issue of representation—precipitated the examination of specific ideological tenets—
the notion of the people’s sovereignty, for example—in the formation of the
•

American political structure.

T7

According to Wood, in the process of examining and

70 Edmund Morgan writes: “During the years of controversy from 1763 to 1776 the colonists studied
Locke and Harrington closely (along with subsequent writers like Thomas Gordon, John Trenchard,
and James Burgh...).” (Morgan, pp. 74-75) If the recommendations o f Thomas Jefferson are any
indication, the Country ideology o f Harrington was received in the form o f its Opposition variation, by
way of the writings of Lord Bolingbroke. The combined influence o f Liberal and Opposition thought
is reflected in Jefferson’s recommendations to Robert Skipwith for the outfitting o f his library in 1771.
In addition to works by Locke and Bolingbroke, Jefferson suggested Montesquieu, Hume, Smith and
common-sense theorists like Karnes, Reid and Steuart. Various novels by noted English authors, as
well as works by Pope, Dryden, Milton, Addison and others are also mentioned. Notably absent are
the writings o f Shaftesbury. Notably present is Hogarth’s Analysis o f Beauty. SeeA Virginia
Gentleman’s Library. As proposed by Thomas Jefferson to Robert Skipwith in 1771 and now
assembled in the Brush-Everard House, Williamsburg, Virginia, introduction by Arthur Pierce
Middleton (Colonial Williamsburg, 1952); Morgan, The Birth o f the Republic, 1763-1789, 3rd ed.
(Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 74-75. See also Thomas Paine, Common Sense, in
Common Sense, The Rights o f Man, and Other Essential Writings o f Thomas Paine, introduction by
Sidney Hook (New York: Penguin Books, 1969).
71 Wood, The Radicalism o f the American Revolution, pp. 30-33.
72 Bailyn, The Ideological Origins o f the American Revolution, pp. 77-79; Wood, The Creation o f the
American Republic, 1776-1787, p. ix. To some extent, Greene argues, the groundwork was laid in the
decades preceding the Revolution, insofar as economics had already infiltrated the political sphere and
local government was manned by an established, stable and more inclusive elite. As he explains it, the
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redressing these tenets, the definition of individual liberty was clarified and
expanded, and the perception of social association was modified.73 On the one hand,
the right to happiness was distinguished from the public good. On the other hand, the
individual was recognized as an autonomous entity whose relationship to society was
based on contract. The result was a two-part program embracing happiness (interest)
and good (progress towards potentiality), according to a narrative of natural law—
what Jefferson described as “a free people claiming their rights, as derived from the
laws of nature.”74
Hence, it was not until the post-War period that the full implications of
colonial perceptions of liberty were brought to bear on the American narrative. In the
process, Boardman suggests, the gap between agricultural and commercial industry,
agricultural and commercial benevolence, agricultural and commercial politeness
began to blur as emphasis shifted from the economic means—agricultural or
commercial—to the ideological ends—happiness and goodness—of the American
cause. In complement with this development, the individual was re-modeled
according to moral standards of industry, benevolence, and politeness. By the same

beginning to colonial dissent dates from 1748, when Walpole’s policy of accommodation was
abandoned in favor o f stricter regulations undertaken by Halifax at the Board o f Trade. By this point,
colonial and British perceptions of their respective rights and responsibilities had diverged. Following
the Seven Years War, when Britain resumed its enforcement of stricter trade regulations, the colonies
had already attained a level of self-sufficiency incompatible with imperial demands. See Greene, “An
Uneasy Connection,” in Stephen G. Kurtz and James H. Hutson, eds., p. 32-80.
73 According to Merrill Jensen, within the larger framework o f the Revolution there occurred a
secondary internal revolt against classical republicanism to which the traditional elite responded with a
counter-rebellion in 1787. One unintended effect of this internal revolt was the dissemination of
liberal ideals to the populace. See Jensen, The American Revolution within America (New York: New
York University Press, 1974), pp. 2 ,6 -7 ,1 8 ,2 7 , 39,49,113,166,173-175,207,219.
74 Wood, The Creation o f the American Republic, 129-133; Wood, The Radicalism o f the American
Revolution, pp. 7-11, 129, 162-164, 183-189, 217-218; Thomas Jefferson, A Summary View o f the
Rights o f British America (1774; reprinted by Colonial Williamsburg, n.d.), p. 22.
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token, government became a Rousseauian corrective to individual imperfection—
what Paine termed “the badge of lost innocence.”75
Setting, costume, accoutrements, posture and gaze: all seem to have
contributed to the imag[in]ing of identity in eighteenth-century portraiture, their
combined influence suggesting that colonial emulation of the grand-manner portrait
was increasingly modified at some point in the 1760s, reflecting emerging
sensibilities about the nature of liberty and its implications for the American
narrative. But the use of technique in the work of Copley and others invites further
consideration. Copley’s portrait of John Hancock, for example, is all the more
compelling for the clarity and crispness of his method. Indeed, the enamel-like
surface recalls Vertue’s criticism of Ramsay’s “rather lick’t than pencilled”
7f\

conversational technique. In the language of Reynolds, Hancock is more
“mechanical” than Sparhccwk and, so, more suggestive of the artist’s ignorance. Yet
neither Copley nor Hancock would have brooked such slander. Moreover, the
technique appears to have been employed consciously and purposefully, for a similar
development informs Charles Pelham (Fig. 7-13; ca. 1753-1754; oil on canvas, 36 x
28 inches; Private Collection) and Paul Revere (Fig. 7-14; 1768; oil on canvas, 35 x
28-1/2 inches; Museum of Fine Arts, Boston): in the former, earlier image, a
common artisan is transformed into a literate gentleman; in the latter, later image, the
attributes of an artisan-silversmith are celebrated with an overt—indeed, defiant—
clarity.
75 Paine, Common Sense, p. 24. As Paine explained it, “Society is produced by our wants, and
government by our wickedness, the former promotes our happiness positively, by uniting our
affections, the latter negatively by restraining our vices. The one encourages intercourse, the other
creates distinctions.” See Paine, Common Sense, p. 24.
76 Bindman, Hogarth, p. 146.
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The qualities of Copley’s colonial technique are commonly attributed, at least
in part, to the influence of mezzotints on colonial painting.77 And certainly, the
linearity of colonial portrait painting likely owes much to the linearity of imported
prints. But there is a curious coincidence between the developing influence of
empirical modes of analysis and Copley’s technical interest in the material quality of
his subject-matter, the expanding influence of individualism and Copley’s growing
emphasis on the singularity of his subjects. Indeed, that Copley should paradoxically
progress from the soft, painterly brush and muted tones of Epes Sargent (Fig. 7-15;
ca. 1760; oil on canvas, 49-7/8 x 40 inches; National Gallery of Art, Washington)—a
technique, Spencer (Fig. 7-2) suggests, he re-employed in England,—to the hard,
enamel-like colors and finish of Hancock, a progress which belies conventional civic

77 Carrie Rebora, Paul Staiti, Theodore Stebbins and Marjorie Shelley all note this influence in Rebora
and Staiti, John Singleton Copley in America, pp. 15, 33, 41, 66, 79, 129-130. Indeed, Rebora traces
its long-standing history in “Copley and Art History,” in Rebora and Staiti, John Singleton Copley in
America, p. 15.
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Fig. 74S
humanist assumptions about the intellectual and technical prowess informing general
and particular styles of painting, is suggestive of alternative aesthetic influences.
As already suggested, there was in fact precedent for Copley’s style, most
notably in the work of Allan Ramsay, whose “natural” style likewise evoked the
clarity and intimacy found in Copley’s work.78 In addition to the Drummore portrait
(Fig. 5-1), Ramsay’s Mrs. William Adam (Fig. 7-16; 1754; oil on canvas, 37 x 28
inches; Yale Center for British Art) betrays a concern for individual realism enhanced
by clean lines, a limited palette, a shock of color, and an inescapable engagement
between subject and spectator. Thirty years later, Raeburn was still employing a

78 As Smart notes, the wife of the architect William Adam and mother of Robert Adam is “presented in
widow’s weeds, with a book and a pair o f spectacles in her hands, and once more the colour-scheme is
largely one o f black with a restrained note o f red. It would be hard to find a parallel in British
portraiture o f the period to the intimate realism o f this picture.” See Smart, Allan Ramsay, p. 106.
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“lick’t” technique and like palette in his Lady in a Lace Cap (Fig. 7-17; ca. 1785; oil
on canvas, 36-1/4 x 28 inches; National Gallery of Scotland, Edinburgh).79 It is

Fig, 746

Fig.'747

thus interesting to note the supposed influence of common-sense theory on Raeburn’s
work. 80 Might not Copley, too, if only inadvertently, have been influenced by the
same paragons of empiricism, individualism, and patriotism—Hume, Locke,
Bolingbroke, Karnes—, the same advocates of industry, education and progress—

79 For a discussion o f this image, see Duncan Thomson, Raeburn (Edinburgh: Scottish National
Portrait Gallery, 1997), pp. 48-51.
80 Broadie writes: “Raeburn... produced strongly evocative portraits o f major figures of the
Enlightenment, such as Robertson, Reid, Ferguson, Hutton and Dugald Stewart. He not only painted
the philosophers; he knew them personally and was familiar with their writings, including their
writings on perception. There is evidence that his art was influenced by those writings, particularly
Reid’s... concerning the painter’s need to paint not what is signified by the various patterns o f light
and shade, but instead the light and shade themselves and to leave it to the spectator to interpret the
patterns that the painter has put on canvas.” See Broadie, The Scottish Enlightenment, p. 31.
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Smith, Reid, Stewart—, that Jefferson was urging in 1771 for inclusion in Robert
Skipwith’s library?81
Considered in this context, Copley’s portraits of Hancock and Revere seem to
privilege the material qualities of subject and object at the expense of theoretical
truths

He seems to suggest that knowledge depends on the external evidence of

internal forms and, hence, that the artisan might employ his mechanical powers to
advance the rational good, a point driven home by the dramatic illumination of
Revere’s head and hands. This represents a contradiction of Reynolds’s seventh
Discourse (December 1776), which argued: “success in your art depends almost
entirely on your own industry; .. .not the industry of the hands, but of the mind... ,”82

Fig, 748

81 A Virginia Gentleman’s Library. As proposed by Thomas Jefferson to Robert Skipwith in 1771 and
now assembled in the Brush-Everard House, Williamsburg, Virginia, introduction by Arthur Pierce
Middleton (Colonial Williamsburg, 1952)
82 Reynolds, Discourses on Art, p. 117.
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In fact, the use of dramatic lighting is characteristic of Copley’s mature
colonial work. It is found, for example, in Samuel Adams (Fig. 7-18; 1770-1772; oil
on canvas, 50 x 40-1/4 inches; Museum of Fine Arts, Boston), where the effect is
augmented by a monochromatic palette. Here, the merchant-politician is depicted in
sturdy brown homespun, his starched white linen and powdered hair the only escape
from an otherwise-monotonous color scheme. And yet, it is by these means that the
effect of illumination is made all the more successful, for little distracts us from the
enlightened face and hands—the engaging eyes and emphatic gesture—that
metaphorically convey the complementary union of education and industry—the
pillars of self-sufficiency—in the person of this sitter. Behind Adams, almost
obscured by shadow, is the classical column that confirms his public stature, but its
very faintness suggests redundancy: we can recognize Adams as a Public Man on the
evidence of his “enlightenment” alone. A like effect is achieved in Gilbert Stuart’s
“Vaughan” portrait of George Washington (Fig. 7-19; 1795; oil on canvas, 29 x 23-

Fig. 7-19
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3/4 inches; National Gallery of Art, Washington). In this image, such a force is
Washington’s mind—and, so, his virtue—that it casts a halo behind him.

Fig, 7-20
According to the evidence of Copley’s Nicholas Boylston (Fig. 7-20; 1767; oil
on canvas, 49 x 40 inches; Harvard University Portrait Collection), costume provided
an alternative means for conveying intellectual agility. Here, seated in a rococo side
chair beside a covered table topped with thick ledgers, fronting a view of Boston
harbor, the Boston merchant dons the banyan and robe of the humanist thinker. One
might recall the words of Machiavelli:
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When evening comes, I return to my home, and I go into my study; and on the
threshold, I take off my everyday clothes, which are covered with mud and
mire, and I put on regal and curial robes; and dressed in a more appropriate
manner I enter into the ancient courts of ancient men...; and there I am not
ashamed to speak to them, to ask them the reasons for their actions; and they,
in their humanity, answer me...: I become completely part of them.8J

Although not absent in British painting, such allusions were usually reserved
for more noted intellectuals. Reynolds’s portraits, Samuel Johnson (Fig. 5-6) and
Laurence Sterne (Fig. 7-21; 1761; oil on canvas, 50-1/8 x 39-1/2 inches; National
Portrait Gallery, London), serve as examples of a model that may have originated
with Kneller—note John Locke (Fig. 7-22; 1704; oil on canvas, 30 x 25-1/2 inches;

Virginia Museum of Fine Arts, Richmond)—before adoption by Richardson, William
Hoare, and others—note Richard Boyle, Third Earl o f Burlington (Fig. 7-23; ca.
1717-1719; oil on canvas, 57-1/2 x 46 inches; National Portrait Gallery, London) and
83 Machiavelli, Letter to Vettori; quoted in Grafton, introduction, The Prince, p. xix.
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Alexander Pope (Fig. 7-24; ca. 1738; pastel, 23-7/8 x 17-3/4 inches; National Portrait
Gallery, London). Moreover, while such claims were conventionally deemed a

Fig.

7-23

Fig, 7-24

privilege of leisure, Boylston rests his title, literally and figuratively, on his ledgers.
Once again, the virtues of intellect are supported by the virtues of industry,
paradoxically redressing the neo-Country correlation between intellect and birth.
Significantly, precedent for Copley’s breach of the civic humanist narrative
can be found among the works of Kneller, whose kit-kat portrait of Jacob Tonson I
(Fig. 7-25; 1717; oil on canvas, 36 x 28 inches; National Portrait Gallery, London)
depicts the successful tradesman-printer in similar dress. That Tonson bears a copy
of Milton’s Paradise Lost serves as a cleverly deceptive double-entendre: the overt
reference to Tonson’s intellectualism obscures the equally-relevant reference to
Tonson’s business and the financial benefits he reaped from the book’s copyright.
But it also masks the political undertones resonant in Milton’s work. As Paulson
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notes, the “antimonarchical and revolutionary (indeed, regicidal) politics” in Milton’s
work were “repoliticize[d]” by Hogarth, who highlighted “the Protestant-Whig

Fig, 7-25

Fig, 7-26

element” of “the ‘great English poem’,” most notably its emphasis on “the liberty of
human choice.”84 Ultimately, Tonson suggests, Copley’s Boylston captures the
merchant’s rights to claim for himself the Englishman’s liberties—in this case, the
autonomous intellect of the landed elite. The same point is made in Richardson’s
own Self-Portrait (Fig. 7-26; 1729; oil on canvas 29 x 24-3/4 inches; National Portrait
Gallery, London), which captures the aspiring intellectual in his own banyan and
robe.

84 Paulson, The Analysis o f Beauty, p. xxvii. Paulson adds: “It was the Miltonic association with
liberty (vs. tyrannous confinement) that Addison invoked in his ‘Pleasures o f the Imagination’....
Toland, a more radical Whig, celebrated Milton the apostle o f liberty.... Toland argued that ‘to
display the different Effects o f Liberty and Tyranny, is the chief design o f his Paradise Lost
See
Paulson, The Analysis o f Beauty, p. xxvii.
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Increasingly, an expressive handling of light and darkness seems to have
supplanted a representational use of costume and accoutrements. Copley’s
illumination of the human head as a metaphorical reference to the human intellect
suggests the growing influence of internalization on eighteenth-century portraiture.
Henry Raeburn presents another case in point. His representational image of the
enlightened farmer-scientist, James Hutton (Fig. 7-27; 1787; oil on canvas, 49-1/4 x
41-1/4 inches; Scottish National Portrait Gallery, Edinburgh), serves as a point-of-

comparison for his later and more expressive works, David Anderson (Fig. 7-28; ca.
1790; oil on canvas, 60 x 46-1/2 inches; National Gallery of Art, Washington) and Sir
John Clerk and Lady Clerk o f Penicuik (Fig. 7-29; 1792; oil on canvas, 57 x 80-1/2
85 For a discussion of this image, see Thomson, Raeburn, pp. 66-69.
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inches; National Gallery of Ireland, Dublin), each of which explores the technical
properties and effects of light as a means of conveying, at least in part, an otherwise
invisible, internal process. 86

n
i ll

Fig. 7-21

Fig. 7-29
86 With reference to Penicuik, Thomson writes: '''Contre-jour portraits [are those in which]... the
principal forms are placed against a strong light source so that they are essentially dark by contrast,
their outlines clearly defined and their inner forms verifiable mainly by the ambient light that travels
back by weakened reflection....” (Thomson, Raeburn, p. 75) See Duncan Thomson, Raeburn, pp. 7476, 116-117.
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As the inward-looking self-examination of the early eighteenth century—
intended, as Shaftesbury explained it, for the advancement of human understanding—
gave way to the impassioned self-discovery of the later eighteenth century—intended,
as Rousseau described it, as a medium of human re-engagement with the meaning of
life—, the affects on portraiture became even more pronounced. Images like
Wright’s Brooke Boothby (Fig. 4-2), of 1781, which located their subject in natural
settings as a means of metaphorically re-uniting them with their natural, moral selves,
became images like Mather Brown’s provocative William Vans Murray (Fig. 7-30;
1787; oil on canvas, 30-1/8 x 25 inches; National Gallery of Art, Washington), a

Fig, 7-30
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transition visually mediated by the likes of Ramsay’s David Hume (Fig. 4-3), in
which a Rembrandtesque use of cast light intensifies the emphasis on internal
character.87
In William Vans Murray, the empirical, enamel-like realism of Samuel Adams
has given way to an intense, imaginative and impassioned brushwork that visually
translates the internal workings of the subject’s mind onto canvas through the
plasticity of pigment and the manipulation of brush.88 In such imagery, the
representative gives way to the expressive—to the act of discovery, the internal
pursuit itself.89 And yet, for all its painterly boldness, for all the resulting appearance
of a classical swag-cum-fiery backdrop, for all the blurred delineations between
figure and background, Murray’s countenance remains paradoxically controlled. It is
as though Brown has provided us with the two halves of the divided self: the
impassioned, natural and internal self and the controlled, civilized and external
persona. A similar intent appears to inform Copley’s John Quincy Adams (Fig. 7-31;
1796; oil on canvas, 30 x 25 inches; Museum of Fine Arts, Boston) and John

87 Smart, Allan Ramsay, pp. 206-208.
88 In art, revelation leads to articulation leads to manifestation; art becomes a medium for expressing
nature and the artist becomes a surrogate creator. As Taylor explains it: “Manifesting reality involves
the creation o f new forms which give articulation to an inchoate vision....” (Taylor, p. 379) Thus “In
the perfect work of [Romantic] art, the ‘matter’—the language... or the material— should be entirely
taken up in the manifestation; and reciprocally, what is manifested ought to be available only in the
symbol, and not merely pointed to as an independent object whose nature could be defined in some
other medium.” (Taylor, p. 379) As Abrams likewise observes, the increasingly “expressive” mode of
Romantic art was manifest in “the internal made external, resulting from a creative process operating
under the impulse o f feeling, and embodying the combined product o f the poet’s perceptions, thoughts,
and feelings.” (Abrams, p. 22) ). Or, in Coleridge’s words, ‘“to make the external internal, the internal
external, to make nature thought, and thought nature,—this is the mystery o f genius in the Fine Arts’.”
(Hazlitt, quoted in Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp, p. 53) By the late eighteenth century, Taylor
adds, verbal and visual languages had “come to be seen not only or mainly as directed to the correct
portrayal o f an independent reality but also as our way o f manifesting through expression what we are,
and our place within things.” (Taylor, p. 198) See Taylor, pp. 198, 379; Abrams, pp. 22, 52-53.
89 Taylor, pp. 376-379.
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Trumbull’s Alexander Hamilton (Fig. 7-32; ca. 1792; oil on canvas, 30-1/4 x 24 1/8
inches; National Gallery, Washington).90

Fig, 7-31

Fig. 7-32

Portraits of women were not exempt from the visual manipulations of the neoCountry narrative resonant in Revolutionary portraits of American men. As the
classical attributes of the landed peer were stretched to fit the propertied man, so the
sister attributes of the leisured lady were stretched to redress the colonial mistress.
Take, for example, Copley’s companion portraits Ezekiel Goldthwait and Mrs.
Ezekiel Goldthwait (Figs. 7-33, 7-34; 1771; oil on canvas, 50 x 40 inches (each);
Museum of Fine Arts, Boston). In the case of Mr. Goldthwait, Copley’s use of a
monochromatic palette with white highlights—a tactic he employed in Samuel Adams
a year earlier—draws the viewer’s attention to Goldthwait’s head and hands: the

90 Here, the significance o f the “lamp” metaphor—the casting o f light—becomes apparent. See
Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp, p. 52.
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instrument and medium of his progress. Similarly, a tassel and swag allude to the
sitter’s public merits. But the same holds true for the portrait of his wife. Indeed,

Fig, 7-33

Fig, 744

differences in the two images turn on the potentiality of their respective genders: if
esteem comes to Ezekiel Goldthwait by virtue of his commercial and political roles, it
arises to Mrs. Goldthwait by virtue of her domestic one—her role as wife and mother;
whereas he bears the conversational accoutrements of quill and correspondence—,
she grasps the domestic emblems of her fertility. Moreover, both engage the viewer’s
gaze.
A similar allusion to the complementary and interdependent nature of public
(male) and private (female) life, public (male) and private (female) attributes, is made
by Copley’s Mr. and Mrs. Thomas Mifflin (Fig. 7-35; 1773; oil on ticking, 60-1/2 x
48 inches; Philadelphia Museum of Art). Once again, Copley highlights the mediums
of human progress—education (signified by the book) and industry (signified by the
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fringe-making).91 At the same time, he clearly indicates that this is Mrs. Mifflin’s
sphere of influence: it is she who occupies the foreground, to her that Mr. Mifflin
defers his gaze, it is she who commands the spectator, and her chair that anchors the
classical pillar.

Fig. 7-35
Precedent for this concession to women in portraits may be found throughout
the oeuvres of major British painters; Reynolds, Gainsborough, Romney, Raeburn
and Hogarth all recorded the female virtues and the public benefits of domestic life.
What stands out, however, are the varying types of attributes British artists chose to

91 Neff, John Singleton Copley in England, p. 108.
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render. On the one hand, the attribute of fertility—as evidenced directly by the
inclusion of children or metaphorically through the use of emblems (such as fruit)—

Fig, 7-36

Fig, 7-38

Fig, 7-37

Fig, 7-39
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dominates female imagery on both sides of the Atlantic, from Mrs. Freake and
Daughter Mary (Fig. 7-36; Unknown artist; ca. 1671-1674; oil on canvas, 42-1/2 x
36-3/4 inches; Worcester Art Museum) to Stephen Slaughter’s A Lady and Child
(Fig. 7-37; 1745; oil on canvas, 51-1/6 x 41 inches; National Gallery of Ireland), from
George Beare’s An Elderly Lady and a Young Girl (Fig. 7-38; 1747; oil on canvas,
49-1/16 x 40-1/4 inches; Yale Center for British Art), to Earl’s Mrs. Elijah Boardman
and Son (Fig. 7-39; ca. 1796, oil on canvas, 85-1/4 x 56-1/4 inches; Huntington
Gallery). The same may be said of references to female youth, modesty, grace, and
beauty, be they emblematic—note the swag of flowers in Benjamin West’s Jane
Galloway (Fig. 7-40; ca. 1757; oil on canvas, 49-3/4 x 39-1/4 inches; Historical

Society of Pennsylvania)—or descriptive—as in Joseph Blackburn’s Mrs. James Pitts
(Fig. 7-41; 1757; oil on canvas, 50 x 40 inches; Detroit Institute of Arts) and George
Romneys’s Mrs. Thomas Scott Jackson (Fig. 7-42; ca. 1770/1773; oil on canvas, 94-
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1/8 x 57-7/8 inches; National Gallery of Art, Washington). What varies over time
and place are references to education, industry and even politics, allusions to which

F I |S 7 -4 1

Fig. 7-43

may be found even among the most mechanical images—note the backdrop of books
in Winthrop Chandler’s Mrs. Samuel Chandler (Fig. 7-43; ca. 1780; oil on canvas,
54-3/4 x 47-7/8 inches; National Gallery of Art, Washington). A good example of this
is Sarah Mifflin’s fringe-making.
John Wollaston’s Miss Rebecca Beekman (?) (Fig. 7-44; 1749-1752; oil on
canvas, 52-1/2 x 42-3/8; Art Institute of Chicago) gives evidence of the early use of
gaze and industry in female imagery, with which Reynolds’s portrait, Anne, Countess
o f Albemarle (Fig. 7-45; 1759; oil on canvas, 49-2/3 x 39-3/4 inches; National
Gallery, London) might be readily compared. In all three images—Mifflin, Beekman,
and Albemarle—, a seated female is interrupted in her work—be it frin ge-m ak ing or
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“knotting”—to monitor the trespass of voyeur-spectators, an action which requires
ocular engagement with the (potentially male) viewer. The effect of this engagement
is to place subject and spectator on a visually-equal footing while granting the female
subject the psychological edge. On the one hand, such boldness on the part of a

Fig, 7-44

%m m w '-1*1 —

Fig, 7-4S

female subject contradicts traditional interpretations of female modesty and
acquiescence. On the other hand, it invokes the authority of women in the domestic
sphere.
There is some disagreement about the role and experience of women during
the eighteenth century. The patriarchal premise of Christian hierarchy which
informed settlement patterns in New England endorsed a communal view of society
in which the family served as a micro-unit and the head of household (potentially a
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widow) operated as the lowest rung of the political ladder.92 Familial and political
structures were thus entwined. Different settlement patterns in the Chesapeake South,
where immigrants were commonly unmarried Anglican men driven by economic
motivations—many of whom were indentured servants (unmarried and unlikely to
become so during the term of their indenture)—discouraged any political emphasis on
family.93 There—perhaps even more so than in England—, familial and political
structures were distinct entities, one being a “private” realm of male and female, the
other a “public” realm of men.94
The division between private and public spheres informing Chesapeake
settlement patterns echoed the development of classical republicanism in sixteenthand seventeenth-century England. As Mary Beth Norton and Linda Kerber have each
noted, classicism resolved the private-public tensions of patriarchal order by
separating the spheres of private (family) and public (political) life and subverting the
former to the latter, the private realm becoming a base of support for the public one.95
Eventually, Locke drew on this separation to explain the transition from a natural
(familial) to an artificial (political) society—from a community of families to the

92 As Mary Beth Norton explains, early Puritan settles envisioned a hierarchical sociopolitical order
based on a divinely-imposed inequality o f functions. While all souls were deemed equal, secular
society was thought naturally hierarchical and complementary—interdependent—in which “each
person ‘might have need o f other’ [that]... ‘they might be all knitt more nearly together in the bond o f
brotherly affeccion’,” as John Winthrop wrote in “A Modell of Christian Charity” (1630). Quoted in
Norton, Founding Mothers and Fathers: Gendered Power and the Forming o f American Society (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996), p. 9.
93 Norton, Founding Mothers and Fathers, p. 13.
94 Norton, Founding Mothers and Fathers, pp. 21-22.
95 Norton, Founding Mothers and Fathers, pp. 10-11, and Linda Kerber, Women o f the Republic:
Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary America (Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press,
1980), p. 7. As T. A. Sinclair notes, this money-earning, extralegal class of private men was sizable,
even in Aristotle’s time, yet they were virtually absent from the public sphere; “he has little to say
about them except that they are a possible source o f discontent and a danger to the established order.”
See Sinclair, in Aristotle, The Politics, p. 23.
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community of the State—as one of contract between male heads-of-household.96
However, one consequence of this structural separation was a formal gendering of
politics: whereas the private sphere of the family was of mixed gender, the public
sphere of politics was decidedly male.
In Wollaston’s Beekman, a young lady sits in an imagined, architecturallyframed liminal space, an open view of a wooded landscape, and a portion of a
marble-topped pier table, gracing the space behind her. Costumed in a rich and shiny
satin dress adorned with delicate lace, Rebecca casts the viewer a pleasant smile
before demurely returning to her knotting. Fingers gently curl around a marquis
shaped shuttle and delicately grasp the taut thread. There is no reference to column or
swag.
Ten years later, Reynolds captured the “ancient peeress” and grand-daughter
of Charles II in a more sophisticated version of a similar composition.97 Donning a
blue and white floral damask dress with applique ruching, topped by a black silk
mantle spattered with floral sprigs, Lady Anne Lennox occupies a domestic setting
emblematically augmented by classical drapery. Despite the swag, a modest side
table supports a wicker work-basket and open scissors beside the upholstered and
brass nail-headed chair she occupies. Significantly, Reynolds’s portrait of Lady Anne
preceded his formal commitment to the grand-style portrait and the political
developments of the Revolution. Like Johnson (Fig. 5-6) and Sterne (Fig. 7-21), it
suggests the influence of Ramsay’s conversational manner while simultaneously

96 Norton, Founding Mothers and Fathers, p. 11.
97 Mannings, Reynolds, I, p. 287.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

285

alluding to the Anglo-Protestant virtues of industry and domesticity. And like
Rebecca Beekman, she engages in “knotting.”
According to William Pressley, “knotting was a favored pastime for ladies,
acceptable even at court, as it avoided the appearance of idleness while allowing the
practitioner to display feminine grace and dexterity.”98 As suggested by Beekman
and Albemarle, respectively, he goes on, with “younger sitters it is the coquettish
aspects that are emphasized, while with older women it is industriousness that is
celebrated.”99 In this latter usage, the act of knotting (as opposed to rosary-telling)
bore Protestant (as opposed to Catholic) political connotations. As Pressly explains:
“The second stanza of the poem The Royal Knotter, first published in 1704, makes
this point when praising [the Protestant] Queen Mary [II]:
‘Bless’d we! Who from such Queens are freed,
Who by vain Superstition led,
Are always telling Beads;
But here’s a Queen, no, thanks to God,
Who, when she rides in Coach abroad,
Is always knotting Threads.. .’.”100

In the imag[in]ed identity of Sarah Mifflin, the two functions of feminine
grace and Protestant industry appear to converge. Instead of knotting, however,
which, while emblematic of industry bore no immediate correlation with dutied
imports, Mrs. Mifflin is engaged in fringe-making: the production of household
trimmings which, like more intricate textiles, were generally imported from

98 William L. Pressly, “The Challenge ofN ew Horizons,” in Neff, John Singleton Copley in England,
p. 48.
Pressly, “The Challenge ofN ew Horizons,” in Neff, p. 48.
100 Pressly, “The Challenge ofN ew Horizons,” in N eff fh. 67, pp. 49-50.
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England.101 And this recalls the political purposes that knotting metaphorically
served. While displaying her grace and dexterity to full advantage, Copley uses the
medium of fringe-making not only to assert Sarah’s support for nonimportation, but
to make the proper correlation between nonimportation and the virtues of industry
in form in g

the Anglo-Protestant narrative.

Fig, 7-46
Once again, precedent for more politicized female imagery can be found in
the work of Hogarth. Indeed, Miss Mary Edwards (Fig. 7-46; 1742; oil on canvas,
49-3/4 x 39-7/8 inches; Frick Collection, New York) stands as a female counterpart to
the freeholder image of John Beale Bordley. Like Bordley, she draws on the
materials of English history—materials affiliated with the causes of English

101 Staiti, in Rebora and Staiti, John Singleton Copley in America, pp. 318-321.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

287

patriotism and liberty—to address contemporary political and ideological questions.
For example, bearing a copy of an address delivered by Elizabeth I to her troops, she
urges:
Remember Englishmen the Laws the Rights The generous plan of power
deliver’d down from age to age by your renown’d Forefathers[,] So dearly
bought [at] the price of so much contest[.] Transmit it carefully to Posterity[;]
Do though great Liberty inspire their Souls And make their lives in they
possession happy or die glorious in thy Just defence.

In this image, surrounded by a blending of classical accoutrements and
domestic furnishings, Mary Edwards receives and returns the male gaze. On the one
Iwiff in casting Miss Edwards’s domestic influence as a classical attribute—note the
column and swag—, Hogarth conveys her public significance as a guardian of the
private sphere. That she can engage the male gaze without loss of decorum only
reaffirms her proper authority. But he also alludes to her political significance as a
defender of English virtue. Through emblematic references to Elizabeth I and Alfred
the Great, Hogarth aligned Mary Edwards with the native virtues and fortitude of
England’s “Virgin” Queen and “Patriot” King.103 Decades before the Revolution,
then, there is visual precedent for the allegiance of female colonists with the “ancient
rights and liberties” of English Protestantism.

102 Bindman, Hogarth and his Times, p. 47.
1<b Bindman adds: “Such neo-Elizabeth ideals are unmistakably present in Hogarth's grand portrait of
Miss Mary Edwards of 1742 (fig. 11). She is depicted with the busts of Queen Elizabeth and King
Alfred in the background, reading from Elizabeth's defiant address to the English troops as they went
out to fight the Spaniards at Tilbury....” (Bindman, p. 47) He continues: “Though the paintings
iconography probably owed more the patron's desires than to the painter, it confirms Hogarth's
familiarity with Patriot ideology....” (Bindman, p. 47) Indeed, Hogarth’s Election series would seem
to confirm his Opposition bias, as “expressed in Bolingbroke’s Letters on the Spirit o f Patriotism,
published in 1749 but written some years before,... [in which he] argues for an end to opposing
parties in favour o f a 'Patriot King' to trascend factionalism, as the great British monarchs Alfred and
Elizabeth I had done before him.” (Bindman, p. 50) See Bindman, Hogarth and his Times, pp. 45-50.
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According to Kerber, a peculiar feature of the mid-century rebellion against
British policy was the need to engage women in politics. “Although consumer
boycotts seem to have been devised by men,” she writes, “they were predicated on the
support of women, both as consumers... and as manufacturers.”104 Mifflin’s fringemaking might thus be understood as an individual variation on the communal
“spinning bee,” which, according to Gary Nash, transformed domestic industries
“into a patriotic activity and a symbol of defiance against England.”105 In this guise,
Sarah Mifflin’s image recalls the 1774 agreement signed by fifty-one women in
Edenton, North Carolina, which, according to Norton, “declared their ‘sincere
adherence’ to the resolves of the provincial Congress and proclaimed it their ‘duty’ to
do ‘everything as far as lies in our power’ to support the ‘publick good’.”106
Significantly, the needs of rebellion laid the foundation for post-Revolutionary
social change within the family and between the familial and political spheres. On
the one hand, the private, domestic realm of family life became the recognized sphere
of female authority.107 By the same token, however, the solidification of the female
domestic role inversely affected her political one: for all their influence in the social

104 Kerber, ‘“History Can Do It No Justice’: Women and the Reinterpretation of the American
Revolution,” in Hoffman and Albert, eds., Women in the Age o f Revolution (Charlottesville: University
Press of Virginia, 1989), p. 18.
105 Nash, quoted in Kerber, ‘“History Can Do It No Justice’,” in Hoffman and Albert, eds., Women in
the Age o f Revolution, p. 19. Kerber explains: “The boycotts were an occasion for instruction in
collective political behavior, formalized by the signing o f petitions and manifestos. In 1767, both men
an dwomen signed the Association, promising not to import dutied items.” By these means, Kerber
adds, “men and women devised a political ritual congruent with women’s understanding o f their
domestic roles and readily incorporated into their daily routines.” See Kerber, “‘History Can Do It No
Justice’,” in Hoffman and Albert, eds., Women in the Age o f Revolution, p. 19.
106 Norton, Liberty’s Daughters: The Revolutionary Experience o f American Women, 1750-1800
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press (1980), 1996),p. 160.
107 This is supported by Kerber, who argues that the nature of female authority was expanded and
solidified during the Revolutionary period, although women did not breach the political barrier to
citizenship. See Kerber, “‘History Can Do It No Justice’,” in Hoffman and Albert, eds., Women in the
Age o f Revolution, pp. 31-33, 38-39.
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community, women became more certainly non-public.108 Indeed, Kerber argues, the
standard of female identity came to turn on a model of “Republican Motherhood,”
which united traditional female virtues with the political demands of republican
ideology.109 In this role, as “custodianjs] of civic morality,” one hundred women
from Hartford, Connecticut, joined in 1786 to form a “Patriotic and Economical
Association” encouraging “industry, frugality, and neatness” at home.110 The
influence of this role was likewise felt in contemporary debates over female
education.111
108 According to Susan Juster, republican politics engaged a monastic fraternity that celebrated
manliness against the effeminacy o f a Courtly England. Although women played an active role in the
rebellion, their political use was temporary; after the War, they were consciously marginalized. (Juster,
pp. 135, 138-143) As Linda Kerber likewise notes, “Even the most radical American men had not
intended to make a revolution in the status of their wives and sisters.” (Kerber, Women o f the Republic,
p. 9) See Susan Juster, Disorderly Women: Sexual Politics and Evangelicalism in Revolutionary New
England (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), pp. 135, 138-143; Linda Kerber, Woman o f the
Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary America, pp. 7-9.
109 Republican Mothers “would devote their efforts to... raising sons and disciplining husbands to be
virtuous citizens o f the Republic.” (Kerber, p. 285) Mary Beth Norton has likewise noted the “new
stress on the household as the source o f virtue and stability in government.” (Norton, p. 243) See
Linda Kerber, Women o f the Republic, p. 285; Mary Beth Norton, Liberty’s Daughters, p. 243.
110 Kerber, Women o f the Republic, p. 11; Norton, Liberty’s Daughters, pp. 245-249.
111 Norton, Liberty’s Daughters, p. 255. Judith Sargent Murray described the female ideal in The
Gleaner: “a sensible and informed woman—companionable and serious—possessing also a facility of
temper, and united to a congenial mind—blest with competency—and rearing to maturity a promising
family o f children.” (Murray; quoted in Norton, Liberty’s Daughters, p. 271) As Kerber explains: “A
revolution in women’s education had been underway in England and America when the Revolution
began; in postwar America the ideology o f female education came to be tied to ideas about the sort of
woman who would be o f greatest service to the Republic.... On the one hand, republican political
theory called for a sensibly educated female citizenry to educate future generations o f sensible
republicans; on the other, domestic tradition condemned highly educated women as perverse threats to
family stability.” (Kerber, Women o f the Republic, p. 10)
The notion of female education conflicted with traditional notions o f femininity. Jonathan
Richardson thought his wife better kept “Ignorant o f what is best unknown.” As Gibson-Wood notes,
“Whereas Richardson steadfastly maintained the importance o f thinking through issues like religion for
oneself, he, like many o f his contemporaries, believed that this applied only to men. He clearly
regarded as ideal his wife’s supportive but subordinate role in his life.” (Gibson-Wood, Jonathan
Richardson, pp. 39-40,46, 49, 54) The two positions are taken up in Burney’s Evelina (1778), in
which Villars, on the one hand, encourages Evelina’s development o f “discretion” and “thought”
towards “virtue in action,” “gentleness and modesty” as well as “fortitude and firmness,” whereas Lord
Merton, on the other hand, deems “beauty and good-nature” the only requirements of women, “every
thing else [being]... either impertinent or unnatural.” (Edward A. and Lillian D. Bloom, introduction to
Burney, Evelina, p. xxii, and Burney, Evelina, pp. 217 and 361) By 1796, however, Burney had
written with regard to Miss Maryland: “though a passion for beauty was still as fashionable as it was
natural, the time was past when the altar o f Hymen required no other incense to blaze upon it.”
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The significance of the Mifflin portrait for the interpretation of female identity
is thus fourfold: it links the attributes of women with industry and industry with
Anglo-Protestant virtue; it bridges the gap between private attributes and public good
not only by way of a classicized setting, but by making the domestic sphere and its
female agent the source of public virtue; by extension, it transforms the female
subject into a political agent; and, in the process, places her on an equal footing with
the male spectator. 112

Pig. 7-47

Fig. 7-48

In Copley’s British work, Mrs. Seymour Fort (?) (Fig. 7-47; ca. 1776-1780;
oil on canvas, 49-1/2 x 39-5/8 inches; Wadsworth Atheneum, Hartford), a domestic
interior augmented by a classical swag frames a seated subject engaged in “knotting.”
(Burney, Camilla, p. 747) See Norton, Liberty’s Daughters, pp. 255,263-294; Kerber, Women o f the
Republic, pp. 10-11; Gibson-Wood, Jonathan Richardson, pp. 39-40,46,49, 54; Edward A. and
Lillian D. Bloom, introduction to Burney, Evelina, p. xxii; Burney, Evelina, pp. 217, 361; Richardson,
Camilla, p. 747.
112 In the end, Kerber writes, “virtue would become for women what honor was for men: a private
psychological stance laden with political overtones.” Kerber, “‘History Can Do It No Justice’,” in
Hoffman and Albert, eds., Women in the Age o f Revolution, p. 39.
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A decade and a half later, Gilbert Stuart’s Mrs. Richard Yates (Fig. 7-48; 1793/4; oil
on canvas, 30-1/4 x 25 inches; National Gallery of Art, Washington) dispensed with
the classical swag while retaining the image of the industrious subject. Both portraits
present the sitters as arbiters of the (male) gaze. Against such images of female
industry and authority, grand-manner portraits asserted a more traditional model.
Reynolds’s Duchess o f Devonshire (Fig. 6-8), of 1775-1776, and The Ladies
Waldegrave (Fig. 7-49; 1780; oil on canvas, 56-1/2 x 66 inches; National Gallery,

Scotland), suggest neither the industry nor the authority of his Albemarle portrait.
Indeed, both highlight the passive role of women as private objects of display and
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acquisition. Whereas Duchess o f Devonshire celebrates the grace and beauty of an
aristocratic wife, for example, The Ladies Waldegrave appears like a P.R. poster for
prospective suitors: health (read fertility), beauty (undoubtedly genetic), modesty,
refinement (literacy, artistry, and domesticity): all this (and more) can be yours; only
the qualified (well-born, well-bred, well-endowed) need apply. Through images such
as these, female figures became passive recipients of a consuming male gaze for
which they tacitly displayed a virtuous package of private benefits.

By the same token, whereas the Mifflin portrait subordinated the male
spectator to the female subject, thereby alluding to female authority in the domestic
sphere, Reynolds’s group portrait of the Temple family, George Grenville, Earl
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Temple, Mary, Countess Temple, and their son Richard (Fig. 7-50; 1780-1782; oil on
canvas, 94-3/4 x 72 inches; National Gallery of Ireland, Dublin), places emphasis on
the male progeny arising from domestic relations. In this pyramid composition,
Mary, Countess Temple, takes a subordinate role to her husband and son, ranking
somewhere between the white male heir and the black male servant—a measure of
her place in the traditional social hierarchy. By the same token, the classical column
arises from the shoulders of the family patriarch, as do the roots of the family tree,
metaphorically suggested by the clever layering of oak tree, classical urn, and male
torso.
In the end, then, the evidence of colonial portraits suggests that American
painters modified—and, in so doing, contradicted—basic tenets of the neo-Country
narrative in the interest of satisfying both the realities of colonial experience and the
principles of its developing narrative. The replacement of universal landscapes and
spaces with simple backdrops and private settings, the subversion of a general style to
material realism, the use of simple costumes without public adornments, the
unconventional—even paradoxical—use and blending of established signifiers, and
the presentation of individuals in their singular potentiality, aligned artists and sitters
with alternative narratives that drew on associations between liberty and identity
imbedded in Reformed, Liberal, Restoration, Opposition, Patriot and republican
ideologies.
As the imag[in]ing of identity necessarily engaged in the narrative contextmaking of artist and sitter, so, too, did it necessarily bear ideological and political
implications for society at large. Indeed, images which endorsed alternative
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narratives posed an ideological challenge to the established political order. In the
case of American Revolutionary portraits, the challenge appears to have turned on the
elevation of industrious commoners to positions of esteem on the evidence of virtues
like intellect and industry—head and hands—, evidence which the portraits sought to
provide.
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CHAPTER Vffl
CONCLUSION: PORTRAITS AND POLITICS, CIRCA 1776

The late-medieval split between the internal and external self, resonant in the
example of the Wicked Queen, was important, first, for its allusion to individual
duality, second, for its distinction between the individual and secular society, third,
for its consequent separation of eternal and secular spheres and, fourth, for its
contradiction of the classical narrative. The narrative of natural progress considered
the relationship between the natural and social self to be symbiotic and, consequently,
looked upon the self as a unified extension of one’s form and matter. But the image
of the Wicked Queen suggested a contrary narrative and, hence, a different model of
identity, based on a distinction between the natural, internal self of the eternal world
and the external, social self of the temporal one. The resulting identity, informed by
the selective manipulation of Haywoodian ‘lightnings’—those attributes deemed
momentarily useful'as a public signifier for the self—functioned less to express one’s
natural self than to manipulate the ‘others’ at whose expense one claimed social
privileges.
The possibilities which attended the “divided” self, and their implications for
the construction of identity, inform the principle of imag[in]ing used throughout this
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paper.1 But their accompanying difficulties have set philosophers at odds. For
example, Hume’s rejection of a unified self came at the expense of a ‘true’ identity; as
he described it, “the identity, which we ascribe to the mind of man is only a fictitious
one.”3 This sat uneasily with his contemporaries. In an effort to reconcile Hume’s
claims with persistent demands for a credible identity, Immanuel Kant distinguished
between the nonmenal, ‘perceiving’ or subjective (internal) self, and the phenomenal,
‘perceived’ or objective (external) self—an effect of the collision between internal
self and external world. Because this “phenomenal” self could be “known” through
its affect upon observable experience—and, hence, objectified—, Kant was able to
restore some matter to identity.4
The eighteenth-century explications of Hume and Kant suggest that the
inconsistencies arising from the convergence of Mediaeval and Renaissance,
Christian and neoclassical, thinking, continued to plague the narratives of the
Revolutionary period: was society a natural or an artificial construct, bom of divine
plan or human interest; was man innately motivated towards improvement and,

1 Ultimately, as Baumeister concludes, an “adequate view o f identity” must analyze “both... the inner
self and the outer context.” He explains: “Each approach, by itself... neglects some identity issues. If
identity exists mainly within the individual mind, why are identities so dependent on society? And if
identity is mainly a set o f social roles, what is identity crisis apart from role conflict?” See Baumeister,
p. 247.
2 As Richard White observes: “self as a concept cannot stand alone. In terms o f our current academic
categories, it is connected with the categories of individual and person. These three terms are distinct
but linked; they resemble a holy trinity o f subjectivity. There is a move in anthropology to be more
rigorous in drawing distinctions between human beings as biological entities (bodies, individuals), as
self-conscious subjects (selves), and as socially constructed identities (persons, subject positions).” See
‘“Although I am Dead, I am not Entirely Dead. I have Left a Second of M yself: Constructing Self and
Persons on the Middle Ground o f Early America,” in Through a Glass Darkly: Reflections on Personal
Identity in Early America, Ronald Hoffman, Mechal Sobel, and Fredrika J. Teute, eds. (Chapel Hill,
NC: University o f North Carolina Press for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and
Culture, 1997), pp. 409-410.
J Baumeister, pp. 12-14 261-262,265; Canfield, pp. 1-10, 32.
4 Baumeister, pp. 12-14.
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indeed, was there anything like an ideal potentiality; if so, was society a natural venue
in its achievement or was potential confined to the sphere of revelation; moreover,
could men be said to be naturally equal and what bearing had inequality on claims to
identity and political authority; finally, to what degree was identity—the appellation
of the self—and social rank—its perceived social value—self-determined and, so,
fluid, or prescribed and, so, fixed? At the same time, the variety of ideas effected by
this divergent thinking provided colonists with a pool of intellectual resources for
rationalizing their dissent when the dominant narrative failed to serve them.
While subject to this confusion of influences, portraits simultaneously gave
evidence of their conflicting consequences. For example, in yet another image of a
Queen before her looking-glass, Johann Zoffany employed a mirror to shape, frame
and process identity on the one hand, while underscoring its problematic complexity
on the other. Indeed, Queen Charlotte and her two eldest Sons (Fig. 8-1; 1764; oil on
canvas, 44-1/4 x 50-7/8 inches; Royal Collection) suggests the challenges which
attended the depiction of identity. On the one hand, incorporating a “mirrored” public
image within a “painted” domestic narrative, Zoffany captured Charlotte’s public
“character” as “queen”—conveyed by the regal, “coin-like” profile publicized in the
dressing mirror.5 On the other hand, he underscored its limitations as an index of her
identity, for the public “character” that Zoffany “mirrors” does not square with his
behind-the-scenes glimpse of Charlotte’s “person.” Yet, we cannot escape the fact
5 Marcia Pointon, Hanging the Head: Portraiture and Social Formation in Eighteenth-Century
England (London: Yale University Press, 1993), p. 166. This, too, was prescribed by Richardson:
“Painters should take a Face, and make an Antique Medal, or Bas-Relief o f it, by divesting it of its
Modem Disguises, raising the Air, and the Features, and giving it the Dress of those Times, and
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that the painted image, too, is a dramatic construction, a point driven home by the
children’s theatrical dress and the allusion to the domestic “training” of Frederick’s
“public” self.6 In the end, Zoffany’s image conveys the mutable and relative nature of
identity, recalling Hobbes’s human ‘Mask’ and Plato’s “impersonation” of
“character.”7

Fig. 8-1

suitable to the Character intended.” See Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting, pp. 12, 198212 .
5 Telemachus was described by Plato as a man o f the first or Guardian-Ruler class, one whose “path, so
to speak, has been marked out for him and he must go on his way confident that the poet’s words are
true: “‘Some this, Telemachus, your native wit will tell you, And Heaven will prompt the rest. The
very gods, I’m sure, Have smiled upon your birth and helped to bring you up’.” (Homer, The Odyssey,
HI; quoted in Plato, Laws, p. 292) In encouraging her son to play Telemachus, Queen Charlotte helps
prepare him for the responsibilities of monarchy. See Marcia Pointon’s compelling deconstruction of
this image in Hanging the Head, pp. 162-168; Plato, Laws, p. 292.
7 Kraut, Plato, p. 310.
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Zoffany’s image points to the confusion that dogged the evaluation of modem
identity. In the absence of a digestible alternative, the classical presumption about
necessary unity between an internal-psychological self and its external-sociological
persona, continued to dominate the interpretation of identity for most of the
eighteenth century. This is suggested by Samuel Johnson, whose definition of
identity invoked a complementary relationship between the internal and external self:
“A representation of any man as to his personal qualities;” “Personal qualities;
particular constitution of the mind;” “Adventitious qualities impressed by a post or
office.”8 At the same time, frequent reference to “character” in eighteenth-century
novels, as an evaluative reference for the tangible self (particularly popular for
domestic servants), suggests its continued conflation with perceptions of social
value.9 In other words, a complementary relationship between internal qualities,
external persona and perceived social value, the whole constituting a public signifier
of a singular, unified self, continued to hold sway even after the principles of
individual autonomy and self-determination—implied by Christian dogma—were
articulated (notably by Locke) and acknowledged (even by Shaftesbury) among the
wider public.10 The resulting dynamic between inherited narratives and modem

8 Johnson, Dictionary, definitions four, seven and eight.
9 Samuel Richardson’s Pamela wrote to her mother “that every body gave me a very good character....”
(Richardson, p. 47) She likewise referred to “the characters and persons o f ... four ladies,” describing
their physical features, “airs,” mind, and family connections. (Richardson, p. 83) See Richardson,
Pamela, pp. 47, 83.
10 Though Pocock warns: “The conventional wisdom among scholars who have studied [the] growth [of
myths] has been that the Puritan covenant was reborn in the Lockean contract, so that Locke himself
has been elevated to the status o f a patron saint o f American values and the quarrel with history has
been seen in terms o f a constant attempt to escape into the wilderness and repeat a Lockean experiment
in the foundation o f a natural society. The interpretation put forward here stresses Machiavelli at the
expense o f Locke....” See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 545. It appears to have been Locke
who highlighted the disengagement arising therefrom.
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identities paralleled an emerging emphasis on negotiation: on the one hand, the
principle of autonomous self-determination permitted individual assertions of
imag[in]ed identities; on the other hand, the necessary concession to social judgment
meant acquiescence to a dominant narrative.11
In effect, the continued demand for a credible identity—one based on
legitimate, reciprocal standards—, and the resulting concession to traditional models
of identity, compromised the influence of empirical and Reformed ideas on eighteenth
-century narratives, despite the experience of social change arising from economic
developments.12 Ultimately, the consequent gap between ideology and experience,
reflecting an inconsistent progress from a “stage three” (landed) to a “stage four”
(commercial) society, nurtured the coexistence of overlapping ideologies. On the one
hand, for example, an inherited model of independence might premise identity and
social rank on the natural capacity for disinterested wisdom affiliated with the leisure
afforded a landed elite. On the other hand, a model of independence based on the

11 As Hobbes explained: “men measure, not onely other men, but all other things, by themselves.” He
goes on: “let a man (as most men do,) rate themselves as the highest Value they can; yet their true
Value is no more than it is esteemed by others.” (Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 87, 151-152) Thus, as
Charles Taylor has likewise argued, “One is a self only among other selves... [;] A self can never be
described without reference to those who surround it....” (Taylor, p. 35) This socially-relative, ‘other’oriented identity represents what some modem philosophers call “identity-thinking ” a ‘negative’
relativism premised on “Other-ness” versus “Same-ness.” See, for example, Juliet Steyn, ed., Other
than identity: the subject, politics and art (New York: Manchester University Press, 1997),
particularly: Andrew Benjamin, “Figuring self-identity: Blanchot’s Bataille,” pp. 9-31; Claire
Pajaczkowska, “The ecstatic solace o f culture: self, not-self and other; a psychoanalytic view,” pp. 101112; John Gange, “Beyond identity? The beyond in Beyond Japan,” pp. 198-210; and Juliet Steyn,
“Painting another; other-than-painting,” pp. 211-220. See Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 87, 151-152; Taylor,
pp. 15, 27, 35.
12 The persistence o f civic humanism is evident in the “modem tension between individual selfawareness on the one hand and consciousness o f society, property, and history on the other.” See
Pocock The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 462-463, quoted from p. 462.
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evidence of real experience might premise identity and social rank on a selfdetermined capacity for autonomous reasoning and a potentially nurtured virtue.
In part, the persistent influence of traditional standards of identity was enabled
by the strategic concessions of neo-Country conservatives. For example, in response
to the implications of individualism and Newtonian empiricism, and seeking to
resolve the inherent tension between the unified and progressing self of classicism
and the divided self of Liberalism and Reformed Christianity, Shaftesbury contained
the implications of the divided self—the coexistence of natural and self-determined
selves—by subverting them to an Aristotelian progressive self— form and matter
developing from actuality to potentiality. On this foundation, he prescribed a fixed
model of social order, one which conformed to the classical doctrine of human
intellectual and social progress, in which the social ranks of autonomous, reasoning
subjects was premised on a comparative analysis of individual progresses. This
model came to inform a neo-Aristotelian bias in the neo-Country narrative: as
Aristotelian progress suggested individual advancement from a lower to a higher
state, from a state of passion to a state of reason, as all individuals were held subject
to the same standards of improvement, so a cumulative summary of all progressing
subjects would effect a naturally hierarchical social order.
In this narrative, the “mirror” became a convenient metaphor for the process
of self-reflection requisite to an “improved” identity.13 On the one hand, it conceded

13 What Canfield has aptly described as the “duality o f self as object to itself.” See Canfield, pp. 173,
205.
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the intellectual separation between an internal and external self and the necessity of
their being made “known.” On the other hand, it subverted the practice of the
“Pocket-Mirrour”—the process of engaging with the internal self in the advancement
of “potentiality”—to an overriding natural order. Such is suggested by Clarissa
Harlowe’s lamentations to her friend, Anna Howe: “I would so conduct myself as not
to give reason even for an adversary to censure me; and how shall so weak and so
young a creature avoid the censure of such, if my friend will not hold a looking-glass
before me to let me see my imperfections?”14 This provided a convenient context for
the elevation of portraiture; at least for Jonathan Richardson, portrait-painting became
a visual counterpart to “Mirrour-Writing”: the metaphorical means by which one’s
mental reflection was transcribed and improved through visual imagery.15

II. The American Revolutionary Portrait
A visitor to the National Gallery of Art in the spring of 2002 might have been
drawn by the proximity of two portraits gracing adjacent rooms in the American and
British galleries. The similarities between Reynolds’s portrait, Squire Musters (Fig.
8-2; 1777/80; oil on canvas, 93-7/8 x 58 inches; National Gallery of Art,
Washington), and Earl’s portrait, Daniel Boardman (Fig. 8-3; 1789; oil on canvas, 815/8 x 55-1/4 inches; National Gallery of Art, Washington) seemed to compel the
visitor into their visual comparison. For the hearty looker, the reward was a telling

14 Richardson, Clarissa, p. 73.
Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, vol. 1, pp. 196,204-205. As Jonathan Richardson noted, “Painting
gives us not only the Persons, but the Characters of Great Men. The Air o f the Head, and the Mien in
general, gives strong Indications o f the Mind, and illustrates what the Historian says more expressly
and particularly.” See Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting, p. 12.
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insight into the narrative differences informing British and American identities of the
Revolutionary era.

Fig. 8-2

Fig, 8-3

Standing full-length in their respective British and American landscapes,
Squire Musters and Daniel Boardman serve as striking examplars of their time and
place. On the one hand, the two figures clearly subscribed to similar notions of
decorum: as Squire Musters stands supported by his left leg, an angled walking stick
artfully grasped in his right hand, so Boardman stands supported by his left leg, an
angled walking stick artfully grasped in his right hand; as the bend of Musters’s right
elbow, and the triangular effect of his right hand-on-hip, is echoed in the bend of his
right leg and the triangular effect of his crossed foot (right-over-left), so the same is
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effected by Boardman; as Musters’s left arm rests aside the torso in parallel with his
left leg, so a like complement of lines informs the posture of Boardman; moreover,
both men don comparably fashionable attire. In sum, Daniel Boardman shares with
Squire Musters a comparable politeness and, so, a comparable level of virtue.
But equally telling are the visual differences between the images. First and
foremost, Musters’s figure takes pride-of-place in the center of the canvas, a
sophisticated use of convex illusionism functioning to elevate him vis-a-vis the
spectator. The resulting subordination of spectator to subject is reaffirmed by the
sitter’s averted gaze, which forces the viewer into a passive position. By contrast,
Boardman is placed to the side of the canvas, suggesting a more egalitarian
distribution between subject and setting. This suggestion of interdependence extends
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beyond the picture plane, where a compositionally-level, extraspatial audience is met
by Boardman’s gaze. The effect is more “conversational” and less “grand.”
Differences in the two landscapes are also revealing. On the one hand,
Musters locates the subject in a general, natural setting in a manner akin to
Gainsborough’s Dr. Ralph Schomberg (Fig. 8-4; ca. 1770; oil on canvas, 91-3/4 x 601/2 inches; National Gallery, London) and Sir Benjamin Truman (Fig. 8-5; ca. 17731774; oil on canvas, 93-3/4 x 59-9/16 inches; Tate Britain). In all three images,
country subjects enjoy the leisurely privileges of gentry life. Indeed, only in Truman
is reference made to labor, and this of a theoretical kind: allusion to the pastoral
ideal—note the shepherd tending his flock—invokes the natural and complementary
relationship between Country life and Virgilian virtues, the combination of which
supports—visually and metaphorically—the distant country estate nestled in the copse
of trees.
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By contrast, Boardman suggests a rather different narrative. Recalling
Gainsborough’s early portrait, Mr. and Mrs. Robert Andrews (Fig. 8-6; ca. 17481749; oil on canvas, 27-1/2 x 47 inches; National Gallery, London), Boardman steps
aside in deference to his property and community. As in Andrews—in which the
identity of the newlyweds is literally and metaphorically embedded in the economic
and social attributes of the farm (fertility being signified by the sheaves of com, for
example, politeness with the ownership of land)16—, Boardman’s economic and
social successes are specifically located in New Milford, Connecticut. Against the
Musters, Schomberg, and Truman images, which allude to general attributes (land and
leisure) and a theoretical context (the discourse of civic humanism), Boardman and
Andrews appear more “agricultural” than “landed,” more “industrious” than
“leisured,” more “particular” than “general.” Moreover, as each records a subject
recently “landed,” so each conflates his social virtues with the function of land as an
economic resource.17 As Rosenthal puts it with regard to Andrews, it “attempts to
demonstrate that one can farm and still be polite.”18 In this way, images like
Boardman highlighted the gap between the neo-Country ideals of civic humanism and
its more empirical and Reformed variation.
This emphasis on industry and engagement as the basis of identity, progress,
and good appears to inform American portraiture until at least the Federal period,

16 John Hayes, Gainsborough, p. 76; Rosenthal, The Art o f Thomas Gainsborough, p. 18.
17 Andrews, like Boardman, “was new to the land, for he ‘actually succeeded to the ... estate in 1750’.”
(Rosenthal, p. 18) Hence, the imag[in]ing o f identity: “Gainsborough assists in creating a fiction that
his sitter is long established in living the moral country life.” (Rosenthal, p. 17) See Rosenthal, The Art
o f Thomas Gainsborough, pp. 17-19.
18 Rosenthal, The Art o f Thomas Gainsborough, p. 17.
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when portraits by Stuart suggest a heightened emphasis on internal attributes. From
the 1760s to the 1790s, American portraits appear to assert the complementary
relationship between head and hands—intellect and industry—, together with the
virtues of interdependent social relations, as mutually conducing to the public good.
One is reminded of Hume’s observation: “Thus industry, knowledge, and humanity,
are linked together by an indissoluble chain, and are found, from experience as well as
reason, to be peculiar to the more polished, and, what are commonly denominated, the
more luxurious ages.”19 Supporting this narrative was a specific body of personal
attributes—education and industry based on honesty, frugality, politeness, social
engagement and civic commitment—celebrated in portraiture.

m. A Question o f Liberty
Ultimately, the evidence of Revolutionary portraits suggests that Britain’s
territorial and economic expansion was experienced differently in the American
colonies than in England.20 This different experience effected a comparable gap in
their perceived reality and a like pressure towards narrative reform. Most pointedly,
they suggest a pressure to revise the necessary correlation between landed birth and
civic virtue, a pressure which ultimately turned on the more inclusive and expansive
Public. They also suggest a desire to reaffirm the principle of self-determination and
its supporting virtues of intellect (education) and industry (labor)—the premise of
Belfield’s “Labour with Independence.”

19 Hume, “On Luxury” (1752), quoted in Solkin, Painting for Money, p. 157.
20 Baumeister, p. 54.
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Justification for such revisions borrowed on a combination of ideologies: the
Harrington/Country notion of virtuous self-sufficiency ascribed to the industrious
freeholder; the Protestant promise of autonomous self-determination; the Liberal
rhetoric of social contract; the Whig guarantee of certain “rights and liberties.” All of
these complemented the classical emphasis on progress and good, as long as the
individual was the recognized medium o f potentiality and liberty was recognized as
the natural right o f the individual?1 In other words, on the one hand, the narrative of
American identity turned on a belief in natural liberty and the consequent
independence afforded individual will (as opposed to birth). On the other hand, it
also recognized the implications of a market-born self—a dependence on contract, a
vulnerability to social fluidity, and the challenge of inter-individual competition and
the necessity of containing the inclinations towards vice.22 As Hume aptly observed,
*

•

the modem Public man derived his greatness from two sets of qualities, the public
qualities of his “good and benevolent character”—i.e. “generosity, humanity,
compassion, gratitude, friendship, fidelity, zeal, disinterestedness, liberality”—and the
21 In fact, Locke’s support for a “free, disengaged subject” and a “society ... made up o f and by the
consent o f free individuals and, corollary to this, ... bearers o f individual rights” marked the shift from
a traditional classical and early Christian narrative, which encouraged “Rightful submission” to a
‘natural’ social and political order, to a modem narrative encouraging autonomous self-determination.
As Taylor explains: “As against earlier contract theories, the one we find with Grotius and Locke starts
from the individual.” (Taylor, p. 82) This shift, Taylor argues, informed a key rift between traditional
civic humanism and its more individualist variations. It also affected the definition o f liberty. In an
aristocratic sense, the liberty o f ‘ruling and being ruled’ turned on a principle o f equality in which only
those o f equal virtue participated. In a democratic sense, by contrast, the liberty o f “ruling and being
ruled” turned on a principle of equality in which those equal in freedom might rale and be ruled in turn.
This democratic interpretation lent credence to a second definition o f liberty, ‘to live as you like’— i.e.
to be ruled not at all. See Taylor, pp. 82, 106; Aristotle, Politics, pp. 362-363.
22 As Pocock notes, “his only means o f self-discovery lay in conforming to everybody else’s notions of
what he ought to be and was....” Tocqueville’s “critique of egalite des conditions,” he goes on, “is
basically Aristotelian: it is pointed out in the Politics that when men are treated as all alike, we fail to
take account of them in those respects in which they are not alike;... a society in which every man is
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private qualities of his interested person—“prudence, temperance, frugality, industry,
9*23

assiduity, enterprise, dexterity.”

Hence liberty and independence became conflated.24 As the claim to
independence implied a claim to liberty, so (and this was the tricky part) the claim to
liberty implied a like claim to independence.25 Moreover, once the perception of
independence was altered, the entire narrative was pressured to reform—as Aristotle
observed: when ideological standards changed, “not only the quality of the democracy
altered..., but also its identity.”2* That conditions were ripe for reform is suggested
by Burney:
‘And what is this independence,’ cried Mr. Monckton, ‘which has thus
bewitched your imagination? A mere idle dream ...; one part of a community
must inevitably hang upon another, and ‘tis a farce to call either
independent....’
‘M a n . a n s w e r e d Belfield,... ‘considered merely with respect to his
bodily functions, may indeed be called dependent, since the food by which he
lives... cannot wholly be cultivated and prepared by his own hands: but
considered in a nobler sense... as a being of feeling and understanding..., may
he not claim the freedom of his own thoughts?
‘But who is there in the whole world,’ said Mr. Monckton, ‘.. .that can
pretend to assert, his thoughts, words, and actions, are exempt from controul?
subservient to every other man, because dependent on him for any means o f judging his own existence,
is corrupt within....” See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 537-544, quoted from pp. 537-538.
23 Hume, Treatise o f Human Nature, p. 587. Hence, “we may observe, that whatever we call heroic
virtue, and admire under the character of greatness and elevation o f mind, is either nothing but a steady
and well-establish’d pride and self-esteem, or partakes largely o f that passion.” (Hume, Treatise o f
Human Nature, pp. 599-600) See Hume, Treatise o f Human Nature, pp. 323,257, 365,407-409, 456475, 574-578, 584, 587, 596-610, 616-619; Hume, An Enquiry concerning the Principles o f Morals,
quoted in Broadie, p. 151.
24 According to Harrington, “where a people can live upon their own”—a nation o f independent
“citizens”— “the government may be democracy;” by contrast, “Where a people cannot live upon their
own”—where they are dependent subjects/ servants—“the government is either monarchy or
aristocracy.” See Harrington, A System o f Politics, p. 270.
25 As Taylor describes it, liberty had, by the seventeenth century, assumed a “modem notion o f
freedom... portrayfed]... as the independence o f the subject, his determining his own purposes without
interference from external authority.” See Taylor, Sources o f the Self, pp. 82, 86. For a discussion of
the relevance o f ‘independence’ as a political principle, see Jack P. Greene, “Empire and Identity from
the Glorious Revolution to the American Revolution,” in The Oxford History o f British Empire, vol. II,
The Eighteenth Century, ed. P.J. Marshall, pp. 208-230, particularly 208-210.
26 Aristotle, The Politics, p. 360.
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even where interest... interferes not,—though where that is I confess I cannot
tell—are we not kept silent... by the fear of offending? and made speak .. .by
the desire of obliging...?’
'All these,’ answered Belfield, ‘are so merely matters of ceremony....
The bow is to the coat, the attention to the rank....’
‘Where, then, do you draw the line...?
‘I hold that man,’ cried he, with energy, ‘to be independent, who treats
the Great as Little, and the Little as Great, who neither exults in riches nor
blushes in poverty, who owes no man a groat, and who spends not a shilling
he has not earned’.”27

Somewhere in this exchange lives the Court-Country balance between
interdependence—social engagement—and independence—individual liberty—
reflected in Revolutionary portraits.
In part, the American Revolution stands as evidence of the ideological
difficulties which attended the assimilation of the autonomous individual into the
paradigm of the natural State.28 On the one hand, the persistent insistence on the
necessity of virtue as a corrective to interested vice suggests the continued influence
of civic humanism.29 Indeed, considering the formative influence of commerce on the
colonies, the “Mandevillian” identity is surprisingly absent, suggesting that the
legitimacy of the Revolutionary narrative depended on the credible assimilation of
commerce and interest into a classical narrative of progress and virtue.30 By the same

27 Frances Burney, Cecilia, pp. 733-736. It is interesting to note that Burney conducts this analysis in
the conversational mode that characterized the writing o f Addison and Mandeville.
28 As Pocock notes, the “Court ideology... was based not on a simple antithesis between virtue and
commerce, but on an awareness that the two interpenetrated one another as did land and currency,
authority and liberty;... as far back as 1698, the founders of ‘Country’ ideology admitted this truth,
while drawing different conclusions from it [—] the country gentlemen never [being] as radically
independent as they liked to pretend....” See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 486, 506, 508509, 548-552; quoted from pp. 508-509.
29 Ultimately, Pocock writes, “eighteenth-century attempts to construct a bourgeois ideology contended
none too successfully with the primacy already enjoyed by a civic ideology....” See Pocock, The
Machiavellian Moment, p. 550.
30 See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 507-508. Against the Federalist (Court) vision o f the
influence o f commerce and, hence, culture, for example, Jefferson posed an agrarian ideal; yet even he
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token, the accompanying emphasis on individual autonomy and self-determination
suggests an associated pressure to revise the definition and accessibility of virtue.

31

Difficulties thus turned on the construction of a credible structure for accommodating
these divergent ideals. 32
Bernard Bailyn, Gordon Wood and others thus seem right to suggest the
potency of the Country/ Opposition ideology for rebel Americans. But they are also
right in suggesting that a great deal of revision was required in order to render it
compatible with the American experience.33 Significantly, for example, as the
American version of the republican paradigm never quite condemned a ‘monied
interest’ as the source of modem corruption—the distinction between a ‘monied
acknowledged its limitations— land and, hence, virtue were finite. Banking on the American
opportunity for westward expansion that culminated in the Louisiana Purchase. See Pocock, The
Machiavellian Moment, p. 533.
31 Thomas Paine, Common Sense, in Common Sense, The Rights o f Man, and Other Essential Writings
o f Thomas Paine, intro. Sidney Hook (New York: Penguin Books, 1969), p. 55. See also Pocock, The
Machiavellian Moment, p. 467, 525.
32 Without an established ‘natural elite’, for example, the legitimacy o f colonial virtue— and hence its
claim to independence— appeared more fragile. In compensation, a cadre o f propertied men—the
Sparhawks, Lees, Bordleys and Boardmans o f American society—were elevated to positions of
political prominence. For a discussion o f this development, see Rousseau, O f the Social Compact,
Discourse on Political Economy, and Considerations on the Government o f Poland, in The Social
Contract and other later political writings, pp. 16, 70, 82, 94, 188; Pocock, The Machiavellian
Moment, pp. 514-523; Richard Beeman, “Deference, Republicanism, and the Emergence o f Popular
Politics in Eighteenth-Century America,” The William and Mary Quarterly (July 1992), 401-430;
Robert Gross, The Minutemen and their World, pp. 65-66, 133, 153-155,169.
3j On the one hand, there remained an uneasy tension between America’s origins in modem
imperialism and the republican ideology it assumed; “were not Americans,” Pocock writes, “even in
their own eyes, a system o f colonies extending an empire, and not a republic at all?” (Pocock, The
Machiavellian Moment, pp. 510-511) To resolve these tensions, Americans crafted an originating
myth—one that borrowed, for example, on the classical and Christian traditions o f translatio imperii
and Elizabethan apocalyptic— that lent them a legitimate and credible narrative. (See Pocock, The
Machiavellian Moment, pp. 511-513, 523-533) For a discussion o f these issues, see Bailyn,
Ideological Origins o f the American Revolution, pp. v-vi, 19, 21, 35, 55, 77, 79, 86, 94, 124, 161, 230,
376; Wood, The Creation o f the American Republic, 1776-1787, pp. 15-17,45, 50, 53, 65, 70-71, 75,
81-83, 91, 108, 114, 117, 123-124; Joyce Appleby, “The Social Origins of the American Revolutionary
Ideology,” The Journal o f American History, LXTV (March 1978): 935-958; Richard Beeman,
“Deference, Republicanism, and the Emergence o f Popular Politics in Eighteenth-Century America,”
The William and Mary Quarterly (July 1992): 401-430. Appleby and Beeman suggest that Americans
were moving towards a more liberal narrative even before the Revolution. See also Pocock, The
Machiavellian Moment, pp. 510-513, 523-533; Saunders, in Aristotle, The Politics, p. 151, fit. 2.
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interest’ and a commercial people being likely too narrow to admit

, so portraits de

emphasized the distinction between real and mobile property, each serving as a
potential medium of independence, progress and good. They were afforded this
contradiction through the subtle recasting of ‘landed’ into ‘agrarian’—the former
being affiliated with a well-born leisure, the latter with the industrious freeholder—
and

A m erica’s

unique potential for westward expansion.

34

It thus seems that the primary goal of rebelling colonists was to promote the
• •

promise of English liberty while ameliorating the negative effects arising therefrom.

35

In this sense, the American Revolution may be viewed as a continuation of the
struggle to assimilate the demands of “happiness” into a discourse of “good.”

But it

34 As Pocock explains, Jefferson, in 1785, was “as committed as any classical republican to the ideal of
virtue, but saw the preconditions o f virtue as agrarian rather than natural; he was not a Cato, seeing the
relation o f natural aristocracy to the natural democracy as the thing essential... so much as ... seeing
the preservation o f a yeoman commonwealth as the secret o f virtue’s maintenance. At the same time,
we see, he doubted whether agrarian virtue could be preserved forever; but neither his faith nor his
doubts separate him from the tradition o f classical politics, or from the new liberalism o f Madisonian
Federalism.” (Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 533). As Pocock observes, “So long as the
partnership o f expansion lasts, the plunge into nature can be described simultaneously in pastoral and
industrial terms.. . (Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 539) According to Pocock, the concession
is present in the writings o f Noah Webster, who argued “that freehold land was a more stable
foundation than commerce, but that a predominantly agrarian society could absorb commerce without
essential loss o f virtue.... We are on the verge o f a theory in which frontier, not constitution, is the
‘soul of the republic’...[;] a purely agrarian republic had to be a commonwealth for expansion.”
(Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 534-537) By contrast, Pocock continues, “Alexander
Hamilton... looked east, not west, saw America as commercial empire rather than agrarian republic,
and proclaimed that corruption was inescapable, that the cycle was closed and the end had come, before
the covenant was fairly sealed or the experience in escaping corruption had begun.” (Pocock, The
Machiavellian Moment, p. 544) See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 533-544.
j5 What “was involved,” Pocock writes, “was a flight from modernity and a future no less than from
antiquity and a past, from commercial and Whiggish Britain... no less than from feudal and popish
Europe....” See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 546.
36 On these grounds, Pocock has described the American Revolution as “the last act o f the civic
Renaissance.” (Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 462) As he explains it, “The civil war and
revolution which disrupted the English-speaking Atlantic after 1774 can be seen as involving a
continuation, larger and more irreconcilable, o f that Augustan debate which accompanied the Financial
Revolution in England and Scotland after 1688 and issued after 1714 in the parliamentary oligarchy of
Great Britain... .’’(Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 546-547) Conflict ensued because “the
forces o f change and modernity had crossed the Atlantic somewhat in advance o f the governmental
imperative that compelled their recognition....” (Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 467) Hence,
he argues, “the republic— a concept derived from Renaissance humanism—was the true heir o f the
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might also be recognized as an intensely modem moment, for it was a certainty about
their capacity as individuals—and, perhaps as essentially, about the potential risks to
their autonomy— that propelled and united the colonists.37 In this sense, the balanceof-influence between the individual and society would appear to have shifted in favor
of the former, a sign of more liberal tendencies. Thus a new narrative was crafted
from the language of the old—Bailyn’s “transformed as well as transforming
force”38—, borrowing on once-conflicting ideas to arrive at a narrative meaning of
life that simultaneously liberated Americans and assured them of their virtue.39

[Puritan] covenant and the dread of corruption the true heir of the jeremiad... [;] the foundation of
independent America was seen, and stated, as taking place at a Machiavellian—even a Rousseauan—
moment, at which the fragility o f the experiment, and the ambiguity o f the republic’s position in secular
time, was more vividly appreciated than it could have been from a Lockean perspective.” Pocock, The
Machiavellian Moment, pp. 462,467, 506-507, 545-548; quoted from p. 545.
37 “The greater their apparent independence,” Pocock writes, “the greater their sense that their virtue
was their own; but the more active a government in which they did not directly participate, the greater
their sense that their independence and virtue were threatened by a force they could only call
corruption.... As we now see it,” he goes on, “modem and effective government had transplanted to
America the dread o f modernity itself, o f which the threat to virtue by corruption was the contemporary
ideological expression.” (Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 509) Wood adds: “it was the
pervasive fear that they were not predestined to be a virtuous and egalitarian people that in the last
analysis drove them into revolution in 1776. It was this fear... that made them so readily and so
remarkably responsive to Thomas Paine’s warning that the time for independence was at hand and that
delay would be disastrous.” (Wood, Creation o f the American Republic, p. 108) For a brief period,
then, internal colonial conflicts were largely masked by the external conflict with England. (Wood,
Creation o f the American Republic, pp. 81-83) See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 509;
Wood, Creation o f the American Republic, 1776-1787, pp. 81-83, 108.
Bailyn, Ideological Origins o f the American Revolution, p. 161. Indeed, Pocock adds, for all o f
Bolingbroke’s influence, the American Revolution resulted in: “a drastic rearticulation of the language
and outlook o f English opposition thought... [, according to which] the experience o f the War of
Independence and the constitution-making which followed it necessitated a further revision o f the
classical tradition, and in some aspects a departure from it.” See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment,
pp. 486, 506.
39 As Pocock observes, “it was in those vocabularies and within the ambivalences o f those cultures that
American self-consciousness originated and acquired its terminology.” See Pocock, The Machiavellian
Moment, pp. 546-547; quoted from p. 546.
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